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Preface
The twentieth anniversary of the landing of an American on the surface of the Moon
occasioned many bittersweet reflections. Sweet was the celebration of the historic
event itself, and sweet to space enthusiasts was President George Bush's call for a
new era of human space exploration -- back to the Moon and on to Mars. Bitter, for
those same enthusiasts, was the knowledge that during the twenty intervening
years much of the national consensus that launched this country on its first lunar
adventure had evaporated, and foraging for funds to keep going seemed to have
become a major preoccupation of the old guard that had watched over that
adventure.
Less apparent was the fact that the final act in another human drama was taking
place: a generation of men and women who had defined their lives to a large extent
in terms of this nation's epochal departure from Earth's surface was taking its leave
of the program they had built. Would they, or their work, be remembered? Would
anyone care? As the historian for the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, I had the responsibility of attempting -- attempting, because the task could
never be fully done -- to capture the essence of their lives and careers. Those who
worked "on the front lines" of what I have called, after William James, a "moral
equivalent of war," have had their quirks and genius memorialized in the agency's
lore. Many have had their organizational and technical trials recorded in the
narrative histories produced by NASA. More recently, and with great success,
Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, in Apollo: The Race to the Moon (Simon and
Schuster, 1989), have combined the human and technical sagas of the designers,
flight operators, and project managers who made Apollo happen to weave an
arresting tale of a unique moment in our history.
But history also gathers up in its sweep many ordinary people, not only those
who give orders and do combat at the front lines, but those who slug it out and
otherwise endure in the trenches. If our memory of the Apollo era neglected those
ordinary people, that memory would be incomplete, and we would have done an
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injustice to the true nature of life over time. Thus, the lives and careers laid out on
the pages that follow have been drawn from hours of conversation with a variety of
people: they are my best approximation of the "average" NASA engineer of the
Apollo age; some did remarkable things, while others just filled in the pieces. It soon
became apparent, however, that even the most "average" of them were part of a
story that was larger than the Apollo story itself, much less NASA's story. What
happened to them over the course of their careers was part of the undertow of what
happened to this country during the post-World War II era and the 1960s.
This book would not have been possible without the willing and good-natured
participation of fifty-one NASA engineers who gave freely and openly of themselves
during my extensive interviews. It is to them that this book owes its first and greatest
debt. Not all have had their stories fully retold here, simply because several had
similar stories to tell. Nathaniel B. Cohen, my supervisor at NASA when this project
was conceived, supported it enthusiastically. A veteran of one of NASA's original
aeronautical research laboratories, Nat Cohen has been a firm believer (to my
benefit) that to manage a scientific or scholarly program well, one must continue to
be an active researcher. Nat also patiently read the first draft of the manuscript,
trying to save me from embarrassing errors here, taking issue with me there, but
always in an encouraging way. A. Michal McMahon, who served as associate
historian in the NASA History Division for two years during the early phase of this
project, did half of the interviewing and contributed much through his insightful
and well-informed observations on the engineering profession, interview topics,
and how the interviews might best be interpreted. Lee D. Saegesser, NASA archivist,
to whom virtually every researcher of space history owes a debt, tirelessly found and
delivered to my desk mountains of folders and publications without which I would
have been unable to fill in the details that are typically lost in interviews. Marion
Davis prepared many of the transcripts, edited them, and provided bibliographic
support. Patricia Shephard, administrative assistant for the NASA History Division,
stood watch over my time in a way that would be the envy of any corporate
executive.
Gil Roth, Carl Praktish, David Williamson (all NASA veterans) and Richard P.
Hallion read the manuscript and returned detailed and stimulating comments and
criticisms, as did Howard E. McCurdy. Howard's own study of NASA's evolving
organizational culture led him into some of the same thickets through which I was
traveling; he has shared hours of conversations on the subject of NASA, federal
bureaucracies, American politics, and American society in the postwar world. Many
other colleagues responded cheerfully to questions over the telephone, or reviewed
portions of the manuscript. If, notwithstanding their help, errors remain, only I am
to blame.
Sylvia D. Fries
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One is never satisfied with a portrait of
a person one knows.
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Introduction
On July 20, 1969 millions of television screens captured a new image in the
iconography of American history. To the familar icons that stirred patriotic senti-
ment- the fiercely protective American eagle, the elegantly scripted parchment of
the Declaration of Independence, the solemn countenance of George Washington,
and a majestically waving Stars and Stripes lofted over outstretched hands on the
island of Iwo Jima -- a generation of Americans added a truly new world image: a
speckled black and white television picture of a man clothed in flexible tubes of
white, with a reflective sphere over his head, springing over the alien, gray surface
of our nearest planetary neighbor, thereon to plant a small, vacuum-stilled Ameri-
can flag.
As with all icons, what brought this image into being was somewhat less than
the associated rhetoric claimed for it. The rhetoric with which John F. Kennedy
introduced his challenge to the nation-- "before this decade is out, of landing a man
on the moon and returning him safely to the earth" -- is unmistakable in the
meaning intended for the event: the United States was "engaged in a world-wide
struggle in which we bear a heavy burden to preserve and promote the ideals that
we share with all mankind, or have alien ideals forced upon them." However, for the
ordinary engineers who toiled for two decades so that Neil Armstrong could one
day step onto the Moon -- the culmination of the nation's Apollo program -- the
event turned out to mean something different than rhetoric promised it would be.
The text of Kennedy's May 25, 1961 "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent
National Needs" is replete with allusions to the Cold War and the Communist bloc's
putative campaign to prevail in "a contest of will and purpose as well as force and
violence -- a battle for minds and souls as well as lives and territory." The "great
battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the whole southern
xi
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half of the globe -- Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East -- the lands of
the rising peoples." The notion -- which appears toward the end of Kennedy's
Special Message -- of landing an American on the Moon before the end of the
decade, was offered as the winning climax of an epochal struggle against "the
adversaries of freedom [who] plan to consolidate their territory -- to exploit, to
control, and finally to destroy the hopes of the world's newest nations; and they have
ambition to do it before the end of this decade" [emphasis addedl. As the 1960s drew to
a close, the nation that stood for freedom (that, said Kennedy, was what the United
States was) would be called to account._ The Apollo program was John F. Kennedy's
"moral equivalent of war." Sharing so much else with Theodore Roosevelt, Kennedy
found in the Apollo program what the earlier president had found in the Panama
Canal .2
To be sure, the sight of Nell Armstrong taking his "giant leap for mankind" was
a dramatic affirmation of the power of modern technology over nature, as well as the
more timeless qualities of human questing and courage. In retrospect it was also an
epiphenomenon, a shadow cast by a more fundamental transition in American life.
This is the story less of heroes than of a generation of engineers who made Apollo
possible. It is thus the story of the men and women who stood where the shadow was
deepest. Their story is told largely in their own words, and it tells of the unraveling
of the simpler notions of personal success and national purpose that had given
common meaning to the lives of their parents.
When the Soviet Union successfully launched the first man-made orbiting
satellite, Sputnik I, in October 1957, the Eisenhower administration and Congress
promptly created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to
orchestrate the United States' peaceful response to the Soviet challenge. NASA
officially opened for business on October 1, 1958 with a complement of nearly eight
thousand paid employees transferred from the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (the NACA). Established in 1915 by a rider attached to that year's
congressional Naval Appropriations Act, the NACA had conducted research in
aerodynamics and aircraft structures and propulsion systems for both industrial
and military clients for forty-three years. _The NACA was informally structured and
overseen by its main committee and various technical subcommittees; its engineer-
ing research was done largely by civil servants at Langley Aeronautical Laboratory,
Hampton, Va. (established 1917), Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, Moffett Field,
Calif. (established 1939), the Flight Research Center, Muroc Dry Lake, Calif. (estab-
lished 1946; renamed Dryden Flight Research Center in 1976), and the Lewis Flight
Propulsion Laboratory, Cleveland, Ohio (established 1940).
The NACA's closest precursors were the research laboratories of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture (established 1862), the National Bureau of Standards (estab-
lished 1901 ), and the Marine Hospital and Public Health Service (established 1902).
Not until the end of World War II would Congress create a comparable institution,
xii
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the Atomic Energy Commission (established 1946), which, however, relied not on
civil servants but on contracts with private organizations created to carry out its
research programs.
What distinguished the NACA was the ethos that came to permeate its labora-
tories. With its emphasis on technical competence for engineering research, evaluation
of work by technical peers, and an intimate, free-wheeling working environment
thought conducive to engineering innovation, the NACA's research culture was
poorly equipped to adjust to the bureaucratic controls of federal administration that
began to coalesce in the 1940s. Centralized administrative procedures, hierarchical
organizations, standardized job classifications, and tenure as a determinant of place
and influence-- such mechanisms of public administrative control were resisted by
the NACA, which found itself in intense competition with the powerful Department
of Defense (established 1947) and threatened by the intrusive politics that accom-
panied expanded congressional oversightJ
The NACA was thus transformed in 1958 into the federal civilian space
establishment with a renewed and much enlarged mission. It began with the 7966
paid employees transferred from the NACA's headquarters in Washington, D.C.
and its four research centers; by the end of 1960 its personnel rolls had nearly
doubled to over 16,000. The principal increases occurred largely at NASA Head-
quarters (where personnel more than tripled), and with the addition to the agency
of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (renamed the George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center) and the new Goddard Space Flight Center in Beltsville, Md. and Wallops
Station on Wallops Island, Va. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California
Institute of Technology, a contractor-owned and -operated facility involved in
rocket research since 1936, was transferred from the U.S. Army to NASA in 1958. By
the end of 1960 the old NACA laboratories and Marshall Space Flight Center
accounted for 49 percent and 33 percent, respectively, of NASA's employees. (The
Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Tex. was added in 1961 and the John F.
Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Fla. in 1962.)
Thus a little over 80 percent of NASA's technical core -- its engineers and
scientists-- during its first quarter century was acquired during the flush first days
of the space program. A significant portion of that cohort held within its corporate
memory the experience of working with the NACA, the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency (ABMA), and the organizations from which Goddard Space Flight Center
had drawn much of its personnel [the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the
Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL)]. _ Each group would bring with it a well-
established culture-- the NACA and NRL groups, the culture of in-house engineer-
ing research and science, and the ABMA group, the in-house technical development
culture of the Army's arsenal system. (Engineers who worked on NASA's unpiloted
interplanetary science programs at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory have not been
included in this study because their careers are as likely to have been the conse-
quence of working for the California Institute of Technology as for NASA.)
In time the engineers from these communities would experience the gradual
erosion of the institutional discretion and the ethos of in-house technical compe-
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tence that had characterized their previous careers, ultimately and inexorably
defeated by the new organization and policies Congress imposed on them. First, in
the future they would work for a centrally and hierarchically managed organization,
split into two tiers to accommodate functionally disparate research centers and
program offices. Second, their executive leadership would be chosen for them on the
strength of political connections and managerial, as well as technical, experience. As
experienced public administrators, that leadership would, and did, yield to the
scrutiny and controls imposed by the Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, 7 and the congressional authorization process. Third, the encroach-
ments of managerial competence and political salesmanship on technical compe-
tence as standards for the new organization's success would reach down into the
very heart and soul of the agency's work.
The ideology of the Republican presidential administration under which NASA
first took form militated against the creation of a large government establishment,
requiring instead that as much work as possible be contracted out to the private
sector. The notion of contracting out was, of course, not new with the Eisenhower
administration. Since the early nineteenth century the military services had pro-
cured goods and services from private suppliers. What the military had not wholly
relied on commercial suppliers for was ordnance-- hence the U,S, Army's scattered
armories, or "arsenal system." The experience of World War II suggested that
effective innovation in weapons technology can make the difference between
victory and defeat. In the twentieth century innovation in weapons technology was
no mere Edisonian enterprise; it required systematic, institutionalized research and
development programs.
Lacking a general research and development or production capacity of its own,
the federal government has thus, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, periodically commandeered facilities in place in the private sector, but it
commandeered them in such a way that the corporate integrity of private enter-
prises and chances for legitimate profit would not be compromised. So it was with
NASA when it was given Kennedy's challenge to land a man on the Moon and return
him safely: NASA would buy the know-how and the hardware it needed from
industry; to ensure the flow of scientific knowledge into space technology, it would
prime the pumps of university science and engineering departments around the
country?
The effectiveness of the operating structure the government chose for NASA, as
well as its elaborate research and development procurement machinery (borrowed
from the Department of Defense) would depend on the ease with which NASA's
technical staff adapted to them. But that staff had been accustomed to working in the
relatively autonomous, decentralized in-house research laboratories of the NACA,
the NRL, or the ABMA "arsenal" that would produce the Saturn launch vehicle. The
potential for cultural resistance among the NACA and ABMA engineers was not
mitigated by the expansion of NASA's personnel during the next five years, for the
"new men" would take their cues from those who had helped to establish the agency
and, in the process, were establishing themselves. To have forged such a heterog-
xiv
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enous cluster of research and development communities, sharing only a strong in-
house culture, should have daunted the greatest administrative genius.
The NASA Apollo era engineers interviewed for this profile were selected by
two methods, peer selection and random selection? Both were used in order to
verify whether the "typical" Apollo era engineer, as recognized by the agency's
leadership, was in fact typical -- as measured by a random sampling. To develop a
candidate interviewee list by peer selection, NASA's second highest ranking execuo
tive I° asked the agency's leadership in 1984 to nominate for our profile those
individuals they believed were the most "representative" of the Apollo generation
of NASA engineers. In all probability, those whom NASA's current leadership
regarded as "representative" would embody those personal and professional traits
which were most important to recognition and success within the agency. The 621
nominations received provided a small subgroup-- the "nominee" group-- which
contained a higher preponderance of older men, top-ranking managers, individuals
whose highest degrees were in engineering, and men who had entered NASA before
1960 (see Appendix B). Since almost 95 percent of NASA personnel when the agency
opened its doors in 1958 came from the research centers of the NACA, engineers who
shared the NACA experience contributed significantly to the composition of NASA's
leadership in the 1980s.
A second, much larger population consisted of the 9875 engineers who entered
the agency between 1958 and 1970 and were still with NASA in 1984 when this study
was begun. Absent reliable or comprehensive data about engineers who left NASA
during the period, we had to limit that demographic population to those who,
because they were still with the agency in 1984, could be identified and Iocated.H Our
demographic analysis of NASA's Apollo era engineers was also designed to identify
three lesser cohorts: (1) those who entered NASA between 1958 and 1960, the eve of
President Kennedy's manned lunar landing challenge; (2) those who entered
between 1961 and 1965, when the agency underwent the massive expansion
necessary to carry out the Apollo program; and (3) those who entered between 1966
and the end of 1970, a five-year period that opened as NASA's peak employment
year and ended with a precipitous decline in agency resources (see Appendix B;
NASA's annual budget plummeted from $5 billion in 1967 to slightly over $3 billion
in 1974, not accounting for inflation.)
This profile is thus necessarily restricted to those engineers who, for whatever
reason, preferred to work for NASA. Fifty-one engineers from NASA Headquarters
and its seven principal installations 12were selected for interviews at random from
each of four groups: the "nominee" group and the three cohorts that comprised the
"total population" of engineers who came to work for NASA between 1958 and
1970J 3None declined what was most often received as an opportunity to tell one's
own story and thus surface from the depths of anonymity to which bureaucracy
consigns most of its workers. The interviews clearly suggested that the career
experiences of the "nominee" group were substantially similar to those of the "total
XV
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population" other than what I have noted above, which is indicated by a fairly
straightforward demographic analysis (see Appendix B).
NASA personnel classifications have not and do not distinguish between
scientists and engineers; however, secondary breakdowns of our total population of
9875 by highest degree fields and occupational categories were possible. These re-
vealed that, of the aggregate numbers of scientists and engineers, an average of 60
to 75 percent have been working in occupations classified as engineering (although
increasingly their actual work would be engineering contract monitors). Manage-
ment, and a miscellany of non-aerospace technical occupations, claimed the rest.
The interviews strongly suggested that engineers who drifted into management or
non-technical jobs nevertheless began their NASA careers as engineers.
The historian or journalist who wants to convey the experiences of others in their
own words acquires the task of composing a coherent narrative out of the often
broken and disorganized utterances of persons not always accustomed to talking
about themselves. Only after many hours of listening can one begin to glean with
any confidence the "truth" of a personal experience, distinguishing the perspectives
of the subject and the observer. This is especially true of many of these engineers
who, often by their own admission, are uncomfortable in a universe of words and
feelings. Any solution to this problem must be faithful to the nature of the material
itself, as well as the need to convey in an intelligible textual form the composite lives
of numerous individuals whose aggregate experiences may not necessarily lend
themselves to generalization.
My own solution has been to follow a few principles in attempting to convey the
substance of these interviews. First, and above all else, I have attempted to let these
engineers speak for themselves as much as possible. Second, I as writer have
intervened only as necessary to sustain the narrative, establish an historical setting,
or insert clarifications such as names, places, or dates. In some cases an engineer's
own clarifications, drawn from the interview itself, have been interspersed among
his or her own words. Every effort has been made to convey through punctuation
the rhythms of the original speech. Ellipses have been used liberally to indicate when
the actual sequence of a subject's speech has been broken or reordered. Finally, the
text that unfolds from an engineer's own words has been "cleaned up" only to the
extent of removing the "urns" and "ands" and rhetorical "buts" that litter the speech
of all of us. Strict grammarians might have rewritten the original more than I have
chosen to.
The chapters that follow do not necessarily incorporate the observations or
reflections of every person interviewed on every single subject. Predictably, some
engineers told good stories and others had few stories that they could or wanted to
tell. Some simply had more interesting lives than others. Those whose comments
were selected for inclusion were chosen because the experiences they related were
relatively typical -- that is, other engineers could have told of similar experiences.
Occasionally an engineer's observations were selected precisely because they were
xvi
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atypical; in those instances the reader is alerted to the exceptional nature of what
follows. All of the engineers we asked to interview not only agreed to talk with us,
but were as open about their experiences as their apparent individual levels of
personal reticence seemed to allow. Although none requested anonymity, pseud-
onyms have been used throughout the text that follows (however, actual place
names are used).
While the sequence of the following personal accounts follows the paths of
various technological problems that were overcome during the emergence of the
space program in the 1960s, these chapters do not pretend to provide an historical
survey of aerospace technology in NASA during the period. Moreover, the chapters
rely on recollections, which can be imprecise or incorrect. For example, in the early
years of NASA, competition was rife among the engineers of the old NACA centers
for priority in the solution of previously intractable engineering problems. This
competition among the NACA (and after 1958, NASA) centers has remained an
important ingredient in the organizational life of NASA. At the research level the
competition has been considered salutary; it kept the engineers "on their toes." Thus
any claims to priority in these chapters should be held suspect; such claims are
difficult to prove or disprove. Modern institutionalized research is often an anony-
mous process. For the scientist or engineer, "who discovered it first" may be the most
pressing historical question -- the priority of discovery normally documented in
dates of publications or patent awards. For the historian, how the discovery
occurred, and its significance, may be the more salient question.
A final caution about what follows: I have tried to translate much of the
engineering work into terms that could be readily followed by readers whose prior
knowledge lies elsewhere than engineering. Thus certain technological puzzles and
developments have been simplified -- perhaps too much for more technically
inclined readers.
The explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger over Cape Canaveral on the crisp,
blue morning of January 29, 1986 almost devastated NASA. Subject to seemingly
relentless critical press comment, numerous studies, and the unflattering scrutiny of
the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident headed by
former New York State prosecuting attorney and Secretary of State William P.
Rogers, the agency struggled through the two plus years it took to return the Shuttle
to flight. Did this event color our interviews, which spanned the Challenger
accident? Interviews at NASA Headquarters, Ames Research Center, and Johnson
Space Center were conducted before January 1986. Engineers at Kennedy Space
Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, Langley Research Center, Lewis Research
Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center were interviewed through 1987. We took
some care in the post-January 1986 interviews not to focus on the accident. Its role
as a variable affecting the content of these interviews remains an imponderable,
since most of the subjects explored in the interviews appear to be largely indepen-
dent of the immediate issues raised by the accident. Readers may, however, want to
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keep in mind the time period during which interviews at particular NASA locations
took place as they reflect on the observations that appear in the following chapters.
1 The bi-polar world that had dominated American foreign policy since 1945
persisted in Kennedy's rhetoric, the "free world's" side under the young Democratic
president to be shored up by an ambitious liberal agenda: increased spending for
economic recovery at home, "prudent fiscal standards," increased economic and
military assistance abroad and especially in the Third World, increased funding for
NATO's conventional forces and "our own military and intelligence shield," added
funding for civil defense, nuclear disarmament, and then the trip to the Moon-- all
"to win the battle that is now going on around the world between freedom and
tyranny." See John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent
National Needs," May 25, 1961, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p.
396-406.
2 The phrase "moral equivalent of war" was used by the American philosopher
William James, who argued that mankind had evolved into a creature whose
pugnacious instinct was so deeply ingrained that he required formidable obstacles
to channel his energies into socially useful purposes (William James, "The Moral
Equivalent of War," in Essays on Faith and Morals (New York, 1947). Theodore
Roosevelt was a student of James's at Harvard College. See David McCullough, The
Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (New York, 1977).
3 For a history of the NACA, see Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, NASA SP-4103 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1985), and James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History
of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958, NASA SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987).
4For a detailed account of the NACA's (and later NASA's) struggles with the growth
of centralized federal administrative policies and organizations (e.g., the Bureau of
the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and congressional authorization and
appropriations procedures), see Roland, loc. cit., and Nancy Jane Petrovic, "Design
for Decline: Executive Management and the Eclipse of NASA," Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Maryland, 1982 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms Inter-
national, 1982).
5The 157 personnel who had been working on the Navy's Project Vanguard, which
became the nucleus of the Goddard Space Flight Center (established 1959), were
transferred to NASA in 1958 from one of the Navy's own in-house research
laboratories, the Naval Research Laboratory. They were soon joined by 63 more who
had been working for the Naval Research Laboratory's Space Sciences and Theoreti-
cal divisions. The next large group to transfer to NASA was the 5367 civil servants
from the U.S. Army's Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal,
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Huntsville, Ala. The ABMA had been essentially an in-house operation. The
youngest NASA installations, the Manned Spacecraft Center (established 1961 and
renamed Johnson Space Center in 1973) and Kennedy Space Center (established
1962), were initially staffed by personnel from Langley Research Center and the
ABMA.
b Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966). Source for personnel
data: NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968. Vol. I: NASA Resources, NASA SP-4012
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976); NASA Pocket Statistics
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1971); Personnel
Analysis and Evaluation Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., May 1986.
Personnel data analysis available in the NASA History Office.
7The Bureau of the Budget became the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in
1970, while the Civil Service Commission became the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM) in 1979.
The growth of the complex and intricate devices by which the U.S. government has
tried to procure research and development as well as standard goods and services
is traced in Clarence H. Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological Change
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings lnstitution, 1968) and Merton J. Peck and Frederick
M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard
University Press, 1962). For an informed, incisive, and humorous view of the
outcome of federal advanced technical systems procurement practices, see Norman
R. Augustine, Augustine's Laws, And Major System Development Programs, rev. (New
York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1983).
Much of what we know in any systematic fashion about engineers (or scientists)
comes from studies combining demographic analysis, oral histories, and social
theory--studies such as Ann Roe's TheMakingofa Scientist (Greenwood Press, 1953),
Robert Perucci's _ind Joel E. Gerstl's Profession Without Community: Engineers in
American Society (Random House, 1969), and more recently, Robert Zussman's
Mechanics of the Middle Class: Work and Politics Among American Engineers (University
of California Press, 1985). In addition, see Robert Perucci and Joel E. Gerstl, eds. The
Engineers and the Social System (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969), a collection of essays
exploring the occupational and work roles of engineering, recruitment, and social-
ization, and the social dimension of engineering careers. The value of insightful and
informed readings of documentary sources is amply demonstrated by Edwin T.
Layton, Jr., The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineer-
ing Profession, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
"_ Dr. Hans Mark, Deputy Administrator of NASA from 1981 through 1984. The
agency's leadership was defined as current and past program administrators and
center directors. See Appendix A.
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" Given an average turnover rate of about 5 percent, the number of scientists and
engineers who actually crossed NASA's threshold over the period was materially
larger than 9875.
,2 Ames Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, Lyndon B. Johnson Space
Center, John F. Kennedy Space Center, Langley Research Center, Lewis Research
Center, and George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.
_3 Because of the small percentage of minorities and females among NASA's
engineers (see Appendix B, table 7), a random sampling for the purpose of inter-
views would not, in all probability, have resulted in any interviews with non-white
males. However, because the experiences of minorities who began to enter the
agency in the 1960s could reflect the environment created by the majority in this (as
in any other) organization, the "nominee" group includes a sampling of minorities
and females supplied by NASA's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity.
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... the sons of pullman porters,
And the sons of engineers,
Ride their fathers' magic carpets
Made of steel ....
"City of New Orleans"
©Steve Goodman, 1970
Chapter 1
Beginnings: 1918-1932
Almost ten thousand engineers began their careers with NASA during the Apollo
decade. Slightly over 60 percent were born before 1935. It was mostly these older
engineers whom NASA's leadership, as late as 1984, considered to be the "most
representative" of the agency's Apollo decade engineers2 These older men (and
they were almost all men) were the ones to leave the most lasting imprint on the
space agency's culture.
1918 -- the year that Robert Strong was born -- was the year the guns fell silent,
bringing to an end four years of human carnage in the forests and river valleys,
plains and hillsides of Europe -- and bringing to an end the world that had created
western civilization as it was then known. What was left of a generation once 10
million perished from disease or wounds, and 20 million more later succumbed to
a world-wide influenza scourge, suffered yet another kind of death -- the death of
"the old lie," wrote Wilfred Owen: 'Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. '''2
On the other side of the Atlantic, life had gone on much as before. An American
president proposed his formula for perpetual peace, and the Red Sox won the World
Series. Not far from a jubilant Boston, in North Andover, Mass., an old New England
mill town, a boy began a life that would reach far beyond the American Woolen
Company mill where his father was an overseer. Unknown to the boy, Gustav Hoist
had already put to music the vision that would carry Strong into the last frontier: _
The boy from Massachusetts would be among those who would launch the first
human into the final vastness of space.
Robert Strong's career really began when he was eleven, the year Charles
Lindbergh flew alone across the Atlantic Ocean. That crossing "is still one of the
greatest achievements of the century .... North Andover was a small town; it
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couldn't have been more than forty-five hundred people in that town at that time
[with a] small high school [of] about three hundred and fifty students. My oldest
brother was playing baseball that afternoon. [We] had a little, small, ball park, hardly
anybody there; just a few of us. And the umpire stopped the game and announced...
he was pleased to report that Captain Charles Lindbergh had landed in Le
Bourget Air Field." After Lindbergh's flight "several of my friends and myself got
interested in building model airplanes .... There was a flying field close by. We'd go
up and do spare jobs with the.., airplanes that would come in from time to time ....
Of course, kids my age all wanted to be pilots. But then, as I grew older and got
interested in more scientific subjects, I decided I'd be an aeronautical engineer."
In 1934 Strong entered the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he
discovered the work of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)
"through those marvelous books they put out-- the technical reports and technical
notes and technical memorandum .... At MIT lthe] NACA was a renowned place,
even then." It was as a student at MIT that Strong discovered Jerome Hunsaker, the
designer of the first aircraft to cross the Atlantic, who had introduced at MIT, in 1914,
the first college course in aeronautical engineering. 4 And it was at MIT that the
NACA discovered Robert Strong, recruiting him in 1938, at the end of his senior
year. "The kind of people who were attracted there," to the NACA's parent
aeronautical laboratory at Langley Field in Virginia, "came from all over the states.
During the Depression it was probably the only place they could do that kind of
work .... At that time Langley was very small, it must have been two hundred fifty,
three hundred people there, at the most."
On a late spring day in 1938 Strong and two others "rode the train to Washing-
ton and transferred to a boat and got off at Old Point Comfort .... The train ride...
was ten dollars. I had a big steamer trunk with all my possessions, and got it on the
boat, and that boat used to land at Old Point Comfort about 5:30 in the morning.
You'd have to get off and spend the first night -- as many did -- in the Langley
Hotel .... Hampton was a one stop-light town, at the corner of King and Queen Street,
and that was it in those days. Many of the people, local, viewed the [Langley]
group with a jaundiced eye. [We were] free spirits in many respects." Hampton
people called them, less elegantly, the "NACA nuts."
A thousand miles from North Andover, below the southernmost foothills of the
Appalachians, where the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad once crossed the Cahaba
River, survives the small town in which Dan O'Neill was born. Centreville, Ala. was
"a little place" when he was born there in 1920, and by last count it was a little place
still, a town of about 2500. "There wasn't really much in a small town. You just didn't
know much about what was going on in the world." The changes that would affect
O'Neill's life were stirring when he was born, although few inhabitants of Centreville
had the luxury, in 1920, of concerning themselves with the creation of the National
Socialist German Workers' (NAZI) Party, much less the publication of Sir Arthur S.
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Eddington's Space, Time and Gravitation -- one of the first English language exposi-
tions of the theory of relativity.
O'Neill was one of seven children who "grew up on a small farm, like everybody
else was doing in those days." His father "was... a two-mule farmer" as well as "the
local blacksmith." O'Neill is a maker and a fixer, which he attributes to the days
when he was "just a small boy working in [his father'sl shop, helping. My dad
sharpened the plows for the local farmers. He did welding, welded wagon tires ....
He fixed wagons and shod the mules and all those things .... A lot of woodwork he
did by hand, making wagon axles and spokes. He could completely rebuild a
wagon." O'Neill worked in the shop "turning the forge.., to build the fire up, holding
the material while ]his] dad worked on it, beat on it." As he grew up, working with
his father, he learned a lot of carpentry, which he does to this day.
"Back in those days, most of the books that we had to read were more like the
westerns or Doc Savage. We used to subscribe to Doc Savage, and that had...some
quite far out scientific things .... He was a super sleuth.., he had all kinds of scientific
things that were way beyond -- not like Buck Rogers .... He had chemists,
engineers, and doctors, and they'd go out and solve all of these big problems."
O'Neill's mother "never finished college." She "taught school for a few years
before she got married." She was "a good mother. She cooked and took care of the
family. And she was, I guess, my inspiration ... she could help me with my school
work until I got past what she knew, which I did, eventually .... My parents ... saw
that we went to school. All seven of us graduated from college." When O'Neill
finished high school, he "really had no desire to go to college. I don't know what I
would have taken, had I gone. I got a job with the Alabama Power Company
trimming trees." The pay "was seventy five dollars a month. I ... paid five dollars
a week for room and board. I was making good money. But after working a few
months with the power company, I observed that people who had been there twenty
years were still climbing poles and stringing wire in the hot weather and the cold
weather, and I decided there must be a better way to do things. So I saved a little
money and I decided to go back to school."
O'Neilrs oldest brother "took agricultural science [in college] and worked in
that field for a year, but I'd had enough of farming .... And as I had the idea that I'd
like to fly, I thought, well, aeronautical engineering is the thing to do. So that's why
I started in aeronautical engineering .... I didn't know much about it until I actually
started to school and began to learn some of these things." In 1939, when O'Neill
started college at the University of Alabama, "we weren't really involved in the war
yet. But listening to your professors talk about their experiences in aeronautics and
what airplanes could do, and what they would do in the future ... | began to realize
'well, this aeronautical business is really a coming thing'.... I guess I've been a
dreamer all of my life.
"I put myself through college. I borrowed ten dollars one time to start my second
year of college. That was |for] a bicycle so I could deliver papers .... I lived in a fire
station .... I worked in a shoe store. And I delivered papers." The college education
in engineering that O'Neill could get at the University of Alabama in the early 1940s
was "not broad by any means .... I never was as smart as some people. I had
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problems, especially with math .... I did pretty good until I got to calculus, but I had
problems with calculus." O'Neill struggled on for four years, working part-time,
studying part-time. He was also in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. Then, in
March 1943, when millions of young Americans saw conscription looming before
them, O'Neill surrendered and entered the Army's Officer Candidate School (OCS).
"I went through engineering OCS right after ROTC and then I decided, if I was ever
going to learn how to fly, now was the time. So I put in for flight training and I went
through flight training as a second lieutenant and got my wings .... The next two and
a half years, I enjoyed flying, but I kind of lost my desire to become an aeronautical
engineer for some reason. That's when I went back to school. I transferred to
industrial engineering .... I really didn't understand then as much about...the
different kinds of engineering .... But I considered industrial engineering to be more
in the management of business, rather than in designing .... I remember one college
professor, whose name was Johnson. And he was an industrial engineer."
O'Neill finally got his bachelor's degree in engineering in 1949. He stayed with
the U.S. Air Force Reserve, eventually retiring as a Reserve Lt. Colonel. "After I got
my degree ... I went to work for a pipeline company that built ... gas lines. They
called us 'progress engineers:... I worked in Tennessee and Texas .... I worked on the
line, on the powder crew, for four months.., loading poles and fuses and caps and
shooting dynamite.., but.., like the power company job climbing trees, it was a job,
but not much future .... When my job played out there, I went back home."
O'Neill and his wife married in 1949. They lived "in a trailer on the pipeline. And
in order to have something to do, I started teaching school at a Veterans' Continu-
ation School .... Some of the third graders could barely read .... That exposure really
got me interested in education .... There were so many people who were not
educated .... I lived about twenty-five miles from the University [of Alabama[ .... So
I went to school in the morning and I got a master's degree in school administration
and majored in elemetary education .... Then I taught school for four years-- math,
science, physics. In 19571 decided it was time for a change. I had an interview with
ABMA [the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Ala.] and I came to work
at ABMA, here on the [Redstone] arsenal, on the first of July, 1957.
"On the first of July, 1960... exactly three years from the time I started ... some
five thousand of us transferred to NASA." (Congress had just transferred the
ABMA's space facilities and personnel to NASA's newly designated George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center.) O'Neill went "to work on Wernher von Braun's staff
in his Technical Program Coordination Office, which [oversaw the] budget, fund-
ing, programming, and scheduling -- making charts for meetings and presenta-
tions" for the Jupiter missile program. O'Neill has been at Marshall "ever since."
Located on what was once a vast mudflat whose Y-shaped rivers reached almost
from Lake Michigan to the drainage basin of the Mississippi River system, Chicago
was destined by its location as the water, and later rail, gateway to the American
west, to become a great city. With the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 and the
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Illinois and Michigan Canal in 1848, Chicago became one of the United States' great
geographic catch basins, gathering in its depths the raw material not only of much
of this country's nineteenth century economic growth, but also its distinctive literary
and social movements. Much of that raw material came from the second great
European hegira, which brought to this continent the Italians, Poles, Serbs, Croats,
Bohemians, and countless Jews from southern and eastern Europe who would
constitute three-quarters of Chicago's population by the turn of the century.
Here, in 1920, Ernest Cohen was born, offspring of two families of Eastern
European rabbis. "On my mother's side ... they came from somewhere up on the
Russian-Polish border .... My grandmother might have come from Lithuania .... My
grandparents remember the Cossaks getting drunk on Saturday night and.., running
through the village .... My grandfather.., was a peddler and he peddled in a Polish
neighborhood ... because he did know the language. And they had large families."
Both of his grandfathers "were rabbis. The one on my mother's side was a scholar ....
On my father's side.., they came from Germany. There was a great deal of difference
in the way they ... cooked and the way they lived. Great grandfather" on Cohen's
father's side "was a rabbi ... he didn't really work, but he owned a bakery .... The
girls used to run the bakery .... My grandmother on my father's side learned to read
and write and to figure, because she was too small to do the heavy work .... [Great
grandfather] taught all of his sons to read and to write and to figure, but none of the
daughters except my grandmother, so she could take care of the books for the
bakery.
"Mother ... was the oldest of thirteen children .... The way the family ran, the
oldest child used to raise the younger ones, and my grandma raised the babies. So
mother actually raised most of my aunts and uncles .... We first lived next door to my
grandma. And it was always more exciting for me to be at my grandma's place ....
Part of the family would be fighting, the other part would be singing and having a
good time .... I suspect that my grandmother probably raised me more than my
mother."
Cohen's father "did a lot of things .... When he was young he was part of a
blackface act" in Chicago vaudeville .... "He liked that kind of stuff. But when he got
married, my mother felt differently .... He got a job as a milkman and he also was...
interested in the mail order business.., he got a lot of mail and he did a lot of writing.
He liked that." But having been "a singer and [done the] soft shoe, he always missed
it." Many years later, when Cohen's parents moved "to Los Angeles, he actually
bought a small bookshop right very close to the old Columbia studios, and ... he and
my mother both used to get quite a thrill when all the old movie stars used to come
in and chat with them.
"We lived in an apartment building most of the time .... When I was small, my
dad bought a house. The Depression came in '29... land values evaporated, and the
place became a slum .... It was ... right ... on the west side of Chicago. But before it
became a slum, it had a very large ... Italian population .... [They were] very, very
nice people, except they were bootleggers .... We did eventually move to the
northwest .... I was the oldest grandchild. 1 had all these uncles and I used -- when
I was small-- to see most of the hockey games in Chicago. I'd get [to] the ball games,
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the boxing matches, the wrestling matches .... I had an uncle who was, like, two years
older than myself .... I guess the families were beginning to run together .... Friday
night was Sabbath for us, so Friday was a big baking day for [grandmother]. She
baked the cholla in loaves, great big pies and stuff. One thing she used to bake was
apple strudle .... She had one of these great big, round tables [and] used to stretch this
dough. And she used to chatter all the time to me .... My grandmother used to...
dress my grandfather ... help him on with the coat and sweaters, used to have the
whisk broom, clean him, pack the lunches.
"When I was very, very small one of my uncles bought himself an erector set ....
When we'd go over to visit him, to keep me quiet, he let me use the erector set. But
then, after a while, I kept losing the screws and he wouldn't give me the erector set
any more. So my parents bought me an erector set, and I played with that damn thing
for hours and days .... They always knew where I was ... I was building with this
thing."
Cohen attended grade school and high school in Chicago, not deciding on
engineering "until the.., last year of high school .... I got real interested in chemistry.
And... I felt that maybe I'd like to be a chemical engineer .... No one in our family
ever was an engineer before. We didn't know much about that .... Engineering was
the last thing they ever expected me to go into. They probably thought -- a lawyer,
or medicine, or something like that. Those were the two professions.., that everyone
knew something about. Maybe accounting, or something like that, but engineering
kind of floored them ... because of my total ignorance of what engineering was all
about." As it turned out, Cohen "was lucky [in[ that I really enjoyed it .... I really
consider myself extremely lucky to have chosen something that I just plain liked.
"Going to college.., was a real thing for my parents .... I'm one of the few people
in my family that ever really did go to college." After he graduated from high school
in 1938, Cohen went to the Armour Institute of Technology, which later merged with
the Lewis Institute of Technology to become the Illinois Institute of Technology.
"Money was.., pretty tight.., in the Depression," and Cohen largely worked his way
through school. "My folks sacrificed a great deal in order to get me through college.
I went to a private engineering college because they figu red that ... it would be cheaper
to go to...college in Chicago than go down to the University of Illinois and be away
from home.
"Most of my friends that went to college with me ... used to work, bring all the
money home, and we'd get an allowance .... And even after I got a job, I was living
at home. I still brought all my money home and got an allowance from my parents.
They bought all my clothes and stuff .... The college ... was pretty close to about 60
percent Irish Catholic, and they had strong family ties that way too .... It was hard
to get money ... but ... there was a lot of ways for us to have fun. Saturday nights
mostly we used to get together and dance. Anybody whose parents owned a house
in Chicago always had a basement. They used to paint the basement Chinese red and
wax it. And there was usually a ping pong table down there, so there was always a
chance to have a party. And in the winter time it was always things like ice skating,
and summer time, [there were] places to have picnics and go to the beach .... We
could have a good time on a very limited amount of money."
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At the Armour Institute, "there were only five kinds of engineering when I was
there. It was straight engineering.., electrical, chemical, mechanical, fire protection,
and architectural. And that was it .... There was two years of English ... the English
and math departments were the strongest departments in the school because
everybody had to take English and math .... When I went in, as a [high school] senior,
I got a book and the book gave the program, all four years. And you didn't get an
elective until your fourth year. It was a choice between differential equations and
thermodynamics."
When Cohen graduated from the Illinois Institute of Technology he "got a job
as an engineer in a small company" called National Die Casting. "The employees...
were tool and die makers.., their engineers were essentially draftsmen .... They were
making at the time -- the war had started -- demand oxygen regulators, for pilots...
and other aircraft instruments, and I sort of got interested in fluid mechanics and that
kind of design .... I worked for about two years designing aircraft instruments ....
Before the war it used to make orange juice squeezers.., they made a lot of money
Ion them]. They had a lot of interesting things that they tried that were kind of
foolish," including a mechanical scalp massager advertised to reduce hair loss,
which was based on the orange juice squeezer design, and a die-cast juke box that
failed commercially for lack of audio resonance.
The U.S. Army infantry claimed Cohen in 1944. "I was transferred into the [U.S.
Army Corps of] engineers, and sent to Los Alamos, New Mexico [where] I was
assigned to the Manhattan Bomb project for roughly about two years." He was
discharged from the Army in 1946, got married and returned to Los Alamos to work
for a short time, and then went to Cornell University. With the help of two stipends
and the GI bill, he earned a master's degree in physical chemistry from Cornell.
"From there I went to the Bureau of Mines in [Bartlesville], Oklahoma .... I was very
interested in thermodynamics at the time and did fundamental research in
thermodynamics .... My main job there was ...doing some bomb killer imagery
there ...we published some papers on that .... We used to do statistical thermal
calculations .... I didn't do it all that much, but we had guys who used to do that eight
hours a day, over and over and over again .... I liked the job a lot ...it was...real
exacting work. ]But] after a while you were just doing the same thing over and over
and over again .... I just felt ... too confined."
Cohen moved on to the University of Wichita, where "they had a research and
development outfit that was associated with the school and did research and
development work for Coleman lanterns and Coleman furnaces [and] other small
companies around there .... It was a small group of people, about eighteen or twenty
engineers or chemists. We all got along very well." He had enjoyed teaching as a
student assistant at Cornell, and he warmed to the collegial university setting with
its lectures and concerts. However, by the time he and his wife had moved to
Wichita, they had four children. "I wasn't making enough money.., so it was starve
or move on." In 1952 Cohen took his family "to St. Louis and went to work for part
of an architectural design outfit, Sverdrup and Parcel." When Cohen joined the firm,
for which he would do fluid dynamics, their main business was building bridges,
roads, hospitals, laboratories, and other large facilities. The firm had had no
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experience building aeronautical facilities. Nonetheless, thanks to the war-time
contacts of its founders, it won a government contract to build the Arnold Engineer-
ing Development Center, for which it built the transonic, supersonic, and hypersonic
wind tunnels. "They did real well, because they hired a lot of good people who really
knew how to do this work .... They were very honest [and] a good company to work
for.
"But then," he remembers, "I got caught up in the space age." When the AVCO
Corporation (an aerospace research and development contracting firm) came to St.
Louis to recruit, Cohen interviewed for a job. "And the way they explained it, they'd
got a project .... What they really should have said is that they were proposing one."
Cohen went to work for AVCO, but "about a year ]later] I decided, 'well, they won't
do it.' There was.., about eighteen or twenty of us who were doing nothing because
there was nothing to do." As it turned out, the boss Cohen had had at Sverdrup and
Parcel had moved on to NASA; he worked at the Goddard Space Flight Center
outside Washington, D.C. in Greenbelt, Md. "He came to see me one time, and he
said, 'Hey, you know, you ought to come and work for me again.'" So, in the fall of
1960, Cohen moved his family to Greenbelt. "I never really intended to stay this long,
but I've been here ever since."
New York City has been another great American catch basin, port of entry to the
Land of Promise throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century. It
was here that Isaac Petrovsky, with his father, a once prosperous Lithuanian
merchant, and his mother, an opera singer, caught his first glimpse of America in
1930. It was not an auspicious year for an Eastern European immigrant family in
search of material security, if not prosperity. New York City's Bank of the United
States, with its sixty branches and half a million depositors, closed its doors along
with more than 1300 banks across the United States. Meanwhile, President Herbert
C. Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, thereby assuring a precipitous decline
in international trade. It is unlikely that the ten-year-old boy who stood before the
immigration clerk at Ellis Island -- or even the father who brought him there --
knew or cared much about tariffs and banks.
The boy and his father, who had sold everything the family owned, left
Lithuania with only their baggage. "We went by train to Bremerhaven, but before
that we were stopped before we crossed over the border, and ... they took us back.
So my father had to bribe them to be able to get out. He left me in a restaurant by the
train. I waited there for about three hours and didn't know what was happening.
Then we finally got over [the border] and we stopped off in Germany for one night,
and then we got to Bremerhaven. It was a five to six day trip. So that's the beginning
of my life.
"We came in on the Bremen. I was sick for five days. I and my father" shared a
cabin with "two Hungarians. One of them smoked a terrible cigar." When they
arrived at Ellis Island on April Fool's Day, "there was a crowd of people being
pushed around ... we came over before the [immigration clerk's] desk .... I wanted
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to be an American, right then and there, and 1... wanted an American name .... They
told me to write down something. So I wrote down Ike -- I didn't know how to spell
it .... And the most amazing thing was, they gave me an orange! I knew what an
orange was, because my Dad was wealthy enough to import citrus fruits from Israel
-- or Palestine, in those days .... He told me that one orange cost ... one Lithuanian
dollar. But it had an exchange value of ten American cents."
When they came to the United States, Isaac Petrovsky and his father knew not
one word of English. At home the family had spoken Yiddish mixed with German
and smatterings of Polish and Lithuanian. Their first refuge was Middletown, N.Y.,
where some relatives of the mother had made a home for themselves. "Eventually
we moved to Brooklyn. My father felt very secure in that enclave of that type of
people."
This American journey had begun in Kaunas, the capital city of Lithuania,
where Isaac, as a boy, had "lived... in a very big apartment .... We did not have
electricity. Heating was done by fireplaces. The kitchen was tremendous .... The
house was full of servants.., this was what distinguished you from people who
could not afford it ... the number of servants you had .... Water was brought in two
pails on a yoke -- one of the servants would go down to the river and ... bring it up
and put it in a barrel. We never drank any of the water; we drank tea, which means
the water was boiled. My father was a businessman, and he apparently was quite
well-to-do, because I never lacked for anything .... He was a 'luftmensch,' Iwhich
means] 'free agent'.... He started out.., when he was a younger man, before he was
married ... in some lumber business. He bought lumber for some German firms ...
and he imported and exported ... some medicines or perfumes .... My mother was
a mezzo-soprano .... She was a beautiful woman." Her own family had emigrated to
the United States a few years earlier, having (once she and her husband resolved to
emigrate) left as soon as she could get an artist's visa, She survived by working with
a traveling vaudeville company that presented exerpts from operas in between the
silent movies then shown in theaters. "She knew the Sam Goldwyn people, and
Warner Brothers, because they were starting out in the movies...back in the
'twenties.'"
Her son Isaac, an only child, stayed behind to be "raised by nannies. When I was
old enough, I went to the ... Hebrew gymnasium .... Everything was in Hebrew,
everything they taught me .... They would also teach us something about the
Bible .... During the day I would go to that school ... then I went home. lIn] addition
to that, I had teachers. I had piano teachers. I had teachers that taught me how to
write and read German. They came to the house. I was an only child. I was one of
those lonely little ones."
After the family emigrated and moved to Brooklyn, N.Y., Petrovsky's father
"went into all kinds of business. He started out with a cousin of his, that he met, with
the ladies' stocking business. And apparently the cousin took the money and
disappeared. My father went into restaurants .... He did whatever he had to do. He
was a peddler, if he had to do that. He became very successful .... When I was in
junior high, we lived [in} -- I would call it now, in retrospect, a ghetto. It was an
area ten blocks by ten blocks that was a Jewish neighborhood and an Italian
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neighborhood .... We never really left that area." At long last the loneliness came to
an end. "Friends... were all around the neighborhood there. I played stick ball and
baseball, [but] I discovered really that I didn't have the patience for all of these
games. I read, I listened to records, and I played the piano. I stopped playing the
piano, ! think, when I was about fourteen. My mother decided to give me violin
lessons. ! got tired of holding the fiddle after a while .... I discovered -- of course, I
didn't understand it then -- that I didn't have a left hand.
"I went to Hebrew School ... all the way through junior high. We had Hebrew
lessons in the morning and then the regular curriculum, and then I went to New
Utrecht High School to finish off. I was what you call a standard C student. There
were certain things that I took to quicker than other things. Like geometry was
something that I could relate to. Algebra I could too .... I loved English because I was
crazy about Shakespeare... to me that was the most beautiful language in the world.
I also took four years of French, three years of Spanish. When I graduated, I worked
for a year in the garment district in downtown New York and went to Brooklyn
College at night .... I went to Brooklyn College because I didn't have any money to
go to the university .... And I was studying ancient history and Spanish because I
wanted to go into the State Department or the Foreign Service. But after that my
father got enough money together and I went to New York University .... My father
says to me, 'you know, Ike, go to college. I got the money. Go to college.' So I went
to the nearest school that was a college. That was New York University .... And I
said, 'what's the nearest thing to a trade?' And they said, 'engineering'.... I needed
a trade. I needed to have something that I could earn a living with. That's the reason
| became an engineer. That was it .... And I said, 'OK, I'll take that.' So I signed up
for civil engineering. And I started taking the preparatory courses."
In 1941, after the United States was drawn into World War II, Isaac "took ROTC
because they gave me a uniform. I didn't have too many suits of clothing .... They
called us up and they said ... 'you have to sign up now, because otherwise you'll be
drafted. This way you can become a second lieutenant.' So I signed up. They
processed us... and they sent us to Fort Belvoir, Virginia for ten weeks.., and I went
through all that basic training .... I felt good. I mean, I had muscles I never heard of
before. When I finished basic training, they said, 'now you go back to working on
your studies and get your degree and when we have an opening for you, we'll send
you back to Fort Belvoir for another ten weeks.' And I didn't want to have tear gas
thrown at me and all that. Then they said that all students studying aeronautical
engineering would be sent to Miami Beach, OCS. So I went over [to the registrar's
office] at lunch time. The girl had gone out to lunch, so I said, 'I just want to change
my courses right now.' The other girl said 'what do you want?' She pulled out my
master file, crossed out civil engineering, and put in aeronautical engineering. She
went out to lunch and I went down to Miami Beach. [Miami Beach] was fantastic ....
It was the first time that I saw the beach sand and palm trees."
Not long after Petrovsky finished Officers' Candidate School he learned that he
was due to be sent overseas. "I said, 'My God, you can get killed wherever they're
going .... They sent me down to Miami to pick up a flight and I was flying-- they still
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wouldn't tell us [wherel. And I'm flying and flying and flying and I see the jungle
underneath me, and I said, 'My God, we're already over the Japanese!'" As it turned
out Petrovsky had been sent to British Guiana, where he served as an aircraft
maintenance officer until the war ended. In 1945 he returned to New York University
to finish the course work for his degree in engineering, which he received in 1946.
During the next year Petrovsky worked with Boeing Aircraft in Seattle until he was
laid off. The separation was mutual: "I didn't care for aeronautics." He and his new
bride returned to Brooklyn, where he worked briefly for an engineering company.
He was on the road again in 1948, headed toward Florida to be close to his retired
parents. Once there, he found work in civil engineering. That lasted until his wife,
who did not get along with Petrovsky's mother, contacted friends in Hollywood,
Calif., and arranged another cross-country migration.
Petrovsky settled down in Hollywood until 1966, working for various civil
engineering firms as a structural engineer. "I was working and I had good jobs and
I was doing very well .... I was recognized in my field, because I was never out of
work. When a project would end with one company, I would get a call from
another." Then, he remembers one day "walking up the stairs...and l think about
the third or fourth stair ... a voice said to me in my head, 'you're going to be hitting
that step for the next thirty or forty years'.... ! missed the family...we had the chil-
dren.., my mother and father, they lived in Florida .... So that's when I decided to
go back to the East Coast."
Back to Florida he went. Bendix Corporation hired him as a structural engineer
at Kennedy Space Center, but he soon found that his job "was a paper shuffling
job .... It was the first time I was involved with the space program, and I was
completely shattered, because everything was paper, paper. Everybody was going
to meetings. They used their own buzz-words, and I didn't understand a word of it,
because I know steel, concrete .... | realized ... 'hey, you're stuck. You can't go back
to California. Your furniture is on the way, so you're stuck here. You better make the
best of it. The thing I need, then, is a job I can depend on. So I have to go work for
the government.'" In 1968 Petrovsky landed his government job -- with NASA,
working with the organization that oversees the contractors who maintain the
launch pad facilities at Kennedy Space Center. "When I got the job, I didn't even ask
what it was all about. All I wanted was to get into the system. Well, I got into the
system .... There were about ten guys ... and we were all tracking the requirements
documentation to support the testing for the Apollo program.., it was paper.., and
l learned one thing: you got to keep your nose clean for three years, so you can
become a career [employee]. ! did that, and I moved a piece of the paper beautifully.
I punched the holes. I knew how to change the pages. I hadn't the foggiest idea what
the hell it all meant .... I kept my nose clean for three years."
Years later the branch chief who hired Petrovsky told him why he had chosen
him for the job: "You could do just so much page changes [his boss told him], and
you wait for other offices to respond. So we would have discussions. We'd have
about 10 or 12 guys having discussions. Each one is different. Each one has his input.
They wanted all kinds." They thought a Pole would add something to their
11
NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo
discussions, but they didn't have a Pole. Since there did not seem to be all that much
difference between a Lithuanian and a Pole, Petrovsky would do.
Deep in south central Michigan, about halfway between Lake Erie and Lake
Michigan, the New York Central Railroad's largest maintenance and operations
center west of Buffalo lay spread out in the town of Jackson, Mich. American
railroading was flush when Henry Strassen was born in Jackson in 1922; he was the
son and grandson of railroad engineers, and Jackson's railyards must have been
lavish with the screech and soot of locomotives. The net annual income of the
nation's railroads had surpassed the three-quarter of a billion level in the 1920s,
approaching the billion dollar mark in 1929, a sum equivalent to 31 percent of the
federal government's budget for that year. However, by 1932, as the Great Depres-
sion began to take its toll, that figure plummeted to a net loss of slightly over $100
million, recovered to its Depression era high of $220 million in 1936, and did not
return to its pre-Depression high until it was rescued by the war-time traffic of 19427
The human cost was, as most human costs are, incalculable.
To the affected families in languishing railroad towns like Jackson, the human
cost was the cost that mattered. As a boy in his early teens, Strassen was "deeply
impressed" as Jackson "was pretty much destroyed" by the Depression, its popula-
tion diminished from 75,000 to 45,000. By the early 1980s Jackson's townspeople
numbered fewer than 40,000. Thus, as a teenager, Strassen knew "damn well" that
he was not going to let his livelihood depend on "some outside group like Goodyear
or General Motors." He would try to make a go of it on his own.
For Strassen, as for Robert Strong, "probably the most significant thing in my life
was Lindbergh." Strassen had learned about Lindbergh's solitary crossing on the
family's old radio, "one with three dials and a big antenna .... I was seven years old
when he flew the Atlantic, and I was terribly impressed .... It's probably as vivid to
me as the Apollo landing. I used to go out to the airport all summer long and spend
time just sitting at the airport, and working. I'd earn 15 cents washing an airplane,
or I'd work for an airplane owner for a week, or just riding around." While his friends
"were all more interested in automobiles," Strassen built airplane models. When the
chance eventually came to pursue a career involving airplanes, he would be ready.
Strassen was the youngest of three siblings; it was his eldest sister's husband, a
successful lawyer, who first interested him in college -- initially law school. But
Strassen was also interested in mechanical things. Believing that patent law would
allow him to combine a secure profession (legal practice) with his first interest w
machinery -- he entered the University of Michigan in a combined law and
engineering program. Then, for him, as for so many other young men, the ghost of
war intervened. "I woke up one morning and I had a notice: 'Dear Mr. Strassen, you
have a nice low draft number and you're about to be drafted. If you persist in going
to law school, we will draft you immediately. But if you stay in engineering, we'll
grant you a deferment until you graduate.' So that was when I decided to be an
engineer." Strassen transferred to the engineering school and "almost bombed out
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about halfway through .... I got the bug to go into the Navy .... I went over to Grosse
Ile, near Detroit, where the Navy has an air base, and volunteered to become a naval
aviation cadet.
"In those days they took you out and flew you around in a Navy aircraft. In this
particular case it was a Navy dive-bomber. We went through the whole series of
aerobatic and simulator dives. I can't imagine going through that today!" Strassen
survived, but before he could sign up, the Navy recruiting officer urged him to
return to school and get his degree. "It was the best thing that ever happened. I
would have probably been a lieutenant at Pearl Harbor, flying out over the Pacific,
and that would have been the end of that." In the fall before his graduation from
Michigan, Strassen was approached by the Navy again, this time with an offer to
send him to graduate school in exchange for a commission as an ensign. He could
go where he wanted. He flipped a coin over MIT or the California Institute of
Technology, and it came up MIT, which he entered in 1940. Before he could complete
his degree, however, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The Navy commissioned
him and put him on active duty. He remained in the Navy until 1962, doing technical
intelligence work and program management in areas from advanced fighter aircraft
to guided missiles.
Strassen's work with the Navy gave him more than a career; it provided ever
greater exposure to the possibilities of space travel, and it was while he served as the
Navy's representative on a special NACA advisory committee that Strassen met
Wernher von Braun. By the end of 1962 the prospect of a manned landing on the
Moon and safe return "had gotten too compelling." He retired from the Navy and
went to work for NASA, believing "there was just no doubt that there was the
place to be." True space exploration, however, "didn't really sink in... until [Neil]
Armstrong walked on the Moon .... It took a long, long time to accept that manned
[space] flight was ... real."
From A. W. von Hoffman to Rudolf Diesel, from Werner von Siemans and
Gottlieb Daimler to Hermann Oberth and Wernher von Braun, German culture in
the 1920s continued a venerable tradition of engineering research. While the
American intelligentsia has often been suspicious of technological change, leaning
instead toward a world of pastoral images and populist values, science and
engineering in Germany have occupied a well-established domain as respectable
careers for those of aristocratic as well as middle class origins. Faustian ambitions
of spirit and personality, rather than the aspirations of rootless tinkerers, seem to
have fueled the German dynamo.
Born in 1923 in the old Prussian capital of Berlin to the family of a nationally
prominent German banker, Werner Posen "had always an inclination and a great
attraction...to mathematics, physics, chemistry, to natural sciences." The elder
Posen had regretted choosing a career in banking over architecture and, for that
reason, may have encouraged his son's fascination with the workings of the physical
world. The boy's parents bought him "the right kind of experimental sets and gifts,"
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and especially "erector sets. [I] loved erector sets." Soon he was entering annual
competititions for the best erector set designs. "I got one of those awards .... My
parents were proud of that." His school friends "didn't know what they wanted to
be," but he did: "I wanted to be a scientist, in particular, a physicist.
"I also read a lot of science fiction.., and that got me into some close relationship
to the rocket ship development, even though it was, at that time -- the 1930s --
certainly not something that everyone was familiar with." He remembers "many
]science fiction] books .... We had a famous science fiction writer in Germany --
Hans Dominic. I started with one [of his books] and I had to read them all .... He was,
I would say, a predominant influence on my life."
Notwithstanding Posen's scientific leanings, his father insisted on a traditional
liberal schooling for his son and sent him to a gymnasium in Berlin, where he had
to learn Greek and Latin. "I didn't like it at all ... they didn't emphasize math and
they didn't emphasize physics and all those things that I felt stronger in. [But] we had
working groups for students with common interests, and one was a working group
for physics .... We did gyro experiments and so on. So, I got ... as a young boy, the
science fiction side and then, as a high school student, I got into serious matter. At
that time I started buying -- and my father actually helped ... serious books about
math that went beyond school. I wanted to learn more than was offered to me.
"And then ... came the war."
Posen was drafted into the Luftwaffe, assigned to a communications unit, and
sent to the eastern front. Illness saved him from the worst horrors of the German
invasion of Russia, and he was returned to Germany, where he recovered in time to
be sent out again -- this time, to the North. "I got assigned to a station on the Baltic
Sea...close to Peenemuende, which was, unknown to me, the development center
for the V-2 and V-1 .... I really marvelled about that .... There were so many millions
of soldiers. And I was just picked for that right thing for me." Posen spent two years,
from 1943 to 1945, "as a soldier assigned to do tracking. We call it now radar tracking
of missiles.., it was all very much clouded in secrecy. But I had good eyes and I knew
my physics to the point that I knew exactly what they were doing two days after I
arrived." Best of all, "I even met von Braun... and I knew.., he was trying to... develop
rockets that would eventually go into space. With my background in physics and my
background in science fiction, that really made me determined at that time that I
wanted to keep doing that."
When he returned to Berlin in 1945 Posen began a study program in experimen-
tal physics at Berlin's Technische Hochschule. Working in the field of secondary
electron emission of semiconductors, he soon became immersed in "fundamental
research" in electronics, completing work for his master's and doctoral degrees by
1952. In the meantime, Posen began working as "a physics editor for what you call
in this country 'Chemical Abstracts'.... It was very good preparation for me
because ... I had already set my eyes on going over to the United States, and my
English was very good."
Posen had "set his eyes" on the United States for several reasons. "I was really
unhappy about the political situation in Germany .... [There was the] devastation,
and I wasn't really sure that the next generation of politicians in Germany would be
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all that much better .... At least equally strong, maybe even stronger, was the desire
to participate in rocket development. I knew the next step was space, and I wanted
to participate in that, and it was very clear that I couldn't, in Europe, for many, many
years." Aware that von Braun had gone to the United States, he asked an American
friend in Berlin to help him locate von Braun who, by that time, had become technical
director for the U.S. Army's Ordnance Guided Missile Development Group at the
Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Ala.
"I looked in all kinds of books and there was very little about Alabama, very
little." Nonetheless, in 1955, at the age of 32, Posen left Germany with his wife and
child, heading for Alabama. "When we finally got here, arriving in New York, they
say [sic],
"'Where are you going?'
"Alabama.
"'Are you sure?'
"My big problem, when I came [to Huntsville], was to listen to the southern
stuff ... and even know what they are saying and, then, in turn, talk so that they
could understand me. That was quite a culture shock .... I wished I had done that ten
years earlier; I would have lost my accent." Nonetheless, Posen, like dozens of other
German scientists and engineers, learned how to make himself understood. He
remained in Huntsville -- first with the Redstone Arsenal and then with NASA's
Marshall Space Flight Center -- working with rockets (since given the more
recondite name of launch vehicles) and their payloads for the rest of his career.
The city of Baltimore, largest city in the border state of Maryland, has been
washed by every current to flow across the American landscape. Its history em-
braces the slave trade, industrialization, the growth of the railroads, the influx of
successive waves of immigration, foreign shipping, urban growth and decay, and
H. L. Mencken. Before the completion of the interstate highway system in the 1960s,
millions of souls on the East Coast knew Baltimore mostly as the place through
which one lurched northward, stop light by stop light, on blistering afternoons in
July and August, to escape from the hot southern summer. As they went, they
passed miles of brick row houses with prim, plain fronts and white door stoops.
These marked the boundaries of the neighborhoods where working class people
lived, people like the parents of Philip Siebold, who was born in Baltimore in 1926,
the year Robert H. Goddard launched the world's first liquid-fueled rocket at
Auburn, Mass.
"My dad was a blue collar worker .... I grew up in a typical lower middle class,
if you can even call it middle class, [area] in Baltimore." Siebold attended various
Catholic schools in Baltimore, his aspirations largely limited to vocational educa-
tion, so he "could learn to be an office worker, a secretary, or a clerk, or something
like that." But he was a good student, good enough so that "someone casually said
to me... 'Why don't you apply to Poly?'" Baltimore Polytechnic High School, "back
in those days ... took students from any place in the city because they had special
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programs, one being a program called the advanced college preparatory course,
which was very heavily college oriented." Siebold took up the suggestion without
much purpose: "I accidentally walked in and did it ... by God's choice -- I don't
know."
Between his mother's and his father's family "of nine or ten [each], of all of us,
there are only about three people who have gone through college, one being a
Catholic priest .... I saw all these people suffering through the Depression and the
poor guys working in the shops and coming home dirty and filthy and dead tired,
and struggling, and I decided that I wanted a white collar job. And I was going to
be an engineer .... Father and mother ... really didn't understand ]his interest in
engineering], but "they were willing for me to go to high school." So he went to
Baltimore Polytechnic High School because "I knew I couldn't afford to go to
college .... I went there knowing that a lot of the people that went there came out and
got into engineering type jobs as draftsmen." With a strong technical curriculum
that included calculus, engineering mechanics, and strength of materials, "we were
admitted to most colleges in an advanced standing ... even in the Naval Academy,
they accepted our students without entrance exams." But college was not for
Siebold -- at least, not then.
When he graduated in 1942 he found a job with the Martin Company, which
"recognized the people coming out of this ]Baltimore Polytechnic High School]
program as being capable of going into their engineering department. Particularly
in those days everybody started on the drawing board .... They even offered a course
in their drawing system, their engineering system, to us in high school on Saturdays.
So I went on Saturdays .... We even studied an airplane called the '167', which is a
predecessor of one of the lightweight bombers that Britain and France bought and
used in the Battle of Africa. With that background, I no sooner finished high
school -- as a matter of fact, I was still taking finals -- when I went down and was
hired as a junior draftsman."
Siebold worked for Martin for over twenty years, interrupted only by a stretch
in the Army after he was drafted. He proudly remembers virtually every aircraft or
missile program he worked on: the Dyna Soar, the Martin B-26, "a number of Navy
airplanes, all of the seaplanes, the P5Ms ... the B-57." In the 1950s he began working
on missile programs. "A lot of them were military and a lot of them were research
vehicles that came and went." As interesting as the work was, he "recognized that
I needed to go to college .... If you're in an engineering department with lots of
engineers and you don't have a degree and they do, it doesn't take you long to
recognize that if you're going to get any place other than the menial tasks, you better
get that degree." He began night school at The Johns Hopkins University, one of the
pioneering institutions in continuing adult education, and earned his degree in
mechanical engineering in 1961, at the age of forty.
During the 1950s Siebold worked on various advanced space vehicle designs as
part of Martin's effort to get into the space business. "It was the little group of ten or
twelve in so-called advanced design that put the basic concepts together. When an
RFP [request for proposals] came in, we would look at those requirements and make
the first cut at what the vehicle should look like, and then get more refined data from
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people that then supported us." By the time Siebold finished his degree, he "had left
the design world and was now working more on the management side and [on]
things called configuration management, control and configuration .... When the
Titan III program started, ! went to Denver as engineering rep .... Baltimore was
doing subcontract ... engineering work under Denver's direction for that program.
I became the engineering liaison man stationed in the Denver division for...about
three years." When it was time to return to Baltimore in 1964, Siebold suspected that
Martin was "going downhill .... 1 saw the handwriting on the wall .... I purely
looked at it and said, 'Who's got all the money? Where's the best future?'.... NASA
was it. They were at the forefront." On his way back from Denver he stopped off at
NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston "to talk about a job." His background
appealed to the center, and he was soon hired and detailed to NASA's launch
operations center at Merritt Island, Fla. When NASA combined its growing launch
complex there with the new Kennedy Space Center in 1965, Siebold opted to remain
with the Johnson Space Center and move to Downey, Calif., where North American
(later Rockwell Corporation) was building hardware for the Apollo program. There
he worked as JSC's resident test director for the first Apollo unmanned vehicle. He
would stay at Downey, as a NASA representative working in on-site quality control,
for the next twenty years.
The immigrant neighborhoods of New York, the Bronx and Brooklyn, were
home in the 1920s and 1930s to countless boys who would grow up to leave their
mark on the postwar expansion of American science and engineering. Whether
these boys' families instilled in them a love of learning inherited from their European
or rabbinical origins, or whether those families were convinced that a cosmopolitan
profession such as medicine or science was the best vehicle of ascent from uprooted
or marginal places in the American scheme of things, the effect was the same: the
Bronx High School of Science and the Brooklyn Technical High School nurtured a
significant proportion of the talent and training that would find its way into the U.S.
space program.
Take Michael Goldbloom, born in Brooklyn in 1926. What led him to become an
engineer? "I guess it's my father that led me in that direction. My father had no
formal education. But he was probably one of the best educated men I've ever met.
He was a voracious reader. He was interested in science .... He used to take me to the
planetarium and the museum of science and industry when I was just 6, 7, 8 years
old. I became very much interested [in science] at that early age." Goldbloom went
to the Bronx High School of Science. He enlisted in the Navy in 1944, before he
reached his eighteenth birthday, and was sent to radar technician school. Twenty
months later Goldbloom was discharged and returned to school. Using his GI Bill
benefits, he was able to complete his work for a bachelor of science degree from the
College of the City of New York. He still keeps in his desk "the first good slide rule"
that he ever owned, bought with his GI Bill money.
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After earning a masters degree from Brooklyn College, Goldbloom took his first
job, with the Sperry Gyroscope Company in Nassau County, N.Y. His training in the
Navy and in graduate school had been largely in the field of automatic controls. "The
reason that Sperry wanted me was to work on automatic pilots." In 1954 Goldbloom
left New York, "never to return," and moved to Los Angeles to work for the
Lockheed Missile Systems division. He stayed in California throughout the 1960s,
working for various aerospace companies. He was working for the Northrop
Corporation's planetary program division when Northrop decided, for business
reasons, "to get totally out of the NASA marketplace." Goldbloom decided in 1970
to transfer to NASA in Washington so he could continue working in the planetary
exploration program. What brought him to NASA was "the intellectual excitement
of the job." Goldbloom had been fascinated by the notion of exploring the planets
since he was a boy, "listening to Buck Rogers on the radio when I was six or seven
years old. And the very prospect that I could earn a living doing science on Jupiter
and sending a spacecraft to Uranus or Neptune .... I couldn't resist it."
Born in 1928, Charles Stern spent the first ten years of his life in Willimantic,
Conn. and then moved with his parents into a middle class Brooklyn neighborhood
of semi-detached homes. His father had graduated from Tufts University with a
degree in chemistry, but had opted to go into business, working first in the
haberdashery trade in Connecticut and then moving into a wholesale glass business
in New York. Neither his father nor his mother -- who had thought he would make
a great accountant -- had given him any particular encouragement to go into
engineering. He was "not mechanically inclined. I'm not one of these kids from the
sticks who was in my fourth car by the time I was fifteen, either .... I hardly knew
what a car was. We had one, but I rode in it and that was it .... ! had no great yearning
to become an engineer or a scientist .... But World War I! was on, and I thought ...
'Gee, | don't want to end up in a trench or in a tank.'" Stern chose to become an
engineer "one hundred percent because of the war. If I'm going to get shot at, I want
to get shot at up [in the air], not down here. If I'm going to fight, I'd like to fight clean."
So he decided "I probably ought to go to a high school from which I could come out
with some kind of technical training...and get into the [U.S. Army[ Air Corps."
Charles Stern is another NASA engineer who received his schooling at Brooklyn
Technical High School. He remembers it as "probably the finest technical high
school in the country .... There were better scientific schools, but not technical. ] took
the aeronautical engineering course, which was ... a pre-engineering course, voca-
tional ... not particularly suited as a college prep course because it didn't offer some
of the math and language required to get into a lot of the universities at that time."
When he graduated in 1946, Stern "figured [that] coming out of high school, I
would n't have a chance to fly. A t least not as a pilot. That was officer or college stuff."
He would do "anything I could do that would get me a head start...in the
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aeronautical business .... It was, again, the war motivation, not any great desire to be
a part of the national aeronautical research establishment." He applied for admis-
sion to Brooklyn Polytechnic School "because it was one of the few schools that
would accept high school graduates with the kind of semi-vocational training I had:
no language [or] math .... I didn't get in because there was this massive influx of
veterans coming home from each of the theaters [of World War II]. So the next step
was to... enlist" in the Army Air Corps. "And I went down and failed the physical."
He entered the hospital for successful medical treatment and "I hadn't been home
more than a few more days...when I got a call from Brooklyn Poly: 'We have a
vacancy.'" So fate finally smiled on Charles Stern and he got to go to college after all.
"I took aeronautical engineering because that was probably all I was suited for --
and because it sounded interesting. As I went through college, of course, it became
more and more interesting and I did fairly well."
Stern graduated in June 1950 and war broke out in Korea shortly thereafter.
Although he had applied for jobs with various naval research organizations as well
as the NACA, he had hoped he would be able to work at the NACA's Langley
Aeronautical Laboratory. But then, "all of a sudden, there was my greeting .... In
November of 19501 went to Fort Devens, was processed into Fort Dix, was processed
down to Fort Eustis, Virginia, and spent my two years of Army [duty] at Fort Eustis."
Fortuitously, Fort Eustis was "just up the road from Langley, which was wonderful,
because it got me a head start." While still in the care of the Army, Stern was able to
begin graduate work in a joint Langley-University of Virginia program in aeronau-
tical engineering at Hampton, Va. He was released from the Army in November
1952 and began working at Langley before the year was out, completing his masters
degree in aeronautical engineering during the evenings.
Aeronautical engineering did not become just interesting for Stern, it became
downright exciting: He happened to enter the Langley laboratory at one of the
aeronautical field's most creative periods. "You remember, we had a missile crisis
gradually growing. In the early '50s we were trying to figure out how in the world
to make a ballistic missile go intercontinental ranges--5000 miles or more-- reenter
the Earth's atmosphere at almost orbital speed.., and survive till it reaches either the
ground or air burst level. One of the things one had to do was study the [airl flow
at those speeds. Or, if you couldn't simulate the flow at those speeds, you simulate
the flow at the same energy levels, and at least you get a partial simulation for the
heat transfer issues, which are the issues that are critical."
At both the Langley Laboratory and the NACA's Ames Research Center,
established in 1939 at Moffet Field, Calif., aerodynamicists were struggling with the
problem of designing a missile nose cone that would not burn up in the heat of
reentry into the atmosphere. One way of simulating the extroardinary heat energy
levels that affect nose cones on reentry was with shock tubes. When Stern went to
Langley, he worked with the "aerodynamics of shock tube flows, shock tube
boundary layers, shock tube heat transfer, shock attenuation behavior." It was
through their shock tube work that engineers at Ames and Langley discovered the
"concept of blunt body flows, which dissipate the energy in drag, heating the friction
layer of the shock layer rather than heating the body" of the missile's nose cone itself.
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"And you do that with a blunt body, not a sharp body, where all the heat goes into
the skin. ''6
Stem's career with NASA was interrupted briefly when, succumbing to the lure
of better pay, he moved to Massachusetts to work with the AVCO Corporation on
reentry heating for ballistic missile nosecones. A year later, missing "the freedom to
work in engineering science and not [to] have to worry about building [a] device,"
he left Massachusetts and returned to Langley.
Henry Beacham is a sociological rarity among the older engineers who became
part of NASA during the Apollo years. Born in 1928, he was raised in an upper
middle class neighborhood in northwest Washington, D.C., the son of well-edu-
cated parents. His mother was an editor for Vogue magazine and wrote for the
Baltimore Sun. She had also done publicity work for the women's suffrage move-
ment and worked for the National Council for the Prevention of War. In the 1920s
she and Beacham's father, a veteran newspaper man, formed an editorial research
business, for which she wrote using a masculine pseudonym: "It was in the days
when you didn't use women's names in the newspaper business." The theory
behind their business was that "an editor could find out what happened ten years
ago in a book, and he could find out what happened two weeks ago by looking
through the papers. But there was an enormous gap of recent history-- the ten year
to one year ago [period]. The trick of the game [was] to give a writer an assignment
that would be completed in a month and put into the mail and have that be
something that editors all around the country would be interested in. And it
worked."
To any one of the country boys who made their way out of rural America in the
decade between the wars, Washington was the city; but those with cosmopolitan
upbringings would look back on Washington in the 1930s and 1940s as "a very small
town." To be active in local politics, as Beacham's parents were, was to be active in
national politics. The elder Beachams "were friends of Justice [Louis D.] Brandeis,
people like that." Beacham was sent to an exclusive private boys' school in suburban
Bethesda, Md., where he mixed with the sons of lawyers, doctors, high-level civil
servants, and affluent Washington area businessmen. His principal boyhood enthu-
siasm was boats; he built his own kayak a nd rowboa t, boa ted on the South River near
Annapolis, Md., and resolved as a teenager to become a naval architect. A brief
experience working for his father proved generally unsuccessful, from both his and
his father's points of view, and by the time he was ready to think about college, he
had decided to make a career of engineering. After graduating from preparatory
school in 1944, Beacham entered Duke University. There he majored in engineering
with a minor in naval science, as part of the Navy's ROTC program. "Whereas the
Army had ninety day wonders, the Navy was still playing around with officers and
gentlemen .... They felt their officers should be college educated ... so they were
going to let us get our degrees before we were commissioned and sent to sea." When
he graduated, the Navy had more officers than it needed, so he was commissioned
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as an Ensign in the Naval Reserve. Since he was not called to active duty, he went
to work for Eastman Kodak in Rochester, N.Y. "In Rochester they had two different
labs: one, the film making; and the other, the camera operation. I was with the
camera group for about a year and a half." Then his urbane upbringing caught up
with him as he discovered (he thought) that he had in fact been "poorly educated."
He went back to school at the University of Rochester, planning to take a graduate
degree in physics -- but not before taking courses in economics and government.
"My father and mother were both newspaper people, and I missed a sense of what
was going on in the world."
From the University of Rochester, where he obtained a master of science degree
in mechanical engineering, Henry Beacham moved on to Syracuse University to do
some teaching. Then, on the eve of the Korean War, he moved to the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory at White Oak, Md. While working for the Navy could not guarantee that
he would not be called to active duty, it might have helped; Beacham was able to stay
at the laboratory for nine years doing "environmental testing and ultimately what
used to be called operations research ... weapons analysis." In 1959 he transferred
to the Navy's Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) at Anacostia. A few months after
the Project Vanguard team was transferred from the NRL to the newly formed
NASA in 1959, Beacham responded to the summons of a former NRL colleague and
transferred to NASA's new Goddard Space Flight Center. There he began his NASA
career by doing environmental testing for unmanned satellites.
Beacham could, he recalls, have gone to NRL in the early days and joined the
Vanguard program, but "it never intrigued me." At the same time, NASA looked
attractive compared to a career at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. "You get
bothered, after a while, computing ... the optimum way to kill ... the maximum
number of people. I don't think I was especially excited about the space program. ]I
was] excited about the challenge, the difficulty of it, but ! was never personally
interested in flying and -- I had no sense of the potential of what you might learn,
in physics particularly, until I had been around a while. That makes it exciting now.
But at the time, it was mostly an engineering challenge."
Bob Jones was one of those "kids from the sticks" who had regularly dirtied his
fingers with auto parts. Born in 1932 in the shadows of Pittsburgh's steel mills, Jones
left the industrial city as a small boy after his father (an electrical engineer) died,
leaving his mother to fend for herself and her small son and infant daughter. There
was a good bit of moving around as his mother fended. "Mother moved in with
relatives in various small mill towns around the area. [Then] an adventuresome
aunt," his mother's sister, also a widow, "went to Florida ... and wrote back to my
mother about how oranges grow on trees and you could pick them, and why didn't
she come down there? And so mother just picked up the two kids and went. The two
sisters rented a house" in St. Petersburg, where Jones grew up, save for a year in
North Carolina, where he and his mother moved with his stepfather, who worked
for the A & p.7 "We came back to Florida," where his mother made ends meet as a
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registered nurse, and "remained there except for some visits up north. By then I was
a southerner and I didn't really care for the north."
Many years later, as a grown man, Jones grew nostalgic at seeing an exhibit at
the Library of Congress of a "number 41/2 model erector set.., identical" to the one
he played with as a youngster. "That was the toy I would never forget. I could hook
it up early in the morning .... I remember all of those little parts, bolts, and brackets."
Then there were the chemistry sets: "We made gun powder.., you know, kids get
into things. We, in high school, got into building cannons ... take a four inch pipe,
thread it, and put a cap on it, drill a hole in the cap and pour about two inches of lead
for a good solid base, and then mix up your gun powder, which is saltpeter, charcoal,
and sulfur. Pour that in there and ram toilet paper down in it for wadding, and put
a handfull of ball bearings in there .... St. Pete's, at that time ... was not as built up,
and the high school was considered fairly out.., so there were undeveloped areas
nearby and we would take one of those things and go out in the vacant lot and tie
it down to a tree and we made fuses either out of regular fire crackers, or you would
take [a] fuse and soak it in gun powder and then put it in the oven to dry." The
ingredients for gun powder could be bought at the local drug store. "Saltpeter is an
anti-aphrodisiac for animals, and we would say, 'my father has a horse, you know'...
potassium nitrate and powdered sulfur is used for any number of things .... We put
a ball bearing right through the grammar school cafeteria wall one time. It made a
neat, one inch hole .... That was the big thing, then, besides tinkering with cars."
Before he got his first car, Jones bought himself a "Cushman motor scooter. One
of my good friends and I built the first -- we thought -- bicycle with a telescopic or
sprung front fork, rather than a rigid frame, so that the wheel would follow, like
springs on a car." Then came the 1941 model Ford coupe. "The '40 Ford was the 'in'
car in the '50s because it had a little better ride than the '41, [but] I could not find a
'40 that I could afford. So that was my first car. It was black. [In high school] my
friends and I and our crowd, we dated and socialized, but not so much as the 'in'
group-- the cheerleader, football team, football heroes and socialites .... My friend's
house was directly across the street from the high school. It had a big two-car
garage .... We would be over there working on [the] hot '41 Ford, and those guys --
you could see them there going to the dance. They wouldn't be dancing with much
delight, except it was an excuse to steal booze if you could get a hold of some .... We
were always working on cars. Frequently there would be a dance across there and
we could sense that we were one type as opposed to the partying crowd. Usually
they had a lot more money, too, and I worked different jobs. I worked at the news
company packaging magazines ... during high school. And mostly worked in gas
stations, and then got a job in a wheel alignment shop and continued that."
Growing up, Jones was not sure what he wanted to be. "Mother ... just let me
kind of find my way .... She insisted I get good grades, scolded me when I didn't ....
I made honor society. But she didn't really tend to drive me toward any career .... I
knew I didn't want to be any of the human skill-oriented people, because I didn't
think ! did well with interactions with other people, and I tended toward things
rather than people .... Psychology classes [in college], where you had to sit and talk
about yourself, drove me crazy; but a physics class, I loved."
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After he graduated from high school in 1950, Jones went to St. Petersburg Junior
College, which was "dirt cheap, like, practically free. We didn't have any money and
[the University of Florida atl Gainesville was the big state school .... I didn't know
how | was going to make it up there, and wasn't motivated. Besides, it didn't have
any engineering at all. lit was] primarily a business and liberal arts school]. Then I
got an F in calculus, and that sort of just turned me off. So I continued to live at home
and work at the Arrow Wheel Alignment Shop. They sponsored a quarter-mile stock
car race, which I suppose was one of the reasons I went, because on Friday nights you
could get the pit crew to a playing field ... in Tampa, and help.., mechanical things
and contained energy .... That was heavy stuff!"
"All of my friends-- the three guys that I ran with-- one of them had dropped
out in his freshman year and joined the Navy. My other good friend dropped out the
semester before me, and let himself get drafted. And the third hung in there, but it
was sort of like the neighborhood was coming apart. I didn't know where I was
going, and I didn't know what 1 wanted to do, and everybody was going into the
service, so I dropped out and went to work at the wheel alignment shop, knowing
full well what would happen .... It took them about six weeks and they sent me my
greeting. So I ended up in the Army, and I guess, subconsciously, 1 planned that,
because I knew all about the GI Bill."
The U.S. Army sent Jones to Alaska, where he was stationed with a small
company that ran a logistics depot. There he learned how to be a supply sergeant.
Best of all, he could oversee the "weaponry, unit armor -- which meant I got to
maintain machine guns." While he hated the Alaskan winter, he loved its summer,
and found a friend who introduced him to the natural wonders of the remote
wilderness. "He was a registered big game guide, and I saw a lot of Alaska and had
access to his car .... We went to Ghost Town, to the Kennecott copper mines. We went
down to Chitina, salmon fished, and we hunted grizzly and shot caribou." Jones and
his friend "hunted" with the camera too, often turning the lens on their buddies. But
Jones was at heart a private person, and he still remembers the refuge he made for
himself in the company supply room. "I even lived there for a while. I just put my
cot in the back to get out of that mass-- no privacy-- type living, and an old cat came
around and I befriended her. And so I had a companion. But they did move me out
of there because of the fire hazard .... Those huts were so dry. At 30 below there is
no moisture in the air."
While Jones was in the Army he realized that he knew what he wanted to do after
all. "My interest had always been in the relationship between physical objects, and
especially motion and linkages and those kinds of things." He would be an engineer.
Two years later Jones returned to Florida; he managed, with the help of the GI Bill,
to graduate from the University of Florida in 1958 with a degree in engineering. He
realized that he had a personal need for "security," and as a result he "wanted to stay
around Florida." Helped by good grades, he interviewed successfully with various
engineering companies. "Ford came and wanted to make a regional service manager
out of me. | knew enough about regional service managers to know that that was
complaints, and that was really working with the public, and I didn't want to do that.
Bendix did one of those 'fly me' [offersl up to Fort Wayne .... It was about ten feet of
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snow on the ground and they do the typical recruiting trip. You had lunch and they
met you at the hotel and took you around. And ! remember this -- what they call
bullpen .... They all had white shirts, and they all had ties on, and one guy was
working on, like, a little bracket. And I thought about that, and the cold, the snow
in my feet." Jones also got an offer from Florida Power. But "that's making steam,
making electricity. Man, you make electricity day and night, day and night .... I had
liked my power plant courses, [butl that's all you do."
His true career would begin with the Army; he was due to be interviewed by the
U.S. Army ordnance department from Aberdeen Proving Ground. "It was automo-
tive and mechanical and things that go 'clank'.... I thought, that was the place for
me." But an Army officer he was to meet with "didn't show, and here I was in my
new Sears, Roebuck suit, and I wandered down the hall and there was this outfit
called the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. It was interviewing for engineers to work
at Cape Canaveral .... They painted a pretty rosy picture.., interviewing specifically
for an engineer to work in the weight and balance section of the booster and nose
cones down there -- in the assembly test section they called it -- to determine the
center of gravity and the weight of the warheads and the thrust units for the
Redstone and Jupiter missiles .... There were some photographs of this thing that
looked like an oil rig, and the guys up there were in leather jackets and they had boots
on, and a tie. The idea of working outdoors with the hardware, hands-on -- ]and]
I could be close to Morn and Gerry [his sister, a "starving artist"J, and it's warm."
Most of all, Jones would be close to the sheer mechanical power that had always
excited him:
'I got Ito Cape Canaveral] just as they were finishing up the Redstone pro-
gram .... I was there for the first lunar probe, and ... there was a Juno that went up
and turned ninety degrees. It was sitting there, and it came back on the pad and a
shock wave came up the flame trench and blew the covers off, and a cigarette
machine outside was pierced and the candy bars and cigarettes went everywhere
and big chunks of concrete -- I thought, 'this is sporty business! This beats the hell
out of drawing brackets!' There's something about working on the rockets that's
different than working on the space station, space craft, or facilities .... I suppose it's
contained energy. I remember working on the Saturn I and IB. You remained on the
pad while the LOX [liquid oxygen] prechilled, with xenon lights, and the wind
blowing, and as those pipes chill, they scream. The vents are blowing and you are
clear and the techs are buttoning it up. You're in a headset ... and this thing is
groaning and moaning and the hydraulic pumps are coming on .... The real highs
were either in the blockhouse, as a nice GS-5, GS-7 weight engineer, at the moment
of ignition, hearing that sharp crack, or, if my alternate was in there, being at the road
block, which was a quarter of a mile away ... sitting in the pick-up truck. We would
watch that thing ignite a beautiful, absolute, thunderous roar, zillions of horse-
power, and you visualize them valves workin' and them turbo pumps goin'
ch-ch-ch-ch-ch-ch-- ." Or when the rocket was just "clearing the pad, just before the
structure went back, during final closeout. The liquid oxygen on board. The thing
is smokin' and ventin' and shakin' and screamin'.
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"That's watching the hardware."
Robert Strong, Dan O'Neill, Isaac Kuritzky, Ernest Cohen, Isaac Petrovsky,
Henry Strassen, Werner Posen, Philip Siebold, Michael Goldbloom, Charles Stern,
Henry Beacham, and Bob Jones: born between World War I and the eve of the Great
Depression, they were the progeny of an America that would be barely recognizable
to the younger men and women who would be working with them at NASA at the
height of the Apollo era. They were the sons of an older industrial America,
predominantly from the upper Midwest and the Northeast. Only one came from the
impoverished countryside of the deep South, and none came from west of the
Mississippi. Three came from the Eastern European immigration that populated this
country's older urban centers and trades. Only three were sons of engineers. And
only two, by any stretch of the imagination, could be considered offspring of an
intelligentsia which, in this country as much as in Europe, dwelt principally in
capital cities. With these two exceptions, theirs was the class that experienced the
pain of the Great Depression more than any other, with its longing for a more secure
place in the world, for salaried middle class stability. What they sought could be
found most directly through the profession of engineering, unencumbered -- partly
because of its novelty -- by the social barriers entrenched in some of the older
professions, such as law and medicine.
With the exception of the three who attended Duke University and MIT, all
attended public institutions and supported themselves partially or wholly while
going through school. They were in the first cohort of young Americans to benefit
from a nearly fourfold increase in the number who were able to go to college (from
8 percent in 1920 to 30 percent in 1959). They included the six from "blue collar"
backgrounds who would be among the first in their families to go to college, as well
as those who were of age to begin college when World War II broke out. In career
aspirations as well as education they were not, as a group, particularly drawn
toward airplanes and spacecraft. Two, it is true, had been inspired by Charles A.
Lindbergh's 1927 solo flight from New York to Paris; these two, thus inspired, were
among the first university-trained aeronautical engineers; both studied at MIT.
(These two, one of whom also attended the University of Michigan, and the graduate
of New York University, were among the earliest beneficiaries of the Guggenheim
Foundation's effort to promote aeronautical engineering.) 8 For the rest, however,
what propelled them forward was something more basic. Engineering provided not
only relatively ready access to a salaried profession; it also provided an acceptable
alternative to active military service, for engineers were eligible for draft defer-
ments. The military's ROTC programs held out comparable inducements. One
astutely noticed that aeronautics was "the coming thing," while two others recall
having read science fiction as children. Only two confessed outright to having had
an intellectual interest in science or engineering, although a few indicated as much
when they remarked simply that they "liked" engineering or machinery.
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All except the oldest, who was already at work at the NACA's Langley
Aeronautical Laboratory when World War II broke out in 1939, joined the military
as enlistees or draftees during World War II-- one of them on the German side. Most
of the eleven began their careers in the 1940s working for engineering firms; only one
ventured to make a career with the military. Seven of these eleven engineers had no
less than nine, and in two cases had had as much as twenty-one, years' experience
working in private industry before they went to work for NASA. This group
included two of the six who had been working with NASA's predecessor organi-
zations -- the NACA, ABMA, and NOL -- when NASA was formed in 1958 and
were thus among the new agency's initial engineering corps. Five joined the agency
between 1958 and 1970.
Sharing, with few exceptions, generally similar social origins and career aspira-
tions, these eleven men were bound together by the fact that the route toward the
fulfillment of their aspirations was eased by the nation's need to mobilize not only
military troops, but military technology, in the service of war. All were initially
employed by either federal engineering agencies or private firms stimulated by
wartime demands. That they were equipped for the jobs they found, or for which
they were in some instances recruited, was attributable to the fact that the federal
government, directly or indirectly, encouraged them to pursue engineering careers.
Private aspirations converged with national need as World War II (like so many
previous wars) became an engine of social change.
See Appendix C, table 4.
: "It is sweet and fitting to die for one's country" (Horace), quoted in "1914," by
Wilfred Owen (1893-1918).
Holst, an English composer, completed his orchestral suite "The Planets" in 1918.
4 Jerome Clarke Hunsaker served as chairman of the NACA from 1941 to 1956.
The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Presen t.(Stamford,
Conn.: Fairfield Publishers, 1965), Series Q 106-116, Y 357-367.
The discovery of the blunt-body theory was made in 1952 by Harvey Allen at Ames
Research Center. See Elizabeth A. Muenger, Sea rch ing the Horizon: A His tory of A rues
Research Center, 1940-1976, NASA SP-4304 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1985), pp. 66-68.
7Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, a supermarket chain.
s The Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics was established
in 1926. Guggenheim grants went to eight major universities: California Institute of
Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, the
University of Michigan, the University of Washington, Stanford University, Georgia
Institute of Technology, and the University of Akron. See Richard P. Hallion, Legacy
of Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to American Aviation (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1977).
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institution in the world.
Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense (1961-1968)
Remark to Reporters, 1966
Chapter 2
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The last time Hank Smith -- now a facilities design engineer at Kennedy Space
Center -- piloted an airplane was in 1959. He was a senior at the University of
Florida, but by then he had already put in a successful stint training as a Navy fighter
pilot. A Korean War veteran finishing college on the G! Bill, he was in an all-veteran
fraternity, and "there was this guy.., he was probably 22 or 23, who had a little
airplane." Smith's fraternity buddies, no doubt impressed by heart-stopping tales of
combat flying, pestered him to fly the fellow's airplane. "I never flew a really light
airplane -- they call them puddle jumpers -- like little Piper Cubs. This was a little
high-wing tail-dragger. I said, 'I don't know how to fly your airplane.'" The owner
of the tail-dragger was insistent; "he said, 'aw, come on.' Well, the fraternity guys
kept bugging me, 'come on Smith, you're a big hot shot Navy pilot! You go fly his
airplane.'"
So "one day in the spring, I said, 'OK, well, tomorrow morning we'll go fly, if it's
nice.'" It was nice, and the two men took off in the little plane. "I sat beside him. He
took it up to a couple of thousand [feet]. He said, 'OK, do you want to fly it?' I said,
'OK. Now, I'm going to tell you something that we learned in the Navy. When I say,
'I've got it,' I've got it. l'm in charge. Get your hands off. Put 'era over your head. I
don't care what you do.' Then I said, 'when I say, you've got it, you've got it. We've
got to do that, because I don't know your plane.' So he says, 'OK, that's a deal. If we
have trouble, you'vegot it.' I say, 'OK, I've got it.' So I took this thing through some
15 angle bank turns -- you know, you had to use rudder pedals to coordinate the
whole flight. Then I say, 'OK, you've got it.' He says, 'come on, fly it!' I say, 'OK, I've
got it again .... Will this thing do 30 degree angle bank turns?' He said 'yes.' I say,
'will it do 45 degree angle bank turns?' He said, 'yes.' I say, 'will it do 60 degree angle
bank turns?'
"He says, 'I don't think so! ! don't think I've ever done over 45 degree angle bank
turns!'
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"I said, 'look back that way,' because I knew where we were going. By the time
he stuck his head back there I cranked that thing up, put on every bit of power I had,
and did a 60 degree angle bank turn, rolled it back, did another one, rolled again, did
another .... I didn't know ifI could do it, but I had just enough power to hang in there.
"Then I said, 'you've got it!'
"This kid's eyes were huge! Big!"
That a fraternity brother might own his own airplane was almost unthinkable
in 1934 when Smith was born in Oneonta, then a small city of 12,000 in upstate New
York. "We lived out in the country ... a mile outside of town ... that's all dairy
country." Smith and the other youngsters worked on the farms, putting hay up in
barns and hauling and spreading manure. "We went through all that. Then, in the
fall, the next big thing was to put corn in the silos .... We'd work from 8 or 9 o'clock
until dark.
"We did ... a lot of odd jobs. I worked in the filling stations. One time a boy and
l-- for several years we took about a half an acre and grew vegetables, and sold them
over in the city. We always had a garden. My mother canned and froze and did
everything like that .... We grew carnations .... Easter Sunday morning there'd be
four or five people making corsages .... We'd be up all night and I'd start delivering
about 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning to the Catholics .... I'd deliver until noon-time.
I never made it to church on many occasions. In the afternoon, it was plants, lily
plants. I had to get all those delivered."
Oneonta was a railroad town, one of those places through which the Delaware
and Hudson passed on its way from Pennsylvania through New York State to
Canada, mostly carrying coal to Montreal. Smith's father, like "just about everybody's
father, worked on the railroad. He worked in the shops area. They did a lot of
fabricating of box cars, repaired cars. They had built passenger cars in the old days.
There was a big roundhouse there where they fixed locomotives .... We used to go
down and play on the trains.., in the empty box cars. Dad used to take us every once
in a while down to the big old roundhouse where they repaired things, and if they
wanted to move it around, we'd get on and watch it go around." Smith was
impressed by the locomotives, "those big powerful things. I always can remember
the filthiness of them, how dirty everything was.
"At one time [Smith's father] worked with his hands. Then... in later years, he
ran the storeroom, handling parts and materials. He ran it, kept it stocked, and
serviced it." While his mother was mostly a homemaker, she had gone "to a little
business school" and worked occasionally as "a legal secretary for the various
attorneys around my home town ... back then, to make ends meet."
Going to college had become, by the time Smith was growing up, the normal
expectation of Oneonta's "solid" families. "We'd all go to college; we'd all gradu-
ate .... If you were a good student, you went on to college." The expectation of a
college education had already begun to work its divisions on the town's high school
students. "There were three curriculums: there were the guys who were jocks-- did
the PE [physical education] stuff, and shop. They also had business courses." And
then, "for the good students," there was the precollege curriculum, in which
students took mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics. Smith was a good
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student, and he "loved math." His father and mother "were eager for me to go to RPI
[Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]," and Smith, too, "always wanted to go to RPI, [to]
get an engineering degree there."
But he never made it to RPI. Instead, he went to one of New York State's two-
year technical institutes, where he began a course in electrical technology. Before he
could finish, he "got inspired to go into the U.S. Navy." Naval recruiters came to the
campus "and started recruiting .... The uniforms were really sharp -- the blues, the
golds, the white hats -- really sharp! Big time stuff! ... They told everybody back
then that you were the top 10 percent of American youth. You know, like the
'Marines need a few good men.' And... the guys that were accepted into that program
were good .... When I started in all the testing ... there were, like, 38 guys from all
over that were getting physicals, testing, both mental and physical. Out of that
group ... seven of us made it .... The rest either couldn't pass the mental test, which
I thought was easy," or the physical. And thanks to "all that good farm work,
[Smith] was in good physical shape."
He was accepted into the Naval Aviation Cadet program when he was twenty
years old. He stayed with the Navy for four years, undergoing rigorous flight
training and officer's ground school at Pensacola, Fla. and the Naval Air Station at
Cecil Field, near Jacksonville. By then he had become a Florida resident, which
meant that he would have had to pay out-of-state tuition had he wanted to go to RPI.
Because he had gone into the Navy during the Korean War (although he was never
sent to Korea), he was eligible for GI Bill benefits. He enrolled at Jacksonville
University -- "a small private institution" -- where his new wife had a teaching
position. "I went two years there .... I took all this pre-engineering stuff, the chemistry
and all ... to get all this stuff out of the way."
Two years later he transferred to the University of Florida, where he earned a
degree in civil engineering in 1962. He and his wife had "bought a little home," and
when it came time to look for a job he applied to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
in Jacksonville. The Corps "had started all the design for NASA for the Kennedy
Space Center .... In the process, they decided -- since it was getting so big-- that they
needed a Canaveral District office .... So they formed that spring the Canaveral
District office, and in July of '63, two or three hundred of us came down here." Smith
worked with the Corps for about a year, until March 1964, when he went to work for
NASA as a facilities design engineer. "This whole place ... on this side of the river, 1
I've seen come out of the ground .... We buried jeeps in the mud -- had sand in the
hair and face." He never left.
Paul Dussault was always something of a misfit, someone who "oscillated
around" a lot when he was young, before he decided what to do with his life. His life
began on the south side of Chicago, now in the inner city; he lived in a flat with his
mother after his father left home when Dussault was too small to remember. Born
in 1932, he led an adventuresome boyhood, watched over by a parent who was both
tolerant and "hard-driving." His mother had been an Army nurse during World
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War II, which meant that he also lived, off and on, with his grandmother. "When I
was in elementary school, I was at the top of my class. I got good grades .... We went
out and did lots of things when I was a kid. We'd go over the whole city exploring.
[ think every weekend there were a bunch of us who would always go downtown
to the museums and things like this, and ride on the streetcars all over the place. It
was cheap transportation. Our parents let us go around ... when I was about eleven
years old, twelve years old, I was riding all over the subways. Then something
happened when I got to high school. There was some misfortune there in the print
shop class ... there were a lot of other things that go on with people of that age. And
so I thought to myself, 'Well, I'm just going to get by from here on out.' So that's what
I did.
"I got red Fs all through high school .... I would go about four days every week.
I knew if I was absent more than that, you automatically flunk. But ... I always had
it calculated right down to the last day. So you could miss 20 percent of the time and
still pass .... I would take off every Friday. [Mother] knew I was messing around and
she knew [ was a lot smarter than that. I don't think she was too worried. She figured
I'd straighten out. I was.., interested in something different than everybody else ....
I've always been interested in airplanes ... I used to work on model airplanes. And
when I got to high school... I got interested in World War I airplanes." So on the days
when he skipped school, Dussault scoured old magazine stores for flying magazines
from the 1930s and built airplanes. Everybody else was "interested in World War II
airplanes.., but I wanted to go back further, because this was something that wasn't
so well known .... I used to -- rather than work with kits and stuff like that -- I'd
rather make my own drawings and work from there and build them up .... I would
work with the whole structure of the airplane .... They didn't fly very well .... They
were too heavy; I built them strong .... But I had a lot of fun building them."
Dussault did his calculations right and managed to graduate from high school
and enter a "junior college anybody could get in in those days. I was there for a
couple of weeks and decided I didn't want to do that either .... | was playing on a
basketball team, and... I was also working in this hospital [as an orderly] where my
mother was the head nurse .... I just went there because there were a lot of student
nurses there .... So I quit the school, I played basketball eight hours a day at the Y."
And when "basketball season was over, I joined the Army." By then the United
States was at war in North Korea, and Dussault hankered after the excitement of
combat: "I kept volunteering to get there .... I always liked the military .... I was
trying to make myself look older during World War II, so I could join up." His luck
held, and he managed to join "a special regimental combat team where General
William Westmoreland was the commanding officer .... I enjoyed the whole thing,
because seeing places like Tokyo and stuff like that in Asia was good experience ....
| was in the paratroopers, which was kind of fun .... I liked airplanes."
When the Korean War was over Dussault knew for certain only one thing: he did
not want to stay in the Army. He tried junior college for a few months, taking liberal
arts courses, working "a little harder this time, and [I] got pretty good grades." But
he still had no idea what he wanted to do with himself, and he needed money, so he
went to work for a meatpacking company in the Chicago stockyards. A brief
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inspiration to become a pilot for the U.S. Air Force came to nothing, and he supposed
that he could stay close to airplanes by becoming an aeronautical engineer. Since the
University of Illinois "would, then, admit anyone regardless of grades," he went
there and after two years majored in aeronautical engineering.
At the University of Illinois one of his professors introduced him to orbit theory,
which he was studying when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I in 1957. "The
people at the University of Illinois did some crude tracking of the spacecraft to pin
down its orbit. And we were making some calculations on it... it was kind of
exciting." Then he began taking courses in rocketry and design, and decided that
astronautics might be even more exciting than airplanes. Two years into the "space
age" he realized that he would have to go to the University of California in Los
Angeles (UCLA) to find the "courses in orbit design and.., planning missions, space
missions in the future" that he wanted. He got a summer job with the Rand
Corporation, which was hiring graduate students. "They were doing all kinds of
exciting things there .... I worked on some interplanetary orbits." He had gone to
UCLA principally to study with "this guy ... who was from the old school that had
thought up some nice, elegant ways to calculate all of these orbits by hand. But when
the computers came along, it kind of put him out of business."
In the summer of 1960, half-way into a master's degree program, Dussault ran
out of money and began looking for a job. He found one at NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center. Dussaulrs career at Marshall was brief. "I hadn't finished my
master's" thesis and "people were a little irritated with me at Marshall, because I was
working on my thesis while I was there .... I did mainly my stuff, which was on
libration point satellites." A libration point, he explains, is "an equilibrium point in
an isolated, two-body gravitational system, such as the Earth and the Moon, [which]
are somewhat isolated in the solar system. Or it could be the Sun and the Earth, or
the Sun and Jupiter. It would not be the Sun and the Moon, for instance, because the
Moon is really going around the Earth .... There are five equilibrium points in this
two-body system. This is a general sort of thing that holds throughout the universe ....
Now, if you place a spacecraft at one of these points, with just the right velocity, then
it will stay in the same configuration relative to the other two bodies. So it's kind of
in equilibrium with them." The notion of a gravitational equilibrium between the
Earth and the Moon has been an inspiration for space colony enthusiasts, who have
proposed locating colonies at libration points. 2
Dussault mailed his thesis to UCLA and then decided to become a mathema-
tician. He returned to the University of Illinois and "did almost all the course work
for a degree in mathematics, but | didn't like the pure mathematics courses. I
despised them .... And I didn't take linear algebra and real variables. Those awful
things. I couldn't take that stuffat all." Again he ran out of money. He found work
for a summer at the U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory. "And you know, you get out
there in the real world and things are kind of dull and kind of drab .... I wanted to
go back to school again."
During his last year at the University of Illinois, Dussault had become "obsessed
with one subject -- general relativity theory and cosmology. I really got into the
thing, and all of the mathematics that they had in it. I took courses in tensor
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calculus.., it had so many physical applications, I really liked it. So I thought TI1 try
to get into mathematics up at Berkeley.'" On his way back to California he made a
detour through Queen Elizabeth College at the University of London, England,
where he planned to work with a physicist who shared his enthusiasms -- and, he
confesses, enjoy the company of the college's many comely young women. "I was
over there all of three days after going over there on the Queen Mary. It was a nice
trip. But... I decided, 'Gee, ! don't like the way students live over here.' It was pretty
bad. You live in hovels. | thought, 'I'm not used to this anymore; I don't think I can
take this.' So I took an airplane home.
"I had no job, no money, nothing. And I said, 'Gee, I'd better go back out to
California and see if I can get a job.' So I just drove my car out to California, and
started looking for a job .... It turned out, ! got there at just the right time." He found
a job at Lockheed Missiles and Spacecraft's research laboratory at Palo Alto, where
he worked with John Breakwell and Stanley Ross, specialists in orbit theory. "Ross,
at that time, was working on a contract for Marshall Space Flight Center to do the
interplanetary flight handbook for NASA. And people still refer to this thing .... So
I helped him draw up all the plots ... he gave me a lot of crummy work to do and I
seemed to do it with relish, so ... he liked to have me around."
John Breakwell, meanwhile, had become "a professor at Stanford University ....
We were within a stone's throw of the university .... Breakwell, being over there...
encouraged me to come back .... I got into the school all right, because my grades
were good .... In the meantime, I got married.., my wife had lots of money and all
I had was lots of debts." His mother had remarried and built up a profitable nursing
home business. Between the two women, there was enough money to put him
through school.
He completed all of his course work at Stanford but "kept putting off the oral
examinations." Money began to run out; he was being paid "a paltry sum," and it
was time to look for a job again. This time he found one with a space mission
planning group for NASA's Electronic Research Center, located in Boston. "I'd
have to go back and forth to ERC all the time. And I had a terrible fear of flying, but
I overcame it .... I used to jump out of planes." But as a passenger, "I didn't have
any control over the situation. That's what I don't like." He worked for the
Electronic Research Center for three years; most of the time he was actually located
at NASA's Ames Research Center. Meanwhile, with the help of Stanley Ross, he was
able to get a NASA fellowship at Stanford University to complete his doctorate
"working day and night, weekends, everything -- well, l was really interested in
what I was doing, too.
"I had a lot of ideas ! had developed in my thesis. One of the main ones that had
some applications as far as NASA was concerned was a data-relay satellite for
communications off the far side of the Moon. And it involves being in a libration
point orbit.., and controlling this spacecraft, because the libration point orbits are
not stable .... So I did all of the first work on this stuff. And then I thought, 'I'm going
to see some of this stuff used, because I'm not interested in just writing papers'.... I
tried to get this started when I was at Ames... but people just kind of laughed. And
there were scientific applications also, putting a spacecraft in a halo orbit about the
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Sun and the Earth where it could monitor the solar wind as it came in towards the
Earth .... I took that [idea] to some of the space science guys at Ames... and they said,
'Nah, we're not interested in that'.... I said, 'Hey, you can put it in the tail of the Earth
and just leave it there all the time.' 'Nah, we aren't interested in that.' Most of the
people that you find working at NASA are specialists in one thing. And they don't
seem to want to know what anybody else is doing.The one thing I did get with my
jumping around in different areas is, I have a pretty good background in physics and
space science and mathematics and engineering. So [it was the] perfect thing for a
systems engineer coming into NASA, and then all my model airplane work early on,
when I get into the spacecraft systems, it's the same type of thing."
Once at the Electronic Research Center, Dussault discovered that "they weren't
interested in space science, but they were interested in the communications on the
far side of the moon. And the lunar landings were taking place around that time
[and[ the orbiting of the Moon. And it became pretty obvious that they were having
problems communicating with these guys on the far side. So I thought, 'Gee, I'm in
NASA now, I'm going to start writing letters.' So I wrote a letter to George Low,
saying, 'Hey, you ought to worry about the safety problem here, you know'.... He
wasn't too happy getting it. 'Who is this upstart telling me I should do something
different?'" Dussault got "a very short reply, just 'Thanks for your information; we'll
file it somewhere.' The people at the Electronic Research Center (ERC) were pretty
interested in this .... But nobody took ERC very seriously; that place was the outer
edges of the NASA system."
NASA's Electronic Research Center was closed down in 1969, and its facilities
transferred to the Department of Transportation. Dussault, who (along with his
wife) had not liked living in Boston anyway, had to look elsewhere for work. Finally
he found a place for himself at Goddard Space Flight Center, where there was some
interest in a lunar communications satellite. That interest was short lived, but
Dussault stayed on at Goddard, continuing to work out his ideas in the development
of trajectories for unmanned satellites.
George Sieger, like Paul Dussault, was left fatherless as a small boy and also
marvels over the freedom for adventure that meant when he was growing up. World
War II not only provided his mother an occupation and an income (as it had
Dussaulrs mother), but exposed him to an early and lasting enthusiasm: airplanes.
Sieger was born in Toledo, Ohio, where his mother operated a boarding house to
support herself, George, and his two sisters. There she sheltered enlisted men (and,
after the war, veterans) as they passed through town. There were "steam-fitters who
worked at the local refineries. We had a semi-pro basketball team in there. We had
country 'n western singers .... They'd go through and stay anywhere from a couple
of days to weeks at a time," remembers Sieger. "After they would leave, they would
send various packages, mementos, stuff that they had gotten overseas .... So I had a
continuous source of everything from war relics to tons of balsa wood -- literally
huge boxes of balsa wood .... A couple of the people that we had got me interested
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in modeling various airplanes .... They'd send me aircraft recognition manuals, and
I became very interested in the military services, and in particular, flying."
The self-confidence he would later need hovering over the controls at mission
operations at Johnson Space Center during an Apollo mission came to him as a boy.
"It came from the fact that to a great extent I was on my own to pick and choose and
make my decisions from a very early age. I used to drive my mother nuts. One day,
I'd be there coming home from high school." Then "I'd have a couple of days off from
work, and I'd hitch-hike to see the air races -- say, 'Hi, Mom, I'm going!' Christ, if
my kids did that to me today, I'd have cardiac arrest!"
When Sieger "was in late grade school and early high school, I was.., building
my own airplanes. Originally, I started off from kits, and found out that the kits left
a lot to be desired. I had [acquired] a hard and practicable knowledge of aerodynamics,
just in the process of building various airplanes. And I finally came to the point
where I started designing my own airplanes." His first flight happened when he was
a teenager; a brother-in-law took him to Franklin Field, where he had the first of
many flights in "an old Piper J-2 Cub." Sieger's interest in airplanes and flying
readily transferred itself to spaceflight, as he began to devour, in the 1940s, articles
by "the Wernher von Brauns and the Willy Leys who [had] written in several of --
I guess, at that time, what was considered pulp magazines ... those were the only
magazines that would publish some of their far-out thoughts."
By his senior year in high school at Toledo Central Catholic, Sieger was ready
for an imaginary venture into space, writing for his first term paper "a thesis ... on
going to the Moon, where I had taken some of the more advanced thinking of the von
Brauns and the Willy Leys and, to a great extent, sketched out the basic type machine
that would go to the Moon. I was naive enough to believe it could be as simple as a
three-stage rocket. 3 I designed all of the interior portions of the rocket .... The
unfortunate thing is, I never thought how to get back .... And when I was in the Air
Force over in Formosa, in October of '57, I also had the opportunity to see the impact
of Sputnik I on people in the Far East. There was no doubt in my mind that I wanted
to be associated with space at the earliest opportunity I could. But at the same time,
I was also interested in aircraft flying."
High school had been especially important to Sieger. "They had an extremely
good engineering school associated with [it] ... a coop program, where, as you
finished your second year of drafting, you then picked a direction, whether you
would go into the mechanical side ... the surveying side ... the electrical side. They
had several good instructors, who turned me on to ... looking forward to going to
college. I also had some fine chemistry and physics teachers." He would not be the
first, nor would he be the last, youngster to be taken under the wing of a dedicated
and enterprising teacher determined to live and act the pieties of a democratic
American education.
Things were tight in the Sieger household as George, his mother, and two sisters
all worked to make ends meet and have enough left over for the sisters to attend
nursing school. For Sieger, the fruits of hard work turned into a mixed blessing. On
one hand, he earned two scholarships -- one to the U.S. Naval Academy, and the
other to a Naval ROTC program at Notre Dame. But "I had been carrying several jobs
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throughout" high school, including a job "at the A & P warehouses, and the standard
fare down there was ... a quart of chocolate milk and some brownies for supper
every night when you got home from school; I had been doing that for a couple of
years in a row." The result was diet-induced diabetic symptoms, and he "flunked
both of [the] physicals" required by the Navy.
Undaunted by this reverse in the fortunes of one of her charges, Sieger's history
teacher at Central Catholic, "Sister Mary Mark... gave me the encouragement to go
off and believe that I could get through college on my own. She ... kept me going
on .... My father was a World War I veteran, and she had done enough research to
find out that ... the State of Ohio Elks Association provided funding for schooling
for lchildren of] deceased veterans of World War I." Sieger won a modest scholarship
from the Elks -- "it was five hundred dollars a year; in the early '50s, that was a hell
of a lot of money" -- which he took to begin work on a B.S. degree program at Parks
College in East St. Louis, Ill. Parks was one of the few aviation schools in the country
that offered a B.S. degree, and Sieger was keen to get into a U.S. Air Force aviation
training program, which required one year of college. His sisters would work
successfully with him to repair his diet, so he could pass his physical. But there was
more to Parks College than convenience. "I liked their basic philosophy -- that in
order to graduate from school you had to be able to design an airplane, build an
airplane, and fly an airplane .... As you were approaching the end of your
curriculum, you would get into a two-year design project where you would actually
take and build that ... airplane at Parks College."
He finished work for his B.S. degree in three years and in 1954 applied for and
received his appointment for Air Force flight training. During the nine-month hiatus
between graduation and his reporting date, he worked for McDonnell-Douglas
Aircraft at Lambert Field in St. Louis. There he learned "an awful lot about aircraft
flight test data reduction [working on} one of the first of the true supersonic
airplanes, the F-101A, [and] the XV-1 Convertaplane, which was a pulsejet-driven
helicopter." In the spring of 1955 he finally began his flight training for the U.S. Air
Force, graduating from basic to propellor and then jet-driven aircraft before being
assigned to a fighter squadron. It was during that training period that he met another
person who would make a large difference in his life: Morris Coleman. "He was a
barnstormer, crop duster, and flight instructor. He taught you an awful lot, not only
about flying, but about people. And I think he was very instrumental in developing
a large amount of my attitudes Iabout] working with people .... His philosophy in
dealing with your crew chief was one of the most instrumental ... because the crew
chief's the guy who is ultimately responsible for you, your ass, and your airplane.
You take good care of him and he'll take good care of you .... You've got to earn
respect, so right off the bat, you proceed to earn it. He also taught me to fly."
Sieger was attached to the 13th Air Force and sent to Korea to fly F-86s. "We got
an opportunity to fly all over the Far East .... We ranged down into Okinawa,
Formosa; we got down into the Philippines .... We were all over in Thailand, and we
got an opportunity to see the Far East .... It was the best flying in the world." Flying
tankers (what the Air Force evidently had in mind for him next) would have been
too much of a let-down; Sieger left active duty and returned to McDonnell-Douglas
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in St. Louis. He had hoped to get a slot as a test pilot, but "at that time they were knee
deep in pilot slots, so I picked up a flight test engineering slot." He began work for
McDonnell, about 1958, at Holloman Air Force Base working on F-101B and F-102B
aircraft and on McDonnelrs new missile program. For two years he worked for
McDonnell, learning what he could from the experience of "hands-on operational
engineering."
By 1960 NASA's Space Task Group, newly formed at Langley Research Center
to orchestrate the Mercury -- the first American 'man in space' -- program, was
advertising in Aviation Week for capable young men with operational engineering
experience. Sieger applied and was accepted. He soon found himself working in the
control center at Cape Canaveral during the Mercury launches. In time, millions
around the world would see the back of his head as he peered at display screens or
bent over controls at NASA's mission control in Houston; few were aware of the
cool-headed temperament needed to talk men -- however much of the "right stuff"
they might have -- through the perils of the remote and unforgiving sea of space.
The Southern Railway passes along the eastern slopes of Virginia's Blue Ridge
mountains and crosses the James River at Lynchburg, the city where Ed Beckwith
was born in the worst year of the Depression. Surrounded by the rolling hills of some
of the loveliest country in the East, home of Virginia's fabled gentry, Lynchburg has
struggled off and on to sustain its mixed community of small factories, merchants,
bankers, rail entrepot, and local and neighboring colleges. The city itself ushers the
southward bound toward the Piedmont's small manufacturing region that spreads
loosely from Danville down through North Carolina, a result of the wa ter power that
flows east from the mountains. "My birthday," says Beckwith, still sensitive to the
deprivations of poverty, "is 1933, which indicates probably a small family. I was the
only child. Of the people I knew, almost all were either single, or only had one
sibling .... We became close to one another.., through the family." The two principal
industries in Lynchburg at that time employed Beckwith's parents. "Father was
with a railroad express company ... he was always called 'the extra board,' which
meant that he did a job each week or so, looking at the board to see which jobs were
available according to seniority. Sometimes he rode the mail car or freight car to
various cities from Lynchburg. Sometimes he just handled freight." Beckwith's
mother worked in the Craddock Terry shoe factory.
"I wanted to be a pilot .... Across the street from me lived Woody Edmondson,
who was the national aerobatics champion for several years during the war .... I was
just a little kid. I knew him -- not well .... I could see him drive in and drive out."
And so Beckwith became enamored of airplanes. "I was the first kid on the block to
build stick models and that kind of thing .... Back in those days, you were fortunate
to find a balsa wood kit. They were pine, because balsa was being used by the
military in World War II .... I was in sixth grade in school; I remember carrying my
first model to the auction and auctioning it off. It was very popular, and it went very
quickly .... I was excited."
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Beckwith had finished high school and begun college at Lynchburg College
when disaster struck his family. "My parents both were in an automobile accident
and neither worked for a while. I stopped school and went to work at Craddock
Terry .... I nailed on shoe heels." However, a friend of the family who knew of
Beckwith's enthusiasm for airplane model building suggested the NACA's ap-
prenticeship program at Langley Research Center near Hampton, across the James
River from Newport News. Beckwith applied, and after hardly a month of nailing
heels into shoes at Craddock Terry, Beckwith began work at Langley in June 1953.
"Immediately I wanted to get into the model shop .... Of course it was filled up. I
went into the sheet metal shop."
The NACA also helped Beckwith finish college. Under its cooperative educa-
tion program, he returned to school at the Norfolk Division of William and Mary,
and at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, while he was working at Langley and accu-
mulating credit toward an advance in grade and salary. His college studies under
the coop program were a "straightforward [curriculum] in aeronautical
engineering .... The only thing that the coops did not have to do... during those days,
was -- for one English course we were allowed to substitute reports that we had to
write back at NACA .... We didn't get any credit for it; we just didn't have to take it.
"During the coop plan, each time you came back to work after spending a
quarter at school, you went to a different organization .... During those early days,
coops were cheap labor, so we spent a time in the sheet metal shop .... I had already
spent a year there, [and] in the machine shop, the wood shop -- which is the model
maintenance shop; in the instrument research division, in which we used to
calibrate instruments.., and then, after those had been covered, you went into some
research organization -- hypersonics, subsonics, whatever."
Finally, in 1958, Beckwith earned a bachelor's degree in aeronautical engineer-
ing. "In my travels around [Langley] field ... working at various places, I learned to
know people .... I was fortunate enough to be able to get to enough places in
engineering -- besides research scientist-- to know where I wanted to go, and they
were willing to have me back, so I went to what was called the free-flight tunnel ...
flew models in a wind-tunnel." It had been a long way there, but he made it.
One of the few black men to reach the upper tiers of NASA's management
hierarchyd William McIver was another child of Brooklyn, where he was born in
1936. He was one of five children; his mother was a homemaker, and his father was
a freight inspector for the Lehigh Valley Railroad. He remembers his boyhood as
having been "fairly sheltered. I was largely interested in athletics and science ever
since I was a kid. I used to listen to these radio programs like Captain Midnight
and ... the Green Hornet. I ... always remember sending in for secret decoder rings
and ... got interested in all that sort of stuff. And particularly during the Second
World War, there were all these things about secret weapons and NAZI agents ...
hiding out in Patagonia developing a secret weapon and so forth. So I got
interested ... in science and engineering from a sort of adventure standpoint."
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While he does not say so, his parents must have urged schooling on their
children, for of their four offspring who survived childhood, one became an
electrical engineer, one a political scientist, one went into business administration,
and one, William, obtained a doctorate in aerospace science. The strongest influence
on his career was one of his father's godsons, a chemical engineer who gave William
a summer job working in his company. "I used to work part time [for him]. He'd let
me do drafting .... In hindsight, now, I can see that it was really just busywork, but
at the time it was great .... He had a small company, a precision machine shop, so ]
got a chance to actually get my hands on a lathe and a drill press."
McIver went to Brooklyn Technical High School, "one of the three competitive
[science and technical[ high schools in New York City. There's Bronx High School
of Science. There's Peter Stuyvesant and there's Brooklyn Tech. Those are the science
and engineering high schools. Then there's the school of needle trades, the school of
fashion and design, the school of music and art .... I went to the engineering school
largely because it was in Brooklyn, and because of the athletic teams .... There was
also some snob value in going to a competitive high school like Brooklyn Tech. And
then, probably the key thing was that CCNY [the City College of New York] in those
days was absolutely tuition free .... If you had something like an A average in high
school.., you could go to CCNY tuition free, which is, thank heaven, what I was able
to do. And that was very lucky, because then I really didn't have to work full time
or anything like that when I was in college. I could study .... I was very fortunate."
McIver now chuckles over his great expectations when he graduated from
CCNY in 1957 with a mechanical engineering degree: "I -- as [were] many City
College guys -- was fairly self-confident. | decided I wanted to come to Lewis
[Research Center] and I had heard about people like Si Ostrach, Frank Moore, and
Harold Mirels.L.. I wanted to join their research group -- with my bachelor's
degree!" When he was interviewed for his first job at Lewis, McIver was politely told
that he might not be quite ready to work with the likes of Ostrach, Moore, and Mirel,
but that he could get his feet wet in some research at Lewis, and, after he had some
experience, he might move into "analytical research." He was hired by George M.
Low," then chief of the special project branch of the supersonic propulsion division
at Lewis. Low encouraged him to do graduate work at Case Western Reserve with
NASA support "as long as I made up the time on Saturdays or Sundays." This
Mclver did, earning his master's (1959) and doctoral (1964) degrees while working
at Lewis.
Mclver finally got to work with Simon Ostrach who, in addition to being his
branch chief at Lewis, was his professor at Case Western Reserve. "Those were the
glory days ... of aerodynamics and high-speed research." Like so many aerody-
namicists in the 1950s, Mclver was drawn to the problem of protecting the nose
cones of intercontinental ballistic missiles from burning up on reentry. Where his
own work converged with the problem was in the possibilities of sheathing the
blunt-shaped nose with an ablative material that would burn away as the missile
reentered the Earth's atmosphere. Mclver stayed at Lewis until 1969, when he was
lured by NASA's "career development" programs to Washington, where he began
38
Beginnings: 1932-1948
a second career on the executive staff in the administrator's office and a program
office at NASA Headquarters.
Among the characteristics that distinguish NASA's Apollo era engineers, none
is so striking as the fact that virtually all of them are white males. Only among the
youngest -- those who arrived at NASA in the late 1960s -- did the percentage of
blacks creep to 3 percent, or the percentage of women to 4 percent. Compared to
black and women scientists and engineers employed nationally in 1970 (1 percent
and 5 percent, respectively), a black engineer had a better chance of employment
with NASA, while a woman engineer fared slightly worse7 By 1984, 13.1 percent of
NASA's scientists and engineers were women, while 8.7 percent were black.
(Nationally, in 1984 about 12 percent of all employed scientists and engineers were
women, while 2 percent were black.S) Blacks continued to find NASA, a government
agency, a relatively more ready employer than did women. Richard Ashton and
Marylyn Goode were two other NASA Apollo era engineers-- one a black man, the
other a black woman -- who managed to thread their way through the eye of the
needle. Both were from the South and were beneficiaries of that region's network of
black educational institutions and communities with strong religious foundations
that had emerged from the hopefulness of Reconstruction. Both gravitated toward
Langley Research Center.
Ashton's father was a farmer from Westmoreland County in northern Virginia.
The land was everything, the southern black family's succor and hedge against the
future. The Ashton farm had been in the family since Richard's great, great
grandfather cultivated it. "When he passed away my great grandfather left the
provision in [his] will that any Ashton that wanted to could take up homestead there.
I've got a number of relatives living up there on the farm right now." Stability and
continuity also marked Ashton's mother's family. His grandmother had lived
"around the corner" from his great grandmother in Norfolk until she died at the age
of ninety-five. Ashton, his mother, and grandmother all grew up in the same house.
Each parent's family was large, with eight or more children, while his parents
themselves produced a large family -- Ashton was one of eight siblings. Ashton
himself has four children. "It makes a very warm, close relationship, having a very
large family." What is more, he observes, "out of that group you've got to have a
couple of good ones. And later on the older kids, they always tend to serve as role
models for the younger ones." Ashton is also the son and grandson of men who
fought in segregated armies. His father managed to enter Hampton Institute in 1942
on a baseball scholarship only to be drafted and sent to fight in Europe and the
Pacific. Then there's "great, great uncle Joe that fought in the Spanish American War,
and my grandfather [who] fought in World War I."
In his own way Ashton knows that a national need for technical skills has
promoted social and economic mobility, as he remarks that he and his brothers and
sisters "came through when they had the Sputnik era in space and everyone was
hired on, going and working for NASA and so forth .... Most of us went into the
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technical fields, with the exception of one brother who went into business admin-
istration and one sister that went into elementary education." Indeed, it would seem
as if the "space age" was as liberating for Ashton's generation as the Union armies
had been for his great, great grandfather's. Four of his five sisters have been
employed in some facet of engineering-- one as a mechanical engineer for the Navy,
another as a nuclear technician (also for the Navy), another as an electronics
technician, and the fourth as an electrical engineer for the Northrop Corporation.
One brother, an Army officer, like Ashton has a degree in physics.
"Resourceful" best describes the kind of childhood Ashton and his brothers and
sisters had, one in which they learned mathematics not only because their father
insisted on it, but because the boys all "worked" a paper route. "From when I was
eleven to eighteen, I had a paper route for ten miles .... Counting became a part of me
and the rest of my brothers, and we just passed it on down. Even my sisters, from
time to time, worked that route. My older sisters, they used to work in stores. They
had to do a lot of counting." It was their resourcefulness, too, which enabled them
to learn basic fluid dynamics when they first became interested in moving things.
Living in Norfolk, "on the water," Ashton amused himself by making boats, and
then airplanes.
"All the materials I needed to make airplanes or submarines were right back
there [on the water front] ... reeds, and crates .... The most I would have [to] buy
would be rubber bands." He learned how to put "together an airplane so that it
would glide and fly pretty well, how to balance it, [the correct] wing spread .... I
wasn't reading books .... I was just trying the various designs, [doing] a lot of
experimentation .... I was just crazy about airplanes. I had an encyclopedia of all
sorts of airplanes from World War I and II .... My brothers ... we all used to make
planes, submarines. We used to make submarines that would go under the water
and come back up ]with] rubber bands ]to move] a propellor .... Submarines have
diving planks and you turn them down and the power from the propellor pushing
them forward causes the submarine to dive down just as an airplane will go up. As
long as the submarine was being powered, it would stay down .... I used to carve [the
propellors] out of [tree] limbs, old clothes pins." One day in 1957, when Ashton was
thirteen years old, he made his "first metallic rocket. It was too heavy to fly. But I was
in a metalwork class and I made a rocket. I didn't have anything that I could use for
a propulsion system, because I wasn't that knowledgeable about chemistry and
making explosives. Then, if I had put an explosive in the rocket I probably wouldn't
be here today." Two years later, when Ashton was in high school, the Soviet Union
launched the first man-made satellite, and after that he "had dreams of joining
NASA."
Richard Ashton's father feared that his son would be crushed if he did not
abandon those dreams. In the ninth grade Ashton had to choose between his high
school's "general" or "college preparatory" curriculum, in which he would "get a lot
of analytical courses, the mathematics, the sciences." Ashton's father wanted him to
take the more vocationally oriented general curriculum. After all, he insisted, the
purpose of schooling is to get a job. Ashton's guidance counselor urged the college
preparatory course. He took the college preparatory curriculum and "although we
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didn't have calculus, we had algebra, trigonometry, solid geometry, a little bit of
analytical geometry, physics, chemistry .... The school was ... fundamentally good
in the sciences."
Norfolk State (the Norfolk Division of the Virginia State College) was one of the
many state-supported community colleges available to youngsters like Ashton who
would have been unable to attend college otherwise. Ashton, like his brothers and
sisters, entered Norfolk State after high school. "Being there, [it] gave us an
opportunity to work in the summer to get enough money to go to college during the
other part of the year. The tuition was low, and you could walk to school." Once in
college Ashton began studying for a concentration in mathematics or electrical
engineering. "But my father showed me this [news]paper back in 1962 and said,
'look at all of these electrical engineers looking for work in California. You don't
want to be an electrical engineer.' He told me, '[become] a physical education
teacher. You can always get a job because they will always need teachers.' My father
... didn't want to take any chances. Then again, at that time there weren't that many
black engineers and scientists and he probably thought, if I'd gone into that area l'd
have come out and wouldn't have had a job. So he thought ]being a] teacher would
have been a safe thing for me to do -- or go into the post office." Not only did Ashton
decline a career in physical education or the post office, he changed his college major
from mathematics to physics. "I enjoyed working the problems [and] decided l'd
switch over to physics and stay with physics .... I liked the applications."
"I enjoyed math, ! enjoyed science," and when Ashton's college physics teacher
suggested in 1964 that he participate in Langley Research Center's cooperative
training program, he was thrilled. "I came here [to NASA at Langley] to be a
scientist. I had an idea of winning whatever prize there is to [be] found -- a Nobel
or Pulitzer Prize in science and engineering .... That was my goal, [and] also to get
a Ph.D. in physics." But he was soon disappointed, although not in the way his father
had feared. His first coop assignment at Langley was in the standards section of the
instrument research division, which calibrated instruments. "The civil servants
really didn't do much there. [The work] was mostly done on contract.., other people
monitored contracts, [did] paper pushing -- nothing, really, in terms of 'hands on.'
The coops do all the sorts of things that the engineers don't want to do ... xeroxing,
running errands, walking through purchase requests, picking up travel, doing a few
mathematical computations, but not much .... I'd always had jobs, working hard,
during the summer shoveling rocks [and] doing hard, difficult, tedious labor type
jobs in which people stand over you all day long. And if you had half an hour for
lunch they made sure you didn't take one second beyond the half an hour .... And
every minute you had to be busy, working very, very hard. So I came to NASA,
and ... it was my first encounter with people coming in and drinking coffee, reading
the paper .... The people around me weren't all that productive. And I said to myself
'Gee Whiz, now I know why the Russians are beating us in space.'"
Ashton toughed it out. He "got through it" with the help of "a very good mentor
and good person to talk to." Next to disenchantment, what he had to "get through"
was being one of a handful of black engineers at Langley Research Center. "I had
never been in a different environment like that. When ! grew up I went to [an] all-
41
NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo
black elementary school [and] high school. Norfolk State was a black college. When
I came here ... I had to learn to adjust to... a different culture. It took me a long
time .... My adjustment wasn't as difficult as some other people. I think I had it pretty
easy. There were some people that got here before me, [black] engineers and
scientists ... they had a terrible time." After three months Ashton was able to get
reassigned to one of Langley's research divisions, where he could work on things he
"really enjoyed -- optics, spectra of meteorites entering the atmosphere, cameras,
determining things about the energy, the density [of the atmosphere] .... I just loved
that. It was scientific, and I thought I was making a contribution .... Usually black
engineer scientists didn't work in research areas at Langley Research Center .... They
worked in more operational support [areas], calibration labs, the computer facility
running computers ... operational sorts of things."
About a year after he had been working at Langley in earnest, Ashton was able
to go to the University of Virginia graduate school, where he earned a master's
degree in engineering physics -- a program for which NASA paid his "full salary,
tuition, everything." But when he returned to Langley, Ashton was repeatedly
assigned to jobs in various support or operational activities. What he wanted to do
was research, and a true research assignment always seemed to elude him. He had
turned down offers from Westinghouse and IBM, at 50 percent increases in salary,
in the hopes of moving into one of Langley's research areas. At long last he was able
to get reassigned to the same research division he had worked in earlier. "I was
working on optical properties of various satellites, materials, and their surfaces ...
and also studies of the atmosphere, [the[ determination of atmospheric ozone .... Then
I went on to actually working with the experiments that were designed to actively
measure the constituents of the upper atmosphere, {or[ aeronomy." He also worked
on "lifetime" studies of satellites, or studies to predict the effects on a satellite's life
of its movement through the Earth's atmosphere and the interplanetary medium.
Although Richard Ashton would never get his Nobel, or Pulitzer, or Ph.D., he was
finally doing research.
NASA offers its mid-level professional employees a "career development"
program to give them an opportunity for the varied experiences they might need to
advance. In the late 1970s Ashton went to NASA Headquarters for a year of "career
development." But his career failed to develop; by 1981 he had been sidelined to an
administrative staff position, where he has remained, one of the 30 percent minority
of NASA scientists and engineers who, after more than fifteen years service, had not
achieved a grade higher than a GS-12.
Like Richard Ashton, Marylyn Goode comes from a large southern black family.
And like Ashton, she volunteers the information that her parents were able to send
all of their children to college, and that all five children were able to become
professionals. Goode herself is an engineer. One brother is a dentist and a minister,
another is a doctor, and her two sisters are both teachers. Richard Ashton's father
had urged him to become a teacher because there would always be a need for
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teachers, and it appears that many young black people had followed that advice;
both of Goode's parents were trained as teachers at a Presbyterian college in
Knoxville, Tenn. (Goode's mother stayed in elementary school teaching, but her
father abandoned it in favor of the insurance business.)
Born in 1942 in Asheville, N.C., Goode attended church-affiliated schools in her
hometown. It was as a schoolgirl that she discovered her love for mathematics and
science. Although advanced course offerings were negligible, an appreciative
teacher encouraged her, and she began "thinking about medicine." But when it came
time for Goode to go to Hampton Institute, she "majored in teacher education
because my father -- realizing when I went to school in 1958 [that] there were not
very many jobs open for blacks ]and] teaching was a field that black women could
get into-- insisted.., that I get a degree in teacher education. I did not want to teach."
Nevertheless, she yielded to her father's wishes and pursued her high school's
"teacher education" curriculum rather than its "general studies" program, which
would have enabled her to major in mathematics and science. Still, she clung to the
hope of a career in some area of science. "My solution to that was ... I took
everything.., required for teacher education, but I [also] took the higher-level math
courses as electives."
Her father had been right. Goode supported herself for two years after gradu-
ating from Hampton Institute by teaching. But as she taught, she took graduate
courses at Virginia State College in Petersburg. One of her physics professors must
have admired her determination and ability, for he offered her a teaching assistantship
in aerosol physics, which enabled her to stop teaching and work for her master's
degree in physics. Meanwhile, she had married and started a family. In 1967 she
earned her degree and took a job at Langley Research Center because her husband
had found a teaching job nearby. She began her work at Langley "as a data
analyst .... At that time they were hiring most of the women as what they called
'computers' and they were putting them in an office together" where they worked
on Friden calculators. Although Goode had already had experience with FORTRAN
and programming IBM computers, she, too, was put in the "computer pool."
Langley had only just disbanded its racially segregated all-female computer
pools, and Goode spent most of her time with the survivors of the black female
computer group once located at the edge of the center. Goode found the computer
pool deadly. "Men coming here with math degrees were never put into a computing
pool; they were just put out in the sections with the engineers. And they were usually
converted to engineers within a very short time. So I asked the division chief about
that, and he says, 'Well, nobody's ever complained ... the women seem to be happy
doing that, and so that's what they do.' And that was it." Goode never rested, and
after five years of tedium she was able to get an assignment to a n engineering section.
At the same time (1973), her two children were now old enough to tend themselves,
and she began a protracted and ultimately successful struggle to earn a doctoral
degree in physics.
The hurdles she has overcome have been considerable, but she readily acknowl-
edges the support of individuals who sympathized with her and supported her. She
recalls one supervisor in particular, who told her that when he thought of" 'a woman
43
NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo
working, it was someone who you always had to make excuses for because she
didn't do her work right' or something to that effect. He really thought that a woman
should be at home, and when she was out here working she was just sort of a
bumbling something. And I said, 'Well, gee thanks. I'm sitting here, a woman.' He
said, 'Well, I don't think of you as a woman.'" Her efforts to complete her work for
a doctoral degree were handicapped by supervisors who evidently "didn't think it
was worth their while ... to educate the women out here, because they thought the
women would quit."
Persevering in her determined way to master a field of advanced aircraft design,
"sonic boom propagation," she found herself in "left field" when public funding for
a supersonic transport all but vanished. If and when commercial supersonic
transport revives on a large scale, Goode suspects she will be "one of the few around
who's working it because those who were very into it in the late _0s, and there were
a lot of them who did a lot of work in it, they are retiring .... You know, things you
try that don't work are not always written up. So they might have to redo a lot of [that
early workl .... We write up the successes, but you don't always write up something
that you've tried and that didn't work."
Matthew O'Day, like George Sieger, came from a Catholic family in Toledo,
Ohio. O'Day's father, unlike Sieger's, survived World War I, but his initial enthu-
siasm for engineering did not. The eider O'Day had been one of the fortunate few to
enter college-- where he began an engineering program -- in the first decade of the
twentieth century. When he returned, he chose to make dentistry his life's work.
(O'Day's mother had gone into nursing, one of the few professions then open to
women.) Nonetheless, O'Day's father retained his interest in mechanical things and
shared that interest with his growing son, who "spent a lot of... time just watching
what he was doing" while his father repaired the family automobile and did "do-it-
yourself types of things" around the house.
O'Day remembers that "most boys" were interested, as he was, "in airplanes
and building model airplanes .... I was doing things like that along with the people
that I grew up with." At the same time, he was doing well in school in "subjects like
physics, chemistry -- things like that .... The teachers that I remember the most are
the ones that were involved in the technical subjects, like algebra or chemistry .... They
gave you aptitude tests" in school, and "in areas like engineering ... there was an
indication that I would do well."
The assumption in the O'Day household was that the children would go to
college. "I wanted to go to a Catholic university, [and] some place that offered
aeronautical engineering." So after graduating from high school in 1954, O'Day
went to the University of Detroit, which was located sixty miles from Toledo and
offered the special attraction of a cooperative work-study program with the NACA.
"I certainly remember when the Russians launched Sputnik .... I was in college .... I
was more interested in the aeronautical part [of engineering], and still am, than I was
in the space part of it, because that's all there was when I was growing up. There was
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a little bit of publicity about [whatl Robert Goddard had done ]and], in the Second
World War, what the Germans were doing with their rockets. But that was an aspect
of things that I didn't particularly care for because they were weapons of death
rather than things that would really benefit mankind." Later in his life O'Day would
reject working on military or classified projects, having resolved to apply his talents
to "peaceful" uses.
At the University of Detroit O'Day concentrated on aeronautical engineering,
ultimately specializing in structures and strength of materials. Both at Detroit and
the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech), where he would later do graduate
work, he was exposed to nontechnical subjects and later came to appreciate the
relative breadth of his education. "In engineering [at Detroit] I had courses in
accounting and economics [which were] required. Being a Catholic university, you
had to take philosophy courses or you studied logic and ethics and things like this.
But with your engineering courses, you didn't have the time ... to take courses that
I think I would have liked to have taken. That's one thing that impressed me about
Cal Tech, because there was a requirement for a humanities course in the master's
program .... I took a course in ... American and English history .... I did well in it ...
enjoyed the humanities courses." After two years at the University of Detroit, O'Day
entered the coop program, which "provides you with the wherewithall to complete
your education. That was not a major consideration for me." However, the coop
program did introduce O'Day to Lewis Research Center, where he began working
during alternate quarters in bearings and icing research. After he got his bachelor's
degree in aeronautical engineering in 1959, O'Day went to Cal Tech -- again with
NASA help -- for a master's degree. Since the NASA graduate study program was
"relatively generous, I saved enough money to go another year of graduate
school ... and got what's called an engineer's degree in 1961." Cal Tech "provided
you with the kind of background that you would need if you wanted to go into a
research type of engineering career as opposed to the manufacturing or something
like that. So it all pretty well fit in with what I planned to do when I finished graduate
school, which was to return to Lewis."
A certain idealism, possibly shaped by the relatively broad curriculum he had
had at the University of Detroit and Cal Tech, led to an important detour in O'Day's
early career. While he had been at Cal Tech, "John Kennedy had been elected
president. He pushed forward the Peace Corps program, and I found that to be an
interesting concept. So I applied ... and in August, '61" -- only a few months after
returning to Lewis from California -- "I was selected for a program that was to go to
West Pakistan .... The Peace Corps tour of duty was two years .... What I did essentially
was teach engineering subjects. One of them was strength of materials, in a
government polytechnic institute .... I also taught a course in hydraulics. I never had
a course in hydraulics myself; it took a little fast footwork to keep ahead of the students!"
A measure of O'Day's dedication was that he had to resign his job with NASA
in order to join the Peace Corps. Virtue had more than its own reward, however;
before he completed his two-year tour in 1963, Congress passed legislation reinstating
government employees in their old positions, so O'Day "had a job waiting for me
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back here at Lewis." He began working with materials and structures for advanced
propulsion systems, and remained with NASA, at Lewis, for the next two decades.
"The thing was -- if I go back through my life," reflects Ed Collins, "I'm a
Christian, and I believe in God, and that He had his hand on my life." Perhaps it was
a divine hand that guided Collins from Charlotte, N.C., where he was born in 1940,
to Langley Research Center toward the end of the Apollo decade. His father had
owned a contracting business and operated a do-it-yourself franchise store, and
Collins' growing up resembled the fabled "all American" boyhood of the 1950s. "I
raised chickens and sold eggs. I sold Christmas cards.., door to door .... I was in the
Boy Scouts. I was an eagle scout. I liked sports. I ran cross-country [and] track all
through high school [and] college."
Perhaps his faith that God has guided his life is due to the vacillations of his own
purpose-- as distinct from a desire simply to "do well" -- as a boy. Unlike some of
the older Apollo era engineers, Collins did not play with airplane models or erector
sets. He might have gone into business. When he was about sixteen, his father found
operating both a contracting business and a franchise too burdensome, and turned
the store over to his son "to just kind of run it for him. I really enjoyed doing that .... I
liked to put up displays, figure out the advertising, and things like that. My goal at
that time -- I would have stayed in that store, had it made it. | probably wouldn't
have gone to college."
But "the store didn't make it .... That was my senior year in high school, and all
of a sudden I had to decide what I wanted to do .... I had decided at that time, even
though I liked business and all, there was more future in engineering." Collins had
been a good student: "I did pretty well in everything .... I graduated ... in the top 5
percent in the state [in] math, verbal, everything .... Nuclear engineering looked
very attractive to me at that time; it was exciting, and a new field." Besides, North
Carolina State University, where most of Collins's family had gone to college and he
was destined to go, "did not have business administration. They were not a liberal
arts school .... It was either go there in some technical field or go somewhere else."
It also happened that North Carolina State was one of the few institutions that had
a nuclear reactor, so he figured, "this might be a really good jumping off place."
Collins entered North Carolina State in Raleigh in 1958, planning to major in
nuclear engineering. "I made average grades my first two years. I played around a
lot because.., my mother [had] held pretty close strings on me. I hadn't really sowed
any oats .... When I went to college I joined the fraternity and I became an officer in
the band," for which he played the trombone. "I was running track and cross-
country, indoor and outdoor .... In my senior year I was a senior senator for the
student government, and I liked to get into activities like that. [ was in the YMCA on
the campus and played volleyball for them." He also joined "Mu Beta Psi, which is
a music fraternity." Once he settled down into his major program he "made all As
and Bs, because I really got interested .... We had a lot of one-on-one and you could
go and talk to your professor if you were having a problem .... In the nuclear
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engineering classes we sort of became a team, because they would give us problems
to work and we would do them together."
Once he graduated, in 1962, he was in danger of losing his draft deferment, and,
not wanting to go into the military, he turned down a lucrative but probably short-
lived position with a national heating and air conditioning firm to take a job with the
U.S. Navy. For a few months he worked with a unit that went down into the bowels
of ships to design changes in piping, "where the pipes would go, determine what the
weight changes would be to the center of gravity of the ship, and determine the parts
that were needed, and an estimated cost, estimated time .... But I didn't want to do
that the rest of my life." He contacted a friend who worked for NASA at Langley
Research Center, and before the year was out he was able to arrange a transfer. "They
still had a lot of slots at that time. This was still in '62 and the space agency was hiring
and it [was] the big heyday. Everything was flowing pretty freely .... I was brought
in to do research on semi-conductor devices ... mainly with radiation damage
effects." NASA also arranged for him to return to school, to the College of William
and Mary, where he earned a master's degree in integrated optics in 1965.
After working at Langley for a number of years, he was faced with another
career decision and would awaken to the fortuitous nature of the divine guidance
he believed he was receiving. He had been offered an opportunity to return to North
Carolina State and study for a doctorate in acoustical engineering. He and his wife
had already started their family: "We decided we wanted three children, and I said,
'we are going to have to have our third one now, before all this is done.' So we did.
During that time is when I became a Christian, and I began to see God's hand in my
life and began to pray and ask for guidance. I felt He wanted me in some type of
project work, and I developed a real desire to work on a project. I began thinking
about the team efforts that I had been involved in ... all the way back to college ...
and how enjoyable they were .... I put everything together. I decided I didn't want
to go back to school .... A Ph.D. would look nice on my record, but it wouldn't really
get me another promotion, and it would really take time away from equivalency. I
believe after a certain number of years of research, a man is equivalent to a Ph.D.
whether he has a title or not. So I decided that was what I was supposed to do, after
much prayer, and thinking, and talking."
In the end, project work would not provide the avenue of advancement that
Collins had expected, and he tried repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, to shift into
management to earn the promotions he thought God intended him to have. Instead,
Collins would spend his NASA career working on several innovative engineering
research projects, most of which were abandoned as the agency scaled down after
the heyday of Apollo. Meanwhile, he would continue attempting to broaden the
circle of Christian fellowship among his friends and co-workers.
A few of the NASA engineers who first sent men into orbit in tiny capsules were
already well into their careers with the NACA when Hank Martin was born in
1943 -- the year word of German experiments with long-range rockets began to slip
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into the British war ministry. The son of a research chemist for a multinational oil
firm, Martin was raised in Woodbury, N.J., across the Delaware River from Phila-
delphia. Woodbury was "a typical small town .... an interesting mix.., of blue collar
and white collar." His mother was a homemaker, and the family socialized mostly
with the families of his father's colleagues.
Martin came to engineering quite purposefully. "I was always into how things
worked .... I wanted to take things from ... basic concepts and make ... spectacular
things to happen." He had a chemistry set, "of course. I did all kinds of strange
things, and that led to my interest in rockets and explosives .... I used to like to play
with fireworks, and then make my own." He used to shoot them off "across the
school ground .... They didn't have any kind of organized model rockets or com-
mercial versions .... If you wanted a rocket that really flew, you made it yourself. You
got the match heads and the gun powder and you built the thing." He was also
intrigued by electronics. "I was fascinated about how you could split water into
hydrogen and oxygen ... and so I used to try to accumulate vast quantities of
hydrogen and oxygen and make them react with each other, make water .... I was
usually building a burglar alarm or a crystal set, or something like that."
After going to Catholic grammar and preparatory schools in New Jersey, in 1962
Martin entered Catholic University in Washington, D.C. While there was no doubt
he would go into science or engineering, he is not bashful about admitting that he
chose engineering over science to avoid foreign language proficiency requirements.
"I knew I wanted something that involved labs and science .... But I had a terrible
time with languages, and ! knew that if you wanted to get into pure science, you had
to have French, German ... and ! really didn't want to deal with that stuff." Besides,
"by that time I was into my car phase .... I could see engineering ... associated with
cars. And I always thought that was really neat. So ... I started out in chemical
engineering, and then switched over to mechanical engineering."
Catholic University proved difficult for Martin, or rather its mathematics
courses did. "! never really had that much of an aptitude for pure mathematics ...
but I did take a shine to computers." Equally important, Catholic University
introduced him to philosophy and conceptual approaches to problems. "The school
is geared toward s you probably going on and doing some graduate work as opposed
to the type of engineering school where you might come out and know how to do
something .... I came out with a general approach to problem solving ... a way to
think about things.., a way to break big problems down to small problems and then
build up the answers until you had something that worked."
By then he had also acquired a taste for philosophy, just as he had acquired an
abstract interest in space exploration. He remembers seeing the 1950 film Destination
Moon, based on Robert A. Heinlein's 1947juvenile novel, Rocket Ship Galileo, and 2001:
A Space Odyssey, released in 1968. When he saw Destination Moon, "that was back in
the days when you could sit through and see it a second time ... and I did. I was
hooked from that point." As for Stanley Kubrik's 2001, "I liked the philosophy in the
picture better than I liked the picture as a science fiction picture." He became an avid
science fiction reader-- necessary, he thought, to understanding much of what went
on in a film like Kubrik's. As with science fiction, so with philosophy: "I think it gave
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me a much broader view of what was going on .... Philosophy ... had a profound
effect on the way I think about things .... You just don't.., take everything as truth ....
And I'm always looking for alternative explanations, alternative ways of doing
things."
Perhaps, but when he graduated from Catholic University there was only one
alternative: NASA. "There was status, working for NASA .... You were somebody
on the block if you worked for NASA." He began working at Goddard Space Flight
Center in heat transfer, conducting thermal analysis and design for satellites, or
ensuring that satellites in orbit operate at the right temperature to protect their
delicate instruments. "I could not have walked out of school -- any school -- at the
time, and sat down.., and done a thermal design on a satellite. No one was teaching
you how to do thermal design.., they were doing it all with electrical analogy at the
time. And digital computers were starting to be of significant value .... It was a brand
new field, and that's probably one of the things I liked about it." Although the
organization Martin entered in 1966 "changed names, changed leaders, came under
different divisions," the fundamental problems it was trying to solve remained the
same, and Martin continued working with it for the next two decades.
Like Hank Martin, Richard Lockwood is the son of an engineer, but an aeronau-
tical engineer who spent most of his career working with the NACA at Langley
Aeronautical Laboratory. His father "was pretty well immersed in his work. His
work was kind of his life." The new middle class _and the era of postwar affluence
into which Robert was born in 1944 offered the increasing possibility that
preference -- rather than necessity -- might decide the outlines of one's work life.
Robert's mother wanted him to "look around" when it came to deciding on a career;
his father, he insists, "didn't push" him into aeronautical engineering. But then, his
father did not have to. Robert had "always had a natural inclination towards
mathematics and science -- always enjoyed them." He built model airplanes and
worked on his own car. He followed his father's work and "occasionally watched
wind tunnel tests at Langley."
After attending schools in Hampton and Newport News, Va., Lockwood went
to Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VPI). There he took part in a cooperative work-
study program with the U.S. Army's Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Ala. He
worked at Redstone for alternate quarters during the last three years of his five-year
degree program in aeronautical engineering, doing "trajectory analysis on comput-
ers, both analog and digital," as well as computerized "structural analysis." When
he graduated from VPI in 1964, he transferred to NASA's Langley Research Center
and began working "in the twenty-two inch helium tunnel -- it was a hypersonic
tunnel-- doing experimental research. My own research was mostly in ... studying
the effect of mach number on boundary layer transition."
He was again able to take advantage of a work-study program, as NASA bore
the costs of graduate courses at the University of Virginia while he worked at
Langley. During the process, he discovered a fundamental difference between
doing analytical and experimental work. "The work is different. And it takes a
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special kind of a person to be a good experimentalist. You really have to be a nit-
picker on detail. And I've always hated minutiae." Thus he decided to do further
graduate work, so he could earn a doctorate and continue working in the realm of
analysis. Lockwood also realized that he preferred physics to mathematics: "I've
always enjoyed the connection between reality and theory. You learn something
about certain equations ... and then, by George, you go out in nature and you see it
happen .... It gives you confidence that what you're doing is real. I couldn't be an
abstract mathematician ... who plays abstract games that, in their lifetime, they [sic]
may never see a concrete example [off. It's just a bunch of equations on a piece of
paper." He may have disapproved of mathematicians' preoccupations with equa-
tions on paper, and he may have disliked minutiae, but Lockwood was increasingly
drawn into computerized analysis. "I don't know why I work with computers,
because they're almost one hundred percent minutiae." Computers are also full of
numbers and equations; but they are, he says, merely tools, tools that encourage one
to "start thinking a lot more about form .... And it tends to have you make things
more orderly. And I think that it's useful to try to reduce that chaos."
With NASA's help, Lockwood managed to earn a master's degree from Harvard
and, after transferring to NASA's Ames Research Center in California, a doctorate
in aeronautics from Stanford University in 1969. He denies that his pursuit of
successive degrees in a field that did not normally require the doctorate represented
any special career ambition; rather, it enabled him to do what he wanted to do, which
was to develop computer programs to simulate air flows and turbulence around
aircraft -- or computational fluid dynamics. He really did not care about "moving
ahead, [and] and I never have moved ahead." He's "very comfortable" making
"more money through investments than" he does from his salary at Ames.
Although deeply immersed in the computerized mysteries of modern aircraft
design, Lockwood is a space program enthusiast, but for pragmatic reasons that
echo some of the controversies of his own generation: "We need to find outlets. It's
healthy to have outlets for creativity and work and everything other than war .... In
the past, the primary mover of technology has been war. It's kind of nice to have
something peaceful that pushes technology." He cares that NASA is a civilian, not
a military,, agency. "I don't think I could work to build better hydrogen bombs ....
I'm not anti-nuclear .... Human nature being what it is, we can't trust the other side."
Fred Hauser claims no special aptitude or enthusiasm for engineering, having
become an engineer mostly because his father was one. Born in 1946, he grew up in
the Philadelphia and southern New Jersey area, where his father was a mechanical
engineer for the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). "He tried to be objective and
not force me into something that I wouldn't want myself [but] had he not been an
engineer, I probably would not be. I don't know what I would be, but I probably
would not be an engineer." Hauser's mother, a trained nurse, "worked some, part
time, and the rest of her time was devoted to housework .... She did not sew or do
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decoupage or thinks like that, like some women do." She also died "relatively
young, when she was fifty two." If his mother appears to have worked constantly,
his father found time to garden, which he preferred to working on cars. Nor has the
younger Hauser worked on cars or been a "fix-it" person. "I'm just not that way."
The family took its Catholicism se_riously. Hauser's father had gone to Villanova
University, and Hauser resolved that he, too, wanted to go to a Catholic college. He
also knew that he wanted to leave home and live at school. He admits to not having
agonized much about where he should go to school, nor had there been much d eba te
in the family whether he would go to college to at all. Notre Dame just seemed the
place, and he started there in 1964, beginning a program in mechanical engineering
"probably because my dad was a mechanical engineer." After the first year he
decided to switch to aerospace engineering. When "l entered college ... NASA was
going strong, and I think I was very heavily influenced by that." As it turned out,
"aerospace was just a fancy name, and they just added a course or two to the
curriculum that related to space flight. My undergraduate education, if you had a
specialty ... would have been in the area of flight dynamics" -- a field in which he
has done little work since leaving college.
There was another disillusionment as well. College "was tough. It was difficult,
truly .... The difficulty I had with engineering is just simply due to intellectual
abilities .... I probably just don't have the raw intellectual talent .... I worked very
hard, and I think I probably did almost as good as I could have. ] was in the bottom
half of my class". Although he read a lot -- novels, not science fiction -- he learned
"early, in fact, I probably learned by the time I was a sophomore in college, that I
don't really like sitting down and working detailed engineering problems. And I'm
just not very good at it."
Hauser stayed at Notre Dame in a graduate degree program. It was 1968, and
the number of American troops in Viet Nam was growing from 385,300 in 1966 to
536,100 by the end of the year. Casualties were growing too; over 10,000 American
families had lost their sons or daughters to combat in Viet Nam since 1965. The Tet
Offensive of January had intensified the polarization over the war among policy
makers and public alike, and by the end of the year more stringent draft exemptions
provoked further student unrest on campuses across the country. Hauser found
himself in danger of losing his student draft deferment and quickly decided it was
time to go to work as an engineer for the government. He called Marshall Space
Flight Center, where he had k)cated an opening, and soon found himself in
Huntsville, Ala.
Once on the NASA rolls, Hauser began the work that would take him into the
next decade: the preliminary design, planning, and "costing" of future programs.
Apollo 11 would land its crew on the Moon's surface the next summer, and NASA
engineers were busily defining the possible missions to carry them over into the next
decade. He continued working, for the remainder of his career, on "phased program
planning," the last planning phase for a space project before metal is bent. Having
limited confidence in his intellectual and engineering abilities, he found that
planning and organizing were things he could do and liked to do. "I think I do have
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management talent. I do have abilities to plan and organize and coordinate. If I was
seventeen, I wouldn't go into engineering."
By the winter of 1949 World War II was becoming a thing of bittersweet
memories and the lineaments of the postwar era had been drawn. As the U.S. Senate
ratified the agreement creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
creation of two separate German states assured the continued dominance of the
Soviet Union over much of Eastern Europe, the Communist Chinese drove the
Nationalists off of the mainland, whence they retreated to the island of Formosa. In
the United States, New York audiences thronged to see Richard Rodgers' and Oscar
Hammersteins' "South Pacific," while in France, Simone de Beauvoir ignited one of
the war-fueled revolutions of modern times with her feminist treatise, The Second
Sex. More subtle harbingers of things to come occurred that year when Northrop
Aircraft, Inc. took delivery of the BINAC, a guidance computer for its new missile
projects for the Navy, ]° and domestic economic and federal procurement policy
became intertwined as the Truman administration initiated the practice of awarding
military contracts to "distressed areas. ''N
Ronald Siemans, born in 1949 in Oil City, Pa., would still be a schoolboy when
John F. Kennedy issued his challenge to the nation's space agency in 1961 to send a
man to the Moon and bring him back. He would be one of the last new engineers to
join NASA before the end of the Apollo decade, first going to work at Johnson Space
Center in 1967 as part of a cooperative work-study program at Finn Engineering
(later Cleveland State University) in Cleveland, Ohio. The son of a mail carrier,
Siemans grew up in a household little involved in the new age of science or
technc_logy I indeed, his parents, neither of whom had attended college, "didn't
know too much about" education at all. Nonetheless, they managed to start their
drst child, Siemans's older brother, in college. Lawrence had shown some inclina-
tion toward science or engineering in high school, but was discouraged from
pursuing a scientific career by guidance counselors who warned of humanities
requirements for most undergraduate science curricula. "I wasn't too interested in
getting into literature .... I didn't want to get off into a lot of the humanities type
education requirements that were required for the pure science background ... so I
picked engineering .... You had to take your science courses; it's just that you're not
required to take the heavy amounts of history and English and literature and all that
sort of stuff, which was not one of my stronger suits."
Another thing Siemans worried about was money: how would he pay for
college? Finn Engineering offered financial aid in the form of a cooperative work-
study program with NASA, so he chose Finn and began his studies in chemical
engineering. His first coop assignment was at the Johnson Space Center, where he
worked during alternate quarters after his freshman year. There he began "working
with what engineers do, plotting, just [being a] technical aide. It was right after the
Apollo fire. ]2... A lot of people were involved in trying to figure out how to make the
fixes and changes required to get the Apollo [program] back on schedule. But there
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were still teams looking at Moon bases and Mars missions and space station."
Siemans was assigned to a group that was doing "trade studies" for a possible
manned orbiting space station. Trade studies examine the trade-offs to be made
between cost, weight, fuels, environmental systems, and other design features in
which an improvement in one may result in disadvantages elsewhere in the design.
"I did a lot of schematics ... just to look at which was the most optimum way to go
as far as the type of chemical systems that were used in the environmental control
system of the station. The area I went into was the crew systems division, which is
responsible for the environmental control systems, EVA [extravehicular activity]
systems, and thermal systems".
Siemans had entered the coop program not only because it would help to pay
his expenses, but in the widely shared expectation that he would have a job waiting
for him at Johnson Space Center when he graduated. In this expectation he was
sorely disappointed. "If you don't get it in writing, you'd better not believe the
government, because they really put it to us." NASA's budget sank to its lowest ebb
in fiscal year 1974; the decline had begun with the fiscal year 1969 budget.131971 "was
the year the RIFs ]reductions in force] were occurring, and the promise of a
guaranteed job didn't hold up that year."
He managed to wait out the ebb tide by entering a master's degree program ill
chemical engineering at Rice University, in nearby Houston, Tex. "Rice was a far
superior school ... and the depth of the education and expectations for each course
was higher .... But I can't say, honestly, that I've used much of that extra
education ... well, yes, I have," When Siemans was able to return to a real position
at Johnson Space Center in 1972, he used his Rice training in catalysis to promote an
air communication device to improve the environmental system on the then-new
space shuttle orbiter. From that point on he would spend his career with NASA
working on environmental systems for advanced manned spacecraft designs.
The transformation of American society that had begun during the early lives
of the NASA Apollo era engineers who were born between 1918 and 1932 was
virtually complete by the time the guns had been silenced at the end of World War
II. The twelve younger men and one woman who talk of themselves in this chapter
share some characteristics with the earlier group. Most still came from the old
Northwest and Northeast; a few more came from the South; none came from west
of the Mississippi. Of the younger group, more grew up in urban than in rural areas,
but about the same proportion (or more) were the sons of manual or service workers
in the older group; three of the younger engineers' fathers had been employed by the
railroads. Four of the five whose fathers had been salaried professionals were sons
of engineers; the fifth, the single woman in the group, was the daughter of school
teachers. More so than in the older group, attendance at college -- and thus the
promise of middle class employment -- had become the normal expectation.
While virtually all had shown special abilities in science and mathematics, they
gravitated not toward academic careers, but toward engineering or engineering
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research. Relatively more of the younger group were attracted not only to engineer-
ing, but to the kind of engineering that would bring them ultimately to NASA;
NASA's cooperative work-study programs enabled more than a few to fulfill their
ambition. More than half had been fascinated by airplanes; a few had flown them.
Several were fascinated by rockets as well.
Their educational experiences were similar to those of the older group. Few, as
before, attended the elite or prestigous engineering schools or universities; when
they did, it was to complete graduate programs, and their advanced work was
subsidized by NASA. The availability of publicly funded higher education was
significant for virtually all of them, especially the three blacks in the group, which
included one woman. The three out of four who did not do most of their under-
graduate work in publicly supported state colleges attended Catholic colleges or
univerMties.
The federal government was the employer of first resort for virtually the entire
group. A few took temporary odd jobs -- in a classroom, a factory, a metal shop --
as a means of surviving before settling into their careers. But even those who did not
begin working with NASA shortly after graduating from college worked in govern-
ment jobs; one was a volunteer engineering instructor with the Peace Corps. And
only one -- George Sieger -- spent any significant amount of time working in
private industry, for a large government aerospace contractor. Half the group began
working for NASA within a year of graduating from college. And with the exception
of one who went to work for the NACA's Langley Laboratory in 1953, and another
who began his first job at the NACA's Lewis Research Laboratory in 1957, all began
their NASA careers in the 1960s.
The wars that marked their generation were the Korean War and the Vietnam
War, but those wars left little mark on this group; only three enlisted during the
Korean War, and only two of them experienced combat duty. The two youngest,
who might have served in Vietnam, escaped by obtaining draft deferments as
civilian engineers working for the government (the Navy and NASA). One must
assume that the majority, who did not enlist, were eligible for deferments by
attending engineering schools. Their mobilization was of another kind.
No engine designed or built to launch men to the Moon was as powerful as the
engine of the U.S. government itself. Modern technology is the product, first and
foremost, of vast organizations; it was the federal government which above all else
ensured that NASA, the defense establishment, and the aerospace industry would
have the armies of trained engineers needed to design, develop, and build the
machines that would fly -- long before anyone decided just what those machines
should be, or where they should go. The GI Bill, the military services' reserve
officers' training programs, cooperative work-education programs, the draft --
with its exemptions and deferments for those in engineering school or working for
the government in engineering fields-- all generated in this country one of the great
social and occupational changes of the twentieth century.
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With one eye cocked on the growing joblessness and labor unrest that followed
demobilization in 1919-1920 (the miseries of which were exacerbated by an inflation
in the cost of living of over 100 percent between 1913 and 1920), and the other on the
languishing supply of scientists, technicians, and medical personnel as young men
marched off to war or into the factories that would supply the front, the federal
government went into action itself. During World War I students in scientific,
technical, and military fields began to receive deferments from the draft, instituted
in May 1917. The Student Army Training Corps, administered through over 525
institutions, paid for the support and education of no less than 140,000 students who
enlisted, prepared to go into active duty when called. Uncle Sam continued the
policy with the National Defense Act of 1920, creating the Army and Navy Reserve
Officers Training Corps at American colleges and universities. The fortuitously
compatible motives of containing unemployment and building a technical workforce
continued in the creation of the National Youth Administration, which educated
620,000 young people between 1935 and 1943. The next year Congress passed the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act (better known as the GI Bill), which, along with its
Korean War counterpart, kept millions of veterans out of the job market and sent
them to school instead.
The federal government thus became not only an agent of occupational change,
but of social and economic change. Where once higher education had been the
preserve of a genteel minority with a virtual monopoly on "higher learning," by the
dawn of the post-World War II era, attending college -- any one of the 900
institutions added to the 951 in existence in 1910-- became possible for the offspring
of parents who had never dreamed of admission to the realm of the salaried
professional. The social and economic aspirations (and accompanying insecurities)
thus released have yet to be measured, but they are etched in the middle class
experience common to most of us. _4This is the phenomenon that largely unites
NASA's Apollo era engineers, for all their individual diversity, and that brought
them to the threshold of the space age.
tThe Banana River separates John F. Kennedy SpaceCenter from the Cape Canaveral
Air Force Station, site of NASA's launch pads.
2See, for example, Gerard K. O'Neill, The High Frontier (New York: William Morrow,
1977).
3The mammoth Nova booster, envisioned by NASA engineers in 1960 as necessary
for a direct ascent to the Moon, incorporated four stages; the Saturn V (AS-506), used
for the lunar orbit and rendevous manned Apollo Moon landings, consisted of three
stages (S-IC, S-II, and S-IVB). See Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological
History of the Apollo Saturn Launch Vehicles, NASA SP-4206 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1980).
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4 The arcanum of NASA's management hierarchy can have more nominal than
substantive significance. From the top down, it goes something like this: Adminis-
trator, Deputy Administrator, Associate Deputy Administrator, Associate Admin-
istrator for line or staff functions, General Counsel, Inspector General, Assistant
Administrator, Assistant Associate Administrator, Deputy Associate or Assistant
Administrator, Division Director, Branch Chief, and Section Head. Division direc-
tors and above are normally members of the government's senior executive service.
The building of a flight propulsion laboratory for the NACA was authorized by
Congress in 1940. Located adjacent to the Cleveland, Ohio municipal airport, the
laboratory began operations in 1942 and in 1948 was named the Lewis Flight
Propulsion Laboratory in honor of Dr. George W. Lewis, the NACA's Director of
Aeronautical Research from 1919 to 1947. In 1958, the laboratory became a part of
NASA and was renamed Lewis Research Center. Simon Ostrach, Franklin K. Moore,
and Harold Mirels were members of a small group of "resident geniuses" at Lewis
who were allowed virtually complete freedom to pursue basic research in aerody-
namics, especially problems of heat transfer. All three have been inducted into the
National Academy of Engineering. See Virginia P. Dawson, Engines and Innovation:
A History of Lewis Research Center, NASA SP-4306 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1991).
6An Austrian by birth, Low was detailed from Lewis to NASA Headquarters in 1958
to serve as chief of Manned Space Flight (programs). He moved to NASA's new
Manned Spacecraft Center in Clear Lake, Tex. for the Mercury program and held
various high-level line positions in NASA's manned spaceflight programs until
returning to Headquarters in 1969 to serve as Deputy Administrator (1969 to 1976).
7See Appendix C, table 7 and National Science Foundation, "Characteristics of the
National Sample of Scientists and Engineers, 1974," Part 2: Employment, NSF 76-323
(Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1976).
NASA Personnel Analysis and Evaluation Office, "The Civil Service Work Force
as of September 30, 1984" (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 1985) and National Science Foundation, "Women and Minorities in
Science and Engineering" (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, Janu-
ary 1986).
The "new middle class," as described in C. Wright Mills' classic White Collar: The
American Middle Classes (1951), is a twentieth century class consisting of salaried
workers -- primarily managers, salaried professionals, salespeople, and office
workers. It is a class which has largely replaced the "old middle class" of the
nineteenth century, which was composed of well-to-do farmers, entrepreneurs, and
independent professionals.
_'_Developed by J. Presper Eckert, Jr., and John W. Mauchly, the BINAC was the first
airborne computer. A much simpler machine than the ENIAC, which used a decimal
system, the BINAC operated with a two-digit binary code and was actually two
56
Beginnings: 1932-1948
computers which constantly checked one another. Harry Wulforst, Breakthrough to
the Computer Age (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982).
]_Official Washington had been persuaded by wartime prosperity that full employ-
ment was the key to a healthy economy. This conviction resulted in the Employment
Act of 1946, a measure which signaled the federal government's acceptance of a
responsibility to "promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing
power." The economic downturn of 1948-1949, which prompted the administration's
decision to use military contracts to reduce unemployment, was followed by a
revival, which intensified with the onset of the Korean War.
t2 Apollo astronauts Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White II, and Roger B. Chaffee
perished in a fire on January 27, 1967 in the Apollo command module during a
simulated countdown for mission AS-204.
_3NASA's total budget authority declined from a pre-1980 high of $5.25 billion in
1965 to slightly over $3 billion in 1974.
i4See Frederick Rudolph, Tire American College and University: A Histo_ (New York:
Knopf, 1962), John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A
History of American Colle,_es arrd Universities, 1636-1976 (New York, 1976), Tile Sta-
tistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (Stamford, Conn.:
Fairfield Publishers, 1965), and Ross M. Robertson, History of tire American Economy,
2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964).
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The American, by nature, is optimistic.
He is experimental, an inventor and a
builder who builds best when called
upon to build greatly.
John Fitzgerald Kemwdy
Announcm S his candidacy for
Presi_Jent _( the United States
(January 1960)
Chapter 3
What Goes Up
The careers of the many men and a handful of women who worked as engineers with
NASA during the Apollo decade combine to tell a story -- as do most careers -- of
personal triumphs and disappointments, of growing confidence and creeping
self-doubt, of discovery and intellectual frustration. Their careers are also about
making one's way through the complexities of organizational life, marked out --
like the flags on a strategist's map -- by organizational units named and renamed,
elevated and diminished, and by innumerable accommodations to personalities
and forces beyond anyone's apparent control. In keeping with most engineering'
careers, many moved farther and farther away from the "hands on," "heads under
the hood" experience that attracted them to engineering in the first place. To move
up in the NASA organization was, and still is, to move into management.
For those engineers who had worked for the NACA, the shift in career
pattern came about as the NACA, an organization charged principally with aero-
nautical research, was transformed into NASA, designed to be a research and de-
velopment organization. Then again, an increasing disassociation from engineering
practice experienced by upward-moving NASA engineers was compounded by a
policy throughout the federal establishment of relying on private-sector firms for
engineering research and development, as well as production and routine services.
What the lure of management and the increasing shift of NASA's actual engineering
work to the private sector has meant for these careers is explored in chapter 6. Also
explored in a separate chapter (chapter 5) is a problem of professional identity
somewhat special to the Apollo generation: the popular press typically described
the successful Apollo venture as the triumph of the nation's scientists. However,
those close to the professions of science and engineering certainly were aware
that a scientist was not an engineer. How they differed, if in truth or only in
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perception, has also helped to shape the careers and outlook of these men and
women.
Abraham Bauer came within a hair's breadth of being sent off to war in 1942,
after finishing college at the University of Missouri, but was able to get a deferment
to work for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as a chemical engineer. The effort
to produce strong but lightweight materials for aircraft and military hardware was
under way there, as elsewhere. The project a t TVA that "made the most impression"
on Bauer involved "a big electric furnace ... about ten feet in diameter" that "used
a carbon electrode sixteen inches in diameter." When "lowered down into the cen-
ter" of the furnace, "an enormous power source was turned on, with materials in
there that were to be processed at high temperatures, and an arc was struck which
produced a tremendous amount of heat." Bauer "designed some auxiliary equip-
ment to work on that furnace." He found the project "exciting" and has kept the
drawings he made. A related project was an attempt to extract aluminum from "low-
grade ores" embedded in clay. "Aluminum was very important during the war to
make airplanes, and the Germans were sinking the ships bringing aluminum ore up
from South America." The project succeeded, and within two years Bauer was ready
to move on.
Bauer had "heard that there was something going on at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee ... only a few hundred miles away." With little idea of what they were
headed for, Bauer and a friend took jobs with the Eastman Kodak Company, or
Tennessee Eastman, a major contractor for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Tennessee Eastman had been contracted to operate a uranium isotope separation
plant "using extremely large-scale mass spectrometers. What you do with a mass
spectrometer," explains Bauer, "is ... inject a beam of ions -- ions being molecules
that have been stripped of one or more electrons -- and shoot them into a magnetic
field at high speed. And they.., travel a curved path in a magnetic field .... The
heavier particles swing to the outside, as you might expect; the lighter ones curve
more sharply. So you can separate things out according to... their particle mass. And
that was the technique that was used to separate the uranium 235 from uranium
238 .... These devices ... had tracks ... consisting of ninety-six of these mass
spectrometer units, each of which was about twelve feet high. And each one of them
was operated by a girl who was a technically untrained person. They had people
who were called technical supervisors, who wandered around to see if everything
was going well, and if they had problems, they helped them to solve them." And
Bauer "became that person."
After a while, "these units would fail. They would run for some number of hours
and then they would.., break down in one way or another .... They would get pulled
out of the big vacuum chamber and pulled into the service area. We were asked...
to inspect them and see what had gone wrong. And we did. And then we made a
record of the collected data on why they were failing and then we made inputs back
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into the management structure, saying, 'you really ought to change this a little bit,
and if you do this, it wouldn't fail there.' So we were trying to get them to run longer
before breaking down. And that was important in a production sense because they
were very slow producers .... Running all that equipment, you would only get a few
grams per week. And so it took a long time to build up a quantity of uranium 235 that
they needed in order to make a bomb."
"We gradually became aware of what we were doing. There was tremendous
security associated with the place-- but right up to the time of dropping the bombs
on Hiroshima, the general population in that plant didn't know what was happen-
ing .... In fact, there was some concern that there might be a major postwar scandal
because ... [it] was regarded as a possible boondoggle. Eighty thousand people
down there working -- and nothing is coming out. There were some fairly famous
physicists who were floating around there. The whole basic design of that plant was
based on work at the University of California at Berkeley, and in particular, E. O.
Lawrence. So I saw E. O. Lawrence walking around the plant there on one or two
occasions, and J. Robert Oppenheimer .... I remember him as being a very nervous
individual ... slender ... he looked almost like a hunted animal -- he was darting
around all the time."
When the war ended in 1945 the Oak Ridge plant was closed down, and Bauer
went to the University of Tennessee to teach physics. "Soldiers were coming back by
the thousands" and virtually anyone who knew anything about physics -- which,
by then, included Bauer -- was sought out to teach. He was only twenty-six, and
many of his students were older than him. When his parents and his sister moved
to the West Coast, he tried to join them by getting a position as an instructor in
physics at Stanford University or the University of California at Berkeley, but those
West Coast institutions proved more picky than the University of Tennessee. Bauer
was casting about for other possibilities when he encountered a recruiter from the
NACA, and by the summer of 1948, he was on his way to the NACA's Ames
Research Center.
Spread out alongside the U.S. Navy's Moffett Airfield, Ames Research Center
lies in a rich, aquafer-fed basin that opens at the southern end of San Francisco Bay.
Luxurious foliage combines large evergreens with tropical plants that bloom in
Chagall colors through much of the year. To the west are the gentle green slopes of
the San Mateo mountains, while the eastern horizon is curtained with the rose and
ocre undulations of the Santa Clara range, outlined in sunlit yellows and shadows
of deep purple and brown.
In this opulent natural setting aeronautical engineers imported from the Lan-
gley laboratory were already at work in 1940 when Abraham Bauer arrived, probing
one of the fundamental technological barriers that would have to be surmounted not
only to refine the technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but to enable a
guided missile to deliver a human being into Earth orbit and return him unharmed:
how to prevent the incineration of the missile and its occupant as it reentered Earth's
atmosphere? The initial approach to the problem had come from high-speed, high-
altitude flight studies, especially the search for the best design for hypersonic'
aircraft to be used largely by the military: assuming an engine powerful enough to
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propel an aircraft of a given weight and the right shape and construction five times
faster than the speed of sound, what ought to be the aircraft's "right" shape, its
"right" construction? Before engineers could decide those questions, they had to
replicate with models the phenomena of flying objects bursting through the sky at
almost unimaginable speeds. This NACA and NASA engineers tried to do at Ames
and Langley Research Laboratories throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, designing
and building various devices, such as hypersonic wind tunnels and shock tubes.
Bauer was hired by H. Julian (Harvey) Allen, who had recently been brought to
Ames to head the laboratory's theoretical aerodynamics section and was, by the time
Bauer arrived, in charge of the high-speed research division and Ames's supersonic
wind tunnels, where aircraft models were subjected to the aerodynamic flows and
pressures of supersonic flight. However, "in the early years of NACA," Bauer
recalls, "the great thrust was always to go to higher speeds." That meant hypersonic
flight, the understanding of which would become as important for space flight as for
high-performance aircraft. Extreme heat and pressures result from the kinetic
energy of hypersonic flight, and before engineers could design a vehicle capable of
withstanding such extraordinary temperatures, they would have to be able to
simulate hypersonic flight. Conventional wind tunnels could not be used because
"the gas in the [wind tunnel's] test section was extremely cold and would drop down
to the liquifaction temperature of air. If you tried to push it any faster, you'd be
getting some liquid air droplets, and, at those low stream temperatures, when the
gas recompressed on the face of the model, it still just came back ... to room
temperature. One of the features of hypersonic flow that was important to simulate
is the hot temperatures ... that are developed in the flow, because the high
temperatures affect the flow .... They are responsible for the hypersonic heating that
was a primary concern. So the heating problems couldn't really be adequately
simulated in ordinary wind tunnels." Bauer remembers that "there were shock tube
advocates ... people who worked in shock tubes simulated the thermal part of the
flow, but not the aerodynamic part. The people who worked in the wind tunnels
simulated the aerodynamic part, but not the thermal."
"Harvey had had an idea to go beyond what wind tunnels ... were ... capable
of doing .... He wanted to get up to extremely high hypersonic speeds by using gun-
launched models. You put a model of something that you're interested in a gun, and
then you put a charge of gunpowder in there and ... shoot it out, and it comes out
at several thousand feet per second. That idea was not novel .... The novel idea was
to combine that with the conventional ... supersonic wind tunnel, which was built
here at Ames and came to be called the Supersonic Free Flying Wind Tunnel .... The
gun would be fired, and the model would go shooting upstream through this
supersonic air stream and it would result in a very high test velocity."
"There were a number of design engineers who were working to put the thing
together, and ! was asked to figure out what to do with it when it got put together ....
It proved to be an enormously valuable device," simulating both the thermal and the
aerodynamic aspects of hypersonic flight, the effects of which were recorded with
Schlieren or shadowgraph photography. "For a period of ... about 1950 to 1968, it
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was one of the most productive means available of developing an understanding of
hypersonic flows .... We did pioneering research in hypersonic aerodynamics, and
we were able to do things with this facility that couldn't be approached in any other
way."
To simulate the thermal and aerodynamic aspects of hypersonic flight was not,
however, to know how to design the nose of a ballistic missile -- or manned
spacecraft-- so that it would not burn up on reentry. Aerodynamicists had known
that friction exists at the interface between a solid surface and a fluid, and they called
the friction "drag. ''2 Reducing drag was an important part of making an aircraft
aerodynamically "clean," and the shape of the aircraft was what normally deter-
mined its drag. Immediately next to the surface of an object moving through air or
water lies a thin boundary layer, and the characteristics of the flow of air through this
layer -- whether it is steady, or "laminar," or whether it is turbulent -- determines
the extent of friction to which the objecr s surface is subjected (or its drag) as it moves
through the air)
As aerodynamicists turned to the problem of bodies reentering the atmosphere
from hypersonic and high-altitude or upper-atmospheric flight, one of the largest
problems that faced them was the reduction of drag, and hence friction and heat, at
the aircraft's laminar boundary layer. Conventional wisdom, based on atmospheric
flight experience, was that drag would be minimized in slender, streamlined
designs. (If more heat-resistant alloys could be found, they, too, would help to
overcome the thermal barrier.) That was the approach taken with the experimental
rocket-powered X-15 aircraft, begun in 1954 as a joint NACA, Air Force, and Navy
project. However, as Harvey Allen puzzled out the problem, he came to the
unorthodox conclusion that a reentry body should have a high, not low, drag shape.
The streamlined shape of conventional wisdom would absorb half of the heat
generated by friction at reentry, but the kinetic energy of a vehicle returning to the
heavier lower atmosphere could be absorbed by the "shock layer" of air between the
shock wave and the body of the nose, instead of the nose itself, if the nose was bluntly
shaped.
So far, so good; still, there were many possible variations on the "blunt" body
shape. Bauer and his co-workers in Allen's group began to experiment with various
high-drag shapes. "Now the carryover from subsonic aerodynamics had been that
bodies should have a favorable pressure gradient -- like a sphere -- something
where the pressure is continually falling from the nose as you go around the sides,
that this would help to maintain the boundary layer laminar." Bauer and his fellow
research engineers persisted. "We tried a variety of things. We tried bodies that were
pointed. We tried pure cones. We tried cones that retained the pointed tip but
introduced curvature along the sides so as to keep a favorable pressure gradient.
Nothing worked."
Then "one day a blunt piece of plastic accidentally flew down the channel and
one of my colleagues, a good friend of mine.., saw the shadowgraph pictures from
that shot and he looked at it, and he said, 'Hey, look! This is laminar!'" The piece of
plastic had a "flat" shape (actually, it was slightly curved), "and we started making
up models that were flat." By the time the NACA was absorbed into NASA in 1958
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and the new agency's focus shifted to Project Mercury to launch a man into Earth
orbit, 4 the blunt-body concept had been refined to the Mercury capsule's nearly
flattened bottom end. "We solved problems of the early generation of ballistic
missiles," Bauer proudly asserts; "we did tests which led to the selection of shape for
the manned space vehicles -- Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. ''s
During the 1950s at the NACA's Langley and Ames Research Laboratories,
engineers in supersonic aerodynamics and reentry physics worked head to head to
increase their understanding, with its urgent practical implications, of supersonic,
hypersonic, and transatmospheric flight. They, too, struggled to find the best shape
for the first generation of manned space vehicles. Bill Cassirer was drawn to Langley
in 1949, after finishing a master of aeronautical engineering program at Cornell
University, by the sheer excitement of it all. He was followed there three years later
by Charles Stern. Cassirer "had thirteen job offers, which was a lot for those
days .... NACA was the lowest in salary." But the NACA had managed to obtain
Italy's leading aerodynamicist, Antonio Ferri, through the efforts of the Army's
Office of Strategic Services, which brought Ferri to the United States in 1944. Ferri
knew a great deal about the progress the Germans as well as the Italians had made
in replicating transonic flight in wind tunnels, and the prospect of working with him
was more than ample compensation for Cassirer. "It was my plan that I would come
down here," to Langley, "if I could work with Tony... for about a year or so, and then
leave .... Ferri left" (in 1950, to teach at Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute), and Cassirer
stayed on. "The reason I stayed was -- until I had been here a lot of years -- nobody
ever told me what I had to do. ''_
Cassirer concentrated on supersonic aerodynamics research until 1960, when he
shifted to reentry physics. Both he and Stern, for whom he was something of a
mentor, were working in the early 1950s on the "aerodynamics of shock tube flows."
The shock tube was a laboratory device researchers used to generate shock waves
by breaking a fragile diaphram between the low-pressure and high-pressure sections
of a tube. Both researchers, recalls Stern, and others working with them, were
interested in "shock tube boundary layers, shock tube heat transfer, interaction with
the main flow of shock, and shock attenuation behavior." Phenomena such as these
interested them because they held the keys to understanding "the unsteady flows
in experimental ramjets." Cassirer "had been working on unsteady flows in inlets--
not necessarily ramjets -- but inlets in general. One characteristic of unsteady flow
was called 'buzz'.... You get an instability in the flow and a shock wave bounces in
and out .... What it is, is an oscillating flow which could easily be termed 'buzz.' The
question was, 'what causes those instabilities?' One of the ways to learn about the
shocks and shock boundary layer interactions was through the instantaneous
unsteady flows associated with shock tubes. So we were using the shock tube as a
diagnostic tool to try and learn more about ... 'buzz.'"
Cassirer and Stern worked together on shock tube research to gain a better
understanding of supersonic engine inlet performance and "buzz" for four years,
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until 1956. As the 1950s and ballistic missile research progressed, Stern remembers,
"there began to be interest in the use of the shock tube for simulation of the high
energy flows associated with reentry. Two things were taking place simultaneously.
Out at Lewis Research Laboratory, a couple of guys were working on similar things
to what we were doing -- shock tube flows as a means of simulating unsteady flow
characteristics and shock boundary layer interactions .... We went into some inter-
esting discussions, and arguments, and fights, and competing reports." Meanwhile,
"with the interest in the ballistic missile program came the question, how does one
simulate the extremely high energy flow field associated with the reentering
missile? Some people up at AVCO [Corporation in Massachusetts] were coming to
use the shock tube in a different way entirely, simulating very strong shocks flowing
down the shock tube which set up behind them the high energy flow that was
characteristic in many respects of ... reentry."
Stern had been at Langley for four years when, in late 1956, he said to himself
"'I'm now ready to go out and brave the commercial world and make a lot of
money.'" The NACA "was a great place to get one's basic training in research .... It
well fitted individuals to go out and go into applied research or ... to where one
could just, hell, rise a lot faster .... And there was the ballistic missile crisis -- they
were hiring like mad, and I did get a pretty good offer from AVCO. So I went. At that
time [AVCO was] the prime contractor for the Titan ballistic missile nose cone.
Martin Marietta was the missile contractor. The big competition was General
Electric, for the nose cone of the Atlas, and AVCO, for the nose cone of the Titan. And
both were going the direction of ... blunt bodies. And I ... worked about a year in
various pieces of what |'11 call applied research for AVCO, and got myself involved
in this same reentry problem: The matter of how one understands the flow around
blunt bodies reentering the atmosphere at extremely high speeds and predicts
what's going to happen to them so that one can design survivable nose cones."
Stern remained at AVCO for only a year. "At Langley we were.., trying to fully
understand flow .... | was interested in shock tubes for their use in simulating
unsteady flows that would be experienced in engine inlets -- | wasn't interested in
this engine or that engine .... When I went to AVCO, we were still doing research, but
we were now trying to apply it to a specific use .... We were now in the business of
trying to build a nose cone that would survive reentry after having been launched
on the back of this big Titan missile. I decided that ... I really liked it better at
Langley .... I liked the freedom to work in engineering science and not to have to
worry about building the device .... So I... came back to Langley and worked almost
exclusively on the aerodynamics and thermodynamics of reentry. We continued
some more shock tube work, but it was now finishing up." Because shock waves
occur in atmospheric gases, and their first effect is on the physical density and
(through altered tempera tures) on the molecular composition of the gases themselves,
"we were getting into aerodynamics mixed with physical chemistry, where the
aerodynamics of extremely high speed flows gets into chemistry and physics."
When Stern returned to Langley in 1958, Cassirer and other Langley researchers
had already begun to move into space-related problems of hypervelocity flight and
reentry. Throughout the Apollo decade, from 1960 to 1970, Cassirer remained in
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reentry physics. "We were working on reentry -- predicting reentry heating for
Apollo .... What our job was, was to predict what heating the.., body would expe-
rience -- both convective ... and friction.... When the second Apollo landed," in
November 1969, 7 "we were working on making predictions for a manned Mars
landing, not the Viking, but the manned Mars landing .... You just keep asking,
what's next, what's next. At that time, space looked like it had a limitless future."
Perhaps it did, but Cassirer had a hunch that there were still important break-
throughs to be made. In 1969 "people started saying, 'what's new?' I told my guys,
'look, we're going.., out of reentry and back into high-speed flight-- hypersonics.'"
Recurrent interest during the 1970s and 1980s in hypersonic aircraft and
transatmospheric "vehicles" would prove him right.
Other research avenues converged on the problem that faced NACA engineers
at Ames and Langley Research Laboratories in the late 1940s and early 1950s. H.
Julian Allen's "blunt body" concept promised to reduce the surface heating to which
vehicles reentering Earth's atmosphere would be subjected -- but not enough to
fully protect the interior. Certain materials -- like the nickel-chrome alloy Inconel-
X proposed for the body of the X-15 -- could endure rapid heating to temperatures
above 1000 ° F without significant losses in strength. There were two possible solu-
tions to the problem: cover the nose cone with a heat sink, or cover the nose cone with
an ablative material. The heat sink, which had been used successfully before 1958 on
early intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) nose cones, was a highly conductive
metal that absorbed reentry heat into a mass sufficient to prevent melting. The
principle of the ablative surface -- which was less well understood in 1958 -- was
the dissipation of heat through the burning or vaporization of the material covering
the nose cone. An ablative nose cone had been tested successfully on the Army's
Jupiter-C ICBM in 1957. Ablative or heat sink: the question would have to be solved
before NASA could send the first American into space. 8
William Mclver began working on the reentry heating problem shortly after his
arrival at the NACA's Lewis Research Center in 1957. While at Lewis he also worked
toward his doctorate in aerospace science at neighboring Case Western Reserve
University (which awarded him a Ph.D. in 1964); his thesis was a study of Australiasian
tektites, small pieces of glass of uncertain origin first found in Australia and
Indonesia. "Tektites are little pieces of glass ... on the order of a centimeter or so ...
found all around the world." They "have very little oxygen ... very little water in
them. It's presumed that they could not have come from some kind of terrestrial
origin because-- let's say ... there is a meteor impact on the Earth... sand is melted
and stuff goes up in orbit and then the wind carries it all around the world." But if
textites were of terrestrial origin, as they "melted in the atmosphere ... they would
contain a lot of moisture and oxygen. Well, these things contain very little moisture
and very little oxygen. So the theory was that they were actually, as a result of a
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meteor impact on the Moon ... splashed from the surface of the Moon, up into
cislunar orbit, and then gradually, by the Earth's gravitational field, sucked into the
Earth. When these spheres from space enter the Earth's atmosphere, they come
down and they melt .... On one side, they show signs of melting on the front ... on
the back, they're perfectly spherical."
That was the theory. Mclver wanted to test it. "I built a vertical wind tunnel" to
simulate the opposing forces acting on an object entering the atmosphere, "the wind
blowing up and the gravitational force pulling down.., that's why you get these ring
waves developing" around the object, "because you have the balance of these
opposing forces .... I proved that's how it could have happened."
NASA engineers would debate and test, test and debate, the relative merits of
the beryllium heat sink and ablative heat shield right to the threshold of the first
manned space launch. "Big Joe," which combined the U.S. Air Force's mighty Atlas
ICBM as booster and a full-scale Mercury capsule with an ablative heatshield, was
tested successfully in September 1959. It was this combination that sent John H.
Glenn, Jr. into orbit on a winter day in 1962.
When David Strickland left the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1944 after
receiving a degree in aeronautical engineering (with the help of the U.S. Navy, in
which he had served as a missile guidance officer), he went to work in the aircraft
industry. "I got involved in the airplane business, since there wasn't any space
business at all .... Until the Saturn" launch vehicle, the multistage launch vehicle
with clustered engines developed for the Apollo program, "everything that was
done in space was done with a ... derivative of the ballistic missile. And that was sort
of... coincidental .... It could have gone to the automobile industry or anyplace else,
but the aeronautical industry was the place that it went, because ... everything in
space had to go through the atmosphere .... The industry was in place, and it had the
kind of technical disciplines, the structures, and the electronics and the communi-
cations." A transition from aeronautics to space engineering was a part of Strickland's
career, as it was a part of many other aeronautical engineers' careers. After another
year in the Navy and a master's degree program at the University of Michigan,
Strickland went to work in 1952 at Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation
(Convair) in San Diego, Calif. He stayed at Convair until 1958, working as an
aerodynamicist on aircraft.
When Strickland went to San Diego, Convair was working on a new fighter-
interceptor plane for the U.S. Air Force, the F-102. With its bullet-shaped fuselage,
sharp-edged delta wings, and powerful Pratt and Whitney J-57 engine, the aircraft
was intended to fly at transonic speeds. However, tests in the NACA's Langley
Research Center's wind tunnels showed that it could not pass through mach 1. For
the next two years Convair worked on a redesigned prototype that applied the "area
rule" discovered by Langley aerodynamicist Richard T. Whitcomb.
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For years aerodynamicists had assumed that streamlining the fuselage of an
aircraft was the best way to diminish drag. Puzzling in 195I over the way shock
waves pass over airplanes at transonic speeds, Whitcomb imagined that the total
cross-sectional area of a plane's fuselage, and not simply its diameter, was what
determined the extent of drag. With Whitcomb's "area rule," the wasp-waist or
"coke bottle" came into being as the design solution to the problem of drag at
transonic speeds. Convair redesigned its prototype, following the area rule, and,
during tests in December 1954, the F-102A proved Whitcomb's discovery. Built for
the U.S. Air Force, the F-102 and its more advanced successors became a critical part
of the U.S. continental air defense for the next three decades? Convair engineers --
including Strickland -- spent a lot of time at Langley Research Center in the early
1950s.
In 1958 Strickland left Convair to return to Ann Arbor, Mich., where he worked
for the Bendix Corporation and hoped to earn a doctorate in engineering from the
University of Michigan. But he had married and started a family. "I found after a
while that I just wasn't going to do it, so I went back to Convair .... Rather than the
airplane division, I went to the astronautics division, whose responsibilities were
the Atlas and the Centaur. ''1° From 1962 to 1965 Strickland worked on advanced
projects and the Atlas space launch vehicle for General Dynamics (parent company
of Convair). "We carried responsibilities for very major aspects of the Mercury
program.., on our relatively inexperienced shoulders, and it didn't faze us .... Atlases
blew up, and the next day we went to work and we sat down and tried again. And
nobody.., expected perfection then." In 1965, by now well schooled in the intricacies
of sophisticated hardware development, Strickland left industry and went to work
for NASA in the first of a series of project and program management positions he
held for the remainder of his NASA career.
To make the transition from atmospheric to transonic and space flight, engi-
neers had to try novel vehicle designs and structural materials. Even that need was
predicated on their ability to design the "power plants," or engines capable of
propelling aircraft or launch vehicles at the speeds necessary to travel faster than the
speed of sound, or the thrust ("specific impulse") necessary to burst through the
heavy barrier of Earth's atmosphere and gravity. It was, for example, the develop-
ment of the jet engine in the late 1940s that intensified the search for new aircraft
designs and construction materials to minimize air drag and heating during high-
speed flightJ t
Space travel, especially for long-duration missions to other planets, com-
pounded the technological challenge by demanding highly efficient, minimal-
weight integral power and propulsion systems for spacecraft. Common to all high-
performance power systems-- whether for aircraft, rockets, or spacecraft-- was the
problem of developing designs and materials that could withstand the unprec-
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edented temperature extremes and pressures to which such systems would be
subjected. Thus much of the critical engineering work done by NASA during the
1960s would be in materials, structures, and heat transfer.
Matthew O'Day's first introduction to Lewis Research Center occurred during
his junior year in college, in 1956, when he began working at Lewis as part of NASA's
cooperative work-study program. In his coop work at Lewis, O'Day "had worked
in a number of areas .... I started out in bearings research, and I worked in icing
research." Five years later, with a master's degree from the California Institute of
Technology in hand, he returned to Lewis. His last coop work experience at Lewis
had been in orbital mechanics; "there's lots of mathematics, physics involved," but
it was "an area that I really had no interest in." Instead, he was interested in
structures, and found work in Lewis's materials and structures division. "Lewis is
NASA's propulsion center, so all of the structures work here was to advance" work
in propulsion systems such as "jet engine structures or propellant tanks for rockets."
Achieving the specific impulse necessary for rockets to lift heavy loads into
space depends, among other things, on reducing the molecular weight (the sum of
the atomic weights of all the atoms in a molecule) of the gases which, when combined
with an oxidizer, produce the combustion that pushes the rocket forward. The lower
the molecular weight, the more dramatic the increase in the specific impulse of the
rocket or launch vehicle. The lowest molecular weights are found in light gases such
as hydrogen -- and, of course, the oxygen necessary to produce combustion.
However, the volume of gas required to fuel any large rocket would be so enormous
that efficient gaseous fuels had to be condensed into their liquid states. That required
extreme cooling and pressurized plumbing and also produced the same structural
stresses of contained liquids in motion, or "sloshing," that forced the makers of
ocean-going tankers to build baffles into their holds. Thus structural engineering
continued to pair with thermodynamics or heat physics -- since rocket combustion
itself created astronomical temperatures-- as critial areas of aerospace engineering.
Learning how to handle cryogenic fuels -- gases cooled to temperatures below
240 °F-- was critical to post-World War II work in the United States on intercontinental
ballistic missiles and launch vehicles for space missions. American engineers at first
relied heavily on German cryogenic technology for Vo2 rockets, but by the early
1950s cryogenics had became an established engineering discipline in U.S. indus-
trial and government research centers. Shortly after his return to Lewis, O'Day "got
involved with one particular program to test titanium pressure vessels. I had the
opportunity to pretty much plan the program .... When you're working with liquid
hydrogen, it is kind of a hazardous situation ... so safety issues were a pretty
sensitive area. It was relatively basic research ... not only testing pressure vessels,
but also testing materials' reactions to cryogenic temperatures." He also worked at
"developing instrumentation ... because this was fracture mechanics," and among
the things one examines is "the growth of cracks."
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O'Day spent about thirteen years working in Lewis's materials and structures
division. "Roughly the first half of that was devoted to the fracture mechanics.., of
structures .... We were doing this work" on "cryogenic pressure vessels, working
with titanium and aluminum." And then there was "... writing reports. We'd finish
a chunk of research and, back in those days, that was the only way you'd get a chance
to travel-- if you put together a paper and presented it at some kind of conference."
Modestly, O'Day insists "much of my early work ... was really of a short-term
benefit, with a relatively small incremental increase in knowledge of no particular
interest to anybody."
Around 1969 O'Day's division "decided to get into another up-and-coming
area ... the area of advanced composite materials ... like graphite epoxy, boron
epoxy, boron aluminum, and more recently, kevlar epoxy composites." In the
process, O'Day turned from "cryogenic testing to ambient temperature testing, and
an entirely different category of materials, composites. But again, it was the same
type of work: trying to characterize these composites. And one important way of
characterizing composite materials" is by "subjecting them to biaxial loading ... as
well as putting shear on the structure itself."
By 1978 O'Day was at work on the Centaur liquid hydrogen fueled upper stage.
Work on the Centaur had begun in 1956 for the Department of Defense's Advanced
Research Projects Agency; combined with the Atlas lower stage, the payload and
communications carrying Centaur became a workhorse in the NASA stable of
launch vehicles for heavy communications satellites and space probes. "The
Centaur ... used welded stainless steel tanks .... We tested steel, using different
welding techniques. We made spiral welding tanks and tested those. We were
involved not only in fracture mechanics but in stress analysis, so we could have done
stress analysis work on model Centaur tanks .... It makes so much sense to me now,"
reflects O'Day. "Why weren't we doing research to support the Centaur? Why were
we testing titanium? Why were we testing aluminum?" Had they written "some-
thing that was a definitive stress analysis of a Centaur tank, it would have been used
up until today," and "answered a lot of questions that still aren't answered." But
around 1977 "Lewis was going through reductions in force and reorganizations and
the whole character of the work was changing. My initial desire was to be involved
with research. But it seemed like that portion of the work here was being
deemphasized, was shrinking, and the area involved with projects was growing. ''12
John Songyin began his engineering career at the National Bureau of Standards,
where he went in 1950 after graduating with a degree in mechanical engineering
from the City College of New York. For the next three years he worked on
"developing strain gauges to get better sensitivity to measure stress and strain."
Naval vessels, not aircraft, were the immediate cause of the work. "One of the big
problems that we were looking at was the oil tankers during World War II that sailed
in the North Atlantic. Due to the cold, a lot of the bulkheads were fracturing .... People
were looking at the designs where the bulkheads met, and the kind of cutouts to
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allow oil to flow from one hole to the other," to get a better grasp of the "stress
concentrations" in tanker construction. "Most of my work was looking into better
ways to increase the sensitivity of strain gauges."
The strain gauge then most commonly used consisted of "fine wires that were
attached to structures so that when the structure would strain, this would be picked
up by these thin wires" as changes in resistance. "We were looking into other means"
as well, "like applying paints of metallic solutions, and looking at the change in
strain -- how that would affect the change in resistance of this painted-on solution.
It was something like that, that eventually developed into printed circuitry. In
testing for these strain gauges, we would just take a flat bar stock and paint these
things on with the proper kinds of substrates, and then put them into a tensile
machine" with a "very optically correct apparatus that gave us the reference points,
and then see what the upward change in resistance" was and "how that could be
related to the reference change in strain. The strain gauge.., is very much a basic part
of mechanical engineering .... A lot of work was done by mechanical calculators ...
that put up such a clatter. Put in something," divide one number by another, "and
this thing would churn away and clatter away and then read out these numbers. It
was very, very cumbersome. It was only a little better than a slide rule."
Songyin left the National Bureau of Standards in 1953 for New York, where he
worked briefly, and unhappily, for an engineering consulting firm "that contracted
out to architects and engineers for buildings and institutions." He managed to find
another job with General Electric in Evandale, Ohio, "where we worked on jet
aircraft and rockets. And that's where I started specializing in ... heat transfer. We
were working on military jet engines, las well as] the nuclear jet engine program
too .... But those were essentially paper studies and nothing [to dol with any
hardware .... I remember using a lot of the NACA engine data." Then things "started
to phase down at GE," while "things were really booming in Cleveland." Songyin
served his two years in the Army and moved to Cleveland in 1961 to work at Lewis
Research Center, beginning his NASA engineering career doing stress analysis for
a new breed of "power plants for space. That was the SNAP program -- Systems for
Nuclear Auxiliary PowerJ 3 At that time Lewis was devoted to developing tech-
nologies with no specific application" but that "we expected would find an appli-
cation in the near future. One of the things that we foresaw as a mission was
interplanetary travel to Mars .... We were concentrating on converting the heat
power of a nuclear source to electrical energy."
Songyin's "whole division was working ... on this SNAP project." Some
branches studied "the rotating machinery"; others looked at different components,
such as condensers and boilers. Still others probed how various aspects of the system
should be tested. But growing public concern over fallout from nuclear accidents in
space prompted a search for alternate power systems for long-duration space flight.
So "we went from the SNAP system into the Brayton system ... around 1967."
The Brayton system operated on the principle of a "thermodynamic cycle that,
instead of using a working fuel that undergoes a phase change from liquid to gas or
vapor and then is condensed back into a liquid, just uses a single phase -- a gas in
this case -- which gets heated ... powers a turbine, and then is cooled down in the
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heat exchanger. There's no condensation; therefore, no change in flow is involved."
In this instance, "the heat of the Sun" provided the energy for the heat cycle. "We
used a large mirror which focuses into a cavity, through which the tubes carry the
gas, pick up the heat, and deliver the energy to a turbine which turns an electrical
generator. The working fluid -- the gas -- then gets cooled down and gets pumped
around and recirculated.
"I concentrated mostly on the heat receiver that gets the reflection from the
mirror into this component," shaped like "the frustrum of a cone, which absorbed
the heat from the Sun and transferred it to the gas .... The tricky part" was to design
the system for "low Earth orbit -- like two hundred and fifty miles altitude." The
system would be "exposed to the Sun for sixty minutes" and then would be in the
shade "for about thirty-six minutes." It would "have to absorb enough energy from
the Sun to tide it over during the shade part of the orbit .... The way we did that ...
was to use these salts that would melt in the Sun and then give up" their heat as they
solidified in the shade.
"A lot of [Songyin's] heat transfer background came into" that work. "Lithium
chloride undergoes quite a volume change -- something like thirty percent ... as it
solidifies and shrinks .... You have to be aware of the pattern of solidification,"
which produces "voids all over the place. That means when you come back into the
Sun, the Sun -- with high-intensity solar flux -- could be focusing on an area in
which there's a void where the salt has shrunk away from the surface, and therefore"
there is "nothing to take away the heat of the Sun. Therefore there's a danger of
overheating the container and burning a hole in it .... A lot of our attention was" on
trying "to control where the shrinkage takes place to insure that there wouldn't be
these evacuated areas." Songyin's group tested the design "under 1-g" conditions,
"and we figured that if we could control" the shrinkage "under 1 gravity," the
system "certainly would work under zero gravity." But the big long-duration
mission "never came off. So all of that technology was shelved .... Now [1986}
they're talking about" possibly using a Brayton cycle power plant for the Space
Station. Some of the Brayton hardware "has been taken off the shelves, out of the
mothballs .... I think there are two or three units that were built." After twenty years
NASA's "picking up exactly where we left off."
Songyin worked on the solar power system for about five years, into the early
1970s. "At that time we were" also "looking at the Mercury Rankine System," for use
in long-duration space missions, "the Rankine being similar to a steam power plant,
but instead of water you're using mercury as the working fluid. It goes through the
same cycle of boiling and condensing and activating a turbine which generates
electricity .... The whole cycle would be closed," and "the same mercury would be
circulated." Songyin's own work was devoted to mastering the heat transfer aspects
of the Rankine system.
"We were looking into the problem of mercury condensation; we were worried
about the effect of zero gravity on ... the condensation of the mercury. My re-
sponsibility was to ... come up with experiments that would simulate zero gravity,
to give us an idea of whether there really was a problem with zero gravity. This
involved experimentation in the lab, here, and also installing a condensation rig in
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the bottom bay of an AJ-2 bomber, H which went through a zero-G maneuver, and,
in those ten to fifteen seconds of zero gravity, to get high-speed photographs and to
analyze the droplets to see if we could get better insight into the phenomena of
mercury condensation and see if there would be a problem in long-term zero
gravity ... conditions.
"We were doing the basic spadework for a mission we thought would
be coming .... Our aim there was not tied to any particular schedule leading to
launch and takeoff." Songyin's group was attempting to answer the technological
questions so that when the mission was identified, and schedules made, the
technological answers would be there for the system people to put it all together.
Sandra Jansen has been working at Lewis Research Center longer than most.
After earning a teaching degree with a major in math in 1947 from Ohio State
University, she worked for a year at various odd jobs. In 1948 she started working
at Lewis, where she joined the dozens of women who worked as NASA's human
computers, reducing data from hours and hours of tests run in the center's engine
research facilities and wind tunnels.
Sandra Jansen's career parallels the rapid evolution of computers from the noisy
mechanical desk machines of the 1940s to the high-speed electronic mainframes and
microcomputers of the 1980s; she has worked "entirely with computers" throughout
her career. "I had grown up with them ... worked ... in machine language, in
assembly language, in interpretive languages [like BASIC], and then in FORTRAN."
In the early 1950s, "the first things that we had were.., punch card computers." Most
of the data they worked with came from tests of pressures inside and on the surfaces
of engines.
"We had ... manometer boards [and] ... people that sat and through magnifying
glasses.., read the level of mercury in those manometer columns." In time, film was
developed "that could be taken automatically and kept on a continuous roll, so that
you could get a shot here, and then a shot here, and a shot here .... You would sit
there, and there was a cross hair that you'd move by hand-maneuverable wheels ....
You would cross those hairs at the top of a particular manometer tube, press a
button, and that would punch into a card. Then you'd move to the next manometer
tube with your cross hairs, punch the button with your foot .... The way in which the
data was reduced was all manual, by hand. We had four different ... sections of
girls .... Computing at that time consisted of row after row of women ... who sat and
did line after line of calculations on desk-top calculators." The women, few of whom
had college degrees, "had forms set up for them with instructions as to what to do.
"We had big books of exponential functions and logarithmic functions and of
the various trig functions you needed to do your job -- the things that you, today,
can push one key on a pocket calculator and get." Jansen's job was to "set up those
sheets that [the women] used to do their calculations. I was a math major, so I could
take the equations and translate them into the various sheets they needed to do their
job. They didn't have to do the math; all they had to do was follow the instructions.
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I prepared the instructions.., and the girls who worked there were called computers."
Within a few years Jansen was promoted to a job as supervisor "of an office of
about twenty people." She was still "setting up the sheets and handing out...
assignments.., and tracking to make sure they got done on time." By the mid-1950s
the new computer age took root at Lewis, and Jansen began developing programs
for electronic computers as part of various research projects, "doing," she remem-
bers, "the same work as the engineers. The first ... that we had were {IBM] 604s,
which were punch card coded .... You put your instructions as well as your data in
through punch cards. This eliminated the need for people sitting at desk calculators.
We learned how to code these equations into these punch card computers."
Meanwhile, the need to obtain increasingly subtle and accurate measurements
for more sophisticated test engines stimulated the invention or development of new
automated pressure-measuring devices. One device consisted of "hundreds of
pressure capsules, little thin membranes ... mounted on the outside of a pressure
tank. The tank was maybe two or three feet tall. And coming to the outside.., of these
membranes were plugs.., that were actually sensing pressure inside the experiment
cavity .... They evacuated the chamber down to a very low pressure and then
gradually allowed that pressure to rise. And as the pressure on the external side of
this capsule and the pressure in the tank became equal, there would be a snapping
of the membrane .... Now what they were really sensing was ... the time from the
beginning of this change in pressure inside to the end of the change in pressure
inside. And they calibrated the time with the pressure." Using a conversion formula,
"you could take the time and, with a small equation, come up with what was the
pressure."
By the mid-1950s Lewis engineers also developed a central computerized
automatic digital data encoder, or CADDE, "the purpose of which was not to sense
data, but to record data in an automated manner via land lines from the facilities,
without anybody having to write anything down." The CADDE was "not a general-
purpose computer"; it was developed specifically for Lewis to service several test
facilities, including the 10 foot by 10 foot tunnel.
After the first UNIVAC computer (the 1103) _5arrived at Lewis in 1953, "there
was a whole gradual development of continually automating both the acquisition
of the data -- so that you didn't have to have people writing anything down in the
test cells or taking pictures of manometer boards -- and the processing of the data
by having the more powerful computers ... to do what you needed to do. The new
machine did those calculations for the tunnel ... that were being done by the girls
with those desk-top calculators" in a moment, instead of in "an hour's or day's or
week's ... turn around." The UNIVAC's "primary goal in life was to support
[Lewis's] 10 foot by 10 foot wind tunnel ... but you didn't need all of that computer
power just to support the tunnel. So extra time was used to do other types of
research."
Greater computing power, along with more advanced automated measuring
devices, enabled Lewis to centralize test data collection and processing. Data from
wind tunnels, and both large and small engine research facilities, could be recorded
and "fed by line ... through a central data collector ... put on tape, archived, and
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made available directly into the large computers for processing." The growth of
electronic, high-speed computation as a new technological discipline was reflected
in a change in the organizational location of what would not be much longer, "the
girls." When Jansen first went to work at Lewis, she and the other computing women
worked in "sections that sat within the R & D divisions. And then.., sometime in the
'50s, there was a conglomeration of all the people into a computer services concept,
a division that did nothing but this work."
Remington Rand's UNIVAC (which Jansen says "never became a really popular
computer at Lewis") soon gave way to machines produced and marketed by IBM,
which moved quickly into commercial computers, sold primarily to the government
and defense contractors, after Remington Rand's initial success with the UNIVAC.
"About 1956 we got some IBM 650s which were truly open shop type machines .... An
engineer who could read and learn how to write a program could sign up for an
hour's worth of time on this machine, key punch his stuff up on decks of cards, and
run it through, and do the calculations .... We had three of those at our peak ...
located in the 8 foot by 6 foot [wind tunnel]. They were so heavily used that.., if you
were really doing some heavy computing.., you would run at night, you would run
on holidays, you would do whatever you needed to get your computer time .... They
became very popular, so the IBM world sort of infiltrated here .... Then, when we
went for our first major large computer that was going to be truly scientific, and open
to the users to write programs in FORTRAN, it was an IBM 704. ''1_However, before
the 704 was delivered, Jansen left Lewis to have her first child.
"When I left I was working in ... engineering ... developing programs on the
computers, and writing reports in basically ... internal engine research. I was
actually doing research. I had been given a project, and I was developing the
equations and the programs and doing the actual work on the computer .... The last
report I wrote was on boundary layer interactions." Both Lewis and Langley
Research Centers were working on boundary layers. In Jansen's case, she was
investigating the "boundary layer external to ... the blade rows of the compressor"
within an aircraft engine, "as opposed to the boundary layer of the airfoil. The theory
is the thing -- the fact that you're working with cascades of blades and rotating
machinery makes the process much more complex."
Jansen was away from her work for over three years, during which time she was
miserable, watching from the outside while "the space program was coming to the
forefront in everyone's imagination, and when [Alan B.] Shepard made his first
suborbital flight, and [John H.] Glenn made his first orbital flight, and I was not a part
of it, it was ripping me apart inside. Everywhere... the media talked about how you
should be happy just making cookies and taking care of your little children. At that
time ... I did not see a way in which I could keep my hand active and still stay
home .... So it became very difficult for me, because ... I saw a part of history
developing through this space program that I wanted very much to be a part of.
"It was not an easy decision," she remembers, "to leave the kids and come back
to work." During the three and a half years that Jansen had been away, Lewis "had
gone through two generations of computers and had another, a much newer, more
powerful, system." When Jansen returned to work in mid-1962, she had a choice of
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jobs at Lewis, but decided to go "back into the computing world, because that is
where I had felt the most ... satisfied -- most productive. I never really felt
comfortable as an engineer.., doing the research on my own. I had always felt more
comfortable when I was doing the math part of it, and supporting the engineers."
"They had gone through two generations of computers. FORTRAN was still the
major language that was used .... I had a lot of brushing up to do, and I took ... in
house classes .... It wasn't long before I felt very productive, and I was doing real
honest to gosh work." Jansen returned to her old computing section, which was
supporting Lewis's large wind tunnels. The laboratory had moved into "nuclear
fusion and fission investigations, [so she began] developing some modeling of
fusion processes, electromagnetic theories. I actually have a report that I coauthored
on some electromagnetic modeling." Gradually her work shifted from theoretical
calculations "[to] support of the experimental facilities again .... They were still
using the 1103 [UNIVAC], believe it or not.., and they wanted to move the support
of the wind tunnels and the test cells into the IBM environment." In time Jansen
acquired increased levels of oversight responsibility in Lewis's data systems orga-
nization, which "provided all the supports, both real time and post processing, for
the wind tunnels and for the experimental facilities that are around the center."
While the advent of high-speed electronic computing diminished the need for
women computers, "there was never anyone that was pushed out the gate because
of it .... " insists Jansen. "First of all ... a lot of these people didn't stay long; they'd
come out of high school, they would work there for a couple of years, and then got
married. And when they got their first pregnancy, they would walk out the gates.
So gradually there was a diminishing number .... Some of them went back to school,
got their math degrees, and ended up being bona fide mathematician computer
programmers [working with] the large mainframes." Lewis began to hire people
"with math backgrounds and then trained them in the use of computers, because the
colleges weren't at that point yet .... This was one of the few areas, back in the '60s,
where there was a fairly high percentage of women ... in the math area, and the
application and use of computers."
Joseph Totten's road to the space age began in Biloxi, Miss., where he went
through basic training in the U.S. Army Air Corps at Keesler Field. 17"As a kid I
always had a fascination for aviation, and I built model plane after model plane. My
room was well filled with model airplanes all the time. I'd fly them -- not the kind
that you have a motor in -- but the rubber band kind. In those days, I don't believe
we had motors.., other kids that I ran around with, we were all doing the same sort
of thing." In 1944, fresh out of high school, Totten enlisted in the U.S. Army Air
Corps. A few months after the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945, he was
discharged. He returned to Illinois, where he attended Joliet Junior College and later
went to the University of Illinois, finally earning a bachelor's degree in civil
engineering in 1954. In between he got married, had his first children, and worked
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for a public works company, "designing subdivisions, streets, sewer systems, water
systems, designing some small bridges and things like that."
When Totten finished college he returned to the same company for a year,
largely out of loyalty to the man who had helped finance his last year in college.
Restless for something bigger and better, he then cast about for a job as a city
engineer or public works administrator. As a fall-back, he applied for a job with
Douglas Aircraft in E1Segundo, Calif. Douglas offered him a job and turned out to
be the only company that "would provide any moving expenses for me. So ! decided
to take that job. My wife and I ... we had two kids and she was pregnant at the
time -- we took off, went to California." He was the first Totten to leave Illinois. And
that, he says, is "how I got into the aerospace business."
He was soon working on the analysis and design of jet aircraft for the Navy,
including "the A3D ... a twin engine attack bomber, carrier based." He also worked
"on the A4D ... still flying today (or a more modern version of it), which is an attack
fighter aircraft, and the F4D ... a delta wing airplane ... called 'the Skyray.' They
looked like a damn stingray -- the planform. They had no normal wingshape to it,
just a big delta wing." The Skyray was designed for "speed and maneuverability...
an aircraft that would be flying over mach 1; at that time, that was a relatively new
field." While he found himself working with "aluminum, and things like that"
rather than "working with sand and gravel, and cement ]Tottenl really didn't have
to learn new tricks. The fundamental engineering equations.., you can apply almost
anywhere. It was just a matter of learning a different language -- aircraft language
rather than civil engineering language."
Toward the end of the 1950s the aerospace industry suffered a downturn.
"Budgeting was pretty low and a lot of programs that had been developed were
canceled, like the Eagle missile program, the F10D ... most of the companies were
laying people off." Totten decided he did not want to "stay around and get laid off."
Besides, the Douglas Aircraft Company had undergone a change in top management
which Totten thought was letting the company "go to pot ... there were a lot of us
that got very discouraged" with the way the company was being run. So Totten
contacted a friend who was working with the Chrysler Corporation, an aerospace
contractor in Huntsville, Ala. and the friend put him in touch with Brown Engineering.
"The majority of the work that they did was contract to the government providing
services in support of the Marshall Space Flight Center." At the beginning of the new
year, 1961, Totten returned to the deep South to work for Brown.
The enthusiasm with which Totten began working for Brown Engineering was
due in part to his admiration for Brown's president, Milton Cummings, who had
interviewed him. "The guy was something else ... a far out looker, you know. He
could see things in the future, and he knew how to work things to get to that
point .... He was the guy who ... developed the HIC [Huntsville Industrial Center]
building complex, which was.., used a lot by NASA in the early days. The HIC was
a large cotton mill at one time, and he converted it to office space and laboratories
for Brown Engineering and a lot of aerospace companies that were just starting to
come into Huntsville .... There were no other large facilities here, outside of the
Redstone Arsenal .... Within a year or so, he had the foresight to buy the property."
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Totten had foresight too. "After being in Huntsville a while, I saw where the power
was and where the control was, with the government. And so I applied for a job with
NASA in 1962.]_... I was a civil engineer, structural.., you're just applying the same
laws ... to a different field, that's all.
"Marshall's main work [during the mid-1960s] was the development of the
Saturn V," the mighty booster that lifted over 3100 tons -- more than a "good sized
Navy destroyer" -- off the launch pad at Cape Kennedy and nosed the 55-ton
combined Apollo command, service, and lunar lander modules into an orbit around
the Moon on July 19, 19692 q The thundering Saturn was the descendant of liquid-
fuel rocket technology foreseen at the turn of the century by Konstantin Tsiolkovski,
tested successfully by Robert H. Goddard in 1926, and developed during the 1940s
at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory (California Institute of Technology)
and by Wernher von Braun's German Army ordnance group at Peenemuende on the
North Sea.
Germany had been stung by the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Versailles
(1919), the negotiations for which excluded the German government, and her
military leaders ingeniously sought ways to circumvent the treaty's disarmament
terms. 2° Those terms forbade Germany to maintain tanks, military aviation, sub-
marines, heavy artillery, or military conscription. At the same time, Britain's use of
aircraft and tanks during the Somme offensive (1916) was not lost on the German
general staff, which resolved to prepare for the next battle sophisticated, mechanized
warfare. These were the seeds not only of the German "blitzkrieg" of World War II,
but of the German Army's work, during the 1930s, on rocket research as part of the
development of long-range artillery.
Bureaucratic ingenuity played a role as well in the growing importance of the
U.S. Army's rocket work at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Ala., 21
to the future space program. In 1955, when a select panel chose the Navy's Viking
over the Army's Jupiter C as the launch vehicle for the first U.S. satellite program,
ABMA persevered with its work on the Jupiter C, maintaining that it was merely
testing nose cones for ballistic missile warheads. Again, when, in 1957, the U.S. Air
Force won the interservice battle for responsibility for long-range military rocket
development, ABMA decided to "leapfrog" the competition by concentrating on
large booster development for space exploration. 22The strategy was inspired, for
Wernher von Braun was a space visionary as much as a master of advanced rocket
research. (As fortune would have it, the Navy's first entry into the "space race,"
designated Vanguard, would culminate in a ball of fire on the launch pad. ABMA
emerged triumphant after all as its four-stage Jupiter C, Juno I, took the honor on
January 31, 1958 of sending this country's first satellite into Earth orbit.)
Thus it was that in 1957 ABMA began work on a large, advanced booster,
dubbed the Super-Jupiter, capable of lifting as much as five tons through Earth's
gravitational barrier and placing it into Earth orbit -- a feat that would require 1.5
million pounds of thrust. For the Mercury and Gemini projects, the first U.S. manned
forays into space, NASA had requisitioned boosters from the military services-- the
Redstone missile from the Army, and the Thor, Atlas, and Titan missiles from the Air
Force. By 1960 NASA was ready for its own super-booster program, and ABMA was
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ready for NASA. That year, on the Ides of March, ABMA opened its doors as NASA's
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.
When Torten left Brown engineering for the Marshall Space Flight Center in
1962, his "first assignment ... was providing stress analysis support for what we, in
those days, called advanced designs ... such things as lunar landers, NOVA 23
vehicles .... We worked on a variety of things in support of the advanced designs of
that sort, mostly to do with outer space ... vehicles .... I was working on things that
were probably another ten or fifteen years down the road." After working on
advanced design projects, Totten joined "a group that worked directly with the
Saturn IB," the booster that launched the first manned Apollo spacecraft, Apollo 7,
in October 1968 and was used again in 1973 to launch crews to the Skylab orbiting
workshop. 24He "started out in stress analysis and then progressed up .... Stress
analysis ... was all we did, analyze the designs to make sure they were strong
enough .... [Working in the] structures propulsion area, we were pretty much
concerned with design, analysis, thermal, and that sort of thing, where we were
actually putting stuff on the paper, checking it to make sure it was strong enough to
handle the environments that we'd fly through, and then get all the drawings ready
to release and send them over to be manufactured." Then, "during the late '60s,
[Totten began working] not only the static side of the house, but ... dynamic and
vibration analysis, along with the structural analysis." Totten also worked "in the
design side of the house ... the design, propulsion, and structural design lab, where
all new engines [were] developed [and] all new structures.., new launch vehicles,"
payloads, and experiments were designed.
Born in the Illinois farm belt, the son of an auto mechanic, Joseph Totten claims
that he can "remember the horse and buggy .... I lived through that as a little kid, and
I've seen going to the stars. There are not too many people who can say that they've
been there."
Sam Browning also came to the space program by way of the U.S. Air Force,
which he joined because he "wanted to fly an airplane." And, he says, "I don't want
this to sound trite, but I really felt that people ought to serve this country.., avoiding
the draft was not something that occurred to me -- another difference between the
generation today, and our generation." A native of Birmingham, Ala., the eldest of
three boys, Browning was the son of an itinerant carpenter who finally managed to
settle himself with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Huntsville. Even though he
had had little schooling beyond the eighth grade, Browning's father was "a very
talented guy." When the younger Browning declared his enthusiasm for chemistry,
his father "pointed out that you have to have a Ph.D to go anywhere in chemistry,
and that was long and expensive .... why don't you go into chemical engineering?
You'll make a lot more money." And so he did.
Browning's first encounter with the space program was in 1957, when he began
working at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency as a coop student while he was
studying for a degree in chemistry from Auburn University. "I was in the solid
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rocket testing area .... The Army group was divided into the solid rocket group and
the guided missile development division -- which was von Braun's team." After
about a year he realized that while he "was able to put my engineering drawing to
good use by designing test pictures ... and working down on the range with the
crews installing solid motors, [he] wasn't getting any chemistry or any exposure
to... what I was really going through school after, so I asked for a transfer to GMDD
(the Guided Missile Development Division) ... and I came over here and worked in
the materials laboratory."
In 1959, Browning graduated from Auburn, where he had been in an advanced
ROTC program; he then spent three years in the Air Force. To his dismay, he failed
his first physical when entering active duty. As luck would have it "there was an
outfit in Sacramento that was tagging the personnel folders of people with degrees
in chemistry, chemical engineering ... engineering physics, I guess. So I got tagged
to go into the nuclear development, warhead development testing." Browning did
classified work at McClellan Air Force Base for three years, learning "a lot more
chemistry there than I had in college. And ... a lot of physics.
"We had a few field grade officers ... and a laboratory full of second and first
lieutenants with engineering and chemistry and physics degrees." Browning's
experience at McClellan helped him to "realize that I could compete with people
who had degrees from MIT and CalTech and prestige institutions .... Growing up in
the South and going to school at Auburn, I had a little bit of an inferiority
complex .... These people ... were well trained, but ... it came down to ... whether
you got the job done or not. We had one fellow from MIT who was all thumbs ... in
spite of the fact that he was quite well educated." Browning discovered "these are
mortals too. I can hang in there with them."
When Browning's stint with the Air Force ended in 1962, he debated returning
to his old ABMA organization at Huntsville-- which had, by now, become NASA's
Marshall Space Flight Center. "I had a hard time deciding what to do when I got out
of the Air Force, because I had a chemical engineering degree and an interest in
working in the chemical processing industry. I had.., some experience in the nuclear
field, and this terrific interest in NASA and the aerospace business .... | didn't want
to come back to Huntsville .... Huntsville was a very small town .... One great thing
the Air Force did for me was to expose me to California .... Sacramento is a big, big
valley. Most of the days you couldn't even see the horizon. The sky just blended into
the horizon somehow, because of the smog .... It was almost an alien culture --
Marin [County] ... yuppie type stuff. ''2_ But as time went on "I learned that I missed
the hills around Huntsville."
Nineteen sixty-two was not a bad time for an engineer to be looking for a job.
Browning had offers from Babcock and Wilcox, Brookhaven National Laboratories,
Chemstrand, Monsanto Chemicals, Morton Thiokol, and Pratt and Whitney, "to
work on the SNAP reactor program up at their Connecticut Advanced Nuclear
Engineering Laboratory." His decision not to take the Pratt and Whitney job was
fortuitous, for Pratt and Whitney had to close down their SNAP program within a
year. Ultimately the "lure of the Apollo program ... won out over the rest of it and,
like everybody else I guess who's worked for NASA, I didn't take the highest offer
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I got .... I came to work for NASA to be part of the space program and to be back in
Huntsville." Browning began the year 1963 by reporting to Marshall Space Flight
Center, where his first assignment was in the propulsion division. He had been
slated "to work on the reactor inflight test stage ... and specifically, the NERVA
{nuclear engine for rocket vehicle applications]," but both programs were cancelled
the following year. 2_ "At that point the section that ! was a part of also had
responsibility for the RL-10 oxygen, liquid hydrogen rocket engine. And I was
simply shifted over to work on the RL-10 .... The RL-10 is an engine that was the free
world's first.., oxygen, liquid hydrogen rocket engine, [a] very advanced system for
its day, and [it] still is one of the better rocket engines around. "27
In 1964 "a new fellow ... came into the section named J. R. Thompson. ''2_
Thompson had been working for Pratt and Whitney, and when he arrived at
Marshall he was put "to work on the J-2 engine, which was ... still in early
development stages. "2. Browning was one of a "pair detailed to work with J.R.
developing a math model for the J-2 engine, which was something I had no idea how
to go about doing -- but J.R. did." Working "in that group through the J-2 engine
qualification program" kept Browning busy during late 1965 and early 1966. Once
the J-2 engine passed its qualification tests, Browning decided he "didn't really want
to get bogged down in tracking paper work on an engine that was now about to
move out of the development phase into the flight phase. [He wanted} to stay closer
to the new technology part [of Marshall's work], the farther out kinds of
things .... There weren't many chemical engineers around, so they tended to assign
me to the cats and dogs that came in in advanced propulsion type stuff, which in
those days was mainly exotic type propellants." Browning was transferred into the
propulsion and vehicle engineering research laboratory, where "we were looking at
post Saturn, NOVA class vehicles.., eighteen to thirty million pounds of thrust .... One
concept was ... something like two to three million pound thrust engines clustered
around a plug nozzle. [Another was the] so-called aerospike nozzle, which has a
single annular throat around the periphery of this thing, that might be sixty feet in
diameter that, again, had an aerospike nozzle instead of the traditional bell-type
nozzle."
Browning's background in chemical engineering had been an "open sesame" to
much of Marshall's work in advanced rocket propulsion. For example, he was
assigned to a working group investigating the use of fluorine as a rocket propellant
to replace oxygen. "We were also looking at new ways to build turbo machinery that
would be lower in cost. So I had a couple of studies in low-cost turbo machinery,
turbopumps .... We had some contracts out on high-energy propellants, and I
monitored those." Before the mighty Saturn V would launch the three-man crew of
Apollo 11 on its journey to the Moon in July 1969, Browning was already at work on
a NASA venture which actually predated the manned lunar landing mission -- a
manned orbiting space station. _)
But even as the crew of Apollo 11 made its epochal voyage to the Moon, NASA
was phasing out production of the Sa turn in what would become, after the Challenger
accident of January 28, 1986, one of its more controversial decisions. In place of the
Saturn, the agency began developing a new Space Transportation System, consisting
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of a winged, reusable orbiting rocket plane or space "shuttle," an external fuel tank,
and two refurbishable, reusable boosters? 1 One of the places the Shuttle was ex-
pected to go was to an Earth-orbiting space station, which had been a gleam in the
eyes of aerospace engineers at Langley Research Laboratory and German rocket
engineers working with Wernher von Braun at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency
even before NASA was created. Although NASA tried repeatedly -- and unsuc-
cessfully until 1984 -- to obtain White House approval to begin a space station
program, preliminary design and definition studies were an intermittent feature of
advanced technology work at both Johnson Space Center and Marshall Space Flight
Center throughout the 1960s.
When in 1961 NASA formally embarked on the research and development work
necessary to carry a man to the Moon by the end of the 1960s, the agency was able
to draw on the cumulative efforts of thousands of engineers who had already been
mobilized to solve some of the fundamental technical problems that stood between
it and triumph. Important groundwork had been laid during the 1950s in the
aerodynamics of high-performance (or military) aircraft, guided missiles, electronic
data processing, and advanced aircraft engine and rocket research and development.
That groundwork was laid by engineers Bill Cassirer and Joseph Torten and others
like them, men and women who began their careers in the 1950s.
The early careers of the ten NASA Apollo-era engineers profiled in this chapter
reflect the successful mobilization by the United States of the civilian, technical
manpower to wage the Cold War. That war had among its principal weapons not
only nuclear deterrence (and the ballistic missiles necessary to make the threat of
nuclear weapons meaningful), but the air power thought essential to any successful
response to any future military "emergency." The Apollo program provided a
peaceful corollary to the militarily inspired work being done along a wide front of
technological development.
These early recruits into the new civilian army of the Cold War came, for the
most part, from the Northeast or Midwest; one came from Alabama and another
from the state of Washington. Half were the sons (and one the daughter) of
practicing engineers or scientists. NASA support, through undergraduate coop
programs or support for graduate work, was instrumental in the training and initial
career choice for at least half of these men and one woman. A majority of them
started out wanting to go into aeronautical or aerospace engineering, and all who
did moved directly into work in NACA laboratories or the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency, with the exception of two who worked for several years with large aircraft
manufacturers dependent on government orders before going to work for NASA in
the early 1960s. Two of the three engineers in this group who did not begin their
careers intent upon going into aerospace research or engineering nonetheless were
employed by the federal agencies involved in the research and development work.
The one woman in the group began her career with training in mathematics and,
except for a few years during which she stayed home to care for a young family, did
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the same kind of work in the same NASA organization throughout her entire career.
(The constancy of her career pattern raises the question of whether, as a woman in
a man's profession, once she found a niche she clung to it, or whether alternate
opportunities were truly closed to her.)
By the time these engineers were interviewed they had been working for NASA
(or the NACA or ABMA) for no less than twenty years, and in seven cases for more
than twenty-five years. Did their careers fulfill their initial hopes or expectations?
Four had clearly wanted to do research of some kind; only one of those four managed
to continue doing fundamental research (in aeronautics) without paying a penalty
in "getting ahead." Two gradually shifted into management, moving to NASA
Headquarters in Washington, D.C. to carry out administrative or Headquarters staff
functions. The fourth also moved into management, but project management that
enabled him to remain close to the work in instrumenting spacecraft for planetary
missions that had intrigued him when he first joined NASA. All four had risen to the
ranks of the senior executive service. Two others achieved senior executive rank
during their twenty-plus years with NASA; both had started out as enlistees in
military pilot training programs, and both spent several years in the aerospace
industry working on optimum engine and airframe designs for high-performance
aircraft before coming to NASA. One went into technical management (at Marshall
Space Flight Center), while the other moved into program management at NASA
Headquarters. All but one of these six, whose NASA careers terminated in senior-
level management rather than the "hands on" work that had drawn them to research
and technology in the first place, began their NASA careers as NACA or ABMA
veterans.
Of the four of these ten engineers who did not advance into executive positions,
one was promoted into a managerial track that could lead to a senior executive
position, while three remained in technical occupations. Of those three, one became
essentially a contract monitor with little further involvement in actual engineering
work; one is involved in structural analysis for the Centaur upper stage manufac-
tured by General Dynamics; and one is adrift on a career plateau, passing through
a "career development" program and a study of power generating systems for a
space station but, by his own account, "pretty much stuck."
1A "supersonic" speed is greater than the speed of sound (around 670 miles per hour
at sea level, or roach 1); "transonic" describes the range between subsonic and
supersonic speeds. "Hypersonic" speeds are greater than five times the speed of
sound, or mach 5.
2The hydraulics engineer knows that the same friction can determine the pressure
loss in a pipe or channel.
3 Since much aeronautical research was conducted with scale models in wind
tunnels, it was important to be able to extrapolate from models to full-scale aircraft.
Working in the field of hydrodynamics, Osborne Reynolds (1842-1912) established
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experimentally that the range of velocity at which a flowing fluid will become
turbulent depends on the fluid's mass density and viscosity, the size or shape of the
conduit, and the velocity of the flow. The numerical ratio reflecting this relationship
came to be called the Reynolds number. The use of the Reynolds number has enabled
aeronautical engineers to extrapolate from wind tunnel tests of models to actual full-
scale construction by ensuring that the Reynolds ratio for the full-scale project
equals that of the model.
4 Project Mercury culminated in L. Gordon Cooper's full-day flight of May 15-16,
1963, the sixth flight and fourth orbital space mission for the project.
For a more complete account of H. Julian Allen's work and its place in the NACA's
research program in the 1950s, see Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and
Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 55-72, and Edwin P.
Hartman, Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1965, NASA
SP-4302 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), passim.
6For accounts of the research work carried out in the NACA laboratories during the
1950s, see James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical
Laboratory, 1917-1958, NASA SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987), and Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, 1915-1958, 2 vols., NASA SP-4103 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1985), passim.
7 Apollo 12 was launched on November 14, 1969, toward the second successful
manned lunar landing. The mission took ten days.
This New Ocean gives a good account of the process of "man-rating" the launch
vehicle and spacecraft for the Mercury program.
9For an account of the area rule and the design of the F-102, see James R. Hansen,
Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958, NASA
SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 334-339.
10First contracted to Convair/Astronautics Division of General Dynamics in 1958 by
the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the
liquid hydrogen fueled Centaur was intended to serve as a second stage to increase
the payload capability of its host launcher and for versatility in complex space
missions. Convair was also the U.S. Air Force contractor for the Atlas missile and
launch vehicles.
_1For a discussion of high-performance aeronautical developments at the end of
World War II, see Roger E. Bilstein, Flight in America, 1900-1983: From the Wrights to
the Astronauts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), pp. 178-184.
12See comments on the growing competition throughout NASA during this period
between technology research and project work in chapter 6.
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_3The SNAP program was begun by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1955 to
develop nuclear power systems for space vehicles. SNAP-l, designed by the Martin
Company, would generate 500 watts of electrical power from the heat of the
decaying radioisotope cerium-144. The SNAP series involved the use of both
radioisotopic fuel and nuclear fission reactors. The first SNAP power plant launched
into space was a 500-watt SNAP 10-Z, placed into orbit from Vandenburg Air Force
Base, California, on April 13, 1965. See William R. Corliss, SNAP Nuclear Space Re-
actors, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (September 1966).
_4The AJ-2 bomber was a surplus Navy aircraft powered by two reciprocating
engines and, for extra speed in combat situations, a J-33 turbojet engine in the
fuselage. The J-33 also powered the F-80 fighter.
_ The UNIVAC, or Universal Automatic Computer, was the first general-purpose
commercial electronic computer. Developed by J. presper Eckert, Jr. and John W.
Mauchly, the UNIVAC replaced punched card information storage and retrieval
with magnetic tape which, driven on reels past read-write heads, could process
alphanumeric information at the rate of half a million characters per minute. The
Eckert-Mauchly Computer Company was acquired by Remington Rand in 1950.
Remington Rand delivered the first of several UNIVACs to the U.S. Census Bureau
in 1951. The American public had its first opportunity to be awed by the "genius"
of the computer when CBS television showed the UNIVAC as it forecast Dwight D.
Eisenhower's 1952 presidential election victory over Adlai E. Stevenson within four
electoral votes.
1_The IBM 704 was the successor to the 701, an electronic computer capable of doing
high-speed repetitive computations for nuclear weapons and aircraft and missiles
design. Aggressively marketed to government laboratories, the first 701 was shipped
in March 1953 to the Federal Atomic Weapons Development Center at Los Alamos,
New Mexico. For a lively and accessible account of the early years of electronic
computers, see Harry Wilforst, Breakthrough to the Computer Age (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1982).
_7The U.S. Air Force was created in July 1947, when President Harry S. Truman
signed the Armed Forces Unification Act, which established the Air Force as one of
three services (the others being the Army and the Navy) under a Secretary of
Defense. Primary responsibility for the nation's missile programs was assigned to
the U.S. Army's Ordnance Command.
_ The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville was
transferred to NASA and renamed the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in
March 1960. The ABMA itself had been formed, in 1956, from the nucleus of German
missile scientists, led by Wernher von Braun, established in 1950 by the U.S. Army
at Redstone Arsenal as the Ordnance Guided Missile Center.
'* The media was fond of pointing out that the Saturn V was taller than the Statue of
Liberty and weighed 13 times as much. Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A
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Technological History of the Apollo Saturn Launch Vehicles, NASA SP-4206
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 354.
20After Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Germany abandoned all pretense of
disarmament.
21The U.S. Army established Werner von Braun and his cadre of German rocket
engineers as the Ordnance Guided Missile Center at the Redstone Arsenal in
Huntsville in 1950. The installation was recreated as the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency in 1956 and took the lead role in the joint Army-Navy work in ballistic
missiles that resulted in the Jupiter C launch vehicle. It was the Jupiter C that
launched the Explorer I satellite into orbit on January 31,1958, four months after the
Soviet launch of Sputnik I.
22See Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, pp. 11-25.
23See footnote 2, chapter 2.
24 The nomenclature for the Saturn launch vehicles was altered several times
throughout the program. The Saturn 1B first stage booster used eight clustered H-
1 engines. The H-1 engine, developed by Rocketdyne Division of North American
Aviation, Inc., was an uprated version of the original Thor-Jupiter engine, which
burned liquid oxygen and a kerosene-based propellant.
25In the 1980s the expression "yuppie" (young urban or upwardly mobile profes-
sional) came into use to characterize a new generation of salaried professionals who
were thought to be unusually aggressive, self-centered, and materialistic in their
aspirations.
26Nuclear-powered rocket engines were originally proposed for the upper stage of
the Saturn and were developed sufficiently for ground testing in the 1960s. The
nuclear-powered engine operated on a fairly simple principle: a small nuclear
reactor would heat liquid hydrogen which, as it expanded, would produce thrust.
A joint NASA and Atomic Energy Commission project, with Aerojet-General
serving as prime contractor, the NERVA was never intended to fly and has not
flown. However, radioisotopic thermoelectric generators (RTGs), which substitute
for batteries, fuel cells, or solar power sources in furnishing nonpropulsive power
for spacecraft, have been used successfully on the Pioneer 10 and 11 and Voyager
interplanetary spacecraft.
27The RL-10 engine was used in the Centaur upper stage and in the Saturn vehicle's
upper stage. It was contracted to General Dynamics by the Department of Defense's
Advanced Research Projects Agency.
2_James R. "J.R." Thompson, Jr. arrived at Marshall Space Flight Center in 1963 and
remained with the center until 1983, when he moved to Princeton, N.J. to serve as
deputy director for technical operations at the Princeton Plasma Laboratory. He
returned to Marshall in October 1986, as the center's director. A distinguished rocket
specialist, he was project manager for the shuttle main engine and vice-chairman of
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the NASA inquiry into the causes of the shuttle Challenger explosion on January 28,
1986.
2_ Borrowing from the technology developed for the RL-10 engine, the J-2 liquid
hydrogen engine went into production in 1963. A fully self-contained propulsion
system that could be stopped and restarted in orbit, the J-2 was manufactured by
Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation.
_ For a history of NASA's manned orbiting space station concepts, see Sylvia D.
Fries, "2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's Space Station
System," Technology and Culture (July 1988), pp. 568-593.
31The earliest conceptions of the Space Transportation System (1970-1975) included
as well a space tug to move payloads between orbits, a low Earth orbit space station,
cislunar space station, shuttle-carried space laboratory module, unmanned large lift
vehicle using the external tank and solid rocket boosters, and an unmanned
geosynchronous orbiting platform.
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Winning isn't everything.
It's the only thing.
Vince Lombardi
Coach, Green Bay Packers
1959-1967
Chapter 4
Journeys
One of the many lessons of World War II was that air supremacy could be the
linchpin of military victory. As nuclear warheads emerged as the "ultimate"
weapon of the Cold War, the development of guided land- and sea-based ballistic
missiles took on a special urgency in the U.S. military establishment. Not yet
chastened by the protracted land warfare of Vietnam or the complexities of unde-
clared local warfare in the Middle East, most strategists assumed that strategic
security would go to those who commanded the skies. Impelled by the sheer weight
of its role in the allied victory over the Axis powers into an international arena
divided into the "free world" and "iron curtain" countries, the United States
belatedly entered the race to conquer space.
But what did it mean to conquer space? A nation's ability to send guided
missiles into space, or to orbit objects of whatever size and function, served as an
ominous announcement to a contentious world that the ultimate penalty for
"aggression" might be close to unthinkable. Was there no peaceful purpose to which
we might put the capacity to loft objects into space, to view the heavens -- and
Earth -- with unprecedented visual clarity and perspective?
American scientists, too, had a strategic interest in space. Having tasted the
brew served up by military patrons during the national "emergency" and the
Manhattan Project, the scientific community sought to remain at the table with an
ongoing menu of government-funded "basic" research. Yet consciences had been
troubled by the uses to which science had been put in "winning" the surrender of
Japan; many in the scientific fraternity were eager to explore the next frontier of
space under civilian, rather than military, support.'
Thus it was that, while the NACA (later NASA) and military engineers began
to transfer the new technologies of hypersonic flight and ballistic missiles to vehicles
that could lift ever heavier payloads into orbit (even sending some of those payloads
on interplanetary trajectories), the payloads themselves were parceled among
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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competing interests. Among those interests, shrouded in ideological assumptions,
were the proponents of "manned space flight" and of "space science" -- or science
in space. The former combined the heroic, romanticized aura of human flight,
inherited from pioneer aviation days, with the new romance of space travel into
exotic and alien realms. The romance of aviation knew few geographic boundaries,
but the romance of space travel was largely an import from Europe, never wholly
adopted by a country whose ideology presupposed that its own wondrous land-
scapes, its own pluralistic culture and institutions, and its own free-wheeling
politics constituted the only last frontier that mattered. The notion that the survival
of democracy required an expanding frontier (a notion easily associated with the
ignominious attempt of nineteenth century Europeans to extend cultural and
political hegemony over the rest of the world) would come back to haunt advocates
of expanding the space frontier as opponents of costly manned space programs
remained indifferent to appeals to an American "manifest destiny" in space.
Claimants to space as the next frontier for scientific observation had no such
ideological difficulty. But they had their own rhetorical problem, which was the
alleged priority of disinterested, or "basic" research (science "for its own sake") over
applied research, an increasingly costly kind of research which, by virtue of its
largely military patronage, could be misapplied. It would be difficult to sequester
the disinterested pursuit of science in an organization that had to respond to the
mixture of constituencies necessary to sustain a large publicly funded technological
enterprise. That there might be powerful sociological tensions at play in the contest
between the cloistered secular priesthood of the academic science establishment,
and the engineers and technicians who served the country's bidding, whether as
industrial or government workers, is also probable. The scientists' handicap --
much of what they did seemed arcane to a public relentlessly bombarded with
novelties and rarely encouraged to reflect upon them-- was compensated for by the
fact that most science in space could be accomplished with automated spacecraft,
normally cheaper than spacecraft designed to launch and sustain human beings.
The maelstrom of political and ideological interests that surrounded NASA as
it broke ground in 1959 and 1962 for its new space centers at Beltsville, Md. and
Houston, Tex. would have much to do with the shape of the agency and the careers
of the roughly ten thousand engineers who flooded its portals, and those of its
contractors, during the Apollo decade. The scientific adventure, riding on the
success of the first U.S. satellite program, staked out the initial claim. Although The
Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory and the U.S. Army and
Navy had both begun to launch sounding rockets 2during the decade after World
War II (the Army using captured German V-2 rockets, the Navy using its more
powerful Viking), the Department of Defense in 1954 pronounced the satellite of no
military value. In this the department was echoing the Rand Corporation's conclu-
sion in a 1946 report that an orbiting satellite was unlikely to be of much military
use-- but could be useful in meteorology, communications, and astronomy? Rand
also noted that the country that launched the first satellite could reap as its reward
strategic psychological and political advantages.
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As the military services continued their missile development programs, scien-
tists from around the world began to make plans for the Third International Polar
Year. The First International Polar Year of 1882 had inaugurated international
scientific cooperation in the study of Earth's polar regions; a Second International
Polar Year in 1932 continued the enterprise. While the Third International Polar Year
would not come due until 1962, the prospect of geophysical investigations during
a period of maximum solar activity anticipated for 1957-1958 both accelerated and
expanded the scientists' vision. In 1952 the International Council of Scientific Unions
gave its blessing to an International Geophysical Year during 1957-1958, inviting all
nations to cooperate in the study not only of the polar regions, but of the entire Earth.
Within the next three years the American Rocket Society, the National Academy
of Sciences, and the Army and the Navy proposed launching a small satellite during
the International Geophysical Year. The White House adopted the idea, and by mid-
summer 1955 the United States had committed itself. The Department of Defense
would launch the satellite; the National Science Foundation (created in 1950) would
fund it; and the National Academy of Sciences would decide what kind of scientific
instruments it would carry. Each of the services was ready to offer its own rocket:
the Air Force its Atlas, the Army its Redstone-derived Jupiter C, and the Navy its
Viking. Noting that only the Viking had been developed as a space research vehicle,
while the country's nascent ballistic missile program required the Atlas and the
Redstone, a Department of Defense selection committee gave the nod to the Naval
Research Laboratory's Viking?
The Naval Research Laboratory's successful entry, renamed Vanguard after the
addition of its Aerobee second stage (a solid-fuel third-stage rocket) and a 1.5-
kilogram scientific satellite, missed its first cue in an unfortunate pyrotechnic
display, _but the Naval Research Laboratory group prevailed to become the nucleus
of the first new space center crea ted after NASA was established in 1958. That center
was Goddard Space Flight Center, established in 1958 on land acquired from the
Department of Agriculture's Beltsville Agricultural Research Center? Joining the
Naval Research Laboratory group were personnel reassigned from the Army Signal
Corps' meteorological and communications satellite activities at Fort Monmouth,
N.J., as well as atmospheric balloon research from Fort Monmouth and the former
NACA Langley Research Center, and the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at Dahlgren,
Va.
Twenty years later Goddard's visual character -- its low-slung, predominantly
red brick buildings settled amid generously wooded, rolling hillsides -- suggests,
more than any other NASA installation, a college campus. A shaded park for picnics
and outings and signs of solicitude for resident Canada geese create an atmosphere
of academic repose and collegiality. Goddard's mission focused increasingly on
space science, especially after the Space Task Group, assigned to manage Project
Mercury, moved from Langley Research Center to the Manned Space Center in
Houston in 1962. 7The institutional separation hinted, correctly, at a cultural sepa-
ration. NASA would become predominantly an organization that accomplished its
work through "out of house" -- nongovernment -- organizations. Since scientific
research has been, in the United States, largely a university enterprise, Goddard's
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external associations would become, more than any NASA installation other than
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (and notwithstanding industrial ties necessary for the
fabrication of instruments and satellites), those of the university science community.
Among the early arrivals at Goddard in 1959 was Henry Beacham, who came
from the Naval Ordnance Laboratory in White Oak, Md. Beacham had several years'
experience working in the camera research laboratory of the Eastman Kodak
company and a master's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of
Rochester. During his seven years at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory -- now called
the Naval Surface Weapons Laboratory -- he worked in operations research, or
weapons analysis. However, calculating the most efficient ways of destruction held
no special charm for him, nor, for that matter, did the space program. What did excite
him was the novelty of the engineering research problems that accompanied the
emerging satellite programs of the early 1960s.
En route to Goddard, Beacham spent a few months working with the Project
Vanguard group at the Naval Research Laboratory at Anacostia Naval Air Station,
Washington, D.C., forming associations that may partially account for his early rise
in Goddard's management ranks. Upon joining the Goddard group he began work
on the environmental testing of satellites, soon moving on to major management
responsibilities for Goddard's Nimbus and Landsat programs.
To those critics who questioned the practical value of the Apollo manned lunar
landing program, NASA could, in the late 1960s, point to its "Earth applications"
programs that placed satellites in Earth or geosynchronous orbit to serve as
platforms for global communications and remote sensing instruments to study
Earth's surface, weather, and upper atmosphere. The prospect of being able to detect
global environmental changes, receive near-instantaneous television broadcasts
from abroad, or make i'eliable and long-range weather forecasts, would become, for
the ordinary person, one of the more invisible but important legacies of the space
age. _
For example, the sophisticated Nimbus series of five meteorological satellites,
launched between 1964 and 1972, Qrelayed over 3,000 weather photographs daily.
Landsat, a later designation for a series of Earth resources satellites first launched in
1972, allowed worldwide monitoring of land masses from desert to forest, glacier to
ocean, as well as accretions and movements of atmospheric pollutants. The first
Landsat (Earth Resources Technology, or ERTS-A) satellite photographed the entire
Earth with 500 pictures, one-thousandth the number required to photograph Earth
by high-altitude aircraft.
Achieving such a dramatic increase in the scale of the world's information about
its own environment depended on the reliable functioning of light-weight motors
and sensitive instruments far distant from the tender care of terrestrial technicians.
The first Nimbus, for example, an 830-pound spacecraft stabilized on all three axes,
carried an advanced vidicon camera system, an automatic picture transmission
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system, and a high-resolution infrared radiometer. The next Nimbus, launched in
1969, carried a SNAP-I 9 auxiliary nuclear power system. "_The first Landsat carried
a multispectral scanner, return-beam vidicon camera system, two wide-band video
tape recorders, and a data collection system.
Ensuring that remote sensing satellites operated as intended required an
understanding, earned through systematic testing and an accumulated apprecia-
tion of the space environment through data from successive satellites, of the
conditions to which each assemblage of instruments-- its materials, electronics, and
optics -- would be subjected. Beacham, his contemporaries from the naval research
and ordnance laboratories, and newcomers to Goddard plowed this virgin territory.
Beacham's personal progression from satellite environmental testing to systems
reliability engineering reflected a logical accumulation of critical technological
know-how.
The influx of German rocket research and engineers into the United States after
World War II has become the stuff of American space lore. 1_Less well known is
aeronautical work done not only in Germany but also in Italy during the 1930s and
1940s, _2 work which laid equally important foundations for modern aerospace
technology. In 1911 the romantic Italian nationalist and poet, Gabriele d'Annunzio,
took to the Italian skies in a Curtiss aircraft. Twenty-nine years later, Romans craned
their necks for hours as two Italians established the world's duration flying record,
circling the Eternal City for 67 hours and 13 minutesJ 3 A measure of the quality of
aeronautical research being done in Italy during the 1930s was the keen interest
shown by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in the Italian aeronautical research
center at GuidoniaJ 4
During the turmoil of World War II, one of the most bitter struggles for the
Italian peninsula occurred at Capua, Italy as the German Wehrmacht fought to hold
the Volturno line against Allied forces. In the summer and fall of 1943 the Allies had
begun their successful advance northward through the difficult and rain-sodden
terrain of the Campania. As British and American troops landed at the Port City of
Salerno after the Italian-Allied armistice of September 3, the Germans began a
systematic campaign of imprisonment and evacuation to labor camps of Italian
troops and Allied prisoners of war. War-time memoirs tell of thousands of Italians
and Allied prisoners escaping into the protective hillsides of the Apennines, seeking
refuge among frightened Italian villagers, who risked their lives and the demolition
of their towns by their defiance, is
One of those prisoners was Frank Toscelli. Born in the little town of Vitulazio,
near Capua, Toscelli was inducted into the Italian Army in 1943. Seized by the
Germans for deportation, he escaped with two of his buddies, was captured, and
escaped again. Although one of Toscelli's buddies was wounded during an artillery
barrage, the trio managed to find what they hoped would be the Allied line. Initially
fearful that they might have stumbled into German hands, they were relieved,
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remembers Toscelli, when they noticed the "shape of the shoe" worn by one of the
strange soldiers: "it was different." They noticed as well "a piece of chewing gum
and ... a cigarette paper." They were safe, and they were free.
Toscelli's father had emigrated to the United States in 1907, only to return nine
years later when his Italian-born wife became ill with what the doctor diagnosed as
an advanced case of homesickness. The elder Toscelli operated a small taxi business
in the town of Vitulazio; as he repaired his taxis' engines and the townspeople's
bicycles, Frank had watched, captivated by a curiosity about how mechanical things
worked especially airplanes. Monoplanes flying overhead fascinated him as well.
His father wanted him to be a doctor, but Frank would become an aeronautical
engineer. After World War II he went to the University of Naples, earning his
diploma in engineering in 1949. Through his father echoed America's siren call. "Go
to America," his father had insisted; that "is the land of [the] free." In 1950 Frank
moved to Pittsburgh, where he lived with an uncle and worked as a busboy and
construction laborer while he attended the Carnegie Institute of Technology (now
Carnegie-Mellon University) on a scholarship. By 1953 he had received a bachelor
of science degree in mechanical engineering.
Sharing the experience of thousands of former Axis nationals eager to emigrate
from war-torn Europe to the land of opportunity, Toscelli played a game of cat and
mouse with U.S. immigration officials as he tried to obtain an immigrant visa.
Neither a new American bride nor a $1,000 bond posted by his uncle could relieve
him of the necessity of traveling to Honduras, Canada, Mexico, or any nation bor-
dering the United States where he might get an immigrant visa so he could reenter
the United States to stay. Finally, a friend of a friend arranged for him to go to Cuba.
With ninety dollars in his pocket, he boarded a Greyhound bus for Key West, Fla.
After a few months in Cuba he was broke, but he could get a visa. He managed to
scrape together enough money to return to Pittsburgh, where Westinghouse Airbrake
(which had first hired him in 1953 as a pneumatic engineer) made a place for him.
He remained with Westinghouse until 1960, working with airbrake and switching
signals.
By 1960 the space program was gathering steam, and Toscelli became "an
enthusiast, like everybody else." Drawn to what he felt was the sheer "adventure"
of space flight, he took a job with Westinghouse Electric's Astronuclear Laborato-
ries, where work was under way on the NERVA nuclear propulsion engine. He got
"involved then in ... shock and vibration and dynamics." His work gave him an
opportunity to see something of America's wide open spaces when he had to
accompany a simulated reactor on a train trip to Jackass Flats, Nev. for testing. "I
rode the train reserved for us .... We had to measure the forces, the excitation applied
to this instrument .... So I saw the country-- the vastness of the country .... After we
got to Iowa, there was nothing else, although the route was chosen to avoid any place
of habitation, any cities or concentration of people." Toscelli also managed to
continue going to school at night at the University of Pittsburgh. By 1960 he had his
master's degree in mechanical engineering, and when he left Westinghouse in 1964
he had risen to the rank of senior engineer for shock vibration and dynamics.
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Toscelli was recruited by NASA in 1964. "They were looking for people to get
involved in space [and they were] looking for" engineers with masters' degrees.
Toscelli's specialty, gas dynamics, appealed to NASA's recruiters, who interviewed
him in Pittsburgh; by the end of the year he had moved to Greenbelt, Md. to work
at Goddard Space Flight Center. "I was in the test evaluation area where we have all
the equipment testing and the chambers .... I was at that time in ... advanced
research and technology because of my considerable experience, and the variety of
subjects that I was familiar with." Goddard was in the midst of designing spacecraft
that would carry sophisticated instruments subject to damage in the environment of
space. Toscelli's work drew him into "the assessment of molecular and particulate
contamination of spacecraft" and the auto-effects on satellites' space environment
"generated by material outgasing, particulate releases, propulsion, and venting." Of
necessity he soon became expert in "vacuum technology [and[ internal gas flow" in
spacecraft, material outgassing, contamination, lubrication, and propulsion prob-
lems. Meanwhile Toscelli remained the restless student, eager to add to his growing
experimental grasp of space-induced phenomena an intellectual mastery which, in
the European tradition, could only be confirmed through university work. For five
years after arriving at Goddard he continued course work at the University of
Maryland and Catholic University to complement the thesis work in vacuum
technology and gas dynamics and contamination he had done at the University of
Naples. In 1969 he traveled to Naples to defend his thesis, returning to Goddard with
a doctorate in mechanical and aerospace engineering.
The nature of his work enabled Toscelli to contribute to virtually every Goddard
satellite program. For example, as any satellite travels through space, its materials
release gases "either because of diffusion through the material or because they are
attached to the surface molecules." Satellites had to be designed so that the release
of gases and pressures internal to the instruments could be closely controlled to
"prevent the problem of voltage breakdown, or contamination of a mirror or other
critical devices which may be degraded by environmental conditions which are not
appropriate." Those conditions would have to be accurately predicted, and one of
Toscelli's accomplishments was the development of a computer program which
could "calculate, given several volumes with different gases," the pressures within
a satellite. The problems with which Toscelli worked were and remain common to
all spacecraft, manned and unmanned alike.
Toscelli speaks proudly of being consulted on the design "parameters" of the
space shuttle and the space station, and he remains puzzled that the authority he has
earned in his engineering field has not translated itself into more than one promo-
tion since he arrived at Goddard. When he arrived at Goddard in 1964, the center
seemed to some to be largely an extension of the Naval Research Laboratory group.
"These guys were in the management area already. [They] had the previous
experience, [they] knew each other." He has watched, frustrated, as those "with less
education, or less production," have been promoted beyond him. "Some ... [get
promoted] because of buddy-buddy ... and also, [there's] my age."
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"We were young and full of enthusiasm ... the work was interesting ... a brand
new facility and all the people, we all had an ambition to move ahead, to do the best
we could in this new adventure .... It was very satisfying and very interesting -- the
prestige, the respect, and of course the fact that we were doing something never done
before ... and we all were contributing very much to the field."
From the time he arrived at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in 1966 until
1985, when he began working on studies of possible science laboratory modules for
NASA's new space station program, Hank Martin worked in the thermal analysis
and design of satellites. "That essentially involves making the spacecraft run at the
right temperature when it's in orbit, which is an interesting set of problems." He was
fresh out of Catholic University when he went to Goddard, with a degree in
engineering and, as engineering curricula go, a fairly broad education that empha-
sized conceptual ability. "I wasn't particularly trained or suited or excited about
heat transfer initially. I could have been in the dynamic structures or propulsion or
a whole lot of different areas ... but this was what looked good."
Radiation heat transfer was "an emerging discipline .... There had been a little
bit of work done in the gas turbine industry because they were dealing with such hot
temperatures. But lo and behold, when you get into space that's all you've got --
there's no air to cool things ... you've got to transfer everything by radiation."
Engineers tried various approaches to the problem, "developing computer models
... to predict" heating and radiation, or doing "supporting research" such as
investigating "thermal control coatings: you paint something white so it's going to
reflect a lot of heat. But it gets out in space and the ultraviolet energy makes it turn
brown and the thing gets too hot and you blow out batteries .... We've lost some
things because of high temperatures on spacecraft."
Goddard's engineers also explored "different kinds of hardware to control
temperatures [like] these louvers, like venetian blinds, that open and close and let
heat in or out of a particular system. [Or] the development of heat pipes, which ...
are extremely efficient devices for making things run under constant temperature--
and various permutations and combinations of heat pipes. Heat transfer
technology ... developed some sort of maturity and sort of leveled out in the
development area ... within maybe ten years or so.
"I think probably.., why I didn't.., burn out on it was the fact that, working heat
transfer for flight projects, I worked in-house programs and out-of-house programs,
no manned stuff, but all free flyer scientific type missions. Everybody else who had
anything to do with that satellite had some sort of a temperature requirement. The
data system guy, he had a radio transmitter, he had some sort of digital onboard
computer. If they didn't run at the right temperature, they wouldn't work right. The
scientist who was running some sort of energetic particle detectors ... if his
experiment didn't run at the right temperature, his data wouldn't be right. The solar
cells had to run at the right temperature. The battery ... every single piece on that
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spacecraft had a temperature requirement. And as a result, I got a little bit of
information about what everybody else was doing. And I got very interested in
some of the other ... subsystem disciplines.., the power, or the electronics, or the
science end of it. If nothing was particularly interesting.., in my particular area of
controlling temperature, I'd be finding out, 'What's this guy doing?... How does his
little box work?'... So there's always something to learn ... some knowledge to ac-
cumulate about what other people were doing."
By the nature of his work, Martin was also drawn into satellite flight operations.
"I've got all this data coming back from everybody's stuff, and folded in there is this
temperature stuff. How do you set up sort of an overview so that I can look at some
sort of a computer printout and in a very rapid fashion be able to tell flight control
whether something had to be done or not?... So it was.., this end-to-end approach,
which I think I probably only got by being here at NASA, that was extremely
interesting. I wasn't really confined into a specific discipline, and part of that was
because the opportunity was there, and part of it was because I'm an inquisitive type
of person.
"Everything back in those days was kind of an experiment. If it didn't work, at
least you learned something. [Whatever it was] in the small project kind of envi-
ronment ... it was something that needs to be there to develop the kind of overview
engineering that I was fortunate enough to have .... In those days.., we had satellites
you could carry in the room .... You could get half a dozen guys in a room sitting
around a table.., and those half a dozen people knew everything, knew that system
inside and out."
Throughout his NASA career the most exciting work Martin remembers doing
"was actually working with the satellite that I helped build just before it was
launched. I worked the S-cubed [small scientific satellite] which was launched out
of San Marco over [west] Africa .... I'm talking about the actual physical hands-on
kinds of interaction with the hardware .... A lot of people from top to bottom really
get emotionally involved with that sort of thing. I knew people that were responsible
for the thermal control coatings, for example .... The satellite would be launched and
they'd stand on the beach and watch it go and they'd cry."
When Elizabeth Mueller went to work at Goddard Space Flight Center in 1963,
the year she received a bachelor's degree from Emory University, no one had
recruited her. In fact, had she not insisted oll being interviewed, NASA would have
turned her away. Lured by the prospect of working near the nation's capital, Mueller
came close to accepting an offer from the Naval Weapons Laboratory at Dahlgren,
Va. until, that is, she looked at a map and discovered that it was not (as had been
advertised to her) a suburb of Washington. "But Goddard did look like a suburb of
Washington, so I came up ... got off the [Baltimore-Washington] parkway, walked
into the main gate, and said, Tm here to talk about a job.'"
Goddard's personnel people, "with their usual enthusiasm, said 'well, I'm sure
you're not qualified, and you can't do this and you can't do that.' And I said, 'well,
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I sent you an application and I believe I am qualified.'" As it turned out, "to be hired
by NASA with a degree in math you had to have twenty hours, or something like
that. And a science other than biology ... physics or chemistry. And I had that in
addition to all the math courses that one could possibly take and good grades .... So
they took the application. I just insisted that I was there, I was from Atlanta, and I
wanted to talk to someone .... So they said, 'all right.' They sent me around to four
people and all four of them wanted to hire me ... and I didn't understand one word
of anything anyone said to me .... I'd never even seen a computer."
Mueller's career began in high school, where she was a good mathematics and
science student. Her mother, a college graduate in mathematics, worked at home
doing office work for her father, who was a divisional sales manager for a national
shoe retail firm. Mother and daughter had two young women friends, "not long out
of college [and] into the early stages of a career [who used to visit and] talk a lot about
job opportunities. Apparently at that point in time math -- this was ... '57, '58 --
math graduates could get jobs anywhere .... So I remember listening to them talk."
Mueller's parents had insisted, as she grew up, that she go to college and have a
career, even if she never needed to work. They had learned at least one of the
depression era's lessons: a woman might have to support herself, not to mention her
husband and her family. "You have to eat, and so you have a job because you want
to eat. So you may as well get one that gets you a lot of money."
Mueller was so keen on getting out and working that she turned down a
graduate fellowship at Emory. "The other thing is that I had made a definite decision
I was not teaching. And my parents were going crazy, because they were convinced
that was the only thing for a woman to do with a math degree. I took one education
course and it was horrible .... My parents couldn't imagine what I was going to do
without teaching. And I couldn't either, but I got one of these guide books [that tells]
who hires people with certain degrees, wrote a bunch of letters, and the next thing
you know, I had all kinds of offers for jobs. IBM at that time was offering one-third
less for women than for men. And they had two pay scales -- they had it published
and that's what they would say .... The federal government was one place where
women could get equal pay."
Mueller's first assignment was with an orbital mechanics group, where she
worked documenting programs for a large IBM 7094, one of the last large mainframe
computers used by NASA before IBM developed its 360 series, available in the mid-
1960s. The IBM 7094 provided the initial data processing for Project Mercury, which,
with two suborbital and three orbital missions between 1961 and 1963, gave the
United States its first manned spaceflight experience. (Goddard had served as the
mission control center for NASA's Space Task Group, responsible for Project
Mercury, before the Manned Spacecraft Center opened in Houston, Tex. in 1962.) By
current standards the machine was as large as its memory was small. Filling the
space of several rooms, and with only 64K memory, the IBM 7094 was a noninter-
active machine that could only batch process from cards or tapes.
Mueller did not linger long with the orbital mechanics group. For orbital
mechanics "you need a lot of astronomy. I'd never taken an astronomy course, and
I really didn't like astronomy .... Second of all ... the computers were choked ... you
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would write a program and submit it and it would be a week before it would come
back .... They gave us work to do documenting programs that other people had
written. They were using a compiler on the 7094 which didn't allow you to learn
much about the machine. Everything was done by the compiler. And t just got
bored." Along with two co-workers also frustrated with their work on the large
mainframes, Mueller transferred to the Goddard office that was programming a
small satellite control computer for NASA's Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO)
series. Between 1962 and 1975 Thor-Delta boosters launched nine OSO satellites
during an eleven-year solar cycle, returning unprecedented photographs and
invisible spectra observations of the solar corona, and solar flares and streamers, as
well as observations of the influence of solar activity on Earth's atmosphere. Six
months before the first OSO launch "they didn't even [have] as much as... a manual
for this computer .... In six months we wrote a system and -- oh! it was great fun! ...
I was single, and I would sleep maybe five hours a day and work all the rest of the
time. [Since Mueller was] programming close to the machine... [with] data coming
in, processing in real time.., it was a good way to learn .... You just had to learn how
the machine worked."
In time Mueller became so competent at her work that she was chosen to head
the control center software group with which she had been working. NASA "was
launching about every year" while she and her group developed the control
software for each new satellite. "What you would do was develop the software for
the new satellite; you'd work in a fury when you didn't have passes to take from the
one [satellite] that was up there. So your work schedule would process with the
orbit. Then you'd be working around the clock .... But ... after a few years of that, it
began to be very old -- to work these long extended hours and late hours." In the
meantime Mueller met her future husband, who had come to Goddard in 1964 to
work on the Orbiting Geophysical Obervatory satellite (six were launched between
1964 and 1969); hoping for something of a normal life, she transferred to Goddard's
project to "develop the first flight computer, the NSSC-1 (NASA Standard Space-
craft Computer)." The project's aim was to "develop the box in-house .... It was not
slated to fly on any particular mission; [their purpose was] just to see if we could
develop [what was] originally called the onboard processor." That processor was
successfully developed and flown as an experiment in 1972 on the Orbiting As-
tronomical Observatory-C (Copernicus), which operated for nine years partly
because, as hardware began to fail, the processor -- actually an experimental
computer -- could be reprogrammed.
NASA's Standard Spacecraft Computer was inspired by two developments --
one particular to Earth-orbiting scientific satellites. By 1966 it had become evident
that NASA would be laboring under persistently constrained budgets. Standard-
ization and reusability became engineering design watchwords throughout the
agency. For instance, the Space Transportation System, with its reusable solid rocket
boosters and shuttle orbiters, was initially conceived as a less costly alternative to the
"throw away" launch vehicles of the early space program. At the same time,
expanding possibilities for scientific satellites in Earth orbit heightened the desire
for autonomous controls on spacecraft which would be beyond the reach of direct
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commands from earth through portions of their orbits. Moreover, scientific satellites
would be more versatile --and hence economical -- not only if their on-board
controls were of a general purpose character which could be reprogrammed for
different missions, but also if instructions to their instruments could be changed,
during a mission, in response to unforeseen situations.
Unmanned as well as manned satellites had to be provided with devices for
attitude, communications (telemetry), and receiving and carrying out commands either
directly from the ground or through "stored command processors" which execute
certain sequences of commands triggered at regular instants of time. The appeal of
developing a digital computer -- as distinct from a processor -- was that, unlike it's
"hardwired" cousin, a computer could be reprogrammed during the spacecraft's flight.
NASA's Standardized Spacecraft Computer would also have to draw a minimum of
power, notwithstanding memory expansion, and be radiation resistant.
The NASA Standard Spacecraft Computer-1 "was originally called the onboard
processor. But... after it flew on OAO-C ... NASA made it a standard computer and
they gave it that name. I got involved," recalls Mueller, "on the ground floor of that
[because of] my software expertise. That was the first flight of the onboard computer
on a Goddard satellite. And we had to beg for people to give us work to do with that
computer." When Mueller completed the onboard processor and advanced onboard
processor (earlier versions of the NSCC-1) everyone was afraid to use it. "Now, of
course, the problem is how to cut down on the number of requests that you have.
They never have enough memory or CPU [central processing unit] to support
everything that people want to do." The core memory TM on the computer grew from
16K in 1972 (for OAO-C) to 48K for the Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS), a
generic spacecraft developed to service a number of different Earth and stellar
observations, and first flown on the Solar Maximum Mission observatory launched
in 1980,17 to 64K for the MMS flown on the Landsat D mission launched in 1982.
Excepting changes in the flight software, the Multimission Modular Spacecraft used
on the Landsat D Earth observation satellite was essentially the same as that used on
the Solar Maximum Mission, proving the concept of a standardized central onboard
computer.
"By the time I finished ... the NSSC-1 on the Orbiting Astronomical Observa-
tory, I had both flight software experience, ground software and a lot of engineering
type experience, so ... I really could do any kind of work in the software area. And
software tends to be very specialized -- you find people who program orbit
determination.., for life." Mueller was assigned to project management for both the
Multimission Modular Spacecraft and the Solar Maximum Mission (which used the
MMS), for which she was responsible for flight software as well as ground software.
"That was an interesting managerial experience: to work for two project managers,
to have budgets for two projects that I had to merge together, to do software that for
MMS had to be common and usable for other than just one mission .... I had a
conglomerate of contractors and civil service staff."
Once the Solar Maximum Mission with its Multimission Modular Spacecraft
was safely launched, Mueller was reassigned to NASA's Large Space Telescope
(renamed in 1983 the Hubble Space Telescope after astronomer Edwin P. Hubble).
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She was moved "pretty much against my will .... At that time we were a functional
organization ... the engineering directorate. They had recognized that there ... was
tremendous amounts of software ]talent] on this team that I was managing, so they
just said: 'there you go.'" Goddard shared with Marshall Space Flight Center
responsibility for the space telescope, and the "not invented here" syndrome may
have affected the space telescope's early history at the Greenbelt center. "There was
no real team here .... The environment was one in which you were just constantly
jerked around .... New management came in and replaced almost everybody. I was
about the only one of the people that were here that didn't get sent off somewhere."
Mueller toyed with a possible transfer to NASA Headquarters to work in advanced
systems planning for the Office of Space Science and Applications. Ultimately she
decided the family upheaval would be too great. Besides, a favorite colleague of hers
with whom she had worked well before returned to Goddard after his own tour at
Headquarters. In 1980 Mueller decided to stay with the Hubble Space Telescope
project to work closely with ground systems and operations development, one of the
two principal space telescope development areas -- the other being hardware
development (e.g., instruments, and communications) -- for which Goddard has
assumed responsibility.
"All the way along the line, even though my background was in math, [l
worked] in engineering oriented areas ... just learning it on the job as I went
along .... I was very fortunate in that I just moved from place to place around
Goddard, and at will .... Sometimes I'd have to say 'this is what I want to do,' and if
you're good enough, they'll let you move .... [NASA has] not been very good about
looking out for people and insuring that people get to try a variety of experiences or
move up in an organization. Only a few people -- the ones that may be recognized
or may be good friends with or otherwise attached to someone else who's moving
up -- get the opportunities to move around ... in a planned kind of way."
The claims made by "manned space flight '''_ on the new space program were
more complex. If all we wanted was scientific knowledge of the heavens or cosmic
views of Earth, robot spacecraft could provide both. Some argued that space was a
new frontier, and mankind would not have breached that frontier unless men
themselves physically crossed into it. (The presumption that space was, in fact, a
man's frontier persisted until 1979, when NASA saw fit to admit women to the
astronaut corps, taking 17 years to respond to the hue and cry raised as the astronaut
groups selected for the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs failed to include any
women.) Besides, once the United States had set a man on the Moon, to the
amazement of television viewers everywhere, and as long as the Soviet Union
persevered with its own manned space program, to do less than persist could be
perceived as a national surrender --unless, of course, the whole business was
dismissed as spectacle.
Others insisted that automatic robotic space systems could not provide the
active, onboard "trouble-shooting" frequently necessary to deal with the inevitable
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glitches that occur with nearly one-of-a-kind, sophisticated technical systems. Less
apparent from the rhetoric that surrounded every successful American manned
space venture was the fact that two generations of engineers were represented in
NASA in the 1960s, many of them schooled in aeronautics and the design of high-
performance aircraft. Those engineers (over 95 percent of whom were men) _
identified their careers with the triumph of human-piloted flight, an achievement
which readily tent itself to the view that humans were destined to explore the high
reaches of outer space. Designing for all the dynamic possibilities of an aircraft with
a man at the controls had been one of the challenges of high-performance aircraft
engineering, to which the military experience of combat flight added its own aura
of valor. It was not for nothing that the media seized on the first seven American
astronauts, former combat or test pilots all, as exemplars of "the Right Stuff. ''2°
Whatever the mixture of motives that sustained NASA's manned spaceflight
program (the U.S. Air Force having opted out of manned spaceflight as a strategic
necessity), the continuing venture imposed on aerospace engineers the added
challenge of designing for human life support, in-flight human control of space
machines, and, most of all, safety and reliability.
Born in the depths of the depression in 1932, John Robertson grew up in Baton
Rouge, La., where his father drove a school bus for the high school system. He had
had a thing about airplanes from the time he was a boy. "The big interest
came ... back when they used to fly airplanes in and land them in the field, and for
twenty-five cents you could get an airplane ride." His fascination with airplanes was
fueled by the proliferation of aircraft during World War II, and, as would become
true of countless other NASA engineers, an early career in aeronautics readily leant
itself to the transition to spaceflight. As a youngster Robertson had also been busy
with the Boy Scouts and with the Air Scouts, "an old scouting organization that
doesn't even exist any longer." While he was in high school he went with the Air
Scouts to "summer encampments, where we went to Air Force bases." Robertson's
father, a scout master, shared his son's enthusiasm for airplanes.
Robertson's real ambition was to become a manager, and he recognized early
that one could enter a career in management as readily from engineering as from a
college course in business administration. "I really went to engineering school to
become a manager," he acknowledges, "because I knew there was [sic] going to be
some years that I had to work as an engineer. [But] the thing that I was interested in,
of course, was aircraft. And I decided that I was going to go out and design the
world's best airplanes .... I knew I had to go through the nitty-gritty -- I had to be
an engineer .... But then, I was looking from the standpoint of not always working
as an engineer."
At Louisiana State University (LSU), from which he received his degree in 1952,
Robertson studied mechanical engineering rather than aeronautics, which was not
available as a major program. "The school d_d that purposely because they [sic]
didn't know" how the aeronautical industry was going to fare. Within the mechanical
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engineering minor field of aeronautics, students could concentrate on design or
performance. Robertson chose performance, "developing performance character-
istics of the airplane for planform design .... We had a wind tunnel ... made of ...
sheet aluminum. Every time we turned it on, it would ... beat like a drum, so we
didn't get the chance to use it too often .... But for a school that's just trying to teach
engineers how to use wind tunnels ... it was adequate .... We couldn't do any
research projects on it, but we used it... to get some ideas of how you would go about
testing different aircraft in the tunnel."
When Robertson graduated from LSU he looked for "the best engineering job
[he] could get ... in aerodynamics, rather than in actual designing of hardware, or
being on a drafting board." Meanwhile, the United States was again at war, this time
in Korea. 21Robertson knew his draft number could come up any day. Still, he had
to go to work. He took a job with Chance-Vought Aircraft, entering the company's
training program in aircraft design. That lasted only "two and a half months. The
day the course ended and everybody went to their departments, I went out the door
to the U.S. Air Force." Robertson had been in the U.S. Air Force ROTC program at
Louisiana State University and spent the next two years as an Air Force explosive
ordnance disposal officer.
Old LSU connections helped him find a job in 1958 with Convair Aircraft at Fort
Worth, Tex. "I enjoyed the work there. To start off with, I was on the B-36
program .... We were working with throttle settings. If a pilot was flying along with
a clean aircraft, he would have one throttle setting. But if he came into a combat
situation and he started dropping turrets ... then he would have to go to a different
throttle setting to maintain the same altitude and same speed ]because] dropping a
turret into the airstream is the equivalent of adding weight to the aircraft .... I had to
... do some calculations on the weight changes to determine what the different
throttle settings would be at different weights and ... at different configurations of
turrets into the airstream .... You draw a set of curves so that the pilot would have
a handbook in the aircraft with him, and as he got into combat he'd have to go back
and find out what his throttle setting would be and change his throttles to maintain
his altitude. [We] used Friden calculators. What would take three hours today took
two weeks, eight hours a day -- once you got to a calculator."
Robertson also worked on an experimental nuclear-powered bomber project:
"Jet engines were used for take-off, ]while] the nuclear engines were started in the
air .... We had a floating, folding wing tip with a droop-snout configuration. The
plane ... was so long because you had to have your ... nuclear source further back
from the crew .... It had to drop the nose [in order for the pilot] to see the runway
coming in." The floating wingtip design was a solution to the need for good cruise
characteristics as well as high-speed threat evasion: "Once you got into combat,
you'd blow those [wingtips] off and then dash in at mach 3, drop your
payload .... When you dropped your payload and got out of enemy territory, you'd
fold out what was left.., a small wing to increase your aspect ratio for getting better
cruise capability."
When Robertson was working at Convair, the nuclear bomber work "was all in
the preliminary dynamic stage .... ]Convair] was trying to come up with a proposal
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for the Air Force as to how it would be built and how it would fly ... [that is,]
developing the planform for the aircraft." However, before he had spent three years
at Convair, the bomber project was canceled. Convair had to lay off many of the
company's engineers after the Air Force discovered that "the aircraft companies
were padding their engineering billets by adding more billets than they needed."
Robertson was out of a job. But, equipped with the more versatile mechanical
engineering degree, he was confident that he could get another job. He considered
entering the General Motors Institute. He considered going into safety engineering.
Then, while visiting in Baton Rouge he learned that the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency was interviewing candidates to work with Wernher von Braun's missile
group. He had studied a bit of rocketry at Louisiana State University with a former
German Air Force "ace". He had even tried, while still at Convair, to move into
Convair's missile program in San Diego, Ca. (but had been turned down because he
lacked a master's degree). He had also read, as a matter of personal interest, reports
"on the V-2 and, knowing that von Braun and that team had been brought over here
... I thought it was a new ... interesting challenge." Intrigued by the differences
between the hardware he had worked on before and missiles -- "the fact that you
really had only one chance in these missiles we were shooting, because if it didn't
go the first time, there was no second chance" -- Robertson applied for a job with
the ABMA. The ABMA hired him and, because he had done some field service
engineering at Convair, placed him in its engine reliability organization.
Robertson's new work -- reliability testing -- exposed him directly to the
engineering for the Redstone, H-l, and Jupiter engines. "We knew that they were
using the Redstone as a vehicle for carrying unmanned satellites into space. We knew
the Jupiters would later be used if we went into a manned program .... How would
you go about testing -- put a man on the top ... sitting in a capsule -- of a rocket?"
When the ABMA's space-related development programs were transferred to
NASA in 1960, "we wanted to go to NASA .... There were people in the Army who
kept trying to get into R & D because they wanted to go to NASA too .... We were all
looking forward to space travel, and we wanted to be part of it. This was the
beginning, and we wanted to be in on the ground floor." Robertson shifted over to
the Marshall Space Flight Center along with many others. Ironically, until he
transferred again to NASA's Johnson Space Center in 1967, he spent most of the
intervening years not at Marshall, but at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility near
New Orleans, La. 22
The first Redstone, and its derivative the Jupiter, had been built at Marshall
Space Flight Center. During the 1950s the federal government (reflecting the
political philosophy of the Eisenhower administration 23)gradually abandoned the
arsenal or "in-house" system of military manufacture historically practiced by the
U.S. Army. NASA contracted out virtually all of its development and production
(see chapter 6). The Chrysler Corporation, which had been manufacturing tanks for
the U.S. Army at Michoud, "was given the contract for the Saturn-IB [launch vehicle[
and Boeing was given the contract for the Saturn-IC ]launch vehicle] ... being built
at the Michoud Center Facility." Robertson was sent to Michoud to develop a
reliability organization to watch over the contractors' work. There he "had four
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engineers working for me to do the job -- two on Chrysler, two on Boeing .... Our
job was just like our government jobs are now -- managing what the contractor was
doing -- but we were managing from the technical standpoint.
"[ enjoyed Michoud probably better than any other place .... I had a real good
relationship with what was going on in industry as well as what was going on in
NASA itself .... One of the interesting things at Michoud [was that] while we were
there -- more so than here [at Johnson Space Center] -- as problems developed that
we couldn't work, there was a number of professors at colleges around the country
that we could call and get advice from .... They would have a chance to find out what
was going on in the space industry, and ... so they were happy to do it .... That gave
us a broader view.., an independent opinion .... If necessary, we would send [them]
design drawings ... reports-- whatever it took .... We ... just made the contacts and
talked with them on the telephone and set up a working relationship with them.
"As time progressed ... I was reaching my other goal of being in manage-
ment .... Working in a reliability organization, we have a broader view of the total
program than somebody that's working in an isolated design section .... We have to
be familiar with the total vehicle ... we deal with every organization here." By the
beginning of 1967 Robertson "could see our program was kind of tailing down. We
had boosters stored, enough probably to have completed the total program already,
and things were slowing down at Michoud." He looked around for another
challenge and found it at Johnson Space Center, then in the midst of a reorganization
following the fire in the Apollo 204 spacecraft which killed three astronauts on the
launchpad. 24Robertson was attracted to the enhanced safety, reliability, and quality
assurance organization established at Johnson, and transferred to its engineering
reliability branch in October 1967. He became "responsible for the reliability of all
the major vehicles that we were flying .... At that time we were flying the Apollo and
the LM llunar module]. Then, later on, we went to Skylab and we went to ASTP. 2_
I also, at that time, had responsibility for ... electrical, electromechanical, and
electronic parts."
Succeeding with his career "game plan," Robertson rose into the management
ranks of safety, reliability, and quality assurance at Johnson, where he took part in
setting the requirements for the Shuttle (Space Transportation System) program.
"We dealt with all the programs. We dealt with the quality aspects of inspection: of
quality engineering, of evaluation, of contamination control, of process control -- all
the gamuts that would cover assuring the quality of the vehicle .... We were
responsible for the failure close-out. We didn't do any math modeling because, with
just a few vehicles, we don't have the statistical average to do any modeling. So we
ran a technique where we made sure that all failures were closed out prior to a flight.
And we still do that. Any time we fly Shuttle, we review and make sure that all
failures have either been explained, so we have a confidence that they're not going
to reoccur on that flight, or that they have been closed out through some design
action -- or some procedural action."
In 1984 NASA won what may prove to have been an uncertain victory when it
received President Ronald W. Reagan's endorsement of a new space station initiative.
The idea of placing in Earth orbit a permanently occupied space station had been one
105
NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo
of the oldest aspirations within NASA. Various space station concepts had been
included in the agency's plans since it was founded, 26but it took twenty five years
for political circumstances to present the agency with a president willing to endorse
its vision with a budget request to Congress to begin a program. First Langley
Research Center, and then Johnson Space Center (as well as Marshall Space Flight
Center), NASA installations dedicated to the development of manned space flight
technology, carried out tentative space station design studies intermittently
throughout the two decades.
"Before Space Station ever became a program," remembers Robertson, "there
was work going on in space station concepts." At the beginning of 1984 he was
assigned to a team developing the technical requirements necessary for NASA to
issue a "request for proposals" to the aerospace industry to engineer and develop a
space station, then configured as a central power-carrying "keel" to which were
attached living and laboratory modules as well as instruments for Earth and space
observations. (NASA engineers artlessly referred to the configuration as a "power
tower;" both configuration and name would change.) "I had a quality, reliability,
and safety man colocated with me ... a representative from the Cape [Kennedy
Space Center] ... from Marshall, from the SR & QA ]safety, reliability, and quality
assurance] area, and.., from Goddard. We... developed a requirements document
that identified the SR & QA requirements that would be imposed upon a space
station. We took a different tack this time. Instead of writing these requirements
down and.., saying, 'this will be it,' I said ... 'the government hasn't built anything
in years.'" That inexperience meant that Robertson and his group would have to go
back to the aerospace industry, which had been doing most of the actual engineering
and building for NASA's program, and solicit its views on the most appropriate
safety and reliability requirements.
Thus Robertson remained sensitive to the need of an engineering organization
to admit to the need of additional expertise and to draw on that expertise wherever
it could be found. As one "gets older," reflects Robertson, "you start bogging down
with your own techniques .... I think that all over.., people are ... going back to the
fact that.., quality, reliability, safety are not the responsibility of a quality, reliability,
and safety organization; it's got to be the responsibility of the engineering organiza-
tion or the designers. They draw from that organization for support and for technical
advice .... We look at our automobiles and see them falling apart, while the Japanese
cars are still running. I don't know if it's outside quality circles .... But the Japanese
are very willing to tell anybody that, when they are asked where they got their
quality techniques, they got them from America. We gave away the techniques and
didn't follow them, and they did. Now it's coming home to us. ''27
NASA engineers had always been comfortable with hardware. However,
designing a spacecraft so that its human occupants could not only survive, but work
effectively and return ready to readapt to Earth's gravity and environment, meant
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that NASA researchers would have to venture into the biomedical realm as well.
Biology and medicine -- fields which, like mathematics, had attracted somewhat
more women than had engineering -- became one route through which women
with scientific inclinations could find a place in NASA.
Like so many of NASA's engineers, Pamela Donaldson was born in a small
southern town, Leesburg, La. Her father was a plumber and pipefitter who did well
enough to build a plumbing appliance and contracting business for himself in
Leesburg. As a young girl Donaldson had become interested in science-- especially
medicine and biology -- but she rejected the conventional pathway for young
women of nursing. Her older sister was a nurse, and Donaldson "didn't particularly
like what she did." An alternative that appealed to her was medical technology;
when she entered Northeastern State College in Louisiana in 1958 she began a major
program in biology. Donaldson was a bright, straight A student in high school, but
her father was struggling to keep four children in college. Northeastern State
College had the particular distinction of being "the cheapest state school in the
United States .... Mainly known for turning out education majors, teachers ... its
tuition was $7.50 a semester."
After three years of college classes she entered a medical technology program
in a New Orleans teaching hospital. In 1962 she graduated with a B.S. in biology,
obtained certification as a medical technician, and traveled to Houston, Tex. to begin
work as a medical technician in a hospital. She worked in the hospital's clinical
chemistry laboratory for six years. Donaldson worked hard but was still able to find
time to take some graduate courses at the University of Houston. She did so well that
in 1968 she competed successfully for a National Research Council research
associateship at NASA's Johnson Space Center.
1968 was an exciting time to enter the field of space medicine. After the
disappointing flight of Apollo 6 (unmanned) in April, when the Saturn suffered
"pogo" oscillations, and burn failures on its second and third stages were followed
by a splashdown of the spacecraft 50 miles off target, NASA successfully orbited
Apollo 7 in October with its three-man crew] s Two months later astronauts Frank
Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr., and William A. Anders were lofted into lunar orbit
from which they confirmed planned manned landing sites, reported that the Moon's
surface appeared like "dirty beach sand with lots of footprints in it," and broadcast
Christmas greetings to a watching and listening world. 29
Anticipating the physiological changes to which the Apollo and later astronauts
would be subject, and ensuring that the spacecraft that housed them and the suits
they wore would adequately protect them was partly the work of biomedical
specialists like Donaldson. When she began work at Johnson Space Center, she
"started working in ... endocrinology and ... the physiological changes with space-
flight." After her research associateship expired in 1970, she stayed at Johnson,
where she acquired ever greater responsibility for the biomedical work done for all
of NASA's Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle missions.
"When we started out the man in space program," she recalls, "we picked up...
Army Air Corps flight surgeons. And National Academy [of Sciences] panels.., all
predicted that when you go to put people in a weightless environment-- shoot them
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off on top of rockets -- you're going to have ... a lot of medical problems .... As it
turned out, after we flew a few flights, some predictions ... just went away
altogether. Things like: Man wouldn't be able to swallow in weightlessness. Well,
we soon found out they could. They wouldn't be able to eat up there. Well, we found
out they could; it could be messy ... you had to contain the food, but they could
eat .... A lot of things that had been initial concerns ... you look back on them now,
they seem kind of foolish.
"Some of the things we had not predicted exactly .... One of them was the effects
of weightlessness on the physiological responses of the body.., some of our Gemini
astronauts were coming back from space flight with altered body chemistry .... My
own area of interest from my graduate education was in endocrine control
mechanisms, and specifically those that control salt water in the body, metabolism."
Donaldson was able to develop a number of experiments that were done on the
Apollo astronauts, and the results of those experiments, along with some medical
data collected during the Gemini program, enabled Donaldson and her co-workers
to "put together a picture of what we most often saw with astronauts. It was not
normal .... While they came back and sat up and walked and talked and waited and
made speeches and all, their chemistry showed that there were still some pretty
dramatic things going on in the body. Not pathology ... [or] anything that would
cause you to medicate them or put them to bed .... But it was ... physiological
changes, interesting science.
"Other folks were working in various fields with the same issues .... You
immerse somebody in water [or] ... to bed rest and they have certain changes that
look kind of like what we were seeing, but not just like it .... I was able to put together
a pretty complete flight experiment for the Skylab missions, looking at the endocrine
control mechanisms during weightlessness .... We were able to put the crews on
controlled metabolic diets and collect blood and urine and fecal samples throughout
the pre- and post-flight [period]. That represents what is the sum total of the ...
information on man in space in that area. Those [Skylab] missions gave us the
foundations that we are now working on.
"Basically what we think is happening [is that] as soon as the human body goes
into weightlessness, the blood that we're used to pooling in our lower extremities...
is redistributed throughout your body because there's no gravity pull. Your body
senses then that it's got too much blood because.., the sensors are in your neck and
great veins of your chest .... The brain says, 'we've got to unload some of this fluid,'"
and the body begins diuresis. In the process, "not only do we get rid of the plasma
volume portion of the blood, but we also get rid of our blood cells .... And it occurs
pretty fast after you get into space. What else happens?... When you lose water, you
also lose salt. And when the body loses salt ... we keep pumping up the hormone
aldostrontium that controls sodium .... The hormones don't seem to work up there
like they do on the ground, and why? We don't know.
"When you land back on Earth ... just the opposite happens. All of a sudden
blood pools in your lower extremeties you feel faint. You sit down or drink
something to make up the volume difference.., your heart, great veins, neck sensors
are all saying, 'hey! where's all the blood?' So... you retain fluids, you retain salt, and
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you build back up the blood volume over a two-week period. None of these
things ... are pathological .... But they are all interesting, and the mechanisms are
particularly interesting .... We need to know about those mechanisms because some
of them need to be corrected .... Shuttle astronauts, after being in weightlessness for
a week.., had to operate the landing controls. They did not need to have any feelings
of queasiness .... We started giving them a liter of salt water before they came back
in because you will retain the salt water immediately .... That would build up their
blood volume."
Donaldson's studies of the effects of weightless on body chemistry led her into
hematology as well as endocrinology, and other biomedical fields as well. "In the
early flights we found" the body also loses red blood cells in space "because of
oxygen. But we don't use 100 percent oxygen anymore .... So right now we're
theorizing that it is sequestration of the cells of, probably, the spleen. It's another
way the body has of reducing the blood volume quickly." She also worked in
toxicology, exploring the permissible components of a spacecraft's atmosphere as
well as what sorts of filters would be needed for its water system.
By its very nature Donaldson's work crossed over the organizational boundaries
separating different projects and programs at Johnson Space Center and enabled her
to survive the chronic reorganizations which seem to afflict all large organizations
trying to cope with changing demands. She enjoys repeating an observation attributed
to an ancient bureaucratic sage: "'We got all together and got ready to work and just
as we got ready, our job got reorganized.'" As NASA's manned spaceflight program
grew, so did Johnson's biomedical program and Donaldson's responsibilities along
with it. In time, during the mid-1970s, she realized that she had probably crossed the
threshold from research to management -- although until 1984, when she was
managing full-time, she was "still conducting research, still having projects, planning
experiments and everything." She thinks of herself as a scientist and not an engineer,
but the work she has done has been an essential part of the subtle engineering
necessary to transport men and women safely through space.
Like many NASA engineers, Ronald Siemans began working with NASA as
part of a cooperative work-study program. Born and raised in Cleveland, Ohio,
Siemans completed a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering at Cleveland State
University at the same time he began working during alternate quarters at Johnson
Space Center. When he first went to Johnson in 1969 he was assigned to environmental
control systems for NASA's manned spacecraft. By the time he settled in on a
permanent basis in 1972, Johnson was heavily involved in the development of the
environmental system for the Shuttle orbiter of the Space Transportation System.
The Shuttle would be the first spacecraft that offered its human occupants an
atmospheric environment truly similar to what they normally experienced on earth.
Earlier manned U.S. spacecraft -- the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab
spacecraft-- averaged an atmospheric pressure of around 5 psi (pounds per square
inch), similar to the atmosphere of military aircraft. The air circulating in them was
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also very high in oxygen (the air in the Apollo spacecraft was 100 percent oxygen)
which, as many realized to their sorrow after the Apollo 204 fire, was an extreme fire
hazard. Pre-Shuttle astronauts had to wear special suits during ascent into orbit and
return in order to adjust gradually to the extreme change in environment they would
experience in space.
With the advent of the Shuttle program, astronauts could look forward to
experiencing an Earth-like atmosphere of 14.7 psi and breathing air with a nitrogen-
oxygen mix of about 78 percent to 21 percent2 ° While the Shuttle was in its early
design and development phases, about the time that Siemans went to Johnson,
"there was an air communication system requirement ... that no one had really
thought too much about .... The traditional systems that are available out in industry
were quite expensive. They were going to require a lot of power and ... the
integration costs would have been terrible to think about." Siemans had done some
work in catalysis while he was completing a graduate program at nearby Rice
University and was able to design a small air purification system for the Orbiter. "I
knew how to do that ... [by] just adding a little cannister onto the side of the
environmental control system. It was a comparatively cheap model to make .... That
knowledge probably saved the government ... a couple of million dollars."
Human comfort and safety onboard spacecraft demanded not only a proper mix
of atmospheric gasses (not to mention carefully controlled temperature and humidity),
but protection from toxic carbon dioxide, a byproduct of respiration. During the
Mercury flights carbon dioxide had been successfully removed from the capsule's
atmosphere with a filter containing lithium chloride. When Siemans arrived at
Johnson "we had a fifty percent performance out of the chemicals that we were
using." He tried to persuade his superiors that NASA should do some more research
to improve the systems that chemically purified the air in manned spacecraft. He
succeeded, and to good effect. "On this last orbiter flight [STS-51I Discovery, a
seven-day mission launched on August 27, 1985] we had an EVA [extravehicular
activity] on there where one of the astronauts put in the same cannister twice by
mistake, and we got 90 percent out of that one."
Siemans was able to transfer the know-how he had acquired to improving the
environmental controls on the space suits developed for extravehicular activity
"which picked up in importance in the Shuttle program and is becoming more
prominent in the space program in general." NASA's first extravehicular life
support system, used during the Gemini program, was a cumbersome chest pack
containing a jungle of hoses and connectors to maintain suit pressure, provide
metabolic oxygen, remove heat, and ventilate gases. Astronauts found the suit a
real nuisance and stiflingly hot after only a brief amount of exercise. If astronauts
were to move about on the Moon, they would need something better. This they
received -- a more compact backpack apparatus.
"You look at a man out in deep space, you see the arms and legs moving around.
But if you look at his back you see a big box. The big box has an environmental control
system in it, just like the vehicle has -- it's just miniaturized. You've got the same
kind of problems that you've got in the vehicle out there, except that you've got the
difficulties of vacuum compatibility and deep space environment ... like vacuum
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and radiation, solar energy impinging on the fellow, ultraviolet light on the eyes --
a lot of different.., problems because you' re outside rather than inside." The Skylab,
Shuttle, and Space Station programs, with their extended stays in orbit, would
further challenge NASA's life support researchers and engineers.
When Siemans first worked with NASA in the late 1960s as a coop student
"there were.., teams looking at Moon bases and Mars missions and Space Station."
He was assigned to "trade studies that were involved in the Space Station -- mass
and energy balances, essentially .... You have to evaluate what the benefits are for a
particular system. You select an approach to do a particular job. You go through a
series of evaluations to see what that decision does to you from a power standpoint,
from a weight standpoint, from a volume in the vehicle standpoint. Any one of
those ... can wipe you out by itself. And you look at the collective integration of all
those items and you compare systems to similar systems."
After NASA's Space Station program won the endorsement of President Ronald
Reagan in 1984, Siemans returned to the problems of providing adequate onboard
life support for Space Station crews. "There are a number of research questions
about the Space Station. It's the first time in the history of man that he's going to be
going into space for a long period of time. The Russians are a little bit ahead of us in
this area .... Are you going to live in space for a long period of time, or are you just
going to send somebody there for three months and.., return them? And we'd better
start thinking about leaving people up there forever.
"In the past one crew would go up and do EVAs maybe twice in an ... entire
career. Now we're talking about one crewman doing EVAs three days a week for his
whole career, which may be ten years long. That's a significant change .... A lot of
issues have to be answered in the medical area .... There's lots of research that needs
to be done involving radiation, for instance. [During the pre-Apollo era] everyone
was afraid.., you'd go to the Moon-- you can get so much radiation the guys wind
up with cancer." Continued monitoring of the Apollo astronauts seemed to indicate
that the spacecraft's radiation shielding, combined with their limited exposure,
protected them from any long-term radiation damage. "However, you talk about
going up there, building Moon bases, you're going to revisit all that.., all those same
old issues that we just gave a cursory look at back in the old days."
New England -- empty of NASA installations save the short-lived Electronics
Research Center 31--has contributed few engineers to NASA's ranks, notwithstand-
ing the significant role played by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
developing the computer and guidance systems for the Apollo program. 32Bostonian
or "down East" patterns of speech strike odd notes in corridors and offices in which
one hears the laconic voices of Texas or Alabama, where vocal energy is normally
reserved for bursts of temper or enthusiasm. Old Greenwich, Conn. -- one of the
enclaves of the Eastern establishment-- is even more remote from the restless space
frontiers of the American South. But the space age has been an age of many minor
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wonders, and one of them was the migration of Richard Williams, born in 1941 in
Old Greenwich, to Kennedy Space Center.
Few NASA engineers, when asked about their parents, mention their mothers
first. Williams does. "My mother is a concert pianist, a graduate of Julliard [who
played] professionally at Carnegie Hall .... She has two baby grand pianos so that
[she and her pupils] can play at the house .... Music made my mother's life."
Williams's mother finally despaired of teaching her son, one of three children, to
play the piano and settled for basic instruction in the rudiments of music. "I think
I had a repertoire of two simple tunes that I could play on the piano." Williams's
father embodied the social mobility of many Americans in the early twentieth
century. The son of a purchasing agent for the Boston and Maine Railroad, the elder
Williams was able to go to engineering school and "worked his way up" from a
machinist at the Shick Electric Razor Company to a production management
position at Conde Nast Press -- publisher of The New Yorker and House and Garden
magazines. An avid sailor, Williams's father crewed regularly for numerous ocean
races, among them the Bermuda and Trans-Atlantic races. The family "had boats .... I
had a sailboat when I was young, a little Cape Cod knock-about, 16 feet .... We spent
an awful lot of time not only on Long Island Sound, but up the Hudson River into
Lake Champlain, up into Canada."
From his family Williams inherited not only a love of boats and the water, but
a love of all things mechanical. "My grandfather on my mother's side was a
Swede .... In Sweden he was a railroad engineer." After he came to the United States
"he somehow got in with the Rockefellers and was the head chauffeur for John D.
Rockefeller, St. They had their home in Greenwich, Conn. And the Rockefeller boys
at one time were going to build a U.S. version of the Rolls Royce .... They tried to set
up a manufacturing line in New Haven. The first car rolled off the line and it was so
heavy that you couldn't steer the thing. It took two men and a boy to steer the thing.
And so my grandfather wound up working.., to change the geometry of the steering
mechanism. He got it to steer, but ultimately the whole idea folded." Williams was
fond of his grandfather, "who lived in the country and had a four- or five-car garage.
He had a small shop in there, and I would go and spend time with him."
So Williams grew up working on cars, his own and those belonging to the
patrons of the local garage and filling station. When he graduated from high school
in 1957 and it came time to go to college, he balked at Old Greenwich expectations
and tried to enlist in the Navy. Although he had been in the Naval Reserve, the Navy
discovered traces of asthma and sent him on his way with an honorable discharge.
He found a job with a company that made electromechanically operated quotation
boards for the New York Stock Exchange and magnetic memory devices for airline
reservation systems. There he got not only several years' experience in product
development and field engineering, but a mentor who persuaded him to return to
school, to Clemson College in South Carolina. Four years later (in 1966) with a good
bit of mechanical engineering and lots of football behind him, Richard Williams
went to Florida.
Williams's Swedish grandfather had preceded him to Florida in 1949, and it was
there that the two generations had met during the summers to toy with machinery.
112
Journeys
"I saw this area as it was, and how it changed .... My grandfather was the one that
talked me into coming out here [to Kennedy Space Center] for an interview while I
was in college." A friend and neighbor of his grandfather's had excited him about
the work NASA was doing there, and when Williams was given a job offer, he took
it. "Pay-wise, it was the lowest offer; it was around $5,200 a year around
1966 .... Everybody, including my parents, told me I was absolutely nuts because I
had an offer from General Motors that was over $8,000 a year. But it was in Flint,
Michigan .... I said, 'aw, I don't want to go to Flint, Michigan.'"
Williams's start at NASA's Kennedy Space Center misfired. He had been hired
to work in a new materials test laboratory, but the laboratory was never built, so he
decided to go to work for Pratt and Whitney, which had made him a handsome offer
to work at a plant in West Palm Beach. But in 1966 "NASA was having so much
trouble recruiting people that they weren't about to let me get out without a
fight .... Back in those days contractors were coming in and offering whole offices
jobs .... Whole offices were leaving NASA one day and going to work for contractors
[the next[." Since NASA had paid his moving expenses to Florida, Williams felt
somewhat obligated to look around the center for something else, and, just when it
seemed that nothing would appeal to him, he paid a visit to the flight simulation
organization "housed in the Air Force side [Cape Canaveral Air Force Station,
adjacent to Kennedy Space Center]." The supervisor "took me out to the simulator
and ... gave me a 'ride'.... We went into orbit right there, and it really sent me 'into
orbit!' I said, 'Boy, this is absolutely fantastic!'
"It was not a KSC position; it was a Manned Spacecraft Center [MSC; renamed
Johnson Space Center in 1973] position. So the government retained me, but KSC lost
me, and I joined MSC. [Williams] hired in with that group and trained the Gemini
9, 10, 11, and 12 crews in the simulator. I continued on in that capacity through the
Apollo program. [The Manned Spacecraft Center had] built a building on the
Kennedy Space Center side, called the flight crew training building, in which we had
two Apollo Command Module simulators and one Lunar Module simulator.., for
mission training purposes. The crews would come down here and by the time they
got to this point.., they would have been selected for a mission and would know all
of the basic systems. Our job was more of putting it into a mission time line and
firming up that time line23
"MSC had (and still has) astronaut quarters over in the Operations and Checkout
building at Kennedy Space Center. We had the flight crew training building and ...
use of a beach house out here on the ocean.., for R & R [rest and recreation] purposes.
It was actually for security as well as... quarantine .... In the earlier days of the Apollo
program, the crews would all be down here from Houston, and they would be
staying here full time because of the schedules .... We socialized with them. We had,
in the afternoons, ball games .... They did come out to parties with us .... We had a
group -- we called it the "lucky 100' -- of people down here that.., had to have close
association with the astronauts .... We were asked during this period not to
frequent public places, [to] eat at home, stay at home .... As a relief mechanism -- the
crews, obviously they stayed out there -- we got to using this beach house, and we
would have after-work parties.
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"I worked with the contractors that built the simulators, the old trainers.., some
of the early aircraft simulators that pilots used to train in .... We worked with those
people quite closely in order to assure fidelity of the simulation. At the same time,
we coordinated quite closely with the home base back in Houston .... I spent a good
bit of my time [going] back and forth to Houston .... We supported the crews right
down to launch .... Any last-minute changes to their procedure they would put in
[their books] in pen and ink ... and they carried that whole file of books for those
missions .... During the missions we would go, one or two of each group, to Houston
to support the mission.., from a console in one of the back engineering rooms off of
the Mission Director's center at Johnson Space Center."
Fifty-five hours into the flight of Apollo 13 [launched April 11, 1970], when an
oxygen tank explosion in the service module forced NASA to abort the mission, "we
were on the consoles that evening ... the crew had just ... bedded down for the
evening. This fellow that was with me knew the command module and service
module systems very well; [after the tank exploded] he said, 'Gee, you know, things
don't look right.' He was actually the one that [sic] pointed out to the front room at
the Mission Control Center that 'hey ... something's looking funny here. I'm not
getting proper signals back on this flight.' This fellow ... started breaking out
systems schematics and what not, looking at things .... We spent the next five or
seven days now almost working around the clock. We brought some other people
in to help us, working out procedures, and we acted as a go-between. We would
work up a procedure out there [in Houston], then I would phone it in to our people
back here because this simulator at KSC was in the configuration that that mission
was in. It simulated the whole nine yards .... It was fortunate for the crew that Fred
Haise was on that mission because he had spent a number of years working with the
Grumman [Corporation] people on that vehicle. So he knew the vehicle inside and
out and knew what it could do. As it turned out, the Lunar Module served as a
lifeboat. 34
"In December of 1970, at the end of the Apollo program, we shut this training
facility down. We were all offered jobs back in Houston. Well, I had spent enough
time in Houston during my tenure with the Manned Spacecraft Center that I knew
that I did not want to go live in Houston .... I was very well situated here, I loved the
area, loved the water, and every time I went to Houston -- they have a little lake
that's called Clear Lake .... I don't know how they came up with the name Clear
Lake; that water is the dirtiest water I have ever seen in my life .... I wouldn't even
put my foot in the water down there at Galveston. You'd come out in the morning
and the stench from the refineries in Texas City would bring tears to my eyes! ...
I refused to transfer to Houston.
"I thought my Christmas present was going to be a layoff notice. The Apollo
program was winding down; this area was becoming a very, very tough area in
which to find a job because of all the layoffs .... I had several neighbors in the area
where I lived ... [who] knew I was NASA and they were contractors, two of them
being Boeing people, and they were offered jobs with Boeing in Seattle, in the aircraft
end of it, if they could get themselves at their own expense to Seattle. You couldn't
give a house away here, and they begged me, 'take over payments, just take the
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house, do anything with it.' And I said, 'here I have an infant son and my wife wasn't
working ... and gosh, I'm looking at a layoff too; I can't do anything.' Well, I made
the decision to stay here, and it was looking grim."
Williams had the good fortune to have gotten to know many KSC people, and
one of them put him in touch with a top-ranking KSC manager who offered him a
job in the center's design engineering group. He persuaded the Manned Space
Center people to keep him on their payroll for a month until he could officially begin
work at Kennedy. In the meantime, he had little to do besides "picking things up and
cleaning things out and housekeeping." When Kennedy Space Center closed down
the Apollo operations, "the contractor [Singer-Link] literally just walked away and
left everything -- just walked out of there on a Friday like they were coming back
on the Monday. All of the logistics and spare parts, everything, was just left .... The
people just walked out and at the work benches the little soldering irons were still
plugged in. There was still food in the refrigerator. It was just incredible. So I spent
that month trying to straighten up things and figure out what we had left .... There
were literally thousands and thousands of dollars of useable parts .... The outfit that
I went to work for at KSC [was designing the building for thel launch processing
system [for] the upcoming Shuttle program. So I was able to get some people
together, and we ... were able to salvage a lot of the equipment and the parts and
pieces that were left and transformed it into a development laboratory from a
simulation facility."
After spending about a year with the center's design engineering group,
Williams began to suspect that he had stumbled "off the beaten path into a deadend
position." He began to look around and found himself a job in unmanned satellite
launch operations "on the Cape side again -- a NASA organization -- and [I] got
back into the spacecraft area," where Williams has remained. "In those days we were
called spacecraft coordinators .... We had the Delta launch vehicle program ... and
the Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle program. And each one of us was assigned various
satellite groups that were coming through to launch their satellites on one of these
launch vehicles. We would go out and work with the manufacturer, the satellite
owner, to integrate their satellite with the launch vehicle. For the most part, a lot of
our satellites were built by three standard manufacturers: Hughes, RCA, or Ford
Aerospace. It was somewhat routine, but each one required its own changes. It was,
once again, dealing with different people and different situations, and it was quite
interesting.
"The thing that has kept me here was.., that we-- about '73 to '77 or '78-- dealt
with a number of foreign entities and launched satellites for these foreign countries.
The first one that I really had any association with was a French-German commu-
nications satellite called Symphonie .... I did spend quite a bit of time in Munich,
Germany and Toulouse, France, working with these organizations .... From that we
went into an English project called OTS (Orbiting Test Satellite) .... And then there
was a number of French satellites. And we got into an Italian one called SIRIO [a
microwave propagation satellite] .... Since then we've done a number of trips
throughout Europe dealing with various satellite companies .... I've been to India
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twice now, meeting with the Indian government. We've launched several satellites
for them."
However, Williams's new-found pleasure in the increasingly cosmopolitan
character of space missions can not erase the dark memories he shares with so many
NASA engineers of the consequences of the collapse of public interest in space after
the successful flight of Apollo 11 -- memories which constitute for him "one of the
lowest points in my career .... We had all been so hyped on this thing of going to the
Moon. And then, to all of a sudden wake up one day with the realization of 'there's
no more'.... Why didn't we plan for something further on?... I was just devastated.
Of course, this whole area, with layoffs ... was just very [hard hit] .... There was no
diversification for these guys that had just finished launching the Apollo launch
vehicle, which was probably one of the greatest engineering marvels of its time.
They would [end] up on the streets, out of work, with no place to go. I knew a couple
of engineers that were actually at the gas station pumping gas .... One of the
engineers.., got into real estate and has left the area. He said, 'I wouldn't go back for
all the tea in China. Just because of the heartbreak'.... If you went around this center
and carefully asked everybody what was the most important experience in their
careers here, I think they would all agree that the collapse of support, the collapse
of the program, the collapse of the money after [the] Apollo period, was the biggest
single event.
"One of the highlights of my career," reflects Williams, "has been my association
with people from all over the world ... with the astronauts .... I wouldn't have
missed it for anything in the world .... [But] I look forward to the future with mixed
emotions, I guess. I hope that we can come out of this Shuttle disaster, the Challenger
accident of January 28, 1986, with some direction. And that direction, I hope, is a
mixed fleet .... I hope we can afford to... carry on with both programs .... The people
that I talk with throughout the agency feel that we've made our mistake with trying
to put all of our eggs into the Shuttle basket."
Throughout the Shuttle era NASA continued to launch spacecraft with un-
manned, expendable rockets. The small Scout, with its limited payload of 150
pounds, continued in production and routinely launched small scientific satellites
into Earth orbit from Wallops Island, while NASA used its remaining inventory of
Delta and Atlas-Centaurs to launch heavier unmanned payloads from Cape
Canaveral. During the two years following the Challenger accident, when U.S. space
policy and NASA's own programs underwent an agonizing period of reappraisal,
the White House modified a decision made during the administration of President
Richard M. Nixon that the Shuttle would be the nation's principal launch vehicle and
the use of expendable launch vehicles gradually phased out. 3sWhile the U.S. Air
Force began to procure Titan launch vehicles again, the Reagan White House
(adhering to its general philosophy of "privatizing" much of the government's
activities) directed in February 1988 that "federal agencies ... procure existing and
future required expendable launch services directly from the private sector to the
fullest extent possible," and announced that in the interests of "assuring" national
"access to space... U.S. space transportation systems that provide sufficient resiliency
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to allow continued operation, despite failures in any single system, are empha-
sized."36
NASA's Apollo generation of engineers was, above all else, a generation caught
in an era of transition. During the immediate postwar period the country's engineers,
working for NASA, the military, and the emerging aerospace industry, mastered the
fundamental problems of designing and building the vehicles needed for controlled
flight beyond the atmosphere. During the Apollo decade programmatic emphasis,
federal funds, and career opportunities expanded to embrace the technical problems
associated with the objects that would be sent into space -- automated scientific
spacecraft and piloted spacecraft to transport human crews to the Moon and
eventually beyond. Engineering secure spacecraft environments -- whether for
delicate instruments or human crews -- became as important as flight dynamics
and, as a result, men and women with backgrounds in mathematics, biology, and
chemical and mechanical engineering were as likely to find careers in NASA as were
aeronautical engineers.
The careers of the seven men and one woman profiled in this chapter embraced
as well a revolution in engineering in which the slide rule and mechanical calculator
were replaced by the high-speed electronic computer, a now ubiquitous and
indispensable device that refines the designs of all modern air- and spacecraft,
controls telecommunications, and has begun to supplant the intuitive guesswork
essential to the creative genius that the engineers brought to aeronautical and rocket
research in the first half of this century. 37
Only two of these engineers began their careers doing work that was a direct
byproduct of World War II-- John Robertson, who worked on bomber engines before
joining the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in 1958, and Henry Beacham, who worked
in weapons testing for the Navy before transferring to NASA's new Goddard Space
Flight Center (with numerous other Navy personnel) in 1959. The rest, except Frank
Toscelli, were born during World War II, and by the time they were ready to seek out
careers, the kinds of engineering work offered by NASA had expanded far beyond
the initial phase of launch vehicle development. They might have as readily gone to
work in other engineering fields, but NASA was where the opportunity was --
especially for the young woman, who would have suffered the most transparent
discrimination had she sought work with a large private computer firm.
Their personal histories and professional lives embraced as well profound
changes in the American social landscape that would unfold after the children of the
Great Depression entered college and later joined the salaried middle class, or what
sociologists of the 1950s proclaimed the new "organization men." Only three of
these eight engineers came from large urban areas, and only two were born in the
Deep South; five of the eight were educated in public institutions. Two were the
children of salaried professionals; the others were children of either small businessmen
or service workers. The institutionalization of both science and engineering, and the
increased role of government in the national pursuit of scientific research and
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technological innovation, for which NASA had become during the 1960s a principal
agent of change, would prove to be one of the most pervasive forces in their careers.
For the best surveys of federally supported science and engineering, see A. Hunter
Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities, 2nd ed.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) and W. Henry Lambright,
Governing Science and Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). The
volume on the military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy is enormous; its range
is suggested by Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1985), Richard G.
Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History
of Images (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), Richard Rhodes, The Making
of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), and George T. Mazuzan,
"Nuclear Energy -- A Subject in Need of Historical Research: Review Essay,"
Technology and Culture, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 1986).
2Sounding rockets enable scientists to obtain vertica I profiles of Earth's atmosphere,
as well as measurements of radiation, plasma, and micrometeoroid flux, from above
the atmosphere. The sounding rocket's measurements, however, are for brief
periods at high altitudes above the launch site.
3R. Cargill Hall Early U.S. Satellite Proposals, in Eugene M. Emme (ed.), The History
of Rocket Technology (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), pp. 74-79.
4For varied accounts of the U.S. inauguration of the space age, see Homer E. Newell,
Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, NASA SP-4211 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), Bilstein, Stages to Saturn (loc. cit.), and
Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History (Washington,
DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971).
s See chapter 3. The first successful American satellite in space was Explorer,
developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technol-
ogy. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory was also responsible for the fourth stage of the
Army Ballistic Missile Agency's Jupiter C rocket, which launched Explorer into orbit
on January 31, 1958.
6 The installation was originally (January 15, 1959) designated the Beltsville Space
Center. On May 1 it was renamed Goddard Space Flight Center in honor of
American rocket pioneer Robert H. Goddard. See Alfred Rosenthal, Venture into Space:
Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA SP-4301 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1968).
7 The Space Task Group was located at Langley Research Center, but administra-
tively it was assigned to the Manned Satellites Directorate at Goddard Space Flight
Center under Robert R. Gilruth. Until the first permanent buildings were occupied
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at Goddard in late 1960, the Center existed more as an organizational entity than a
physical location, its components housed largely at Langley Research Center and
the Naval Research Laboratory. The Manned Spacecraft Center was renamed for
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1973.
NASA's Earth applications satellite programs promptly embroiled the agency in
controversies with other federal agencies such as the Department of Defense (with
its military interest) and the Departments of Commerce, Interior, Agriculture, and
State. The agency would discover again and again that demonstrating the technical
feasibility of any space venture was only half the battle. See Pamela Mack, "The
Politics of Technological Change: A History of Landsat," University of Pennsylva-
nia Doctoral Dissertation (1983) and, for a brief overview, Newell, Beyond the At-
mosphere: Early Years of Space Science, chapter 19.
9The Nimbus series served as the second generation of U.S. meteorological satellites,
following the Tiros series, first launched in 1960, which provided weather images
from above Earth's cloud cover.
10See chapter 3, footnote 13.
11See Frederick I. Ordway, III and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979).
12For recent accounts of early aerodynamic and engine research, see Robert Schlaifer,
Development of Aircraft Engines and Fuels (Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 1950),
Edward W. Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University, 1980), and James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958, NASA SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1987).
13The feat was accomplished in 1930 by Maj. U. Maddalena and Lt. F. Cecconi. See
World Aviation Annual, 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Aviation Research Institute, 1948).
14See chapter 3, footnote 7.
]5 G.A. Shepperd, The Italian Campaign, 1943-1945: A Political and Military Reassess-
ment (New York, 1968), pp. 67-156.
_6For a history of the computer hardware and software developed for NASA's
manned and unmanned spacecraft, see James E. Tomayko, Computers in Spaceflight:
The NASA Experience, Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology, Vol. 18, Supp.
3 (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1987).
17The 5,000-pound Solar Maximum Mission satellite was launched into a 354 mile
high Earth orbit to take continuous observations of the Sun in wavelengths ranging
from visible light to the highest-energy gamma rays during the current sunspot
cycle. Its attitude control devices were disabled by the failure of undersized fuses six
months into its mission, and the satellite was placed in a "survival" one degree per
second roll around its solar-pointing axis by the reprogrammed NSCC-1. During the
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1984 mission of Shuttle flight 41-C, the satellite was retrieved, repaired in the
Shuttle's cargo bay, and lifted into orbit, where it resumed operations.
_8During 1988 the gender neutral term "human space flight" began to appear in
some NASA pronouncements and publications.
_9See table 7, appendix C.
2o The expression came into popular usage after it appeared as the title of Tom
Wolfe's trenchant account of the Mercury Seven, The Right Stuff(New York: Farrar,
Straus, Giroux, 1979).
2_North Korean troops crossed into South Korea on June 25,1950. Three years later,
on July 27, 1953, an armistice ended hostilities in a war that resulted in over 54,000
American troop deaths, almost as many as the War in Southeast Asia, which claimed
the lives of slightly over 58,000 American servicemen.
22NASA selected the unused government ordnance plant at Michoud in 1961 for the
industrial production of Saturn launch vehicle stages under the direction of Marshall
Space Flight Center. (The facility was called Michoud Operations until 1965.) The
Michoud Assembly Facility was later used as the manufacture and final assembly
site for the large external tanks for the Space Transportation System.
23See Hans Mark and Arnold Levine, The Management of Research Institutions: A Look
at Government Laboratories, NASA SP-481 (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1984), chapter 3.
24The fire occurred on January 27, taking the lives of the three-man crew for NASA's
first manned Apollo spaceflight: Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White I[, and Richard
B. Chaffee. For details, see Ivan D. Ertel and Roland W. Newkirk, with Courtney G.
Brooks, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Vol. IV, January21,1966-July 13,1974, NASA
SP-4009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).
2sProject Skylab (Apollo Applications Program), which flew in 1973, and the Apollo-
Soyuz Test Project, a joint American and Soviet on-orbit rendezvous and docking
mission, which flew in July 1975, used Apollo-Saturn hardware. See W. David
Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living and Working in Space: A History of Skylab,
NASA SP-4208 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), and
Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, The Partnership: A History of the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, NASA SP-4209 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1978).
26See Sylvia D. Fries, "2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's
Space Station System," loc. cit.
27Robertson was interviewed in September 1985, four months before the Challenger
accident, which occurred on January 28, 1986.
28Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Donn F. Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham. For summaries
of all the Apollo missions, see Courtney G. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, and Loyd
S. Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft, NASA
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SP-4205 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Appendix C,
Apollo Flight Program.
Not everyone watched and listened willingly. Two thousand viewers called into
television networks in New York City, complaining about the interruption in the
broadcast of the day's football game. (The Economist, December 28, 1968, p. 112.)
3oAt, or near to, the surface of Earth, the air contains about 78.09 percent nitrogen,
20.93 percent oxygen, and very small amounts of other gases such as argon, carbon
dioxide, neon, helium, krypton, hydrogen, xenon, and ozone. For an account of this
and other biomedical issues during NASA's manned spaceflight programs, see John
A. Pitts, The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980, NASA
SP-4213 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 20-23 passim.
3_Established in 1964 in Cambridge, Mass., the Electronics Research Center (ERC)
assumed the functions of the NASA North Eastern Office, which had administered
NASA contracts for electronics research and development in the northeastern
United States and served as a liaison with the electronics industry in the region. The
center conducted programs in aeronautical and space-related electronics research.
Because of budget reductions, NASA closed the ERC in 1969 and transferred the
facility to the Department of Transportation.
32See James E. Tomayko, Computers in Spaceflight: The NASA Experience, NASA CR-
182505 (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1988).
33For an intimate account of astronaut simulation training (although for the later
Shuttle program), see Henry S.F. Cooper, Jr., Before Lift-Off: The Making of a Space
Shuttle Crew (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
The crew of Apollo 13 (Fred W. Haise, Jr., James A. Lovell, Jr., and John L. Swigert,
Jr.) relied on the Lunar Module's systems for power and life support for their return
to Earth. See Henry S.F. Cooper, Jr., 13: The Flight That Failed (New York: The Dial
Press, 1973).
3_ In a letter to NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher, written two days before
President Nixon's resignation on August 9, 1974, Deputy Secretary of Defense
William P. Clements, Jr. assured Fletcher that "the Department of Defense is
planning to use the Space Shuttle... to achieve more effective and flexible military
space operations in the future. Once the Shuttle's capabilities and low operating cost
are demonstrated we expect to launch essentially all of our military space payloads
in this new vehicle and phase out of inventory our current expendable launch
vehicles" (NASA History Office) Defense Department policy became national
policy when the Reagan White House announced on July 4, 1982, that the Space
Transportation System "is the primary space launch system for both United States
national security and civil government missions." ("United States Space Policy, The
White House Fact Sheets, 4 July 1982." NASA History Office).
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_ "The President's Space Policy and Commercial Space Initiative to Begin the Next
Century," White House Press Release, February 11, 1988. (NASA History Office)
37For some reflections on the implications of the computerization of engineering
design from a veteran engineer, see Henry Petroski, To Engineer is Human (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1982), especially chapter 15, From Slide Rule to Computer:
Forgetting How It Used to Be Done.
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He that observeth the wind shall not sow;
and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap.
-- Ecclesiastes
For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain
the whole world and lose his own soul?
--Mark, 8:36
Chapter 5
Scientists, Engineers,
Managers
The good natured and cosmopolitan historian Plutarch tells how the Roman consul
Marcellus, during the Second Punic War (bc 218-201), was foiled in his assault on the
coastal city of Syracuse. Marcellus, writes Plutarch, "reckoned without Archimedes."
Marcellus had approached the city wails of Syracuse with a formidable "fleet of sixty
quinquiremes" bristling with "many different kinds of weapons and missiles," and
a massive "siege-engine which was mounted on a huge platform supported by eight
galleys lashed together." But the philosopher of Syracuse, in his role as military
engineer, would not be outdone. Once so confident of victory, the Romans were
horrified by a
tremendous barrage.., of missiles, including a great volley of stones which
descended upon their target with an incredible noise and velocity. There
was no protection against this artillery, and the soldiers were knocked
down in swaths and their ranks thrown into confusion. At the same time
huge beams were run out from the walls so as to project over the Roman
ships: some of them were then sunk by great weights dropped from above,
while others were seized at the bows by iron claws or by beaks like those of
cranes, hauled into the air by means of counterweights until they stood
upright upon their sterns, and then allowed to plunge to the bottom, or else
they were spun round by means of windlasses situated inside the city and
dashed against the steep cliffs and rocks which jutted out under the
walls .... Often there would be seen the terrifying spectacle of a ship being
lifted clean out of the water into the air and whirled about as it hung there,
until every man had been shaken out of the hull and thrown in different
directions, after which it would be dashed down upon the walls.
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The Romans were so alarmed by the sight of "so much as a length of rope or a
piece of timber" over the Syracusan fortifications that Marcellus was forced to
abandon his assault and to attempt to reduce Syracuse by a blockade.
However great may have been the legacy of Rome's eventual triumph over
Carthage and its allies, Plutarch's account of the struggle for Syracuse preserved an
equally enduring legacy from antiquity. That was Archimedes' contempt, inherited
from Plato, for those who devote their lives to "the solution of practical problems"
encountered in "the needs of everyday life." Plutarch's Archimedes "did not regard
his military inventions as an achievement of any importance, but merely as a by-
product, which he occasionally pursued for his own amusement, of his serious
work, namely the study of geometry." In this Archimedes is made to echo the Greek
philosophers' prejudice against the "celebrated and highly prized art of mechanics."
Plato had been "indignant" at the efforts of those who used mechanics "to illustrate
geometrical theorems, and to support by means of mechanical demonstrations
easily grasped by the senses propositions which are too intricate for proof by word
or diagram." Plutarch -- schooled in philosophy in Athens and Delphi -- thus
conveyed Archimedes's prejudice to two millenia of readers:
As for Archimedes, he was a man who possessed such exalted ideals, such
profound spiritual vision, and such a wealth of scientific knowledge that,
although his inventions had earned him a reputation for almost superhu-
man intellectual power, he would not deign to leave behind him any
writings on his mechanical discoveries. He regarded the business of engi-
neering, and indeed of every art which ministers to the material needs of life,
as an ignoble and sordid activity, and he concentrated his ambition exclu-
sively upon those speculations whose beauty and subtlety are untainted by
the claims of necessity.
In the end victory went neither to abstract theory nor to engineering, but to guile.
While negotiating with the Syracusans a ransom for one of their errant number,
Marcellus chanced to notice a poorly guarded tower. As he parleyed with his
opposition, his men measured the tower and prepared "scaling ladders." Patiently
waiting for a feast day when the Syracusans would be preoccupied with "drinking
and other festivities," MarceUus's men crept over the tower. Before the Syracusans
fully grasped what was happening to them, Marcellus stood weeping (so Plutarch
tells us) on the heights over "the great and magnificent city below" as he contem-
plated the plunder that would soon consume it. "But what distressed Marcellus
most of all," writes Plutarch, was the killing of Archimedes. Accounts of Archimedes's
death at the hands of Marcellus's soldiers vary, Plutarch acknowledges. But "at any
rate it is generally agreed that Marcellus was deeply affected by his death, that he
abhorred the man who had killed him as if he had committed an act of sacrilege, and
that he sought out Archimedes's relatives and treated them with honour. "1
The classical education Frank Toscelli received in Italy, in the region where
Roman legions defended the empire two millennia before, was an education rare
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among American engineers. It had evolved from the Renaissance ideal of liberal
learning, a process which cultivated all aspects of the human intellect, physical
attributes, and creative sensibilities. "In my time," he remembers, high school stu-
dents studied philosophy, Latin, Greek, two modern languages, and ancient and
modern history. "We had to study Italian literature, European literature; we read
Shakespeare" and "took courses in translation." Electives were unheard of: a liberal
learning and a full science curriculum "provided that background which would
permit" students "to reason, synthesize, to analyze a problem, and then," with such
tools, to become an engineer. The Renaissance text for the worthy life submerged the
harsh distinction perpetuated by Plutarch between men who work with their minds
and men who work with their hands, men who understand nature and men who
manipulate nature for practical ends. Through the slow and intermittent deterioration
of legal class distinctions in Europe, the nature of one's work would persist as a more
subtle means of announcing one's standing in the world.
For Toscelli engineering represented not the subordinate alternative to science
imagined by Archimedes, but the culmination of scientific understanding in a
sequential evolution of mental capacity. "There is not really much of a difference
between" scientists and engineers. "If you want to be involved, if you have the
background of math and physics, then you can be either one." The business of
education, his own experience had taught him, is to "provide the foundation" on
which you "build yourself." One can become an expert in an exotic field like
materials outgassing in space, but only after one has become well grounded in the
basic sciences and mathematics. He is disturbed by the impatience of the engineer-
ing he sees around him, the haste to calculate without fully understanding what is
being calculated.
Frank Toscelli, with his catholic education, his "love of learning," and his
conviction that problems must be fully understood before they can be solved, stands
out among his peers. Few things unite American engineers trained in the 1940s and
1950s so much as the narrowly technical focus of their education. 2Time and again
NASA's Apollo era engineers confess to having tried to avoid curricula that required
grappling with literature, or philosophy, or history. A narrow technical curriculum,
already pressured by the rapid growth of sheer technical information to be ab-
sorbed, became separated from the study of the natural and physical sciences as
well. Thus the relationship of science to engineering would be burdened by
institutional -- and inevitably sociological -- demarcations having no necessary
relationship to what actually occurred when a handful of engineers puzzled out the
ways to achieve a smoother airframe or a more efficient aircraft engine. Absent the
catholicity of a traditional European or liberal arts education, attempts to unite
science (broadly conceived) with engineering would become as much a matter of
rhetorical contrivance as of substance)
When the crew of Apollo 11 landed on the lunar surface in July 1969, conven-
tional wisdom had it that successful technology was a linear byproduct of scientific
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research: engineers apply what scientists discover. Such a view, of course, helped
scientists at universities (where most "basic research" was done) make their appeals
for federal funding. 4NASA (no doubt unwittingly) yielded to popular perception
in its own accounting of the professional personnel the agency employed throughout
the Apollo decade by placing scientists and engineers in a single category. 5(In doing
so, it followed the example of the federally funded National Science Foundation.)
Granting the problematic character of personnel statistics, organized as they must
be into artificial categories, 6only one-fourth of the 9875 scientists and engineers who
joined the agency between 1958 and 1970 (and were still with NASA in 1980)
consisted of persons whose field of highest degree was in mathematics or a basic
science 7 discipline rather than engineering. The proportion of trained scientists
increased to one-third among those "scientists and engineers" who joined NASA
between 1966 and 1970 (see table 2).
NASA's occupational classifications (or "codes") changed between 1960 and
1985, so the numerical results of the effort to distinguish NASA scientists from
NASA's engineers by the nature of the work they did should be treated as estimates,
based on the merging of similar occupational categories (see table 3). Those categories,
however, are similar enough to enable one to distinguish between persons in
primarily engineering occupations (research and development, design, testing and
evaluation, facilities operations and maintenance) and occupations in the space or
life sciences. As a measure of the kind of work that was most probably being done
by these "scientists and engineers," NASA scientists were outnumbered by NASA
engineers 26 to 1 in the agency's first two years. By the end of the decade the ratio
had declined dramatically -- with NASA employing one scientist for every eight
engineers -- but the large preponderance of persons working as engineers during
the agency's formative years was most certainly a powerful factor in its organiza-
tional ethos.
If aggregate NASA personnel statistics during the 1960s failed to distinguish
between scientists and engineers, NASA's leadership cadre did not. When asked
who among NASA's "pioneering generation of aerospace engineers" most reflected
the "characteristics which have typified NASA during its first quarter century" (see
Appendix C), NASA's top managers in 1984 more clearly identified "scientists and
engineers" who had, in fact, been trained in engineering. Moreover, in identifying
exemplary Apollo era engineers, they were no less certain: the engineers were not
scientists; the engineers were the men who had been doing either engineering or
technical work -- or had risen into NASA's management ranks. 8
NASA engineer Joseph Totten (who began working in stress and structural
analysis for launch vehicles at Marshall Space Flight Center in 1962 after eight years
in private industry) has some difficulty deciding where science stops and engineering
begins. Of himself, he says simply: 'Tin not a scientist. I'm just a practical engineer."
But he credits a good bit of creativity to both occupations. "Engineers, to me, are the
ones who do the designing and analysis of things. The scientists are the ones that
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dream up experiments, that develop new systems, if you will, and they go through
the development part .... They'd be the research part of it. They would diddle with
experiments, or what have you, to develop some kind of a system. Once they got that
to a point where they think it would be worthwhile to make [it] into an experiment
for flight, why then they would turn [it] over to the design people. That's when the
engineering takes place, because then you've got to worry about.., getting the thing
such that it can be manufactured .... So often we get into the manufacturing process,
and the parts won't go together."
Men and women younger than Totten, engineers who came to work for NASA
well into the Apollo program, could have similar difficulty differentiating between
scientists and engineers. "People in science and engineering," offers systems analysis
and integration engineer Fred Hauser, "do either one of two things: they work on
what's called space research and technology, which is kind of independent, or
maybe they work with a contractor on the development of |a] technology that
may ... be used in the future. Or the other thing that those people in science and
engineering do is, they support a project." Engineers like Hauser, who do not
question the assumption that scientists and engineers are fundamentally different,
locate that difference in the realm of intellectual ability, where (as he perceives the
matter) scientists reign and engineering is a practical derivative of science. "Scientists
work on things that engineers will use in ten years," explains Hauser, adding, "space
scientists, these guys are really smart guys. They are Ph.Ds .... I have a little bit of an
intellectual shortcoming there, so I don't have.., the ability, I believe, to develop the
background for that."
One of NASA's older Apollo era engineers, Joe Lipshutz, is a native of the
midwest, son of an erstwhile electrical engineer turned furniture manufacturer. He
has been working in the wind tunnels at NASA's Ames Research Center since before
NASA was created. Assigned in the early 1970s to a computerized aerodynamic
analysis group, he grew restive and unhappy with the abstract character of com-
puterized analysis. "! got tired of it .... It's not the real world .... It's [more] fun to run
a test and see what's really going on. You lose sight of what goes on with a computer,
because after a while, if the computer said so, therefore it's right." In a.few years he
returned to wind tunnel work. The abstract quality of theoretical work is mirrored
in his own distinction between scientists and engineers. "The scientists, to my mind,
are still the Oppenheimers, the Einsteins -- those kind of people ... the truly
theoretical, I might call them a scientist, and not an engineer .... I don't consider
myself a scientist. I don't generate ... really original type theories compared to
people with Ph.Ds." What Lipshutz might do as an engineer is "take what other
people use and maybe make it so that they can use it more quickly, more efficiently."
Bill Cassirer has also been with NASA since the NACA days, also in aeronautical
research, in this case at Langley Research Center. Holder of bachelor's and master's
degrees from Cornell University's program in aeronautics, Cassirer thinks of
himself as a "research scientist" for the same reason Lipshutz thinks of himself (with
a tinge of self-deprecation) as an engineer: "To me," declares Cassirer, "an engineer
is somebody that takes handbook stuff and applies it ... he can look up and get a
formula and then plug the formula in. He accepts what comes out .... A scientist is
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somebody that is working.., to develop the handbook stuff, is working on new ideas
and theories." He identifies himself as a scientist: "I've got patents .... I've published
original theories .... That's how I differentiate between engineers and scientists."
Trained in mathematics and physics, Sarah McDonald began her NASA career
at the Army Ballistics Missile Agency (transferred to NASA in 1960) where, in 1946,
she began work during her junior and senior years in college as a science assistant
for Saturn mission operations. She has been working in computational trajectory
analysis, "developing the equations of motions to write the software programs.., to
integrate these trajectories" for most of her NASA career. McDonald shares with
Lipshutz and Cassirer the perception that engineers exist to apply the original ideas
conceived by scientists to concrete problems. "When I was in school, majoring in
mathematics," she reflects, "my math advisor wanted me to just do research, 'pure
mathematics,' he called it. That was more science oriented." But she found the
environment at ABMA during the early 1950s so exciting that she accepted her
German-born mentor's invitation to return permanently after she graduated from
the University of Alabama. Her mathematics professor would have been disap-
pointed. "I was utilizing knowledge that's available in textbooks.., and synthesizing
those things that we could utilize to work a problem that we had. I don't think that
is research at all ... research is doing something that has not been done before,
discovering new things." In fact, McDonald and her co-workers were heavily
involved in doing research that "had not been done before." Embedded in her
distinction between science and engineering is an effort to discriminate between
unprecedented deeds involving new knowledge, and the acquisition of that
knowledge.
Joe Lipshutz, Bill Cassirer, and Sarah McDonald, who entered college before the
end of World War II, are members of the same generation. Their similar and
somewhat crudely drawn distinction between engineers as essentially mechanics,
and scientists as theorists who define the natural world, is a distinction that echoes
from antiquity. This distinction, one that relies heavily on the perception that the
former are cerebral while the later are not, seems to have provided numerous NASA
"scientists and engineers" a means of occupational differentiation. Hank Smith, a
facilities engineer at Kennedy Space Center, knows (at least in retrospect) why he
did not choose science as a career: "I'm too practical for that... [I] like to go kick tires.
[I'm] hands-on .... I just enjoy doing things .... I can't stand a brain. I think they have
their place, and I think we should have experts like that -- scientist -- absolute-
ly .... But not for me. Never, no."
For some NASA engineers, the choice of engineering as a career was less a
matter of temperament or intellect than of relative occupational security. When
Isaac Bloom started college on the eve of World War II, foremost in his mind was
making a living. Son of an immigrant East European tradesman living in New York
City, Bloom wanted to take up the "nearest thing to a trade" in order to make a living.
When the registrar at Brooklyn College told him that the curriculum offering closest
to "a trade" was engineering, he began to study engineering. Unlike Bloom, Derek
Roebling might have gone into science, had he been more certain that a scientist
could earn a decent living. Although interested as a boy in astronomy, he "lacked an
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understanding of what a scientist was." Moreover, "in those days a scientist was not
always assured of a job .... I was thinking, well, I would really like something where
I would not have to be worried, you know, about making ends meet. And in the
1950s it was not always apparent that a scientist could do that."
The occupational choices of young men like Derek Roebling, who were the first
generation in their families to aspire to college educations but whose families could
not afford to send them, were especially susceptible to the influence of the federal
government on higher education opportunities. The special attraction of engineering
was that if one's college (undergraduate) expenses could be largely met, an engi-
neering career could be launched after four years in a baccalaureate program, while
a young man with other professional ambitions could face more years of graduate,
medical, or law school. A scientist's career prospects encompassed a greater possibility
of unemployment (or underemployment) than the engineer's. At the same time, a
demonstrated ability to do original research was one of the criteria for an advanced
degree in the sciences; significant original research experience could only be had in
the universities that awarded the coveted degrees through their graduate programs.
Thus an aspiring scientist faced the necessity of yet more years of education
expenses and part-time work for all but the well-to-do. (The cost could be mitigated
if the student found work on a federally supported project at a university in whose
graduate program he might enroll.) No less daunting, the cost of a good graduate
education in science was not only high, but was incurred at the same age at which
the scientist's father had been expected to support himself and perhaps a family.
Public policy favored the would-be engineer. During World War II the U.S.
military's reserve officer training corps (ROTC) programs had enabled engineers to
study while they did military service. After the war, the GI Bill (Serviceman's
Readjustment Act of 1944) and its Korean War successor (Public Law 550, 1952)
enabled veterans in all areas to return to college. Moreover, between 1950 and 1960
the federal government, motivated by the cold war preoccupation with a strong
national defense, more than doubled the amount of money it spent on contract
research at American colleges and universities. Nearly half of all federal research
funding went to engineering research and development typically connected with
large technology projects. The principal exception was the infusion of funds for basic
scientific research that came from the Office of Naval Research, created in 1946 and
predecessor to the National Science Foundation, established in 1950. 9Thus, between
1940 and 1950, a young person had a better chance of obtaining a federally
subsidized education leading to salaried industrial or government employment if
he or she chose an engineering field than if he or she chose to work in the basic
sciences._°
The need to compete for university grants and scholarships (unless one had
other means) may have reinforced among scientists the notion that they possessed
superior intellects by virtue of their involvement with abstract ideas and theories
(which Platonists through the centuries have regarded as purer forms of know-
ledge). Those who were able to finance their advanced scientific education them-
selves could benefit from another well-established source of status: in previous
centuries the disinterested study of nature had typically been a gentleman's occupa-
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tion. The scientist's presumptive social standing thus sprang from class as well as
philosophical origins, while the engineer's supposedly inferior standing likewise
could be traced to the newness of his middle-class position as well as philosophical
prejudiceJ _
When attempting to distinguish themselves from scientists, NASA engineers
frequently suggest that the difference has mostly to do with "status." Ed Beckwith,
who worked his way up from an apprenticeship in the sheet metal shop at Langley
Research Center, where he began his engineering career over 30 years ago, insists
that the only true difference between a scientist and an engineer is "in the perception
of management somewhere." The people who go "out and run experiments" [as
technicians, not investigators] are "second class," while the people who sit at desks,
the scientists, are "first class." William McIver, who earned a doctorate in aerospace
science in 1959 and has spent some of his NASA career in the agency's Office of Space
Science and Applications, also sees any distinction between scientists and engineers
largely in terms of status. Scientists in NASA are "as violinists are to an orchestra or
as physicists are to a college campus. Scientists are the creme de la creme."
Some NASA engineers experience the putative superior standing of scientists
less as a management bias than as the manner in which engineers are treated by
scientists. "Engineers tend to be more organized," reflects Jack Olsson, a 25-year
veteran of aeronautical engineering at NASA's Ames Research Center. "They're
prompt. At a meeting, we usually show up on time." The scientists "never show up
on time .... We have personnel problems associated with engineers working for the
scientists. If you're not careful, they want the engineer to become more of a gofer. "_2
Engineers at Goddard Space Flight Center, one of two NASA installations that
has evolved primarily into a government space science laboratory, have had greater
opportunity to ponder the differences between scientists and engineers than have
engineers at other NASA installations. A 25-year veteran at Goddard asserts that
most NASA scientists look upon NASA's engineers as existing to serve them in a
relationship seen much the same way by those engineers. "f think that the vast
majority of engineers, ninety-five percent," observes Henry Beacham, "view them-
selves as serving the science program .... We don't fly satellites for the fun of flying
satellites; we fly satellites because there is science that somebody in their wisdom has
judged ... worth spending the many millions of dollars on -- hundreds of millions,
now." This notion is echoed by Paul Toussault, who began working for NASA in
1969 after 10 years of a checkered career in graduate school and the aerospace
industry. "There's a lot of prima donnas in the science area ... and we have a lot of
them here at this center .... Scientists think that the whole world is run for them. They
think NASA is being run for them."
Scientists "seemed to be much more peer conscious," reflects one of NASA's
oldest and most productive surviving engineers, Robert Strong. 'T ve had physicists
insist on calling 'era 'Doctor.'" A materials research engineer for over 20 years at
Langley Research Center puts the matter of status succinctly: "I live in a little town
called Suffolk, Virginia [with] 50,000 people in the core of the city. I'm one of two
NASA scientists over there. Because we are scientists, we are in the upper crust of
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the social scheme; everybody likes to say they know [us], especially back in the '60s,
when we were really hot items -- hot stuff."
Sensitivity to the relative status of scientists and engineers is more common
among the older engineers interviewed for this study. It may be that status claims
have made themselves felt in NASA's internal politics-- an aspect of organizational
life to which veterans are best attuned -- as well as decades of social experience.
Although members of all professsions harbor stereotypes of each other, popular
notions of scientists held by engineers do not, in and of themselves, tell us much
about those who hold them. Whether (and how) engineers differentiate themselves
from scientists is important primarily if popular stereotypes of scientists affect how
engineers think of themselves and go about their work. NASA engineers see
themselves as inferior -- by virtue of lesser intellect or status -- members of the
"scientist and engineer" coupling in the space program; or they assert that, in fact,
they are really scientists; or they conclude that distinctions between the two are
artificial, dissolving in the crucible of "research."
Pamela Donaldson shares with Bill Cassirer the outspoken view that whatever
use is made of her work, she is really a scientist. Donaldson began her career in 1962
as a medical technician with a bachelor's degree from a small southern state college.
After college she worked for a hospital in Houston, Texas and began her affiliation
with Johnson Space Center through a National Research Council resident
associateship in the biomedical laboratories established by the center to support
NASA's manned spaceflight program. By 1968 she had earned a doctorate from the
University of Houston in physiology and biochemistry; her work in Johnson's
biomedical laboratories continued.
Despite the fact that all her research at NASA was undoubtedly "applied," when
talking about her work she returns to her identity as a scientist, revealing con-
siderable ambiguity (and ambivalence) in the process: "I could never envision
myself, even back in early graduate school, working on projects that I didn't see a
need to answer .... Here our scientists -- and I certainly have been one of them --
have been given certain latitude to explore [the] weightlessness [in space] situation
and its effect on man. But certainly, the main reason we're here.., is because of man
in space .... We've been accused of doing observational research ... but it's some-
thing that you can get terribly committed to." She acknowledges that "lots of
people" do biomedical research without any practical purpose "at universities and
medical centers." But "I don't." When asked whether she has done any significant
biomedical research without a particular application, she replies, "You have to
understand, first of all, that here at the [Johnson Space] center there aren't a great
deal of scientists .... [ was doing scientific research at the same time I was running
operational laboratories."
As engineers who made their careers with NASA articulate their notions of
science and engineering, their sense of themselves wanders among competing
sources of vocational identity. Engineers and scientists are what they are for internal
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(psychological or intellectual) reasons, for functional reasons, or for external (social
or political) reasons; their identities may be shaped by a combination of all three. By
far the most penetrating commentary on the nature of science and engineering
comes from those engineers who give extensive accounts of their own work. The
more detailed or reflective their account, the more likely they are to conclude that
commonplace distinctions between scientists and engineers lose their meaning
when both are involved in research, and that the boundaries between "applied" and
"basic" research have become untenable in the universe of post-World War I!
government-sponsored aerospace research and development.
When he was young, muses David Strickland, he thought scientists worked
only in the abstract while engineers worked on concrete problems. But as he
accumulated years of engineering research in both industry and NASA, he con-
cluded "that there really isn't that much difference between the way a scientist
thinks and the way an engineer thinks." William McIver's observation on the
supposed differences between science and engineering is that such distinctions are
"silly" because "what you are is what you do." And what persons trained in science
or engineering and involved in aerospace research and development typically do is
work that could be called, by most conventional definitions, both science and
engineering. McIver's model engineer is not someone "who simply learn[s} how to
use a handbook and look up a package solution .... You want more creativity; you
want people who can go from an abstract concept or, in fact, who will come up with
abstract concepts. And then, more importantly [people who can] figure out creative,
innovative ways to reduce those abstractions to practice." McIver illustrates his
mode] with the "eminent earth scientist [who can be] an electrical engineer and
knows about antennas and radar patterns .... So he's an earth scientist and an
engineer and he does what you do to get this program done." Or, there's the case of
physicists who, "in order to do their experiments ... are having to learn about
circuitry and instrumentation and this and that," while there are "engineers ...
having to learn about quantum effects in diodes and lasers."
Charles Stern, who began his NASA career working in aeronautical research at
Langley Research Center when it was still a part of the NACA, also believes that the
conventional separation of science and engineering is "another one of these weird
dichotomies that doesn't always make sense." For Stern, science, like beauty, "is in
the eyes of the beholder." Science embraces "mathematical and engineering
sciences .... I don't draw the line until I come to worrying about how do you design
a piece of hardware. And that's another matter." Before settling into his work at
Langley in the 1950s, Stern had spent two years with the AVCO Corporation, then
builders of aircraft engines and refrigerators. There was a difference between the
engineering he did at AVCO -- work he refers to as "applied research" -- and the
engineering he did at Langley: "I think the Langley work was probably ... more
closely associated with basic research .... At Langley ... I wasn't interested in this
engine or that engine. I was interested in the ]engine inlet] flow phenomena and how
does one alter them so that unsteady flows don't occur .... We used a fairly high level
of mathematics in our theoretical research. We used fairly esoteric facilities, wind
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tunnels, shock tubes and the like, in experimental research. But we weren't attempt-
ing to design any particular thing, or even a general thing."
Engineering research, argues Stern, involves not only systematic experimenta-
tion but habits of thought which are above all else "orderly, beginning from zero and
working carefully to the end in ascending or descending [order], as the case may be,
trying to associate cause and effect, trying to think through logically, not emotion-
ally .... A physical scientist or an engineer [is someone] who starts from zero and
moves ahead in a logical cause and effect relationship, trying to find the explanation
to behavior in mathematics or in physics." Had he been a scientist, Stern would
"have done the same thing ... but ... not had I been a musician." An engineer, he
argues, "is one of the genus scientist." If distinctions must be made, they should be
made between engineering research and "drawing board engineering."
Stern's older colleague from the NACA days at Langley Research Center, Robert
Strong, also sees little fundamental difference between engineering research and
science, ascribing to both vocations the essential intellectual activity of relating
cause and effect. "In engineering... [when] you design an airplane it's more than just
an architectural sketch of a vehicle. You've got to analyze structure, the forces and
moments ... the fatigue." Strong's own "bent" in engineering "was more in the
theoretical direction -- understanding, applying analytical techniques." And he,
too, contrasts engineering with "other fields, like education," in which "it might take
a generation to find out whether ... the kid ought to be taught phonetic English."
Most important, the engineer has "to ask the question, 'what happens if I do
this?' ... You have to apply that kind of logic, rather than emotions, to the solution
of problems."
The melding of science and engineering in aerospace engineering research
appears as well in Ed Collins's account of himself and his work. Collins is another
Langley engineer, but one who began his career in the early 1960s; his work has been
primarily in radiation damage research and integrated optics. His college major was
nuclear engineering, and he went on for a master's degree in solid-state physics. "I
was a scientist .... I crossed fields and my ... work description has changed. I was
listed as a physicist and ... I was [a] laboratory type .... I did research. I had to come
up with ideas of trying this thing and that thing .... Once I moved into the electrical
engineering slot I take [sic] that device that is already built and put together for me
by the scientist and I test it, analyze it, and plug it in my system, try to make it play
with the other things and, if I get an improvement out of it, that's wonderful."
Trying things out-- experimentation-- remains essential to both the scientist's
and the engineer's work. Where they differ, in Collins's view, is in the degree of
anonymity and the relative remoteness of the scientist's work from its consequences.
"In science we're doing research [that] you may work on all your life and never really
have anything you can hand to someone and say, 'here's ... what I made.'"
Remoteness from its consequences inheres as much in the anonymity of the
scientist's work as in its motivation. "In the isomer field you can go on forever in
making new materials.., by different combinations." But only 10 percent "accomplish
a significant discovery in their research." Commenting on the accidental discovery
of a commercially successful artificial sweetener, Collins adds: "A lot of it is just pure
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luck." More commonly "the research people are faceless. You could go in and pick
out Joe Blow and say, 'what have you done the last 20 years?' And he may feel very
bad about that because he may say, 'well, I've worked on 52 different development
projects, but I can't show you a gizmo or a chemical, or whatever'.... The guy that
ends up putting the sum total together is the one that gets the glory."
The terms "research," "engineering," and "technology" swim together in Sam
Browning's explanation of what he has seen and done during his thirty-year career
as a chemical engineer at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and then the Marshall
Space Flight Center. "Technology" to him means research in the interest of innovation.
As the Saturn's J-2 engine on which Browning worked progressed through its flight
qualification tests in the mid-1960s, he wanted out. "I didn't really want to get
bogged down in tracking paper work on an engine that was now about to move out
of the development phase into the flight phase, that I'd like to stay closer to the
technology part of it -- the farther out kinds of things."
Unlike Collins, who is sensitive to the disjointed and anonymous nature of
much research, whether in engineering or science, Browning perceives an orderly
sequence of research, technological innovation, and development. "Research would
be, say, the chemist in the lab who's looking for how he can put a couple of elements
together like chlorine and flourine to make a really high-performance oxidizer ...
and characterizing the physical properties, the chemical properties .... The technol-
ogy begins to take over. Now, when he's done that, he calls it chlorine
triflouride .... And you can use that with several fuels as a rocket propellant .... It's
laboratory-scale testing in a real sense, not the traditional chemistry lab, because
you've got to go outdoors on a stand to do it, but that's technology to me.
Development, now, is when you take that and say, 'OK, we've done enough on this,
we understand it, we're going to fly a mission that uses that. So we will go into full-
scale development of an engine system that employs chlorine triflouride.'" Browning's
own identity wanders through the artificial differences. "I'm trying to get the laser
propulsion project going again .... It's almost more research than technology, because
we had to establish that you can, in fact, sustain a stable plasma in hydrogen sup-
ported by a high-powered laser. And there's an awful lot of high-temperature
physics, and computational fluid dynamics, and a lot of other good stuff I don't
know much about involved there."
What Sam Browning refers to as "technology" is similar to what John Songyin,
who spent the Apollo decade at Lewis Research Center working on nuclear
propulsion, calls "applied research." Describing his 1960s work on nuclear power
and thermodynamic engines for space vehicles, he recalls "we were doing the basic
spadework for a mission we thought would be coming .... Our aim there was not tied
to any particular schedule leading to launch and takeoff of this mission. We were...
[trying to] answer the technological questions so that when the mission would be
identified and schedules scheduled, that these technological answers would be
there for the system people to put it all together for the mission .... I would say [it
was] applied research and development.., where you're one step toward a product
development or toward ... an airplane or ... food or something like that." Songyin
compares his early Lewis work with "basic research," which he considers "getting
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down into the very basics of nature-- almost like gene splicing.., you're just trying
to understand nature."
NASA's engineers have been dispersed among the agency's several far-flung
installations, and the installation in which they have worked tends to influence their
perceptions of themselves and their work -- whether they are scientists at heart,
lowly engineers in fact, or represent the union of both in the experimental and logic-
driven process of causal explanation called "research." Langley engineer Marylyn
Goode observes: "There are certainly a lot of engineers that [sic] work a lot more with
their hands and building things than I do, because I work very much sitting at a desk
and writing papers .... I think what a lot of us here at Langley [Research Center[ do
is sort of more in between the pure scientist and the pure engineer than maybe
somebody who works at Kennedy [Space Center[, who really works with the
hardware .... But, by the very nature of Langley and Lewis [Research Center[ and
Ames [Research Center], our work is more into the basic research and things that
some engineer is going to use probably ten years in the future.., rather than working
on something, some immediate product." Intersecting such elusive distinctions are
status differences within aerospace engineering itself: rocket engineers may disparage
aircraft engineers, and both may disparage "facilities engineers."
Whether or not sharp distinctions between science and engineering, or between
"basic" research and "applied" research are tenable any longer may also be a
function of historical time. The NASA engineers who spoke of the melding of science
and engineering in the crucible of research commonly allude to a breakdown in the
stereotyped perceptions they had of each as young men first making career choices.
What their changing view reflects is the emergence of a class of engineering which
has passed through a phase in its own historical development that necessarily
required a high degree of research in the fundamentals of its medium, namely,
aeronautics and space technology.
Hank Martin, one of the younger engineers interviewed, made an unusual effort
to understand historically the vocational identities of scientists and engineers. He,
too, as a high-school student, "pictured a scientist as someone who works in a
laboratory." What has changed since then has been the profession of engineering
and our understanding of it. "Engineering," he suggests, "back in the '50s ... was an
emerging profession .... Engineers, l think, at that time were stereotyped ... as the
sea of white shirts who were doing the mechanical drawings in the aircraft factories
and laying out the steel trusses for the bridgework .... It did not appear at that time
as a very exciting profession, because I think it was stereotyped as something fairly
routine. You look up the specifications in the book and you get the right formula and
you apply the numbers and you put it on a piece of paper and you do the same thing
again the next day. In fact, with the advent of what we would call aerospace
engineering today ... [we have] a more realistic view of what was going on in the
fields of automobile development and electronics design and things like that, even
back then. There's as a lot more ... to it, and there was a lot more interesting type
work than one would be led to believe if you had read the papers and watched the
televisions and the books at the time."
135
NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo
The story that Plutarch tells served to reinforce the ancient platonic philoso-
pher's prejudice against mere mechanics, whose work was caught up in the
"practical... needs of everyday life." The epistemological and functional peculiarities
that allowed such a prejudice to survive no longer have much meaning for post-
World War II engineering in the realm of advancing technologies. The federal
government, now the dominant "client" for both science and engineering, has never
been able to distinguish successfully between the two. Where distinctions do persist
is among professional associations and the academic milieu, which distributes the
credentials for the modern professions -- along with the notion, at once antique and
academic, that those who traffic in knowledge and ideas have a higher claim on
society's deference than those who traffic in things. NASA's Apollo era engineers
have inherited the notion, and struggled with it, and many have concluded that it
has outlived its time.
The question of whether someone working in advanced technology research is
a scientist or engineer is complicated by the fact that each designation is burdened
by perceptions of social status and philosophical prejudice. Objective or measurable
distinctions are also difficult because, at heart, they involve a question of vocation,
or "calling." Personal satisfaction in work comes from a sense of being called to that
work and is ultimately a subjective thing. Vocation should not be confused with
occupation, what men and women have done for millenia to put food on the table.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the fullest rewards of a careeer are reserved to
those whose occupations are vocationally satisfying. Whether seeing themselves as
engineers, caught up in solving practical and concrete problems, or as researchers
unraveling the mysteries of the man-made world in its ongoing dialog with the laws
of nature, NASA's Apollo generation of engineers profess pride in, and affection for,
the work they do-- or used to do. Their vocational choices were made early in their
lives, and their vocational identity is largely faithful to those youthful choices. For
most of them, however, occupation diverged increasingly from vocation as they
began to spend more of their days doing work for which they had little natural
inclination.
The occupational reality most widely shared among engineers is their em-
ployment by hierarchichal organizations, whether in private business or in gov-
ernment, with relatively large numbers of technical underlings at the bottom and
fewer managers toward the top. Authority and responsibility (if not power) for ever
broader line or staff functions increases toward the apex of the organizational
pyramid; and because most personnel systems (certainly that of the federal gov-
ernment) are designed by management to reward the assumption of increasing
managerial responsibility, to "get ahead" or "move up" in the modern organization
is to move into management. This fact has faced all Apollo era NASA engineers. To
the extent that the ethos and pragmatic necessities of management conflict with the
vocation and technical necessities of engineers, that fact has been a ubiquitous
source of discontentJ 3
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As career employees in the federal government move upward in rank and salary
through the GS (general schedule) system, some supervisory or management
responsibilities begin to encroach upon job descriptions at the level of GS-13.14 At
GS-15, under the federal government's personnel classification system instituted in
1979 during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, NASA engineers typically face entering
the senior executive service or staying at GS- 15, contenting themselves with periodic
cost-of-living and performance-based raises. In those rare cases in which the "dual
track" (parallel technical and management grade and salary sequences) has been
effective, an engineer could rise to the level of GS-16 without moving into manage-
ment. Generally, however, an engineer who declines to shift into management can
expect his career, measured by rank and salary, to end at GS-13 -- and to forsake a
roughly 25 percent increase in salary potential.
Thus, when one talks with NASA engineers from the Apollo era, one typically
talks with men and women who are no longer working as engineers. More than four-
fifths of them have gone into management positions, and, among the older engineers
who were employed with NASA by 1960, over 90 percent are in management
positions. Sharply confirming the managerial destiny of "successful" engineers is
the fact that more than 85 percent of the engineers selected by NASA's top
management in 1984 as representative NASA engineers were in fact working as
managers; over four times as many of those "engineers" were in senior executive
service positions as the average Apollo era engineer. ]5
One of a small minority of twenty-plus year engineers who did not go into
management, Joe Lipshutz expressed as succinctly as any why the greater status and
salary rewards in a large organization should be reserved for managers. "No
employee should make more than his boss." And a "boss" is, by definition, a
manager. "If the person is responsible, with a lot of people under him, directing
everything, and he is a GS-15, then an engineer, who is working independently --
why should he be a GS-15? He has no responsibility." As for himself, Lipshutz's
career path came to a stop at GS-13 -- willingly, he insists: "Anybody that goes into
management has got to be crazy. The headaches are not worth the money ... the
paperwork that flows out of [NASA] headquarters and the requirements ... would
drive me up the wall." Thus he implicitly accepts the hierarchical nature of rewards
and responsibility in the large organization for which he, an engineer, works. He
regards efforts to reduce the loss of engineering talent to managerial ranks through
dual (technical and managerial) career ladders as bound to fail.
Ames Research Center, where Lipshutz works, introduced the dual career
ladder "in theory." However, in his view, the notion never went much beyond
theory. "We were told that engineers could reach the GS-15 level. In twenty-eight
years I have known it to occur once, and that's just recently." Someone to whom it
did occur, Jack Olsson, evidently displayed enough talent to be promoted to a GS-
15 staff engineer after resisting the temptation to seek a division-level management
position. Nor has he succumbed to the lure of the Senior Executive Service. 'Tm at
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the top of the grade; they can't give me any more money." The increase in salary, a
few thousand dollars, he might get by entering the Senior Executive Service would
be paltry compensation for the "headaches." A temporary stint as an assistant
divisional manager taught him that the "intellectual" rewards of "research" far
outweigh being mired in work that he "wasn't enjoying."
Time and time again, whether they moved into management or settled for GS-
12 or GS-13 positions, NASA engineers declare the "twin-track" (dual career) ladder
a myth. A very senior level NASA engineer turned manager, David Strickland, is
accustomed to circumlocution; he observes: "The two-track [career ladder] -- we
haven't fostered that particularly well." George Sieger at Johnson Space Center
supposes that the technical career ladder does not work at his center because, unlike
Ames, Johnson is not an R & D center. He attributes the failure of the dual-career
concept at Johnson not only to his center's relative emphasis on human spaceflight
operations, but on the federal government's civil service structure, which is embued
with the same hierarchical structure of management responsibility, rather than
personal professional achievement, found in more traditional organizations. The
government, too, bows to the "organization man."
While ordinary engineers with no special talent or inclination for management
could expect to move upward into management positions in NASA (as we shall see),
the technical career ladder seems to have eluded all but the most exceptional
engineers. John Songyin, who "got pretty much stuck at the GS-13 level" at Lewis
Research Center, thinks that the dice were loaded against the technical career ladder
when it was first instituted at Lewis. It "was set up such that it was very difficult to
go up the technical side of the ladder ... you had to be at least [a] nationally
recognized expert in order to go up that way, whereas it was much easier to go up
the supervisory ladder." John Songyin's colleague Robert McConnell rose to the GS-
15 level by earning a doctorate in chemistry and becoming attached to a major
research division at the center. He has managed, however, to avoid accumulating
supervisory chores. Had he attempted to advance on a technical career ladder, "it
would have been far tougher .... For years they've been talking about dual ladders,
and every time they had a grand meeting of people in the auditorium somebody
brings [sic] up the subject ... and the comment is, 'we're working on it.' [But] to
become a GS-15 without having been a supervisor is nigh impossible."
About half of the handful of research GS-14s and GS-15s who McConnell can
recall have had doctorates; but probably more important than a doctoral degree is
whether an engineer has "something to show ... some finding ... an [industrial
research] award, or a patent." At Marshall Space Flight Center "there is," according
to propulsion engineer Sam Browning, "not really a technical ladder." The chances
of moving beyond GS-13 in a nonsupervisory position are miniscule, "no matter
how competent you are ... unless you've got a Ph.D." But getting a Ph.D. while
holding down a job is tough and requires "a lot of spadework, a lot of cooperation
from management on up the line to get it." He ponders: "If I could go back to the
middle or late '50s," when he began his career, "and know what I know now ... [I
would] probably go for a Ph.D."
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Only at Goddard Space Flight Center did an engineer we interviewed vouch for
a successful dual-career ladder. The ladder "works" at Goddard, where there are "a
fair number of GS-14s" in technical positions. But the "standard's pretty high," adds
Henry Beacham; "if the journeyman is a GS-13, a GS-14 should have a national
reputation, and a GS-15 should have what amounts to an international reputation.
That's very much harder for an engineer to do than a scientist .... At the GS-14 level,
if a person has worked on projects where they [sic] get to challenge contractors like
TRW or General Electric -- all of those -- and they turn out to be right more often
than not, I think that counts."
Bill Cassirer of Langley Research Center, one of those rare engineers who
managed to ascend to GS-16 as a research engineer, remembers a time when the
technical career ladder was not even an option -- however elusive. A well thought
of research engineer, Cassirer struggled to keep up with his research while progress-
ing to section head and branch head. "As a section head... I could do research almost
75 percent of the time. When I got to be a branch head it reached the point where
sometimes I had to get my secretary to lie and say 'Bill's not here.' On the guise of
working on highly classified information I had some frosted glass put on my doors
so I could be in there working." Describing himself as a "research scientist," Cassirer
is quite explicit about what establishes one's standing as an exceptional engineer:
"patents" and "original theories."
There is, as Songyin's and Cassirer's observations suggest, another force at work
in the failure of the dual-career ladder in NASA besides the hierarchical nature of
conventional bureaucracies. Professions attempt to control behavior "standards"
and economic security not only by limiting access (typically through awarding
credentials), but also by regulating upward movement through definitions of
"success." Notwithstanding their many differences, management and
engineering share with all professions an inclination to attach status to the degree
of remoteness from the practical and the particular. In this they echo a long-standing
prejudice. For management, increasing remoteness from practical and
particular concerns inheres in the hierarchical and typically centralized structure of
power; headquarters is "where the action is." One's status is a function of
where one is located, and where one is located determines what one does.
Barriers to upward movement are as likely to be structural as they are to be
personal.
In the learned professions, which include science and by extension research
engineering, professional standing is largely independent from one's location
within an organization. "Achievement" is defined and acknowledged by profes-
sional peers, and it is the judgment of peers that controls access to the "top" of the
profession. Ascent on the technical ladder was, and probably remains, difficult for
NASA engineers because the measures of achievement that signify whether they are
worthy of ascent derive from a profession -- science -- that places a premium on
novelty, for example, "patents" and "new theories," which is understood to be the
result of intellectual rather than manual -- or practical, or particular
preoccupations.
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A GS-12 with a Ph.D., Derek Roebling at Kennedy Space Center argues that "the
way of advancing" in NASA "is not technical knowledge so much, or management
knowledge so much, as [being] the man on the white horse, the leader, the
hard-charger, the friend of management who gets things done .... I have a
doctorate ... but I do not mention it. I do not want some guy who is a bachelor of
science in mechanical engineering and cigar-chomping saying, 'God Damn! We
don't want any Ph.D. professors or anything like that here!'" Robert Ostrand has a
bachelor of science degree in mechanical engineering. He works at Lewis Research
Center, where he willingly moved into management, believing that his best years as
an engineer were numbered. He has what he thinks is a "minority opinion" on the
dual-career ladder: "Here," at Lewis, the "dual ladder is ... grossly overdone .... If
there are certain very talented engineers, if they can show me that they can walk on
water, [that] they're that good, I'll get them a GS-15. [But] in a center like this, that's
one or two guys.., a small percentage of guys." To be an engineer talented enough
to ascend to the same heights as a manager is to be part of a very small
percentage -- almost as small as those who "walk on water."
The care and feeding of the managerial hierarchy has limited opportunities
for one of NASA's (and any similar organization's) essential resources --
technical talent: "Our people," observes George Sieger of Johnson Space Center,
"once they get to the journeyman level-- there is no outlet for them except to become
a manager or a flight director or move out of the organization. And that is
unfortunate, because we need those steady-state GS-12s and GS-13s... they are still
the core of any organization. We have no advancement potential for those kinds of
engineers."
Just how deadening thwarted aspiration can be when engineers realize that
they can only "move up" by going into management -- but that there are many
fewer management positions than upward moving engineers to fill them-- surfaces
in the lament of one frustrated Langley engineer: "In January (1986) I'll get my last
step of a GS-13. I have nowhere to go. If I can't go on the management side or
something doesn't change for promotions on the technical side.., something has got
to change. I'm just typical. There's hundreds of me. That's my last salary increase.
I don't count the cost of living raises because everybody gets them. Other than
incentive awards, I have nowhere to go for another 19 or 20 years. You either leave,
or you pull in and say, 'OK. If I've got nowhere to go, I'm just going to put my feet
up on the desk and do what I have to do.' You know, you can't live that way if you
really care."
When organizations complain of "brain drain," or of being unable to compete
for good talent, they typically cite the inability to offer competitive salaries.
But upward mobility -- or lack of it -- can be shaped as much by the kind of
work attached to career advance as by the kind of money earned along the way.
"A lot of the young guys," explains Richard Williams, a Kennedy Space Center
engineer turned manager, "will ... stay around for four or five years and then
they'll go to private industry where they really can design and can do real
engineering. We're seeing this now -- guys who have twenty years are applying
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for an early out and going to work for contractors, so they can be engineers
again."
The perception that NASA loses valuable engineering talent when engineers
move into management in order to get ahead assumes that the failure of the technical
career ladder stunts otherwise productive and continuously creative engineering
careers. Some of NASA's Apollo era engineers, however, have been aware of the
problem of obsolescence in engineering, and consider management a legitimate and
productive alternative for engineers who have, perforce, accumulated some un-
derstanding of how technical programs work. Even if they are no longer in
command of the details, they are, so to speak, ready to move from the particular to
the general. Robert Strong, who experienced a successful career as both a research
engineer and a NASA program manager, put it this way: "After you've been
involved with technical problems for a long period of time, you find you get stale."
He had observed that "when we started running projects... ]there] were people who
kind of got bored and reached the end. They couldn't see any more progress they
were making in their own field. They wanted a change. Well, these people had
enough technical depth and, with a little help, were able to manage projects and
parts of projects very, very well when they were ]with] people who knew enough
about the ... project so that they could keep track of the main thrust of the effort."
There was a special reason for Philip Siebold's sensitivity to the time clock that
shadows the modern engineer. Now at Johnson Space Center, Siebold began his
career without benefit of an engineering degree. He paid his dues as a draftsman for
the Martin Company and eventually, by going to night school, earned a B.S. in
engineering at the age of 40. By that time, however, he realized he "cou|dn't compete
technically with the 20-year-olds who were coming out of college with either masters
or doctorates in technical fields. I had been spread out too long. What they needed
is someone to direct them, to manage them." Recognizing that engineering man-
agement was the most likely alternative to the wasteland of obsolescence, Siebold
entered a night school program in management; by the time he entered NASA in
1964, he was prepared for a second career. Richard Williams, who made the shift
from engineering to management at age 30 when he left flight crew simulation for
a unit coordinating domestic and foreign spacecraft manifests at Kennedy Space
Center, is open and unassuming about his engineering abilities. Having left "hands-
on" work, he misses it: "I do, and at the same time I don't .... I thoroughly enjoyed
getting out in the field and being around the hardware .... I can go back and ... look
at the hardware, which is still interesting to me. But from an engineering standpoint,
I don't know that I could engineer my way out of a paper bag anymore."
Obsolescence is undoubtedly a difficult subject for those whose career fortunes
depend on a profession that thrives on the accretion of knowledge. That may
account for the fact that far more engineers complain that the lack of a true dual-
career ladder frustrates careers than acknowledge the possibility that management
offers a second chance for most engineers who -- under the press of daily work --
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simply cannot keep up. Whether technical obsolescence sets in before or after
engineers shift to management is a difficult question to answer. More pertinent to
understanding the organizations in which engineers work, not to mention the
quality of their own second careers, is the question of how well they fare as
managers.
NASA engineers experience management in two ways--as technical managers
(managers of projects and tasks having little continuous involvement with the same
people), and as managers of people (or of organizational units having the same
personnel). Those who have spent some time in organizational management recognize
that there is a qualitative difference between "good" engineering and "good"
management, and that a system that rewards good engineering with a promotion
into a management position risks promoting ill-equipped managers. The qualities
these engineers cite as important to good managers all require a high degree of
insight, empathy, and selflessness in dealing with others -- the gift of dealing well
with people. "Good managers are people oriented," insists Ed Collins at Langley
Research Center, "and not all technical and research people are people oriented.
Many of them are loners .... Many of the managers that are in line now.., should be
back in the lab. And some of them came up through the buddy system .... They were
very good men technically, but it was overlooked... [whether] they could work with
people and really handle people and inspire. I think a manager should be able to
inspire his people to work for him." A good manager is "kind of like a teacher,"
observes veteran NASA engineer and manager Robert Strong.
"What I learned," reflects George Sieger, "from the people who were ... good
managers -- I can go back to high school: a teacher in high school.., taught me that
if you develop positive attitudes, things are going to happen." When, as a young
aircraft flight data analyst, Sieger had no idea whether his work was good or not, his
boss "made me think it was beautiful," and thus gave him confidence to try new
things. Sieger remembers every good manager he has had. One taught him "preci-
sion." Another taught him "to use your mind, to not accept the obvious as the
solution." And another taught him "finesse." Imagination, courage -- "all of these
things.., are part of this puzzle every human being represents." Good management
is also "leadership ... being able to ... anticipate ... to mobilize resources, to move
into a posture where you're always looking to find a way to end this job in the belief
that there's another one downstream that's equally interesting, more
challenging .... Management is turning people on." The qualities that make for a
good teacher can require a lifetime of learning. Good managers "evolve," echoes
Fred Hauser at Marshall Space Flight Center; "I don't think you can teach them to
be a manager.., by trial and error, the leaders just come to the surface."
However, the components of "leadership" are open to debate. Those with a
genuine sympathy for people tend to see leadership as a matter of creatively
"drawing out" (the literal meaning of education) the inherent potential in others,
while NASA engineers whose own career goals have stressed technical achievement
measure leadership by the extent to which one can induce others to work to
preestabtished organizational goals. The difference is subtle -- the latter view both
drawing its energy from and reinforcing greater anxiety over organizational control.
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Joseph Totten has a confident, creative attitude toward management similar to that
of George Sieger. "I'd like to think that I have some unique managerial capabilities
that have gotten me where I am. I seem to be able to get along very well with
people .... I don't have too much trouble negotiating things. People find it easy to
work for me, and I find it very easy to get people to do things that need to be
done .... What I try to do is make sure that they understand that I'm not going to be
hard on them every minute of every day .... They're in a position where I give them
responsibilities and I expect them to go ahead and practice that responsibility.., stay
out of their hair, give them what they need. If they have any problems they can't
handle, then I'm here for consultation."
Sieger's and Totten's views of good management contrast with that of Jack
Olsson. For Olsson, the manager's role is essentially instrumental: it is to help his
people succeed by the organization's rules rather than to develop personally and
professionally per se. Each individual has a "limited growth path," he explains, and
the good manager has "to try to develop that path for that person and point out to
him where he's deficient and how he needs to write more reports ... or something
in order to get the kind of recognition that's necessary to move up the ladder, both
professionally and financially. So there's a lot of counseling of peopleand appraising
their work." From Robert Ostrand's perspective, effective management is largely
the same process: since (he claims) 20 percent of the people "make 80 percent of the
significant accomplishments," a manager needs to know who they are and "take
care of them." (Ostrand is not clear about what he should do with the other 80
percent.) Like so many of NASA's engineers turned managers, he had not been
"planning on being a manager. It used to scare the hell out of me whenever ] thought
about it .... When I became a manager for the first time, I had all these guys, and I said
to myself, 'All these guys are sitting there and they're waiting for me to tell them
what to do .... ' It was terrible. But I soon learned to tell them." Werner Posen at
Marshall Space Flight Center believes that management requires, most of all,
"leadership talent." This, he thought, he had: the "talent to make people like to do
what you want them to do... that was a reinforcing process, which led me more and
more into management." A twenty year plus veteran like Posen, Bill Cassirer agrees:
"What makes a good manager is to recognize the type of... people he has working
under him and then do whatever is necessary to get the best output out of his whole
people."
However, virtually every engineer we talked with insisted that engineers, by
inclination and experience, are not natural managers. And, because most of those
interviewed have become managers, that they think so suggests that "moving up"
has meant a struggle to adapt to careers for which they have little interior motivation
other than the desire to get ahead. First, the reason some engineers are chosen for.
management is one of the principal reasons they have difficulty as managers. "We
have a tendency to reward our highly capable technical people by putting them into
management," comments Marshall engineer Joseph Totten, who has happened
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upon the "Peter Principle" (organizations tend to promote people to their levels of
incompetence). _"Unfortunately, a gift for the concrete particulars of a problem does
not necessarily translate into the general outlook managers need to flex with the
unpredictable, the persistent fact of life in organizations. "That's a very tough
adjustment, going from an engineer ... to a manager," concedes Robert Ostrand,
who moved between several engineering and supervisory jobs while working his
way to the GM-15 level at Lewis Research Center. Ostrand shifted "from a very
detailed -- I was working, you know, a one-inch square a mile deep as a
researcher .... All of a sudden I'm in a great area where I'm working a mile square
a millimeter deep. And that's what you do." "Sometimes" managers are "not as well
rounded as they ought to be," echoes another Marshall engineer.
The trouble with managers who were once engineers is that "once an engineer,
you're always a tinkerer," offers John Robertson at Johnson Space Center, another
GS-15. A younger colleague of his in the same center explains: engineers "can't get
away from the engineering side; they've got to do all the details." A proclivity
toward meddlesome management -- an inability to delegate -- does not, however,
seem to be the largest problem facing engineers as prospective managers. The
problem that casts the largest shadow over these engineers turned managers is the
problem of temperament, about which they are both explicit and articulate:
"Engineers got into engineering because they didn't like to deal with people.
They like to deal with things that have definitive answers which you could reach by
a fairly clear set of processes .... They make lousy managers."_7 Or "Quite often your
engineers.., wouldn't recognize an emotion if it hit them in the face.., some of them
are not people oriented at all. ''18 Or 'Tm not really convinced that engineers make
the best managers. Engineers tend not to be the kind of 'people persons' who good
managers should be." _9Or "I don't believe a successful engineer necessarily becomes
a successful manager."... Technicians "really don't interface with outside people .... A
manager has to be prepared to do that. "2° Or "I know people" who "just are not
people persons. They get along with people, but they can't hardly manage their own
time, or selves, let alone other people and an organization. "21 Bob Jones, a GS-14
rocket engineer assigned to Kennedy Space Center, is the most succinct of all:
"Engineers -- like I said of myself: I related to things."
Whether these engineers and others like them have absorbed a stereotype of
engineers or truly experience a profound awkwardness with the more intractable
universe of personalities and feelings is hard to say. But the consequences are likely
to be the same. Common experience tells us that those who feel confident about what
they do are more likely to enjoy their work, and to be adventuresome in their work,
than are those who are haunted by a fear of making mistakes. "You can tell the
technicians who have become managers by the fact that they are probably.., the few
people wearing white shirts and ties," remarks Ed Beckwith at Langley Research
Center. Being at ease with people is an essential ingredient in the fine art of
persuasion, without which few managers succeed for long.
It is not only the NASA managers themselves who suffer from the lack of
confidence with which they, former engineers, appear to have moved into man-
agement. The engineers they leave behind as their subordinates suffer, denied the
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personal skills and sympathies of the good supervisor upon whom their own
success partly depends. "We're so science, technology, engineering oriented that we
have forgotten the human side .... Engineers are kind of selfish people. Their projects
come first. And the people themselves are kind of pushed off to the side." Bettylou
Sanders, a Johnson Space Center engineer in a GS-13 managerial spot, reflects a bit
further: "I'm not sure that we always get the best product, because we have
unsatisfied people."
NASA, like most large corporations, offers management education programs
with varying degrees of emphasis on "sensitivity training." Yet the engineers we
interviewed tend to agree that the qualities that make for a good manager of people
cannot be taught (although they may, through experience, be acquired). Periodic
instruction in management philosophies and techniques does not appear to com-
pensate for an organizational culture that has difficulty identifying and promoting
good managers. Yes, many engineers may not be "natural" managers, even though
management is the principal upward career path open to them. And yes, there may
be some confusion about what "good" management is, as NASA engineers turned
managers commend management styles that range from the highly permissive to
the manipulative. But there are also aspects of management (probably not unique to
NASA) that appear to make it just plain unappealing.
An engineer who remained an engineer, Ed Beckwith has avoided the predica-
ment of the middle manager. Once a NASA engineer goes into a management job,
he can expect to spend the rest of his time "checking budgets ... defending what we
are doing" and enduring the "frustration involved [in] dealing with ... upper
management .... The red tape involved in doing this and the red tape involved in
doing that.., the frustration of a lot of wheel spinning." The problem with manage-
ment is "we've got to take all this crap!" At Lewis Research Center it is not much
different: "Our branch chiefs and section heads," complains Robert McConnell,
"don't know what's going on .... They're much too interested in getting money from
here to support [them], and money from there, and getting this report in every week
and every month."
The dissipation of energies into paper-shuffling and mendicancy (even more
necessary as NASA budgets declined after 1968) may be intensified by the frag-
mentation which threatens any large organization that, like NASA, attempts to
sustain a multitude of programs, projects, and installations. Charles Stern has been
a division-level manager at NASA Headquarters for much of his career. If the agency
has a unified sense of purpose, it will be communicated outward from Headquar-
ters, or not at all. While Headquarters attempts "oversight and coordination ...
management in the broad sense," he reflects, "the degree to which the plans of the
various organizations are [truly] coordinated, the degree to which they all seem to
be oriented to a common future.., is usually nil." Part of the problem is that NASA,
unlike a large private corporation, is constantly poised between the competing
interests of government: competing contractors, competing political constituencies,
145
NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo
their surrogates within the federal bureaucracy, the White House on one hand and
the Congress on the other. Administrator James E. Webb, a veteran of the Bureau of
the Budget who stood at NASA's helm for much of the Apollo decade, made a virtue
out of necessity. He resisted efforts at centralized, long-term planning in the agency,
arguing that NASA's purpose in life was the legitimate business of the political
process and thus always subject to change. Adaptability, and not single-minded
attachment to purpose, should be the hallmark of a well-managed federal agency.
Struggling against the centrifugal tendencies caused by limited resources and
bureaucratic particularism, and pulled at the periphery by competing political
constituencies, managers may be teinpted to retreat into the niceties of organization
charts and chains of commands. When asked to talk about management in NASA,
Pamela Donaldson, one of the few high-ranking women managers in NASA,
described at great length who reported to whom in an elaborate hierarchical mix of
line and staff positions. Most NASA managers, however, seem to recognize that
effective managing in any organization depends on the ability not only to reinforce
good managers and the qualities that produce them, but to transmit those qualities
to younger staff "on the way up."
The temperamental unsuitability of many engineers for work that requires
constant and effective interaction with others, and the centrifugal tug and pull that
act on an organization like NASA, translate daily into a shortage of time and
attention for the "drawing out" that George Sieger described as he talked of how he
learned to be a good manager from other good managers. At Ames Research Center,
Herman Sabado has spent a year or so managing an interplanetary probe project.
But he laments that he has not had the kind of mentoring from a senior manager that
would enable him to feel more prepared for the work he is now doing. What he
means by mentoring is help in mapping out a career that takes account of stages of
preparation and ability, and then some help in following the map. "To some extent,"
he confides, "I feel a little uneasy that I really don't know what I'm doing in
management." NASA did send him to some management courses, "but I really felt
that I should have done that before I got the management position." Notwithstanding
ample amounts of paperwork, "even now, I really do not consider myself a real
manager in the sense of 'I have my own project, and I'm going to manage it.'"
"Because we are all engineers and not humanists," speculates Bob Jones, "there
hasn't been a focused, concerted effort to ... develop a new generation of good
second line management." Joseph Totten, who speaks from the experience of a
senior executive, echoes Jones's observation: "We have done a fairly poor job of
developing real managers." If Jones and Totten are right, everything they and their
colleagues have said about the problems that face NASA's engineers turned
managers would be explanation enough. Still, they work at managing, and some
evidently take managing as a new profession very seriously-- perhaps too seriously,
as if to justify severing their roots in their technical origins. "Now, in the recent
history of NASA," reflects NASA veteran (and manager) at Ames Research Center
Abraham Bauer, "there's been a movement toward ... managers who almost take
pride in not being technically [involved]." He contrasts this trend with the "early
history" of Ames, when the center was managed by "technically oriented manag-
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ers" who understood and cared about decisions that had technical aspects to them,
such as "whether a laboratory should engage in certain areas of work." Bauer
attributes the change to "modern management" ideas in vogue during the 1970s,
and especially the influence of management schools which thrived on the notion
that good managers could be trained by studying "management" practices and
principles detached from the content of the enterprise they would be expected to
manage. He deplores this notion, insisting that "if you want to have a strong research
laboratory, you want to have strong technical people running it." His conviction
reinforces the promotion of engineers to management positions and defies the
conventional wisdom that engineers do not naturally make good managers. "Enough
do," he counters, recalling the career of E. O. Lawrence (for whom the Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley, Calif. is named), inventor of the cyclotron and a
1939 Nobel laureate in physics. "I'm sure that the man had the ability to work with
other people, because there was a whole generation of disciples of his who became
famous physicists."
Ultimately, believes Bauer, good management in technical institutions amounts
to "leadership by example." Good managers in laboratories like Ames Research
Center exemplify "resourcefulness, creativity." When he began working at Ames as
a younger man, "there was a resourceful, creative person at the top. And his ideas
kind of trickled down to others so that people ended up doing important research
who, if they were just thrown out on their own, would never have done extremely
important research .... Right now, individuals are being called upon to be these
things ]resourceful, creative] on their own .... ! do not see present managers as being
mentors. Period."
Abraham Bauer's somewhat unconventional view raises the interesting possi-
bility that, in fact, engineers are neither more or nor less suited to become managers
than are lawyers, physicians, or members of other "learned" professions. Given the
subjective character of most notions of "good" management -- relying, as they do,
on accumulated, anecdotal experiences that are difficult to objectify, perhaps
NASA's engineers do themselves a disservice. Perhaps they have accepted more
than they should a stereotype of the engineer that portrays him (and occasionally
her) as incompetent in a world of personalities, feelings, and the technically
intractable. Some NASA engineers have gone into management, liked it, and
succeeded at it; as Bauer suggests, perhaps "enough do."
One out of five of the NASA managers we spoke with confessed to enjoying
management (and one can assume that if they enjoyed it, they were successful at it).
The reasons they gave for liking managing mirror the range of notions they and their
peers have about what makes a good manager. Just as notions of good management
in NASA vary in emphasis from permissive to manipulative roles, those who enjoy
managing do so for reasons that range from an apparently genuine pleasure in the
creative challenge of working effectively with people to the psychic and monetary
rewards of managerial power and status.
Elizabeth Mueller came to Goddard Space Flight Center with a background in
mathematics and worked her way up as a computer software specialist for various
unmanned satellite projects. She distinguishes between project management and
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"line management," or managing organizational units, for which she has declined
"many jobs." "If you're in a line organization, you're generally.., managing people,
but you're not doing quite so much of the technical work .... You're not outside the
organization interfacing; I have never been interested in doing that." In contrast, she
enjoys project management because "I like to find [technical] requirements, deal
with the outside world, the experimenters [and} the contractors." Although she
seems to shrink from the unremitting interpersonal aspect of line management,
clearly "interfacing" -- where the solution to a complex technical problem is at
stake -- is something she relishes.
Mueller's colleague, Henry Beacham, finds management rewarding for a simi-
lar reason: he likes "trying to make a contribution, trying to figure out what people
want to do and fitting that into what needs to be done-- trying to make people want
to do what needs to be done." The challenge involves both people and technical
experience: while working with people is "what you do do ... you have to have the
outline of it [the technical problem] in your own mind pretty clearly before you want
to ask people to do it." What motivates Beacham is the creative aspect of managing
people doing technical work. A similar kind of creativity is the source of the
satisfaction John Robertson has gotten out of his work managing engineers in a line
organization at Johnson Space Center. Having chosen an engineering career to begin
with in anticipation of moving into management later, he relishes what he experi-
ences as "an interesting and very challenging job." What is interesting for him is
"trying to get all of these people talking together and trying to reach a consensus."
He agrees with a NASA Space Station Freedom project manager who observed:
"Our job is ... to be missionaries."
The satisfaction Joseph Totten gets from his own work in line management --
the satisfaction of working easily with people who seem to find it easy to work with
him -- is no doubt partially a function of his view of what constitutes good
management. That view is a permissive one, one that sees the manager as an enabler
of others' talents and development. There are other NASA engineers turned
managers who share Totten's outlook. At Kennedy Space Center, for example,
Richard Williams talks of the "rewards that go along with" meeting the "challenge
of people, how to keep people meaningfully employed .... l'm extending myself to
my guys that are out in the field. I have seven NASA fellows and three support
contractor guys. The support contractor fellows are all young, fresh out of school
engineers, and I look at them and it just amazes me, because.., none of them had any
field experience up until the time that they joined my group here .... It's a whole new
world for them, and they thoroughly enjoy it." Ha nk Smith, who oversees contractors
doing facilities engineering, gets some of the same satisfaction out of his work. "I
enjoy managing engineering .... I love it; I really do. rve taken short courses [in
management], attended schools here and there on management .... I've always
enjoyed people. And it's a people business now."
If management offers the satisfaction of working creatively through others, it
also offers some relief from the powerlessness often felt by those who are typically
at the receiving end of an organization's directives. Top executives will dispute
whether they have much real power over events, but it is the perception of greater
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authority and status that matters. Although Ed Collins never did achieve his
ambition to enter management, he has found some compensation in the fact that, as
a project engineer, "I do have a title now." Working in her center's central adminis-
trative organization, Eleanor Finch at Kennedy Space Center likes management
because "! have more options now. If I really don't want to do something, I can
always delegate it to somebody else." After fifteen years in engineering, Werner
Posen made a shrewd assessment of where the power lay and began his own shift
into management. "You are part of a system," he explains; "you see who is calling
the shots, and you see ]that} sometimes you work under people who make decisions
that you would do differently .... Who is calling the shots? Do you just want to do
your thing? How about money? How about prestige?"
Because the authority that an engineer has depends as much on the currency of
his or her technical knowledge as on simple talent, that authority declines with the
onset of obsolescence (unless, of course, an engineer manages to remain current
while working). However, a manager's authority is cumulative, and authority for
the manager typically increases the longer he (or she) manages, learning to "work"
an organization's administrative procedures, personalities, and clientele. Robert
Ostrand seems to have grasped this intuitively early in his career, when he realized
that the day would come when (as an engineer) he would face his own obsolescence
and would have to go into management if he wanted to continue to "get ahead." 'Tll
tell you something I learned ... the hard way," he says, reflecting on the misery of
the "reduction in force" Lewis Research Center had to institute in the late 1960s.
"Forty-year old engineers, or older, are very difficult to sell because usually they've
worked for twenty years .... It isn't that they aren't competent; but a company
can ... go and get a young kid out of school and after two years they'll be able to do
the same thing as that forty-year-old engineer .... If you're an engineer and you're
doing pure engineering and you're over forty years old, you're in a high-risk
profession .... That's not true of managers. Hell, I can go out and -- you know, I'm
sixty years old -- I can go out and get a hell of a good job today if ] want to."
For all the creative excitement that surrounded the early years of the U.S. space
program, NASA's engineers have been and appear to be still men (and women)
caught in the middle. They have seen public accolades, influence, and status
conferred upon scientists, whose ideology scorned the "material needs of life" to
which engineers devoted their "art." Yet scientists have not been bashful about
claiming the practical results of engineering as mere applications of their own
abstract speculations, "untainted [as Plutarch wrote] by the claims of necessity." The
ambivalence and confusion with which American institutions deal with science and
engineering is enormous, and it has become internalized by many engineers,
resulting in a true problem of vocational identity. Institutionalized "research" has
offered the engineer a role that is less fraught with ideological biases and generally
understood to be both cerebral and practical; "research" has crossed the chasm that
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Archimedes cut when he pronounced engineering "ignoble and sordid," but the
speculations of science full of "beauty" and "subtlety."
Most of us do not live by vocation alone; aspirants to the salaried middle class
must work and transform a vocation into a career. When NASA's engineers mapped
out or stumbled forward in their careers, they discovered that they could not
normally make much of a life-long career out of engineering -- even engineering as
"research." The hierarchical organization in which they have worked (and in which
most engineers work), has managers, not engineers, at its apex. For most of them
neither temperament nor education equipped them for the daily stuff of manage-
ment. Their peers at private research and development organizations like MITRE
Corporation and RAND Corporation, which benefit from federal funds without the
burdens of federal personnel rigidities, no doubt experience greater career mobility.
Haunted by technical obsolescence, tempted by the relative status, monetary
rewards, and the power of management, most NASA engineers have willingly
"moved up" in the organization only to experience a good bit of frustration. The
"technical career" ladder seems to have offered some hope -- but not much. There
seems to be enough apparent ambivalence about whether engineers really have
much creative ability left in them after mid-life to sap the support for a viable
alternative to management as the culmination of an engineer's career. A few
engineers adapt, and adapt quite well, finding that they can operate in the human
dimension effectively, and with considerable personal satisfaction. But in the end,
the fact remains that they are neither true scientists nor true managers. They are
engineers. NASA's Apollo era engineers can take some consolation from the fact that
the factors that contribute to their situation -- the ideological prejudice that
venerates science while exploiting the works of engineers, or the hierarchical
organization that reserves the top for managers (owners of all modem enterprises
having become so remote as to be virtually invisible) -- affect, to a greater or lesser
degree, the working lives of salaried engineers in every modern research and
development organization.
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The little fishes of the sea,
They sent an answer back to me.
The little fishes' answer was
'We cannot do it, Sir, because-'
Lewis Carroll
"Through the LookingGlass,"
Chapter 7
Chapter 6
Changes
As more than 13,000 NASA engineers worked at their daily routines during the mid-
1960s, pursuing the "moral equivalent of war" to which President Kennedy had
summoned them, the solid ground of common national purpose had already begun
to soften under their feet. In 1962 Kennedy dispatched American "military advisors"
to Vietnam to help shore up the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Before the year was out,
the Soviet Union boldly installed bases for nuclear missiles targeted at the United
States in nearby Cuba, removing them only after Kennedy called the Soviet bluff and
threatened to quarantine Cuba if the missiles were not removed. A year and a month
later Diem was overthrown and murdered, and Kennedy lay buried, victim of an
assassin's bullet. As civil rights protests began to spread in 1963, murder took one
civil rights leader, Medgar Evers, and stalked another, Martin Luther King Jr.,
finding its mark in 1968. The President's brother, Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, would fall to an assassin that same year as he was about to celebrate his
victory in the California primary for the Democratic nomination for the upcoming
presidential election.
American violence at home, as race-related riots spread from urban ghetto to
urban ghetto, was matched by American violence abroad, as air raids ordered over
North Vietnam in 1965 escalated into intensive bombing campaigns and massive
U.S. troop deployments. Television, which had been acquired by 94 percent of all
American households by the mid-1960s, rendered these scenes of violence common-
place and provided a world stage for an outpouring of public protest against U.S.
military involvement in Vietnam. The "Counter Culture," "hippies," and the
radicalism of the "New Left" underscored the disintegration of the simple bi-polar
world of the 1950s, a world of easy contrasts between freedom and communism,
rectitude and sin, success and failure2 In March 1968, President Lyndon B.
Johnson-- so tough in the battle against the North Vietnamese, so tough in the battle
against poverty and race discrimination -- formally abandoned any hope of
reelection.
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Raising the specter of runaway inflation as costs for the war in Vietnam and the
social programs of the "Great Society" mounted, Johnson's economic advisors
persuaded the President in 1965 that the budget for the space program would have
to be contained. For an ambitious space program to follow the Apollo adventure,
there was diminishing enthusiasm outside NASA. In fiscal year 1966 NASA's
budget began its downward slide (although actual expenditures for 1966 were the
highest of the decade).2 The prospect of national abandonment was only one of the
ominous dimensions of the disintegration in the midst of which NASA's Apollo era
engineers found themselves.
One of the most momentous changes in the technique of engineering--a change
that would have been experienced by these scientists and engineers had they spent
their careers with private firms or government agencies other than NASA -- has
been the development of high-speed electronic computation and data processing
devices -- the modern computer. NASA's Apollo era engineers agree on the
importance of the computer revolution to the changing character of their work as
much as they agree on any other single facet of their careers. "The power that a
computer gives you in doing design is phenomenal," observes Michael Goldbloom,
who spent the 1950s and 1960s working in private industry before joining NASA in
1970. "There are things that you can do in a day today that you used to not be able
to do in four or five, six or seven months -- things like ... optimizing a given
design.., looking at various alternatives .... And the thing that's made it that way is
the tremendous revolution that's occurred in microelectronics."
Philip Siebold, who began his career as a junior draftsman for the Martin
Company and stayed with the aerospace industry for twenty years before going to
work for the Johnson Space Center, remembers engineering when its principal tools
were the drafting board and the slide rule. When he began working in 1942
"everybody started on the drawing board. Five years ago you got an engineer out
of college and he didn't know what a drawing board was and didn't want to work
on one. What he wanted to do was sit at a desk. Now, with CAD/CAM 3 coming
in ... [drawingl is becoming a big thing again because ... it's not the laborious thing
of a big drawing board and pencils ... you're sitting there with a little light probe,
and you can make the changes a lot easier. You can play much [sicl more games of
getting a picture and twisting it around rather than all the labor of putting it [on
paper]. So now people are getting more oriented back to drawing." As for the slide
rule Siebold first used, "young people today don't know what one looks like .... Fifteen
years ago we went from slide rules to little hand calculators we carried around ....
You don't even see those any more. Everybody has a big computer sitting in their
office .... You can do a problem today on a computer or a calculator that you couldn't
do thirty years ago; it would take me a lifetime to do it."
One of the computer's effects has been a high degree ofintermarriageamong the
subdisciplines of aeronautical engineering and design. Armed with their light pens
and instantaneous drawings on computer screens, present-day aeronautical engi-
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neers work with designs that instantly merge changes throughout an aircraft.
"Designs are being more and more blended," remarks Joe Lipshutz, another NASA
veteran of an era (at Ames Research Center) when research into aircraft design
concepts was largely a matter of drawing board, slide rule, and models mounted in
wind tunnels. "It's getting kind of hard to determine where the wing stops and the
fuselage begins .... You are not going to build an airplane now just because it is
aerodynamically efficient.., from an aerodynamicisrs point of view." The introduc-
tion of computer-assisted design "means that your chances are that the numbers you
get out of the wind tunnel and extrapolate ... to the actual flight conditions will get
closer to what the final airplane is going to do."
The computer revolution has influenced more than aircraft design; combined
with the laser, 4 it has created a new generation of experimental instruments for
measuring structural tolerances and dynamic forces. _The computer has alsobrought
about an enormous increase in the speed and sophistication with which things like
spacecraft trajectories, for example, can be projected and analyzed. Someone like
Sarah McDonald, who began working at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in 1946
before she had even completed her college work in mathematics and physics, has
especially clear recollections of the impact of the computer on her own work because
she began her career using electromechanical calculators to determine trajectories
for the rockets that would culminate in the first manned Moon landing of 1969. "We
didn't have much data to establish those trajectories with," so she and others began
"some of the first work in... defining the methods that were going to be used to land
on the Moon." In the beginning "all we had was a Marchant and an old Friden
calculator; the most it could do was take a square root, and [the machine[ occupied
much of a table."
McDonald's colleague at Marshall Space Flight Center, Joseph Totten, who
began his working career in the mid-1950s, still keeps his old slide rule in his desk
drawer. "I still use it .... I grew up with it and | still like it." But he readily
acknowledges the changes that high-speed electronic computation have wrought in
engineering. When he first came to work for NASA "the only computers we had
were the 'hand cranks' [analog electro-mechanical calculators]," on which he did all
of his calculations. "In the middle '50s the computer was something that was in
about nine rooms and you couldn't see the end of it. ! can remember the first mobile
computer that we had. [It] was something about half the size of my desk and it had
a bunch of boards.., and it had a lot of pin holes in it and you put in your pin, worked
up your program and then put the pins in to repeat the program on the boards. Then
you put the boards in the computer and it could probably run a very simple
program."
As Totten and his co-workers labored over stress and structural analysis for the
more powerful Saturn booster required to deliver the Apollo spacecraft to the Moon,
"anything we had to do had to be done quick. And to do it on the computer meant
that you had to take time out to write a big program and then you had to go and get
that thing into the computer and then you had to check it out before you could make
sure that it was going to run properly .... We were using computers, but you only
used computers on really big programs. On the little stuff, we just hand cranked it
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out .... Now, hell, you've got hand calculators; you've got programmable memory
in them." As he has shifted into managerial work, Totten mostly uses a computer,
on his desk, as a word processor and information management device. It is the
younger engineers fresh out of school who "are so computer oriented .... They get
in here and they can start designing on a computer right away."
How NASA's Apollo era engineers assess the role of the computer in changing
the nature of their profession depends somewhat on what kind of engineering they
do. For engineers like McDonald, so much of whose work involved crunching
numbers, the computer has been absolutely liberating. "You can walk up and down
the hall and lo6k at engineers working and a larger percentage of them are sitting at
a terminal.., they have tools available to them to make some of the menial parts of
the job a lot easier, so you're able to do a lot more and broaden your scope." Another
of NASA's few female engineers of the Apollo era communicates some ambiguity
in her recollection of the progress brought about by the computer. Sandra Jansen
began her work at Lewis Research Center in 1947 as one of NACA's small armies of
women "computers." Trained, like her co-workers, in mathematics, Jansen spent
her early working days reducing data that flowed in from testing facilities and wind
tunnels.
While NACA's female computer pools were something of an occupational
ghetto, they provided, at the same time, an occupational haven for women with a
taste and talent for engineering trying to make a go of it in a male-dominated
profession. With the coming of the electronic computers in the 1960s came men with
mathematics degrees, men who gradually began to displace the older women.
"Those of us with the math, who were trained then to move into the computer field,
were not discriminated against," and "there were also new younger women that
were hired, too." Nevertheless, between the mid-1950s and 1960s the "almost totally
female" computing sections were transformed into organizations employing about
the same proportion of men and women. Jansen does not speculate about whether
the women could have been retrained to adapt to the new technology. It may be that
the computer did much more than transform the reckonings that make up much of
an engineer's work. Once considered a repetitive, routine chore to be relegated to
women, computing-- the "high technology" of the 1960s-- promoted the emergence
of a proto-scientific profession requiring degrees in mathematics for admission.
Whether that requirement arose out of the technology itself, or out of the aspirations
of a socially mobile generation, is debatable.
The computer revolution, for all its benefits, has left many Apollo era engineers
uneasy. Obsolescence is one of their concerns. Notwithstanding its marvels, the
computer remains an "appendage of your own brain," reflects Michael Goldbloom.
"You have to be completely facile in both designing software and programming it,
as well as using it." Only then does it become "a tremendous help." Unfortunately,
"most engineers of my age, or even younger, that don't become fluent in the use of
the computer become obsolete very rapidly." Now even people "who... know how
to program -- are used to using a computer-- are not anywhere near as versatile or
capable with those systems as a kid that starts playing with it when he's ten or eleven
years old."
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Even though NASA's Ames Research Center has been at the forefront of
NASA's efforts to develop advanced computational capabilities, some Ames engi-
neers "were slow" to welcome the introduction of computers into their work. "There
were some branches that really dragged their feet," remembers flight researcher Jim
Davidson; they "didn't encourage anybody to take programming classes and these
sorts of things." Some of these veteran engineers worry that the growing dependence
of modern engineering on the computer is depriving its practitioners of that
conceptual training and facility essential to theoretical and experimental creativity.
Goldbloom recalls trying to help one of his children with calculus. He realized that
"what can happen is you learn the rules so well that you know what to do, but you
just don't understand the theory behind what you're doing. And it is very important
that you understand the concept and [only] then use the computer as an aid, rather
than use the computer and pure clip book method to do a job without understanding
the process of what you're doing."
Although Frank Toscelli at Goddard Space Flight Center shares the general
amazement at the change in engineering brought about by computers, he too has
doubts. Toscelli can remember working on the first Orbiting Astronomical Obser-
vatory (OAO, launched in 1966), when "we were supposed to have a computer but
decided it would be too complicated, that instead they'd put in some memory
device, and this memory device could memorize two hundred thousand bits. We
thought that was terrific. Now the memory has trillions of bits and bytes." Nonethe-
less, Toscelli doubts that computers ha ve done much to advance engineers' conceptual
grasp of the phenomena they are designing or operating. "Young
people ... are very competent on the computer," he agrees, "but they ... sit in front
[of it] all day long and play .... They throw numbers ... in the computer, and they
provide a lot of numbers. But there is no connection with the real thing .... Older
people know what's going on -- the analysis -- and the approach to take to a
problem." "Engineers coming out of college now ... can leverage themselves by a
tremendous amount," echoes Robert Ostrand at Lewis Research Center. "They've
got to get some judgment by doing their own work. [Experience] is the only way you
can get it."
Jack Olsson, who has remained an active and productive researcher throughout
his career, cautions that "you have to be very careful to realize that the computer
gives you only what you put in. There's a real tendency to believe that simply
because irs in the print-out that it somehow has validity .... The particular area that
I was most interested in when I started [boundary layer theory].., would never have
developed if the computer had been there, because people would have just thrown
the Navier-Stokes 6equations on the computer and found out the solutions numeri-
cally .... There are certain.., simplifications to the differential equations which allow
them to be integrated in closed-form solution that you can write out on a piece of
paper and you don't need a computer; those would never have been developed." Yet
"from those equations ... you get real insights into the problems that you never
would get out of a computer .... So the computer is OK to fill in the last detail and get
very accurate results, but understanding is not enhanced by the computer."
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The computer has become an essential tool of technological change; it is also --
as a few of NASA's Apollo era engineers acknowledge -- an instrument of human
obsolescence as a younger generation of engineers competes for authority and
occupational space with older engineers. Whether those older engineers are otherwise
threatened by the young is not wholly clear; probably, as in most walks of life, some
are and some are not. German-born Werner Posen, who grew up in a culture that
readily cast the mantle of scientific authority on engineering, finds the younger
generation of engineers "not better and not worse." But Joe Lipshutz, who, during
his 30 years working in Ames Research Center's wind tunnels, has seen the
computer compete with the wind tunnels, as the arbiter of what will fly, is much
more sensitive to the danger of personal obsolescence. Younger engineers, he
speculates, are "probably... a lot smarter than ! was twenty-five years ago .... They're
a lot sharper. It's scary." But then, he surmises, "we probably scared the old
engineers too with what we were taught in school that they were never taught."
Sarah McDonald agrees that the younger engineer has survived a more de-
manding curriculum, one in which computer proficiency is an essential part: "I
wonder," she marvels, "how kids ever pass everything." "We've got some sharp
kids coming out of college these days," observes Dan O'Neill, McDonald's co-
worker at Marshall Space Flight Center; "I don't know if they are brighter, but I think
they are exposed to a lot more knowledge and information than I was, and the older
people were."
As one listens to these engineers ponder the changes they have seen, one easily
recognizes the fairly obvious ones -- the computer's inroads and the inevitable
hazards of age in a profession that lives on cumulative knowledge. But they think
they detect more subtle changes in the content of engineering not only as a technical
occupation, but as a profession. "One of the fundamental things" that differentiates
his generation from the current generation of engineers, thinks Dennis Whitebread,
is that his generation was "rooted with a fundamental concept of
engineering .... Today engineers don't.., really perceive their activities as a profes-
sion in the same context as doctors, lawyers, and so forth." Professional identity, it
seems, has been replaced by careerism. What Whitebread remembers is a
profession -- perhaps somewhat romanticized over time -- in which "there was
once more of a humanitarian kind of... engineering .... The engineer was here to
produce for mankind"; engineers worked for "the enjoyment of what they are [sic]
doing." Professional cohesion has dissipated, in Whitebread's reveries: younger
engineers "don't see the need for pursuing professional licenses"; instead, they
"only work in engineering for a period of time and they look forward to coupling this
with an MBA" and moving ahead in management -- which, to him, means
abandoning the engineer's ancient calling.
If careerism has replaced the sense of a common calling in engineering, it may
be that the circumstances under which engineers work has changed. Several of the
Apollo era's engineers detect larger forces at work than differing internal motiva-
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tions between younger and older engineers. Careerism may, in fact, be a reasonable
response to a decline in the opportunities and rewards for independent, creative
work. When William Mclver first went to work at Lewis Research Center in 1957, the
year the Soviet Union opened the "Space Age" with its launch of Sputnik I, "you
could come to NASA ... with a bachelor's degree and get involved in a research
program right away." At Lewis, "we had very small groups of guys working on
really big projects [and] each person working on a project had a significant part in
it. I was involved [in] ... free flight rocket experiments .... We actually had to design
the rocket engine. We had to do the instrumentation. We had to figure out the fuels.
We had to design the burners, the combustion ... the whole shooting match, from
beginning to end, reduce the data, do the calculations -- everything."
Mclver doubts that similar excitement awaits the new engineer today, one like
the "youngster" he met on her way to NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory after
graduating from a southern university. "She's involved in doing the software for the
probability matrices associated with look-up tables and analyzing some data .... The
project she's working on is extremely important," but this young engineer has little
way of personally appreciating "the magnitude or the importance" of her work.
Even if she and other newly minted engineers like her did have an opportunity for
more comprehensive involvement in a particular project, Mclver is not sure that
they could make the best of it because of the fragmented and specialized nature of
the education they have received. That is because he thinks they do not "receive the
training which would orient them toward research and innovation and
conceptualization," the aspects of engineering intelligence that, in Mclver's view,
make for the most creative and rewarding engineering.
Implicit in William McIver's doubts that modern engineers are adequately
prepared for creative work is the notion that the most rewarding kind of engineering
is research engineering. The premium he places on research derives at least partly
from the research culture he entered when he went to work at Lewis, one of the
original laboratories of the pre-NASA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
As the complex technological challenges of the Space Age shouldered aside the
relatively more familiar problems of aircraft design, the amount of creative research
that could be pursued comprehendingly by any single engineer -- or indeed,
encompassed in a basic engineering curriculum -- diminished. Jim Davidson began
his engineering career at Ames Research Center, another NACA laboratory, in 1944,
after a year's stint with North American Aviation. "Aeronautical engineering, when
I took it up," he remembers, "was airplanes -- subsonic airplanes. And education
had to change completely ... for supersonics and space dynamics." As Jack Olsson
(whose NASA career also began at Ames before it became a part of NASA) looks
back on the past 30 years, the most important change he has experienced has been
just this change in emphasis from aircraft to space mission design. A contemporary
of McIver's, Olsson remembers the 1950s as a time when "airplanes [werel as close
as you could get to the engineering of what was then almost "science fiction." And
"suddenly, the opening of the space era made a great deal of difference for me
because I went from airplanes -- hypersonic vehicle design -- very quickly ... into
reentry system design and then, from there, into mission and system analysis."
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Not only research, but all aspects of aerospace engineering, have been
consumed by complexity. The change that has most impressed Bob Jones, who has
spent his career since 1958 working in propulsion systems for launch vehicles at
Kennedy Space Center, is how "relatively simple" the original propulsion
systems w like that of Centaur -- were "compared to the complexity, redundancy
and sophistication of today's systems." Initially "you used to be able to look at an
engine schematic and start the engine. Prevalve opens, main fuel valve opens, et
cetera .... The H-1 engine Ion the Saturn 1B stage] was beautiful. All it needed was
a 28-volt signal to the turbine spinner; [it was} solid concrete from then on; it relied
on its mechanical [parts]. It didn't need any electrical stuff to operate the
machinery." Now "I look at the schematic of the Shuttle Main Engine and I think,
God, what a dinosaur [I am]. I didn't even recognize the main fuel valve .... The
plumbing has gotten more complex, and there's more of it, and the pressures are
higher." Nonetheless, the old engineer's touch still has its place: "You still, in many
cases, go around with soap solution looking at soap bubbles as a way of leak
checking; that's what we were doing in the'50s. They have mass spectrometers now,
and they've got ultrasonics; but the fundamental tools are the same -- pressure
gauges, soap checks. Notwithstanding the fact that "there's orders of magnitude
[of] differences in electronics.., we'd say in the old 'propulsion bucket' that '! don't
trust nothing with a wire tied to it.'"
The extent to which the technical requirements of the nation's space program
can be blamed for the fact that the romance of engineering has been displaced by the
complexity, fragmentation, and specialization that accompany the sheer
magnitude of modern engineering enterprises is an interesting historical
question. When Michael Goldbloom began working for the Sperry Gyroscope
Company in 1949 in the automatic controls field, "the way the company
was organized, the same group of engineers that did the actual mathematical
analysis, what an autopilot should look like, was involved in the circuit design, was
involved in systems testing, followed the system out to the field, was engaged in
flight testing -- in effect, you saw the product, your creation, from womb to tomb."
Goldbloom and his fellow engineers experienced "a tremendous feeling of
satisfaction in seeing a missile fly with your design built into it." Since those ear]y
days of the 1950s, engineering has become "so specialized," argues Goldbloom,
"that I don't believe there is any company that has an organizational structure
that will allow you to do that. Either you're in analysis, and do the original
mathematical, conceptual design of the system; or you're involved in system
testing; or you're involved in flight testing in the field. And you don't follow your
designs completely through from womb to tomb .... Just like in the medical profession,
the field has become so complex that it's just more efficient for
companies to specialize." The problem is that "for an engineer working in that
area I don't believe it's anywhere near as rewarding as the experience that I had
when I first started." If Goldbloom had his career to do over again, he would get a
doctorate so he could either teach or do research; he would not work for a large
company.
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Thomas Swain, a colleague of Jack Olsson's and Jim Davidson's at Ames
Research Center, also recognizes that complexity and specialization are partly
endemic to modern engineering. When Swain's generation "went to high school,
there was just a word called engineering.., that was a respected field to go into." But
now, he asserts, "there's such a huge variety of technologies that people learn
about at quite an early age.., there's this tremendous choice out there," and "when
kids go into college they are aware of the greater variety of things." At the same
time, Swain sees a factor at work within aerospace engineering itself which has
contributed to the perception of deteriorating opportunities for significant creativ-
ity that can be experienced within an individual's career. That factor is the waning
importance of single "breakthroughs" necessitated by serial plateaus in our
understanding and command of fundamental technological problems in
aerospace research and development.
In retrospect, Swain detects three such plateaus: the first was reached after
NACA, with the military as its principal client, mastered the problems of
transonic and supersonic flight. By the mid-1950s "the power controls and aerody-
namic shapes and so forth" to master "supersonic flight had been conquered." Then
came what Swain calls "the doldrums. There was some good routine work going on
... in the wind tunnels. But in the flight research end of it, there was just sort of a
plateau, sort of like waiting for the next set of problems to show up." Then the rapid
growth of commercial aviation, which has relied heavily on technological devel-
opments for military aircraft, generated a significant market for
aeronautical research in its own right. Interest in a supersonic transport, vertical-
and short take-off and landing (VTOL, STOL) aircraft provided "the next set of
problems .... So, all of a sudden there were these new areas" that stimulated a
"resurgence of the aeronautical technology development" that occurred "when
the NACA became NASA." A third new set of problems arose when Ames found
itself part of a rapidly expanding new space agency and part of "a much bigger
organization" which was "suddenly a source of funds." And NASA meant, once
again, "exciting times," prompting many of Swain's colleagues to shift from
aeronautical research to space science -- as, for example, when Ames was given
responsibility for the Pioneer series of interplanetary spacecraft in 1962. 7
Abraham Bauer's ruminations also lead to a sense of passages and plateaus.
His perspective is undoubtedly broadened by his early years as a chemical
engineer and physicist for the Tennessee Valley Authority and Oak Ridge National
Laboratory before moving to Ames in 1948. "There are always eras of golden
opportunity," he reflects; "we had one, I lived through one ... working on the atom
bomb ... ballistic [missiles] ... manned spacecraft ... planetary exploration. How
often does a set of opportunities like that come up within one career?" Engineering
is partly shaped by "the set of opportunities that are available .... But I can't foresee
right now a string of developments of the kind that we've seen in the last thirty years
coming along in the next thirty." NASA's Space Station Freedom program, initiated
in 1986, will offer "lots of opportunities for carrying out things," but as Bauer sees
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them, they won't be "quite as bold and challenging and new as sending a man to the
Moon."
Indeed, the event that most unites the memories of NASA's engineers is the
mission of Apollo 11, the successful effort to land men on the Moon and return them
safely. The event signaled the United States' initial preeminence in space. It was a
technical and managerial achievement of high drama and the first such achievement
of the new age of television, one that enjoyed extraordinary visibility. Granting the
drama, the unarguable technical accomplishment, the global visibility of that
achievement-- one must measure the Apollo program, if it is to be measured by any
way other than its actual monetary cost, by its consequences. The Apollo program
is a prime example of an effort by this society to buy knowledge -- the "hard"
knowledge of science and engineering -- for an urgent national, and largely
political, purpose: to demonstrate to a world divided by the Cold War that the "free
world," and all the ideological and institutional habits with which it was associated,
would prevail over communism. Here, too, was the great opportunity for those
visionaries, especially among the European emigres, who dreamed of crossing the
last frontier of space.
The full historical measure of the Apollo program must be taken not only by the
extent to which it realized the aims of both politicians and visionaries, but by the
extent to which it improved this country's ability to acquire and use knowledge for
broad public purposes in general. Measured by this standard, the processes put in
place or solidified in order to achieve the Apollo triumph are as important, for the
long run, as the event itself and the undeniable technological "spin offs" frequently
used to justify public "investments" of new science and technology. The technologi-
cal boundaries that had to be crossed before Neil Armstrong could step on the Moon
were the simpler ones. (Wernher von Braun is said to have quipped, "We can lick
gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is overwhelming.") It was the managerial
solutions that were the tough ones, for NASA's Apollo era administrators did not
have carte blanche to operate as they chose. A formidable host of accumulated
incentives and constraints normally obscured by the innocuous term "public
administration" determined the larger consequences of the Apollo program, espe-
cially for the men and women who brought their knowledge, and developed that
knowledge, to make it happen.
The incentives and constraints that determined the processes by which NASA
could and did operate were both inherited and externally imposed. One was the
culture of the decentralized in-house research organization inherited from NACA, with
laboratories scattered from Hampton Roads, Va., to Moffett Field, Calif. The transfer
to NASA during the early 1960s of former Army missile facilities at Redstone
Arsenal and Air Force facilities at Cape Canaveral, Fla., and the creation of new
NASA installations at Houston, Tex. and Beltsville, Md., ensured that federal
administrative centralization (see Introduction) would have to compete with de-
162
Changes
centralized laboratories (or "centers") for administrative control of the new space
agency. However, an in-house research culture and a decentralized institution were
not the only inherited constraints that decided how NASA would go about its
work -- and thus determine the shape of its engineers' careers.
Another of those constraints stemmed from the widespread public distrust,
clearly translated into presidential and congressional politics during the 1950s, of
"big government." Coupled with general misgivings about a large government
establishment was the deeply rooted American faith in private enterprise which,
through the mechanism of a free market, was thought the best guarantor of
economic security and a free society. On this usually bipartisan ideological foundation,
and partly in reaction to the alleged excesses of the New Deal, as well as a weariness
with the massive mobilization required to emerge victorious from World War II,
federal policy (enforced by the Bureau of the Budget and its successor, the Office of
Management and Budget, established in 1970) required that the government acquire
its goods and services from the private sector. What became known as federal
acquisitions policy was translated into the dense forest of regulations and proce-
dures governing "contracting out."
Thus was added a third constraint (or, in the eyes of Congress and OMB,
incentive), on the way NASA would conduct the Apollo program and its other
activities. NASA would do its work not by amassing a large complex of federally
owned engineering and fabrication facilities or civil servants (over which NASA had
little managerial latitude in any event), but by contracting for the bulk of its
hardware and R & D work, as well as support services, to the private sector. (One
NASA installation, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of
Technology in Pasadena, Calif., would be wholly a "contractor" operation.) Doing
so had the obvious advantage of enabling the civilian space program to harness
talent and institutional resources already in existence in the emerging aerospace
industry and the country's leading research universities. _ Contracting out had the
additional advantage of distributing federal funding, which was funneled through
NASA'scenters, around the country and, as a consequence, creating within Congress
a political constituency with a material interest in the health-- and management --
of the space program.
The military services had had the most experience with contracting, since they
had acquired equipment and logistics support from the private sector since the early
19th century. More recently, it was the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force, which was
created out of the U.S. Army Air Forces under the Defense Reorganization Act of
1947 that created the Department of Defense, that had the most experience with
contracting to the private sector. As a result of the Army's Manhattan Project and the
ballistic missile programs managed by the Air Force's Research and Development
Command, both services came to rely on private contractors for ad va nced engineering
and development work -- the Air Force going so far as to create the Rand and
Aerospace corporations. In 1959 the General Services Administration authorized
NASA to use the Armed Service Procurement Regulations of 1947, which contained
important exemptions, tailored for research and development work, from the
principle of making awards to the "lowest responsible bidder."
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The practice of contracting out and associated acquisitions procedures were not
the only body of administrative processes NASA acquired from military experience;
equally important was the role of the program as the managerial device for executing
the agency's broadly framed mission to explore space and advance aeronautical and
space technology. Conceptually and administratively the NASA program was the
umbrella under which projects were identified and planned, Congressional au-
thorization and appropriations obtained, private sector sources solicited and
evaluated, contract awards made, and contracts administered. Thus the interests of
NASA program and project managers became closely intertwined with the interests
of actual and prospective contractors. In turn, because programs and projects were
managed through NASA's centers, the institutional health of the centers became
intertwined with the interests of program managers and aerospace contractors.
And, because Congress necessarily attended to constituent interests that included
the communities in which NASA's centers and contractors were located, Con-
gressional interest in NASA's programs reached well beyond the degree to which
they might meet broad national aerospace policy goals.
Decentralized NASA centers, most with strong in-house traditions, NASA
programs, and contracting out together constituted a tightly interwoven triangle of
interest that could frustrate the ability of the agency's central managers at NASA
Headquarters to forge a single coherent strategy for the civil space program. Most
of NASA's Apollo era engineers did not, of course, experience directly the executive
frustrations faced by NASA's senior managers during the 1960s and the 1970s. What
they did experience was the bureaucratic and political consequences of the center,
program, and contracting triangle.
NASA's older engineers -- those who transferred to the new space agency
between 1958 and 1960 from NACA laboratories, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency,
and the U.S. Navy Research Laboratory and Ordnance Laboratory-- share memories
of working in in-house (civil service) facilities whose essential mission was research.
The NACA veterans predominate among this older group, and they measure the
character of today's NASA against the remembered qualities of "the old NACA."
Robert Ostrand remembers Lewis Research Center, the NACA's aircraft engine
research center in Cleveland, Ohio, during the 1940s and well into the 1960s, as a
place whose primary work was technological innovation through research and
testing. Ostrand went to work at Lewis in 1947, fresh from the University of
Michigan. While at Lewis, during the 1950s, he did graduate work at Case Institute
of Technology to earn a master's degree in engineering. The research emphasis of
neighboring Case Western's graduate engineering program undoubtedly reinforced
the notion, for Ostrand, that the best engineering was research engineering. Like
Ostrand, William Mclver had been able to obtain his graduate science and engineering
degrees from Case Western while he worked at Lewis. During working hours he was
able to do the same kind of original research expected of him by Case, an opportunity
offered to numerous other Lewis engineers. NACA, observes McIver, was intended
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to "promote the aeronautical capability [of the country} .... We did the esoteric
research and we transferred the technology to the commercial community."
Long-term support for basic research, whether in government or industry, is an
act of faith, for it has to compete with more tangible and immediate claims on an
institution's budget. It is not surprising, then, that basic research organizations tend
to exist on relatively lean diets. "Before 1958," recalls Robert McConnell, a con-
temporary of Mclver's at Lewis, "you never bought anything. If you had to
experiment on something, you would cut something out of a blade and experiment
that way. {If} you went to buy a 70 dollar item, you'd have to hock your right arm."
Even so, working for the NACA at Lewis seemed special; it seemed special because
of what McIver remembers as the "esprit de corps and reputation associated with the
NACA .... A NACA {Technical] Report was divine; nobody argued with it." And the
reason those technical reports seemed so authoritative was that they had been
scrutinized and concurred in by NACA's other two laboratories, Ames Aeronautical
Laboratory and Langley Research Laboratory. NACA was "just a very proud, very
conscientious research outfit."
NASA's older engineers, who shared the experience of working with the NACA
at the Ames and Langley laboratories have similar memories. The older they are, the
more likely they are to believe that the end of NACA's innocence was brought about
not by the creation of NASA in 1958, but occurred during and shortly after World
War II. Jim Davidson went to work for Ames in 1944, when, as he recalls it, Ames was
full of "people who were very dedicated ... working for very low pay, and there
weren't many amenities .... You had this small core of really excellent, dedicated
people who were doing work that was quite advanced." Thomas Swain has been at
Ames almost as long as Davidson, having arrived there in 1946. The NACA Ames
Aeronautical Laboratory he remembers was a place that "was very young .... The
average age ... was about 30. Even the management was quite young." There was
"a lot of enthusiasm, lots of spirit, a wide range of kinds of people. There were a
number of the real scientists involved [in Ames's work} and a lot of practical
engineers," and the laboratory was "100 percent civil service." One of the advantages
of the young organization was that its "levels of management" were "shallower;
there weren't nearly as many steps between the working level and the top level."
Davidson thinks NACA changed with the war; "a lot of people came in who
maybe didn't have high academic backgrounds, and there were a lot of... bureaucrats
running it .... We were on a pretty tight budget. Congress would spend money for
expensive wind tunnels, but for other things-- even instrumentation-- they didn't
budget" at adequate levels. There were "days [when] we had to sign in when we
arrived in the morning and sign out when we left. Nobody could have coffee
machines in the buildings. The building ! was in... they had one telephone in the hall
and the secretary would tell you when you had a telephone call."
As the aviation industry matured in the 1950s, it began to compete, along with
universities, for the NACA's more creative talent. Swain attributes the gradual
softening of the NACA's research edge to the widening pay differential between
private sector and government. At the same time, universities like Stanford were
able to offer successful NACA research engineers academic careers, with "oppor-
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tunities ... that are above money." Davidson believes that the NACA itself was
partly to blame; he had become dissatisfied by the mid-1950s as he came to realize
that "a lot of new developments and research were being done in the industry and
in the academic community." The change, he thinks, was due partly to "the
personnel involved ... what their directions, motivations were," and partly "the
money Congress would spend on developing ... flight research vehicles" that
NACA would test and develop for the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Air Force.
Nonetheless, there were compensations. Some of the intimacy and unspoiled
atmosphere of Ames su rvived through the 1950s. When Joe Lipshu tz began working
there in 1957 on a cooperative U.S. Army / NACA program, "we were on the frontier
at Ames. There was nothing north of us, and very little east of us .... The whole Santa
Clara Valley was desolate compared to what it is today." One could "go to the top
of the San Mateo mountains and see all the blossoms in the valley .... You could have
a nodding acquaintance with everybody. You could go to certain individuals --
these would be very sharp people -- and pick their brains quite a bit .... You'd walk
up and ask them, Tve got a problem'.... And now there are as many contractors as
there are civil service people on the field. Before ... for all practical purposes, it was
all civil service."
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory was the grand doyen of the NACA. What
some of Langley's veterans came to call the "Langley tradition" (and their junior
colleagues came to understand as the Langley tradition) was virtually synonymous
with the NACA. The Langley laboratory that Bill Cassirer went to work for in 1949
to do supersonic aerodynamic research was a place known for "a kind of bare bones
living, but.., almost everybody working to try to solve good research problems, and
doing a good job -- and the publications that came out of here were high class."
Research, not engineering and development, was the organization's principal
mission --a mission that, in Cassirer's opinion, became compromised as the NACA
began, for survival's sake, to work on "some of the so-called research airplanes, or
project airplanes -- the X-1 and so on. ''9
Because it was a research institution, remembers Robert Strong, Langley's
"product" was not a particular aircraft, but research reports and technical confer-
ences. The quality of the NACA's reports and conferences was what the NACA's
work was measured by, and the organization fostered a keen competition among
individuals and groups of researchers, as well as NACA's centers to produce the
"best." That meant a certain amount of duplication, as more than one research team
or laboratory tackled a problem; the duplication, in the eyes of Strong and another
Langley veteran, Charles Stern, was a small price to pay for the competition that
stimulated the NACA's creative energies.
The NACA's emphasis on original research could be sustained because good
researchers were reinforced by their environment and rewarded with increasing
status and authority. While aeronautical engineers working on design, development,
and manufacturing in the aviation industry during the 1950s might find themselves
working in "bullpens," or rows of drafting tables, Langley aeronautical engineers,
remembers Stern, could be spared such an indignity. Private or shared offices lent
to one's work the atmosphere of an individualized, professional, and original
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enterprise. What's more, "everybody in the whole chain of command from me up
to the director," recalls Cassirer, "had been a rather outstanding scientist .... It used
to be that ... most promotions were made from within, which meant you went from
a branch head to a division chief, then from division chief to associate director, and
then finally, director."
The NACA's culture was more than a research culture, however. Its ethos was
broad enough to embrace the technicians who could not claim to be involved, except
in a supporting role, in the fundamental work of the professional research engineer.
Ed Beckwith, a technician who came to Langley in 1953 as an apprentice in the sheet
metal shop, laments the passing of NACA with as much energy as his co-workers
who were professional engineers. "We had people that you respected. You might
not agree with them and they might really tongue whip you, but you respected those
people .... Back then," insists Beckwith, "you had big people, ]people like] John
Stack _()- hard, tough, he knew what he wanted and really went after it." The
Langley tradition, for someone like Beckwith, was "competence, respect, and
assertiveness -- leadership; things that we don't see now."
The perception that what distinguished the NACA was a unique in-house
research culture, one that fostered individual creativity and independence of mind,
persisted into the post-NASA years, when it continued to be idealized by NASA's
younger engineers. Although the nature of Lewis Research Center's work had
already begun to shift to more applied, project work by the time John Songyin
moved there from General Electric in 1961 (Songyin started out a t Lewis working on
the development of nuclear electric power systems for space vehicles for the Atomic
Energy Commission), this younger NASA engineer imbibed Lewis's NACA iden-
tity as a fundamental research laboratory: "It's my perception that, during the
NACA days, right up to the time when the NACA became NASA, there was a
different kind of atmosphere here, they were more interested in pretty basic
phenomena .... It would be looking into the phenomenon of shock waves, whether
it be wing foils or shapes of fuselages or around propellers or things like that."
Marylyn Goode, Richard Ashton, and Ed Collins all joined NASA's ranks after
1960, going to work at Langley Research Center. For Collins, the NACA culture
persisted well into the 1960s, at least during the period that Floyd Thompson served
as director of Langley Research Center (1960-1968). Under Thompson "we had a
very research-oriented center." Thompson "was interested in research and wanted
researchers to get their due share and notice .... As the other directors came in they
were more hardware oriented, more program oriented; research ... they couldn't
understand it." Goode and Ashton also acknowledge the "Langley tradition" --
only they do so with some ambivalence. That tradition, to Goode suggests "a very,
very dedicated engineer who has very little love of material things, but is whole-
heartedly interested in his project and his science, and he's the kind ... who walks
around looking like a 'nerd,' very intent on his project .... There's some of them still
out there." Richard Ashton, a black Langley engineer with an advanced degree in
engineering physics, after 19 years had not progressed beyond a GS-12. Although he
insists that he is glad he made his career with NASA, his comment on the Langley
tradition strikes a sour note: it's "arrogance," he says; "the attitude that we're the
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best in the world and no one is better than us ... the feeling that we're superior to
everyone else."
Ritual celebrations of the NACA culture -- however warranted -- might have
receded into the backwash of NASA's own institutional life had it not been for the
fact that others who completed NASA's initial complement of scientists and engi-
neers came largely from the Navy's research laboratories, from which they brought
institutional values similar to those extolled by the NACA group. Transferring
directly in 1959 to the new Goddard Space Flight Center, they remember, like their
new colleagues from NACA, an intimate, rough and ready, in-house research
organization that survived into the 1960s. "I still have the boots that they issued me
so we could get to the building if we were first in down the road here," remembers
Henry Beacham; "the mud was pretty deep." The first Explorer satellite built at
Goddard "went from the building it was built in ... to the test facility ... on a little
hand-pulled cart." Getting things done was relatively easy: "It used to be possible
to say, 'Gee, this is what we want to do. Let's get together after work and figure out
how to do it, propose a new building and get it in the budget in a week's time instead
of four years .... We used to take risks, personal risks .... We were bending the rules,
but [if] it was the right thing to do and ... we got called on it, we'd just explain it was
the right thing to do and we'd go on from there."
Entering Goddard fresh out of college in 1966, Hank Martin has similar
memories of problems solved informally by heads bent over a table, or satellites that
could be carried in one's hands. "There was a time at Goddard," muses Ernest
Cohen, who came to Goddard in 1960, when "if you got an idea, you could run with
it. You could build an instrument, or you could do a lot of bootlegging ... getting
experiments pushed through that you'd like to see done."
One of the things that makes it easy to get things done in any organization is
familiarity and common purpose. That was brought to Goddard by the Navy people
was apparent to those who, like Cohen and Frank Toscelli, were not among the
original NRL or NOL group. Toscelli remembers Goddard being run by the former
Navy people, who quickly moved into the new center's management positions; they
"had the previous experience" and "knew each other." At first Toscelli did not mind
being something of an outsider because "the work was interesting ... and we were
young, and full of enthusiasm." As at the former NACA laboratories, so also at
Goddard: the newer staff soon learned to venerate the culture of their predecessors'
memory. "I wasn't here in the early years of Goddard," explains Paul Toussault,
who did not arrive until 1970; "but talking to people, I can see that it was an exciting
time and things got done in a hurry .... The first spacecraft that went to Mars, the first
planetary spacecraft, which was Mariner 4, from the time of the first concept to the
time it actually flew was like a year ... amazing!"
Whether an organization is a private corporation or a public agency, it must
market a wanted product or service in order to flourish. Investing in knowledge for
its own sake is a long-term proposition, and the conviction that increases in
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knowledge are desirable is not widely or demonstrably shared in a democratic
society suspicious of the "high culture" claims of intellectuals.tt Historically the federal
government has given modest funding to the pursuit of "pure" knowledge through
the Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation, and the National
Endowment for the Humanities; however, not withstanding the claim of disinter-
estedness with which pure knowledge is distinguished from useful knowledge,
even government support of science and the arts and humanities is utilitarian: at the
very least there is the expectation that the nation will be somehow enhanced by art,
by literature -- and very much by science, which conventional wisdom holds to be
the wellspring of technological progress.
Advanced technology for national defense has, perforce, dominated the federal
government's support of research and technology, and it was the military's approach
to managing weapons research and development that led to the managerial device
of the R & D "project" and "program." The project (the development of a single
entity or system) and the program (a cluster of interrelated projects) became, in
effect, products and product lines marketed by the military to Congress and the
White House. As the NACA was transformed into NASA, the NACA's more modest
aeronautical research role -- the "service" it provided the military and aviation
industry -- was rapidly replaced by the need to direct its research and development
know-how to specific projects or programs, in particular, the manned sequence
known as the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo projects leading to the landing of a man
on the Moon in 1969.
The effect of this reorientation of the NACA's and NASA's mission on the
careers of its engineers was momentous. The design and execution of a successful
project became the measure of success, and all of NASA's people were caught up in
the annual need to market the agency's projects and programs to Congress in order
to obtain the appropriations necessary to maintain themselves. For the last 20 years,
insists Bill Cassirer, one of Langley Research Center's most accomplished research
engineers, NASA has been caught up in "developing and engineering," not significant
research. "When we decided to go with Apollo, we said ... everything else is just
expanding the 'state of the art.' There were no more breakthroughs required for
Apollo .... The main effort was monitoring, building, developing, and expanding
the database so we could build a pump... [so] we could guarantee success when we
made the decision to 'Go.'" Overhead --- facilities, advanced sustaining research,
administrative support-- corporate costs both mundane and noble, but not billable
to a particular project, was harder to come by than appropriations for projects and
programs. The tyranny of the project and program system over NASA's organiza-
tional life can also be explained by the fact that the project or program became the
institutional and budgetary umbrella under which contracts were awarded to firms
located around the country in the home districts and states of the members of
Congress who voted on the agency's budget year after year.
Many engineers who have spent over a decade working for NASA have come
to take for granted the project and program as a way of organizing the agency's
work. At Ames Research Center, Thomas Swain supposes NASA has only followed
a pattern found in private industry, where the emphasis is on projects, and
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manpower needs can be justified only in relation to them. Fred Hauser arrived at
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in 1968, at the height of the "boom" times of
Apollo. The son of a mechanical engineer for RCA, Hauser's great aspiration is to
become a project manager because "if you had to pick one kind of job as being key
to NASA ... it is the job of project manager." Langley Research Center, reminisces
Richard Ashton, "used to be a big basic research center, but it's not anymore; it's
projects, projects .... We are changed from worrying about contributing to man's
knowledge of basic research ideas [andl principles to doing very big projects .... This
thing is called being 'user friendly'; NASA is changing into a user friendly agency.
That means we have to go out and sell ourselves like we have a product.., we have
to get customers." The importance of projects and programs is equally evident in Ed
Collins's frustration with Langley Research Center's preoccupation with its tradi-
tional mission of aeronautical research. Unlike Ashton, Collins thinks Langley did
not move far or fast enough to capture projects. Langley's directors did not hustle
for "a large chunk of Space Station like Marshall, Johnson, and Goddard [who] have
big pieces of it." Langley got "what was left," and "our funding is hurt because of
that. We're not on the cutting edge."
Some NASA engineers, however, believe that the added costs of the federal
government's project and program system for national R & D are, if not measurable,
nonetheless real and substantial. Lacking the promise of ongoing support for a
government agency that produces widely appreciated items like national defense,
public health, or social security, NASA has had repeatedly to market itself, and
never more so than when the "boom" of the Apollo program was followed by the
inevitable decline in popular interest that followed the return of Apollo 11. However
the elaborate institutional machinery developed to carry out the Apollo program
could not easily be disassembled, given the interlocking interests it created among
NASA's installations, contractors, and geographic regions represented in Wash-
ington.
The Apollo project gave NASA a "job [that] was obviously much bigger than we
had people to do. There was almost no limit .... Every center had plenty to do,"
recalls Werner Posen at Marshall Space Flight Center, "and ... when Apollo was
done, we had to really fight for every dollar. It was not clear what NASA's role
would be in the long run.., we were really recognizing that our territory [was] going
to be restrained, and constrained." That, in Posen's view, was the origin of "the turf
battles that are now raging between centers. Everybody wants to become essential;
everybody wants to do something that [would cause] the agency [to] go under if they
didn't have you." Michael Goldbloom, who has spent all of his NASA career at
Headquarters in the Office of Space Sciences, echoes Posen's observation. During
the 1960s, he remembers "relatively no in tercen ter rivalry because the problem there
was for each center to get enough competent engineers to do the job, and there was
more than enough work to go to every center." After Apollo 11, "several things
happened: One was the temporary weakening of support for science and
technology ... the product of the 1960s and the Vietnam war." With the "downturn
of the NASA budget.., the centers were fighting for a smaller and smaller pie." Had
a private corporation faced a comparable market loss, it might have closed a
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division. But "that is very difficult to do in a political sense for a government agency.
What happened was that each of the centers tried to get a wider and wider charter
so that they could retain the bulk of their people .... It wasn't a healthy kind of
competition, because centers were fighting for their survival."
The consequences were probably natural. The newer space centers -- Johnson,
Marshall, and Kennedy-- were born of space technology projects, especially for the
manned space program (the only program, NASA management insisted, that could
command sizable public enthusiasm and appropriations). But the older NACA
centers struggled to adjust, their fate temporarily obscured by the largesse of
Congress in the initial years of the Apollo project. Chances for good work at Lewis
Research Center, where Robert Ostrand had worked since 1947, abounded in the
early 1960s as the center's staff "doubled from 2500 to 5000 or so." But when Apollo
II was over, "a thousand people were out of work." While during the 1970s and early
1980s barely 10 percent of the NASA budget went to aeronautical research, the old
NACA centers took more than their share of the NASA budget cuts that set in after
1966 as they watched their 11 percent share of 1965 decline to the 7 percent of ]968.
It took a while for the lesson to sink in. The centers would have to capture
portions of NASA's big projects, like Lewis's capture of the Space Station power
system in 1984. And they would have to harness "the politicians.., so our politicians
know who we are and know why they're our representatives." "What was going to
save us in the short term," insists Ostrand, "was politics-- nothing else would save
us. But in the long term we might get ourselves postured ]through projects] so that
wouldn't happen again." Aeronautical research would have to be supported with
funds diverted from major project assignments for sustaining engineering research.
For Ronald Siemans, an engineer at Johnson Space Center, it is no revelation that
politics is "a tremendous power," like the politics that accompanies a decision about
where to locate a project office. "You've got Texas politicians and you've got
Mississippi 12politicians and you've got Ohio politicians and all that get [sic] into the
game."
As public support for the civilian space program remained soft (at least, as
measured by NASA appropriations, which have not recovered their 1965 level in
constant dollars), _3the number of government employees NASA was able to sup-
port continued its steady decline to about two-thirds (in 1988) of the almost 36,000
people on the NASA payroll in 1966. (NASA contractors' employees outnumbered
civil servants 3 to 1 in the early 1960s, ballooned to 10 to I in 1966, and subsided to
about 2 to 1 in the 1980sJ _) Faced with deteriorating support, NASA executives had
a legitimate desire to protect the centers whose most skilled technical employees
were essential to the agency's ability to go about its work. One way to protect the
agency's human resource was to use it more efficiently. By designating "roles and
missions" for each of the centers, NASA attempted to avoid duplication and ensure
that each installation had essential functions related to the particular project work
assigned to it. Richard Ashton at Langley remembers that in 1976 "we had a
reorganization .... Across NASA there was 'roles and missions' rather than all
centers doing everything .... We're going to break the whole NASA stable up into
various categories: 'Langley, you do aeronautics: the body, the wings, the fuselage,
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etc. Lewis, you will do the propulsion system for it.' They said, 'Marshall, you will
do the rockets. Goddard, you will take care of the atmosphere around the Earth and
interrogating and doing what have you with the satellites once they are launched.
Houston, you are responsible for manned spaceflight, and Kennedy, you are
responsible for [launching] the big rockets. Ames, you are doing environmental
quality and deep space planetary stuff.' I used to work in aeronomy, the study of
upper atmospheres of this planet and other planets-- and that went to Ames .... We
used to do helicopter research; that left here." (Ames Research Center took over most
of NASA's helicopter research.) Part of the intent of the "roles and missions" concept
may have been to reduce intercenter rivalry, but institutional specialization has
apparently done little to relieve institutional particularism.
Another device was the "matrix" organization of technical work, so that
scientists and engineers would be kept fully occupied in their specialties through the
phases and transitions between individual projects. However efficient the "matrix"
idea may have been from a management perspective, many engineers experienced
it as a means of further splintering work that had already become fragmented by the
growing complexity of engineering. Through NASA's matrix system (borrowed
from industry), engineers are assigned to functional divisions from which they are
detailed to particular projects as needed. Their time and work is charged to the
projects in a lease-like arrangement that allows the institution to maintain its science
and engineering divisions.
Few engineers seem to have welcomed the opportunity for variation in their
work offered by the matrix system. Rather, what they experienced was further
disintegration. Next to the need to leave engineering for management to "get
ahead," the matrix system is Ernest Cohen's biggest complaint. "The matrix system
is the system whereby.., instead of assigning you to a project for 40 hours, they say
'you're going to help this project 20 hours a week and this one 10 hours a week and
this one 10 hours a week.' The problem comes in when they both want the 20 and 30
percent at the same time." Cohen would like his work better if, when "you wanted
to build an instrument, you had a team report every day full time and [that] team
works on it." "The way NASA works," observes Bettylou Sanders at Johnson Space
Center, "you can't ever take credit for doing one thing because you always have
[only] one piece." Perhaps Cohen's and Sanders's discontent comes from misplaced
expectations: Paul Toussault at Goddard may accurately characterize work under
the matrix system (and allude to its true origins) when he quips: "It's like somebody
working in an automobile factory and they work on part of the thing and it goes on."
Hank Martin at Goddard explains the matrix system this way: "You've got a ...
discipline like heat transfer: that's kind of like one column [of engineers] that you've
got: heat transfer and power systems, electrical system structures .... And those
people are supposed to be smart in those specific systems. Now, where do they
apply their smartness? Along the different rows you've got the Space Station project,
you've got the Space Telescope project, you've got these other [projects]. So that
forms your matrix .... It's not the same thing as working on a focused project with the
other people .... You pick up some information, but really appreciating what the
other guy is doing.., and maybe giving up some of your design margin because that
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guy is in trouble.., there was some magic.., you've been involved since day one and
when all is said and done, this thing is in orbit .... [There's] that sense of momentum,
that sense of teaming with the other people .... I don't think it happens to all the
troops involved because the pieces get broken down into such small parts." Martin
thinks there is more behind the matrix system than efficiency. "A lot of the ... way
we tend to fragment things," he speculates, "is based on lack of willingness to take
risks. If you have that rigid structural breaking down of things, it makes everybody
feel a lot more comfortable. It allows you to manage by committee, rather than an
individual saying, 'Hey, is my neck on the line?'"
How the matrix system relates to the conservatism that inheres in a compulsive
avoidance of risk is something of an imponderable. That kind of conservatism, if
George Sieger at Johnson Space Center is right, comes not only from the diminished
intimacy with a total project that any individual has; it also comes from a diminished
intimacy with engineering that NASA's managers have. Engineers "are ]making]
constant trade-offs between gaining our objectives and risking the flight system.
Management has to be willing to accept that same risk, and unless management
recognizes what trade-offs we're making and why we're making them and how
we're making them," management is ill equipped to make critical choices. Sieger
"can't conceive" of a current NASA manager who has enough of an understanding
of the technical issues about any one system to confidently affirm -- or overrule --
an engineering judgment.
David Strickland, who had a decade of experience building missiles for private
industry before joining NASA, thinks the size, complexity, and costs of space
projects are to blame for the agency's conservatism. "I blew up Atlases on my watch
when I was 35. I use that somewhat figuratively. Atlases blew up, and the next day
we went to work and we sat down and figured out why we blew that one up and
three months later we tried again .... Nobody was looking down his throat because
nobody expected perfection then .... The programs have gotten bigger; therefore,
our mistakes get more expensive." That space projects should get "bigger," and thus
more costly, is a virtual given in NASA's manned space flight program. NASA
successfully argued at the end of the 1970s that the cost of relying on "throw-away"
boosters to launch humans into space justified developing the Space Transportation
System with its reusable Shuttle orbiter. Since then, the notion that NASA should
aim for longer stays in space, which require more complex and costly hardware, has
become the widely accepted requirement for any new space undertaking -- most
notably the Space Station Freedom program. _5
Other engineers, like Toussault, who works in NASA's space science program,
do challenge the need for size and complexity. Echoing one of NASA's most
articulate outside critics, TM Toussault speculates that "NASA usually doesn't like
those things [inexpensive spacecraft]; they like big projects, really costly." Each
project represents jobs to be protected and turf to be expanded: "projects-- that's life
and death to these centers." So long as the project and program system fosters large,
multipurpose and expensive missions, there is little incentive for smaller, less
complicated and thus more cost effective ones27 "Competition," claims Toussault,
"is what makes the [space] program go. As soon as you start cooperating, you're
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going to have nothing. You're going to start squabbling and then, the next thing you
know, nobody does anything. Everybody takes up their marbles and goes home."
The accumulation of knowledge through basic research is at a disadvantage in
a world of R & D projects and programs because basic research cannot guarantee a
marketable product in the forseeable future. Nor does the matrix organization of
engineering work promote basic research, for the intellectual command of a research
problem requires continuity of involvement with that problem. Further militating
against basic research in the U.S. government's approach to the acquisition of
knowledge is its procurement system, which relies on the contract, which must be
awarded for an identifiable product or service. Only the basic research grant,
awarded to university researchers by NASA and other federal agencies with
research as part of their missions, tolerates the spending of revenues for a process
that may not lead to a useful outcome. Thus the constituency for federal grant
programs has been largely confined to the universities that benefit from them, while
the constituency for federal contracting -- U.S. industries and the regions whose
economic well-being depends on their profits -- has remained a strong material
supporter of an ideology that favors private over government enterprise generally.
The notion of contracting out was, of course, not novel with the Eisenhower
administration. Since the early 19th century the military services had procured
goods and services from private suppliers. What the military had not wholly relied
on commercial suppliers for was ordnance -- hence the U.S. Army's scattered
armories, or "arsenal system." The experience of World War lI suggested that
effective innovation in weapons technology can make the difference between
victory and defeat. And in the 20th century innovation in weapons technology was
no mere Edisonian enterprise; it required systematic, institutionalized research and
development programs.
Ames Research Center's Thomas Swain, who has provided as thoughtful a
retrospective on a NACA and NASA career as any of the engineers we interviewed,
was able to have something of a global view of the shift to contracting that coincided
with the transformation of NACA into NASA. After 1958 "it was obvious" to Swain
"that the new organization ... was a different animal. It was now part of a much
bigger organization and it was suddenly a source of funds. NASA assumed the role
of contractor [to the centers], of providing the motivation and the funding for
research and development contracts outside of NASA. The NACA didn't work that
way; NACA had very little on the outside; it was almost completely an in-house
effort." When Ames was "part of NACA," the center had a certain amount of money
which it "pretty much had control over [and] spent as they saw fit [in] in-house
coordination with the other centers and NACA headquarters, and with the advice
of the various ... technical committees." Then "there was that shift to a different
relationship between the centers and the industry. In the late '40s, the early '50s,"
recalls Swain, "the companies didn't engage in a lot of exploratory research work;
they were pretty narrowly directed toward specific airplane projects." But after 1958
174
Changes
"it was not so much outside people coming in for answers, but coming in looking for
contracts. Big aircraft companies, Lockheed or Rockwell, would be just as often
approaching NASA with proposals for research work that they do, rather than
proposing work that NASA do in-house."
Most NASA engineers' experience of the project and program system has been
indirect; they have seen the broader institutional dynamics of the agency shaped by
the politics of capturing projects and programs to survive, if not flourish. Reliance
on contracting was a necessary accompaniment of the government's unprecedented
need to harness talented and industrial capacity to carry out its weapons systems
programs, for that capacity was located primarily in the private sector. Contracting,
observes Bob Jones, who spent much of his NASA career at Marshall Space Flight
Center, "goes clear back to the Army versus the Air Force concept, the in-house
Army arsenal versus the Air Force contractor" approach to systems development.
"I suspect that you have to do that in this country; a program of that magnitude --
Apollo -- you had to rely on industry to build those things. Marshall built some of
the hardware in the old days themselves, as civil servants." But the hardware
required for the manned space flight program "exceeded what Marshall Space
Flight Center had done. Marshall even contracted the Redstones out."
Jones and others who have worked mostly at Johnson, Marshall, and Kennedy
space centers, take contracting for granted as the only way the agency can go about
its business and thus a necessary dimension of a NASA career. But virtuallv all of
NASA's older engineers have seen the substance of their careers directiv and
immediately distorted by the contracting process, and none more so than those who
came to NASA in the expectation of doing research. Robert McConnell, a chemist,
came to Lewis Research Center in the early 1950s to do materials research. He
remembers when he could "work on a thing [research problem] 3 to 5 years, and
either you are [sic] successful or -- generally you are successful in some degree; we
were never unsuccessful .... Maybe you didn't get the answer you were after. You
found out something else." Then, in the mid-1970s, he left the section for which he
worked when he "saw the writing on the wall ... we did less and less basic
research .... We're practically devoid of actually looking into a basic research problem
now." As McConnell experiences NASA, "people are more interested in -- not a
[research] finding --but programs. You know, that's the natural conseq, lence of
contracting." Lewis Research Center receives "money from NASA Headquarters
just like a company receives it from [corporate} headquarters and, therefore, when
you say you're going to do something, that's what you're going to do .... Maybe
that's the best way ... if that's what they want to do, that's fine; but that's not the
environment I came into."
For John Songyin, who did research for the National Bureau of Standards before
coming to Lewis in 1961, the 1970s was a period when contracting replaced basic
research as the center's approach to engine development. The significance of the
shift for him, and many others like him, was that instead of doing engineering work
himself, he became a "contract monitor," overseeing the project-dedicated work of
contractor industrial engineers. The shift to contracting, which at Lewis "really
accelerated in the '80s," meant that there was "less and less real technical work that
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we'd be responsible for in-house. We ourselves would not be doing the hands-on
kind of work, but overseeing and monitoring the work of contractors." Songyin's job
likewise shifted from engineering to project management, which he's "not as
thrilled about.., as I was in the early days where I had more hands-on experience."
Thomas Alvarin, also at Lewis, once "had a couple of technicians under me .... But
at this point, this is just a project office, so mainly the work is contract monitoring."
His experience is shared by his Lewis co-worker Matthew O'Day, whose version of
what contracting has meant to him is simple: "I like doing the work myself more than
giving it to somebody else to do."
The Lewis engineers' difficulty in adapting to contracting mirrors the response
of engineers at Langley Research Center, another former NACA laboratory. One
after another they complain of the deprivation of inherent interest and excitement
of research that occurred as contracting usurped in-house work. "I think contracting
is hellified ... it's terrible," exclaims Richard Ashton. "There are a lot of new
engineers and scientists coming out of school ... joining the government, expecting
to do great things, get hands-on experience. They can't do that because we're
contracting the stuff out. Our computer facilities ... we don't have a single NASA
employee that works there." Ed Collins, who brought unusual experience for the
time in integrated optics to Langley, had hoped to build a small laboratory at the
center in the field, but he was told, "Ed, that is not the way we do things at Langley
anymore. We're going contracts; all we want you to do is stay technical enough that
you can monitor the contract efficiently. We don't want you in a lab."
Bill Cassirer also sees NASA following the Air Force pattern, and thinks the
practice of contracting is ruining the agency's ability to do any good research. "At
Wright Patterson Air Force Base," he alleges, "they used to do some real good
research work early before World War II. And then they suddenly became nothing
more than a bunch of contract monitors; they put out nothing of significance for
years.1_ We have had some contract monitors here, and the poor guys, they just lose.
First of all, you never really assign the sharpest people to the contract monitor [job]
because you don't want to tie them down with the burden. The people that you do
assign normally have some good ability; but after they have been contract monitors
for a couple of years, they've lost that .... It's a great way to lose your research
inertia." The transition to contracting sets in motion a cycle which makes it yet more
difficult for the government to maintain its own engineering know-how. Engineers
like Henry Blackwell at Langley, who tried to maintain their proficiency, found the
going tough. Blackwell works in computerized data acquisiton at Langley and has
watched a friend of his scooped in a research project. "About the time he'd gotten
all of his ducks together to publish, here comes this article by a guy in one of the trade
publications, the same stuff! The guy was consistently beating him to publication.
Part of it was the procurement cycle: Because he was a glamour boy in the industry,
all he had to do was say, 'I need this,' and 2 weeks later, he's got it." Blackwell's
friend, on the other hand, "would say, 'I need this,' and then he'd have to draw up
this [procurement request] and go out for bids, and evaluate the bids, and then we'd
evaluate, and then we'd do this and that and so on... a lot of people got discouraged,"
and, as a consequence, thinks Blackwell, "we've gotten away from the forefront of
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innovation, development." His own section "in the last couple of years ... has
become proposal and contract writers and monitors ... more or less an extension of
procurement." Contracting out may "save the government money. But how about
morale? Now industry is just outstripping us." Even if contracting out for engineering
could be justified because "good people ... are smart enough to have gone outside
to another company and are getting more money than we are," argues Ed Beckwith,
the technical people left behind end up providing free training to the lower-level
skilled personnel that industry hires. Beckwith claims, "I spend an awful lot of my
time training contractors or working with them to do the same job over and over
again ... because the contractor keeps pulling in new people [to replace] those
people who left."
Marshall Space Flight Center, although not a former NACA center, was an in-
house operation in its earlier incarnation as an Army installation. Like their fellow
engineers at Langley, Ames, and Lewis, Marshall's engineers are restive with a
system that relies on contractors for engineering as well as support services. Sam
Browning began working for the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in 1956 after earning
his degree in chemical engineering. By the mid-1960s Marshall had made the
transition: "We didn't do a great deal in-house in those days ... which was sad .... I
didn't really get to go into the laboratory and get hands-on type stuff, which I would
have loved. I had to go visit a contractor's facility, who lsic] was having all the
fun .... I came up with the ideas or picked them up from other people, and we
secured funding from Headquarters to go fund the activity, and we'd award a
contract to some propulsion company." Browning feels a personal loss from having
been denied opportunities to accumulate his own experience with advanced pro-
pulsion systems -- but the loss is not just his. He is currently working on a laser
propulsion project that is "almost more research than technology, because we had
to establish that you can, in fact, sustain a stable plasma in hydrogen supported by
a high-powered laser." The work involves "an awful lot of high-temperature
physics and computational flow dynamics, and a lot of other good stuff I don't know
much about .... My frustration with that is that I don't understand enough about it
to be able to intelligently guide the people who are working on the program."
Although NASA engineers who began their careers working for the NACA or
who work in former NACA laboratories appear most sensitive to the loss of in-house
research opportunities as a result of NASA's reliance on contracted work, engineers
at post-1958 NASA centers (Johnson, Kennedy, and Goddard) are even more aware
of the hidden costs of contracting. Paul Toussault and Frank Toscelli at Goddard
both lament the Joss of"in-house expertise," and do so especially because of NASA's
increased reliance on contractors. "If you haven't really done some of the stuff once
in your life and really gotten involved with it," insists Toussault, "then I don't see
how you're going to be able to be a good monitor of these contracts."
Richard Williams at Kennedy likewise complains about NASA's reliance on
contractors; for those who would argue that the nation does not suffer a loss of
engineering know-how as a result -- it only shifts it to the private sector -- he has
an answer: "Industry, on its own, is not going to be doing the type of things that we
need to be doing." For example, in developing the Space Station, "we ought to be
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looking at new and innovative ways of manufacturing, putting this whole thing
together. If we don't do it, it's not going to be done." Or there is the notion, a
cornerstone of President Ronald Reagan's space policy issued in 1988, that the
private sector should take over launch services, for which the government would be
a buyer: "Every one of the contractors has come back and said 'it's not commercially,
economically feasible .... Without government support [we won't do it]." In terms
of "overall, long-range benefits, without government support, we're going to lose
ground."
It could also be argued that a policy that builds aerospace engineering talent and
know-how in the private sector is inherently sound public policy, since the federal
government has always had to rely on the private sector to produce essential items
during a national emergency. The Apollo program, which relied almost entirely on
contracts to private industry, was certainly as much an industry as a government
agency's triumph. But failures, such as the 1967 fire on the Apollo 204 spacecraft in
which three astronauts perished, inevitably raise questions about the degree of
vigilance the government can or will exercise over its contractors, especially if the
technical expertise is weighted on the side of industryd *
The issue has persisted, especially at the manned spacecraft centers. The costs
of missed opportunities in research are long term and difficult to assess in any event.
But at Johnson Space Center and Kennedy Space Center, the two NASA installations
with primary responsibility for NASA's largest program, human space flight,
complex operations with low error tolerance are a fact of daily life; thus, the costs of
failure can be immediate and severe. The tragedy of the Challenger accident in
January 1986 was felt throughout NASA, but arguably most personally at Johnson
and Kennedy Space Centers. Yet it did not take the Challenger accident for one of
Johnson's most experienced flight operations engineers to become uneasy about the
consequences of contracting for the reliability of space flight operations.
Managers at NASA Headquarters, observed George Sieger in the autumn of
1985, fail to recognize "the synergism that has always existed between operations
and engineering; they tend to consider the operating element as a luxury [and thus]
feel they can contract out the operating element." But, warned Sieger, "as they move
further in that direction, we will find ourselves in the same position of impotence
that I think the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ... as well as the Department of
Transportation, as well as the military services [are in]." During the aftermath of a
serious nuclear reactor fuel cooling misfunction at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania
in 1979, Sieger worked for 3 years on post-accident studies with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and a variety of utility operators and contractors. He came
away from that experience believing that "the healthiest nuclear plant operator"
was Duke Power, because "they do their own design, they do their own engineering.
They do not hire an integration contractor to build their facilities; they manage their
contracts and then they operate the plant," as do many European utilities. At the
heart of Sieger's concern is the belief that contracting out operations severs a vital
communications link between managers, engineers, and operators that must be
preserved if operations are to be effective and reliable. However, the weakening link
between operations and engineering that disturbs Sieger is only part of his larger
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concern, which is (as he sees it) the hemorrhage of NASA's hard-won engineering
skills to industry. During "the first 25 years of the space program," he argues,
"NASA managed to grow a good percentage of the engineers that were necessary
to manage the program, and they were good managers. Where they were deficient,
they would go out to industry to bring [in] the strong corporate management
philosophy." But since the end of the 1970s "we have moved ... away from that
philosophy .... We are weakening our overall [technical] base to manage not only the
Space Transportation System, but.., the Space Station program." For Philip Siebold
at Johnson, NASA's increasing dependence on contractors has been accompanied
by decreasing vigilance over their work. "When we started manned systems" in the
early 1960s, he recalls "we were so concerned about the loss of a man that we very
much did the whole field. We felt that two sets of eyes were better than one. In the
Apollo program," for example, "we were very much in their program .... The reason
we had so many inspectors is every time they had an inspection point, we had an
inspection point." But "in the last few years we -- government -- are trying to get
away with doing less in company plants .... Today we may only have one [inspector]
for every four or five or so of theirs. We look at what they have done, rather than do
it ourselves, in a lot of the detailed inspection functions; we do more of a verification
and an overlook, [rather] than doing so much of the individual work ourselves."
In 1985 this trend did not particularly trouble Siebold. While he recognized that
there was "not less criticality," he was confident that "we have learned to do things
better. Our learning curve has gone up, and we have much more redundancy built
into the system today." Another Johnson Space Center engineer, Ronald Siemans,
was also comfortable with the shift of the critical mass of aerospace engineering
expertise to industry through contracting: "We've got many more contractors now
involved. They're all getting knowledgable about the systems, where just a year ago,
we had nobody who knew anything .... Now you've got many contractors that
know about the job; they may not know all the details, but two years from now they'll
have had time to study, they'll have had time to get their experts, they'll have had
time to hire college graduates out of college. That's what this was all about-- to get
industry up." But two years turned out to be too long.
That George Sieger had cause to worry was borne out by the Challenger accident
that occurred a few months later. At Kennedy Space Center, whose engineers we
interviewed after the Challenger accident, that event has heightened their concern
about the use NASA makes of contractors -- now not only for support service,
engineering, and operations, but to essentially manage themselves. "The new
contracts that we have," notes Hank Smith at Kennedy Space Center, "they [the
contractors] have been given a mission. For example.., the base operations contract:
[the contractor's] mission is base operations. They run the fire trucks, they have the
cops. They paint the buildings, they fix the roofs. They do the air conditioning. We
define the mission; they accept it. They are responsible for cost management and
technical performance. If they don't do good, you downgrade them." Smith is
refering to the "mission contract," a logical answer to the need to contract not only
for particular end items or levels of effort, as in the case of ongoing services, but for
functional areas like building construction and computer maintenance as well. The
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mission contract presents no problem for Smith "because there's not a whole lot of
criticality to it. Mission contracts for space operations, however, are something else.
"The business of Shuttle processing and launching -- I think that's just too critical
to turn over to a contractor. Management needs to be involved in that processing
work. I don't think any one contractor can do the whole thing; it's too big a job."
Not only is the job too big, but accountability is spread too thin. "See," says
Smith, the contractor is "responsible to check himself also. Now NASA's ultimately
responsible, but I don't think [its responsibility goes] deep enough." He is keenly
sensitive to the fact that NASA was held responsible by the media and post-accident
inquiries for the Challenger accident. That being so, he thinks NASA must exercise
more intensive oversight than what accompanies the mission contract. "In base
operations, that's fine; we don't need to be responsible for the fire trucks," allows
Smith. "But the intricate stuff -- the critical stuff-- I think NASA needs to be more
involved. I just don't think you can say 'OK, Mr. Lockheed. Everything wonderful?'
And he says, 'Oh yeah," and you walk away. That's just too much. "2° But he is re-
signed: "Management has put down the edict that that's the way it will be." Smith's
co-worker at Kennedy, Eleanor Finch, shares his reservations. "Contractors are in
business to make money .... And they really don't care a lot of times whether the job
gets done or not, nor do they even really know what the job is, sometimes. And
NASA needs to remind them of what the job is. Day by day. And that is what the
contract monitor role was." Finch says "was," because in the late 1970s the man-
agement consulting firm of Booz-Allen Hamilton recommended that Kennedy
Space Center substantially reduce the number of contract monitors overseeing day-
to-day contract activities. Booz-Allen argued that a great deal of money could be
saved if NASA were willing to settle for periodic reports from contractors. NASA's
euphemism for reduced supervision is "self-sufficiency," an attribute of Kennedy
Space Center's comprehensive mission contracts. Self-sufficiency, explains Finch,
"means that the contractor can make more decisions on his own without coming to
NASA for guidance." She has managed contracts "both ways. You can't get much
out of a report. You have to go down there and talk to those people and find out what
the heck they're doing." And if you don't like what they're doing, "once you've
turned the contract monitor [role] off, it's very hard to turn it around."
Discontent with contracting is by no means uniform among NASA's Apollo era
engineers, nor is it apparently a consequence simply of the Challenger accident.
There were engineers with whom we spoke, after as well as before the accident, and
who had worked at NASA centers with earlier "in-house" traditions, who were
content with the system. Both Fred Hauser and Dan O'Neill at Marshall Space Flight
Center, for example, say their experience working with contractors has been
positive. Hauser has "a lot of confidence in them," while O'Neill "can't think of a
single bad experience" he's had with a contractor. Indeed, he finds that "the most fun
is being involved with them .... We have, normally, pretty well structured contracts,
so we know what they're supposed to do .... Working with the contractor on a
problem that you have some interest in ... [on] the evolution of a solution ... can be
very exciting." Marshall's Joseph Totten is also comfortable working with contractors,
over whom, he feels, Marshall exercises close, reliable supervision.
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In fact, Totten implies that the availability of contractors may be something of
a Godsend, since NASA, a federal agency, would have difficulty putting any
significant number of technical people on its civil service rolls. "The labor rates," he
explains, "are quite a bit different, for one thing. Those people [contractors] can hire
lower level journeymen than we can hire .... Our people here are almost of an age
that all of them can retire, so that means they're probably at the top of whatever pay
level they're at ... whereas a contractor can pay ten dollars an hour and beat us all
to get out." Totten takes the global view: "What we have out here is a national
facility ... a national asset. Right now, because of the lack of technicians, we cannot
utilize it the way it should be utilized." But "eventually," with the help of contracting,
"we're going to have to get around to providing that capability .... From the design
and from the engineering side, I think we're going to retain that capability." At
NASA Headquarters, Langley Research Center, and Ames Research Center, one can
also find engineers who have turned into contract monitors and enjoy it. If their
working relationship with their contractors is cooperative and productive, con-
tracting, at least for engineering, may provide them access to a level and depth of
professional work they might not otherwise have.
Whatever the merits of NASA engineers' views of the steady movement toward
almost total agency reliance on contractors, that movement is likely to be sustained
by the same rationales that led to government contracting in the first place. So also
the other dimension of organizational life at NASA -- the expansion of
bureaucracy -- which is no less likely to persist, inasmuch as it is endemic to any
large organization carrying out a complicated enterprise. NASA's engineers com-
plain bitterly of bureaucracy, its frequent absurdities, its incessant drain on one's
time and energies, as do most employees struggling against paper barriers, hier-
archical protocols, and the shackles of central administration everywhere. On this
subject they are merely sections of a larger chorus and have little to add that is
peculiar to NASA. But they are not wholly devoid of observations that suggest forces
exacerbating the tendency toward bureaucratization in the nation's civilian space
program.
One of those forces is procurement -- contracting -- which contributes its own
special mound of paperwork and procedures to comply with the latest federal
acquisitions regulations. At Langley Ed Beckwith ventilates vexation: "I'm right
now in the throes of trying to get a purchase request through so I can get two
contracts without going through a full and open competition." In Langley's pro-
curement organization "they start talking to you about a JOFOC [Justification for
Other Than Full and Open Competition]. I didn't know what that was. My memos
should not have to go into detail to tel[lhem how Iought to do this to get this contract
out. My memo should say this is the reason for that .... Oh, Lord! You can see the
frustration!" The reason for sluggishness in the procurement process, explains
Henry Beacham at Goddard Space Flight Center, "is fear. Fear of getting a protest
on a contract award. After you deal with a couple of them the system tells itself,
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'We'll never let that happen again.'" And the way to prevent protests on a contract
award is to cross every 'r and dot every 'i' in a complex procedure designed to
ensure that every eligible individual or firm has been given a fair shake in the
scramble for government funds.
On those rare and wonderful occasions when a courageous individual has used
"the system" to get something done or, when that was impossible, has circumvented
the system, it is because an individual has exercised independent judgment and
exceptional powers of persuasion. The ability of an organization to nurture such
individuals is an important element in its battle against bureaucratic ossification.
But there are some NASA engineers who think their organization has failed to
cultivate such individuals, even if they arrived at NASA well equipped to exercise
independent judgment and to persuade. Robert McConnell at Lewis Research
Center does not think they do. Newer and younger engineers may arrive at NASA
with more advanced engineering skills, he concedes, but "in the area of liberal arts,
sometimes I find it appalling -- their inability to write." And "in some areas, like
overall engineering judgment, there seems to be an inadequacy, but I guess you
would expect that; it's something that comes with experience."
And then there's the passion for anonymity, the fabled virtue of the civil servant
that appears too often as a refuge from accountability. If Hank Martin at Goddard
could change anything, he "would change the cover your ass attitude .... It's making
no one responsible: 'Well, this committee decided,' or 'it was the consensus of
everybody,' so nobody's responsible." Always liable to intense public scrutiny, and
with a mission that its critics claim is marginal and thus perpetually in danger of
dissolution, NASA may be especially prone to facelessness. Derek Roebling and Bill
Cassirer, at places as different as Kennedy Space Center and Langley Research
Center, agree that the way NASA has adapted to its political circumstances and
environment has much to do with the degree to which it is afflicted by the worst
handicaps of a bureaucracy. Roebling sees, most of all, a "cultural change" as the
"major" change to have occurred within the agency. With the massive organizational
mobilization required to carry out the Apollo program, NASA "became very
institutionalized," he asserts, and was soon transformed into a "corporate bu-
reaucracy." More important, "the agency has matured from a small group without
an agency culture into another federal agency. I imagine it's probably just as difficult
to get things done in the Veterans Administration. We're no longer the laboratory;
we're now the administrative kind of thing .... Bureaucratization was carried to
extremes in many cases... [with] increased complexity, less personal responsibility,
and more organizational responsibilities achieved through division, multiple sig-
natures, checks and balances, more reviews, more meetings, more formal systems
to keep track of different items," and the replacement of "personal responsibility"
by "organizational hierarchy."
If the worst excesses of bureaucracy are to be mitigated at all, they will be
mitigated by those with the power to establish (or eliminate) administrative pro-
cedures, or at least mediate between externally imposed administrative procedures
and the organization's own preferred ways of going about its business. This is a role
that only NASA's senior management can play. However, NASA's engineers doubt
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that their own management are likely allies in the struggle against bureaucracy;
perversely, they may be the flywheel in the engine of bureaucracy. Roebling
suspects that the agency is increasingly held sway by managers who have distanced
themselves from the actual business of working with hardware. NASA has changed
"from the small NACA [of the] 1950s, X-series aircraft kind of operation, to this huge
conglomeration where you have people who never go within three miles of flight
hardware," leaving the organization enmeshed in "an enormous infrastructure of
people who are not actively involved" in, and thus unlikely to have a genuine
sympathy for, the agency's actual work. A veteran of many years in both the NACA
and NASA, Robert Strong believes that if a project has been "well managed" at the
start, "once a concept has jelled," it should "more or less flow evenly." Thus he
suspects that there is a link between managemenrs remoteness from engineering
work and a proclivity to "micromanagement at high levels," which he finds as
pronounced at NASA's research centers as at NASA Headquarters.
The association of status with managerial positions may encourage a clubbish
self-isolation. Werner Posen compares the hierarchical distances in Marshall Space
Flight Center's current organization to the 1950s, when, as branch head, he had
regular conversations with Wernher von Braun. He observes: "l don't think that our
center directors today talk to people of my level." Posen may also have benefited
from a certain clubbishness among emigre Germans at Marshall. Be that as it may,
Posen's co-worker at Marshall, Joseph Totten, echoes the view that much of the
frustration of bureaucratization in NASA comes from excessive top-down
micromanagement, from center managers as well as Headquarters. He concedes
that NASA is "a government operation ... public surveillance is always there, and
we have to live with that." But he does not "believe we need this reporting in minute
detail, [and] we do ourselves a disservice by our top management not letting us have
a little more free reign in our activities."
The irony, of course, is that the managers of whom Totten and others complain
were, once upon a time, NASA engineers. What happens when engineers become
managers? Do they attempt to exercise the same vigilance over detail -- a vigilance
in which external forces conspire-- over the human processes of organizational life
as they once did when they were designing aircraft and engines? Ed Beckwith at
Langley Research Center is convinced that NASA's management is incapable of
resisting external pressures that produce a bureaucratic mentality. "Today," he
complains, "even center directors say 'I'm sorry, I can't do anything about that.
Headquarters says this or the Congress says this.' You would never hear those
[earlier NACA] people say that; you would see smoke. In the management position
now, we don't have anybody to respect .... They just sit back and count beans."
The changes NASA's engineers perceive in the agency, its environment, and
their careers reflect not only actual changes, but also the experiences and values they
have shared during the most formative years of their careers. When talking with
those scientists and engineers about "change," one learns, albeit indirectly, about a
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common culture that has been disturbed by events and the passage of time. As these
men and women talk about change, they talk about computers, specialization, and
fragmentation. And when they talk about NASA as a changing place, their talk often
turns to loss: the loss of youthful creativity and energy in a maturing organization
struggling with the stultifying forces of bureaucracy, the loss of an innovative
research culture transformed by federal policy into a large procurement and
contract management organization, and the loss of national purpose behind the
peaceful mobilization which once played so great a role in the definition of their
lives.
For one view of the decade, see Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A
History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
2Robert A. Divine, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Space, in Robert A. Divine,
ed., The Johnson Years: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science, Vol. II (University Press
of Kansas, 1987), pp. 217-253.
3Computer-assisted design/computer-assisted manufacturing.
4A device which first appeared in 1960 and amplifies light through the stimulated
emission of radiation. Whereas conventional light sources emit light that is diffuse
or incoherent, the iazer produces a high-energy, coherent wave phase light used
increasingly for micromachining and microsurgery as well "reading" minute
measurements and other electromagnetically recorded information.
See, for example, Sandra Jansen's account in chapter 3 of the transition from manual
calculators to microcomputers used to gauge engine pressures at Lewis Research
Center.
"Equations of motion for viscuous fluids whose molecular viscosity is large enough
to make the viscuous forces a significant part of the total force field in the fluid.
Derived from Stokes's Law of Bodies moving through viscuous fluids, first formu-
la ted by Sir George Gabriel Stokes, British mathematician and physicist (1819-1903).
7There were three series of Pioneer spacecraft: the unsuccessful Pioneer lunar probes
(1958-1960) NASA inherited from the Defense Department Advance Research
Projects Agency; the four successful Pioneer interplanetary probes flown from 1960
through 1968; and the successful Pioneer-Jupiter, Pioneer-Saturn, and Pioneer-
Venus solar system escape missions launched between 1972 and 1978.
s For an excellent and brief discussion of the NASA acquisition process, see Arnold S.
Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era, NASA SP-4102 (Washington, D.C.:U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1982), chapter 4. For background, see Danhof, Govern-
ment Contracting, and Peck and Scherer, The Weapons Acquisitions Process, loc. cit.
See Richard P. Hallion, On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981, NASA
SP-4303 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984) and Laurence K.
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Loftin, Jr., Quest for Performance: The Evolution of Modern Aircraft, NASA SP-468
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), chapter 11.
10One of NACA's leading aeronautical researchers for transonic flight, Stack joined
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory in 1928 and remained with the NACA to be
transferred in 1958 with many of his colleagues to the new NASA.
)_For classic discussions of popular American attitudes toward intellectual life, see
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Francis Bowen, trans. (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1945) and Richard Hofstadter, Ant#Intellectualism in American Life (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).
)2 Location of NASA's Mississippi Test Facility, acquired in 1961 and renamed the
National Space Technology Laboratories (NSTL) in 1974. Site of testing for the
Saturn rocket stages and sea-level testing of the Space Shuttle's main engine, as well
as environmental and resource work for other government agencies, the NSTL was
renamed the John C. Stennis Space Center in 1988 after Stennis, a member of the U.S.
Senate for over 40 years and Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee.
Stennis was responsible for the establishment of NSTL.
13"Towards A New Era in Space: Realigning Policies to New Realities," Committee
on Space Policy, National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering
(National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1988), Figure 1, p. 6.
14Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical
Data Book: NASA Resources, 1958-1968, Vol. I, SP-4012 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1988), p. 118 and NASA Pocket Statistics (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. C-27). Numbers of contractor employees
can only be estimated.
)_See Sylvia D. Fries, 20001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's
Space Station System," Technology and Culture, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1988).
.6Freeman Dyson, Science and Space, in Infinite in All Directions (New York: Harper
& Row, 1988).
)7For an entertaining and pithy account of the costing of government research and
development programs, see Norman R. Augustine, Augustine's Laws and Major
System Development Programs (New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, 1983).
is Needless to say, U.S. Air Force system program managers at Wright Patterson
might have sound reasons to disagree with Cassirer.
_9See Ivan D. Ertel and Roland W. Newkirk, with Courtney G. Brooks, The Apollo
Spacecraft: A Chronology, Vol. IV, NASA SP-4009 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1978).
20NASA contracted with Lockheed Space Operations in 1983 to perform Space
Shuttle launch and landing activities at the Kennedy Space Center and on behalf of
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the U.S. Air Force at Vandenberg Air Force Base, including operation of related
ground systems at both launch sites. Lockheed's Shuttle processing contract was the
second comprehensive missions contract awarded by NASA; E G & G was awarded
a comprehensive base operations contract at Kennedy in 1982.
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And so, they stayed. These engineers' tolerance for the changes that have enveloped
them comes partly from the realization that the grass isn't always greener on the
other side. Henry Beacham, who complains despairingly of bureaucratic impediments
at Goddard Space Flight Center, recalls having worked for the Eastman Kodak
Company after World War II. "I wasn't married," he remembers; "I didn't know the
city, I was learning. So I used to like to stay at my desk. We had time cards. I had to
punch out. All of a sudden I found out my boss was having me justify my overtime,
so I learned that the thing to do was go punch out and come back to my desk." "I
know a lot of young people make a lot more money when they go out into
companies," concedes Marylyn Goode at Langley Research Center, "but I very often
feel that the working atmosphere in companies is sometimes not as good as it is
around here. And even the freedom -- you know, we have things we have to work
on, but there is a certain amount of freedom in how we do it."
With a doctorate in physics, now working on developing new programs for
computational fluid dynamics at Ames Research Center, Richard Lockwood dis-
tinguishes between the relative latitude of working in "fundamental" and "applied"
or project research; it is the engineers working in fundamental research who enjoy
the greater freedom to do what interests them. "We're expected to just go out and
try to push the frontiers back wherever we can," he explains, "and management tells
us which parts of the frontier they'd like to see pushed back." Lockwood's own boss
"isolates us pretty well, lets us do pretty much what we want. The freedom we get
and the support, in terms of equipment and facilities that we get make the job fun
enough that you can afford to give up the bigger salary" offered by industry.
NASA -- as experienced at Ames Research Center-- "has got to be one of the better
places for someone who wants to be a research person," thinks Abraham Bauer; the
agency "does give freedom to people ... to work up to their maximum capability.
And the problems are challenging."
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Another "research person" at Ames, Thomas Swain, adds: "We have an oppor-
tunity which may not be appreciated by some of the young engineers as much as it
should be, and that is [that] there are so many different things going on in the center,
so many different disciplines -- that [you havel the opportunity to look around,
if... the work that you're doing just isn't quite as exciting to you as what you see over
in that other building [and] ... to follow your bent within the organization. I've seen
a number of people do that with marvelous benefits to their careers, because they not
only get to follow what they're interested in, but by the time they've made a few
changes, they've broadened their background." Swain thinks that "there's a lot
more individual work done within NASA" than in industry; the larger proportion
of his own work is research he has chosen for himself.
Traces of the older culture of the in-house laboratory have also survived at
Marshall Space Flight Center, where Fred Hauser appreciates a "flexibility" and
"freedom" that he and others have experienced. "We have extremely talented,
ambitious, diligent people that are allowed to exercise their diligence and ambition."
If Sarah McDonald had her career to do over again, she would still work at Marshall,
where she has relished "the sense of independence, ability to do the work,
authority ... decision-making responsibilities, and freedom," all of which she
doubts she would have had working in industry.
There are even engineers who question the notion of bureaucratization's baleful
consequences. Willie Miller and Hank Smith at Kennedy Space Center deny that
they have been plagued by an excess of bureaucratic procedure, while Smith points
out, what has become increasingly true of much of the agency, that "NASA is really
a technical management organization." Part of Miller's and Smith's tolerance of
bureaucratic procedures may be due to the fact that they were interviewed after the
Challenger accident, one effect of which was serious criticism of NASA's safety
procedures. Thus does Derek Roebling even find merit in bureaucratization: "I think
the good part was [that one] of those things that came out of [the post Challenger
investigationl was the stronger emphasis Ion] and formation of separate safety
functions. I think those kinds of checks and balances are good."
The attributes of their NASA careers that have most inspired Philip Siebold and
Michael Goldbloom are attributes that do not readily succumb to a single, dramatic
failure. Still, Siebold's almost boisterous enthusiasm might have been somewhat
dampened had he been interviewed after the Challenger accident, and not before.
"I'm happy with NASA," declared Siebold from the vantage of pre-Challenger
Johnson Space Center; "it's been good to me. I've enjoyed it. I like what I do. I guess
the fact that we are the drivers, really, rather than the contractors. We're sitting at the
top of the table. So, let's face it, we all like power. And you have a little more power
if you're at NASA... we probably work harder than anybody. We're more dedicated,
hard driving. We never care how many hours we work, and what needs to be done,
we go out and do it."
Goldbloom offers a somewhat more philosophical appreciation than Siebold,
who exudes the "can do" attitude of NASA during the height of the Apollo program,
when Siebold worked with launch operations at Kennedy Space Center. Notwith-
standing a considerable loss of "esprit de corps" and bureaucratizaton, Goldbloom
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thinks that NASA's exploratory mission provides "intellectual content" to work that
could not be found in industry, which, he thinks, is generally the better employer.
Wherever engineers can still do hands-on work there is an "excitement" that comes
from "working in the new frontier areas of technology." For Goldbloom, innovative
engineering at NASA combines with "the sheer exploration ... that appeals to
Americans -- wanting to see what's on the other side of the hill, wanting to probe
the unknown, expanding man's vista to new frontiers" that has made NASA, in
Goldbloom's experience, a place "where for the most part it's a sheer joy to work."
Few of the engineers we interviewed allude to job security as a reason for staying
with NASA; and, in any event, it is arguable whether jobs are ultimately more secure
in the government, which has its own "reductions in force." On the other hand,
many an engineer's job was lost in the early 1970s post-Apollo letdown in the
aerospace industry. The only engineer who ou tright explained his choice of working
for NASA as the desire for a secure, government job is also the only engineer we
interviewed who remembers having been raised in a level of affluence that included
servants, nannies, and private tutors. For most of the engineers of the Apollo era,
establishing themselves in an engineering career was in itself an enormous achieve-
ment.
Beneficiaries of one of the great engines of social change -- war -- this
generation succeeded in crossing the great American divide between the working
class and the salaried middle class. Many did so consciously, purposefully choosing
engineering as their vehicle. Having done so, they became ready recruits in another
war, a war to preserve the bi-polar world that survived the conflagration of World
War II. Footsoldiers in John F. Kennedy's "world-wide struggle ... to preserve and
promote" American ideals against the "adversaries of freedom," these men and
women made careers in the midst of a battle to exploit technology in the peaceful
quest of American supremacy in the air and in outer space.
Before the end of that momentous decade in which the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the armies of the U.S. aerospace industry succeeded
in meeting Kennedy's challenge, the battleground had begun to shift under their
feet. The idealism with which the 1960s opened turned sour before the decade was
out. The era that began with the election of John F. Kennedy ended in the killing
fields of Cambodia and Viet Nam, on the pavement at Kent State University, and in
the corridors of Washington's Watergate hotel and office complex. I Success became
as much a matter of survival as of achievement, whether in politics or in organiza-
tional life-- both of which would have more to d o with the nature of these engineers'
careers than they could have imagined. The nation abandoned the battle for
supremacy in space, partly because it was never wholly clear what -- beyond
Apollo -- supremacy meant. Even though the Soviet Union began its virtually
continuous occupation of its orbiting space station Salyut in 1971, as of 1989 the
probability of a U.S. orbiting station being deployed in space by the mid-1990s was
by no means certain. No policy existed for the demobilization of the troops who had
fought in Kennedy's moral equivalent of war, men and women who were left
stranded to cope with the vast machinery of institutional survival.
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On the 20th anniversary of the Apollo landing, another president issued a call
for another great adventure in space: a return to the Moon and a human expedition
to Mars. But the magic of that earlier challenge is gone: the Challenger accident in
January 1986, the intractability of federal budgetary politics, and the confusion
surrounding the question of this country's future place in the world have produced
a growing policy debate about the purpose a nd means of a continuing American role
in space? Skeptics demur, and believers take heart, urging the nation to ensure once
again that a new generation of men and women well trained in science and
engineering will be both ready and inspired to risk their personal aspirations and
careers on another bold adventure beyond our planet.
On April 30, 1970 U.S. and South Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia to destroy
North Vietnamese staging areas. Four days later violence erupted during an anti-
war demonstration at Kent State University in Ohio, and National Guard troops
opened fire on students; four were killed and eleven wounded. On June 17,1972 five
men were arrested for breaking into the offices of the Democratic National Committee
in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. They turned out to have been
working for the Committee to Reelect the President (Richard M. Nixon). In 1974 the
House voted articles of impeachment against Nixon for White House efforts to
"coverup" its role in the break-in. Nixon resigned from office August 9 in anticipa-
tion of the House action. The Viet Nam war nominally ended with the signing of the
Paris Peace accords in January 27, 1973; the end of the U.S. military draft was
announced that same day, and the last U.S. troops left at the end of March.
2See, for example, Radford Byerly, Jr., ed., Space Policy Reconsidered (Boulder: Uni-
versity of Colorado, 1989).
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Appendix A
NASA Managers Solicited for Names of
"Representative" NASA Engineers
In 1984, Dr. Hans Mark, NASA Deputy Administrator, asked the following present
or former top NASA managers (letter of April 19, 1984) to provide the author with
names of "individual members" of "NASA's pioneering generation of aerospace
engineers" who, in their view, "reflect those characteristics which have typified
NASA during its first quarter century." Ms. Josephine Dibella, who served as
secretary to NASA's associate deputy administrator from 1959 to 1965, was also
asked by Dr. Mark to suggest names. Of the 42 persons of whom Dr. Mark made this
request, 25 responded, providing a total of 621 names. The named individuals
constitute the "nominee" group referred to in Appendix B, Demographic Tables. In
the following list, only the NASA management positions of highest rank are given
for each person listed.
NAME
Lew Allen
Robert O. Aller
John F. Clark
Edgar M. Cortright
Philip E. Culbertson
Josephine Dibella
William F. Ballhaus, Jr.
POSITION
Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (in 1984)
Associate Administrator, Office of Space Tracking and
Data Systems (in 1984)
Director, Goddard Space Flight Center, 1965-1976
Director, Langley Research Center, 1968-1975
Associate Deputy Administrator (in 1984)
Secretary to the Associate Deputy Administrator,
1959-1965
Director, Ames Research Center (in 1984)
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John W. Boyd
June Gibbs Brown
Burton I. Edelson
Stuart J. Evans
Robert R. Gilruth
Robert H. Gray
Donald P. Hearth
Noel W. Hinners
I. Jerry Hlass
S. Neil Hosenball
Roy P. Jackson
Harriet G. Jenkins
E.C. Kilgore
Robert L. Krieger
William R. Lucas
Frank B. McDonald
John J. Martin
Jesse W. Moore
John E. Naugle
C. Thomas Newman
William H. Pickering
Eugene D. Rosen
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Associate Administrator, Office of Management
(in 1984)
Inspector General (in 1984)
Associate Administrator, Office of Space Science and
Applications (in 1984)
Assistant Administrator for Procurement (in 1984)
Director, Manned Spacecraft Center, 1961-1972
Deputy Director of Launch Operations, Kennedy
Space Center (in 1984)
Director, Langley Research Center (in 1984)
Director, Goddard Space Flight Center (in 1984)
Director, National Space Technology Laboratories
(in 1984; in 1988 the NSTL was renamed the
John C. Stennis Space Center
General Counsel (in 1984)
Associate Administrator, Office of Advanced Research
and Technology, 1970-1973
Assistant Administrator, Office of Equal Opportunity
Programs (in 1984)
Associate Administrator, NASA Management
Operations, 1980-1981
Director, Wallops Flight Research Center, 1948--1981
Director, Marshall Space Flight Center (in 1984)
Chief Scientist (in 1984)
Associate Administrator, Office of Aeronautics and
Space Technology (in 1984)
Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight
(in 1984)
Associate Administrator, 1975-1977
Comptroller (in 1984)
Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1954-1976
Director, Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization (in 1984)
Deputy Administrator, 1965-1968
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Willis H. Shapley
Milton A. Silveira
Abe Silverstein
Richard G. Smith
Andrew J. Stofan
Ernst Stuhlinger
C. A. Syvertson
Norman Terrell
Patrick A. Templeton
Walter C. Williams
Associate Deputy Administrator, 1965-1974
Chief Engineer (in 1984)
Director, Lewis Research Center, 1961-1969
Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center (in 1984)
Director, Lewis Research Center (in 1984)
Associate Director for Science, Marshall Space
Flight Center, 1960-1975
Director, Ames Research Center, 1978-1984
Associate Administrator, Office of Policy (in 1984)
Associate Administrator, Office of External Relations
(in 1984)
Associate Director, Space Task Group, 1959-1962
(NASA Chief Engineer, 1975-1982)
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Appendix B
Demographic Tables
The following tables provide statistical summaries of the number of scientists and
engineers in NASA (in comparison to other categories of NASA employees from
1958-1970 (table 1), NASA Apollo era engineers' fields of specialization by training
(table 2) and NASA occupation (table 3), their ascent through civil service ranks
through 1980 (table 4), their educational levels (table 5), their average ages (table 6),
the number of years they have worked in NASA, and their ethnic and gender
distribution.
Table I is drawn from information in the NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968:
Vol. I: NASA Resources, NASA SP-4012 (Washington, D.C.) and "NASA Pocket
Statistics" for January 1971 (NASA History Office). Tables 2-8 were prepared from
data generated and analyzed in 1985 by the Personnel Analysis and Evaluation
Office at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Individuals represented by the category "Nominees" are the 446 verified cases
of the 621 names submitted by NASA senior managers in 1984 as those persons of
"NASA's pioneering generation of aerospace engineers" who most "reflect those
characteristics which have typified NASA during its first quarter century" (see
Appendix A).
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Appendix C
Education and Military Service of NASA
Apollo Era Engineers Interviewed
Institution and Highest Degree
Year entered Militar_
NACA/NASA service
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (BSAE)
Stanford University (MSE)
University of California, Berkeley
(BSME)
University of Montana
(BSCE)
Ohio State University (BSEd)
Cornell University (MSE)
Techniche Hochshule Berlin
(Ph.D.)
University of Virginia (MAE)
Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University (BS)
1938 No
1944 No
1945 Yes (USN)
1948 No
1948 No
1949 Yes (USAAF)
Yes
1952 (German Army)
1952 Yes (USA)
1953
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMEO
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Institution and Highest Degree
Year entered
NACA/NASA
Militar_
service
Purdue University (Ph.D.)
Case Western Reserve University
(Ph.D.)
University of Kansas (MSAE)
Stanford University (MSE)
Parks College (BS)
University of Alabama in Huntsville
(MBA)
Florida State University
(MBA)
University of Rochester
(MME)
California Institute of
Technology (Ph.D)
University of Alabama (BSE)
Cornell University (MSPhyCh)
University of Alabama (MSEd)
City College of New York
(BSME)
Auburn University
(Ph.D., Management)
Auburn University (BSCE)
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign (BSCE)
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (BSE)
Prairie View A&M University
(BSE)
1953
1957
1957
1958
1958
1958
1958
1959
1959
1960
1960
1960
1961
1961
1962
1962
1962
1962
No
No
Yes (USA)
Yes (USAF)
Yes (USAF)
Yes (USA)
Yes (USA)
Yes (USN)
(Peace Corps)
No
Yes (USA)
Yes (USAF)
Yes (USA)
No
Yes (USAF)
Yes (USA)
Yes (USN)
No
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Institution and Highest Degree
Year entered
NACA/NASA
College of William and Mary (MSPhys)
University of Texas at El Paso
(BSEE)
Emory University (BA, Mathematics)
University of Florida (BSE)
University of Naples (Ph.D)
North Carolina State University
(MA, Mathematics)
Stanford University (Ph.D)
The Johns Hopkins University
(BSE)
University of Michigan (MSAE)
Clemson University (BSME)
University of Virginia
(MSEPhys)
St. Joseph's College (BS)
Catholic University of America
(BS)
Louisiana State University
(MSME)
George Washington University
(Ph.D)
Cleveland State University
(BSEE)
University of Houston (Ph.D)
Notre Dame College (BSAE)
1962
1963
1963
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1965
1966
1966
1966
1966
1967
1967
1967
1968
1968
Militar_
service
No
Yes (USA)
No
Yes (USN)
Yes (Italian Army)
No
No
Yes (USA)
Yes (USN)
No
No
Yes (USAF)
No
Yes (USAF)
No
No
No
No
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Institution and Highest Degree
Year entered
NACA/NASA
Militar_
service
Texas Women's University
(BS, Mathematics)
New York University (BSAE)
Stanford University
(Ph.D)
Brooklyn College, City University
of New York (MSE)
Case Western Reserve University
(MAE)
Rice University (BSE)
1968
1968
1969
1970
1972
1972
No
Yes (USA)
Yes (USA)
Yes (USN)
Yes (USN)
No
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2001: A Space Odyssey, 48
Aberdeen Proving Ground, 23
Advanced Research Projects Agency, 70
Aerobee, 91
aerodynamics, supersonic, 64
aeronomy, 42
Aerospace Corporation, 163
airplane, model, 2, 12
Alabama Power Company, 3
Allen, H. Julian (Harvey), 62
Alvarin, Thomas, 176
American Rocket Society, 91
Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, 165
Ames Research Center, 19, 32, 50, 61,62,127,130,
135, 137, 146, 147, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161,169,
172, 174, 181,187, 188
Anders, William A., 107
Apollo 6, 107
Apollo 11, 51, 81,125, 162, 170
Apollo 7, 79
Apollo 13, 114
Applied Physics Laboratory, 90
Archimedes, 123, 125
area rule, 67, 68
Armour Institute of Technology, 6, 7
Armstrong, Neff, 13, 162
Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 4, 23, 78, 79, 82,
104, 117, 128, 134, 155, 177
Army Signal Corps, 91
Arnold Engineering Development Center, 8
Asheville, N.C., 43
Ashton, Richard, 39-42, 167, 170, 171,176
Astronuclear Laboratories, 94
Atlas, 68, 70, 78, 91
Atlas-Centaur, 115, 116
Auburn University, 79
AVCO Corporation, 8, 20, 65, 132
Aviation Week, 36
B-36, 103
Babcock and Wilcox, 80
Baltimore, Md., 15
Baltimore Polytechnic High School, 15, 16
Bartlesville, Okla., 7
Baton Rouge, La., 102
Bauer, Abraham, 60, 146, 147, 161,187
Beacham, Henry, 20-21, 25, 92-93, 117, 130, 139,
148, 168, 181
bearings, 69
Beckwith, Ed, 36-37, 130, 144, 145, 167, 177, 181,
183, 187
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, 91
Bendix Corporation, 11, 23, 68
Berlin, Germany, 13
Biloxi, Miss., 76
Birmingham, Ala., 79
Blackwell, Henry, 176
Bloom, Isaac, 128
Boeing Aircraft, 11
Booz-Allen Hamilton, 180
Borman, Frank, 107
boundary layer, 75
Brandeis, Louis D., 20
Brayton system, 71, 72
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Breakwell, John, 32
Bremerhaven, 8
Bronx High School of Science, 17
Brookhaven National Laboratories, 80
Brooklyn, N.Y., 9, 17, 18
Brooklyn College, 10, 18, 128
Brooklyn Polytechnic School, 19
Brooklyn Technical High School, 17, 18, 37, 38
Brown Engineering, 77
Browning, Sam, 79-82, 134, 138, 177
Buck Rogers, 3, 18
Bureau of Mines, 7
buzz, 64
California Institute of Technology, 13, 45, 69, 78
Cape Canaveral, 23, 36, 116, 162
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, 113
Cape Kennedy, 78
Carnegie Institute of Technology, 94
Carter, Jimmy, 137
Case Institute of Technology, 164
Case Western Reserve University, 38, 66
Cassirer, Bill, 64-66, 82, 127, 128, 131,139, 143,
166, 167, 169, 176, 182
catalysis, 110
Catholic University, 48, 49, 95
Centaur, 68, 70, 83
Centreville, Ala., 2
Challenger, 81,116, 178, 179, 180, 188, 190
Chance-Vought Aircraft, 103
Charlotte, N.C., 46
Chemstrand, 80
Chicago, Ill., 4, 29
Chrysler Corporation, 104
City College of New York, 38, 70
Clemson College, 112
Cleveland, Ohio, 109
Cleveland State University, 52, 109
Cohen, Ernest, 5-8, 25, 168, 172
Cold War, 82, 89, 162
Coleman, Morris, 35
College of the City of New York, 17
Collins, Ed, 46-47, 133, 142, 149, 167, 170, 176
composites, 70
computer pool, 43
computers, 73, 74, 75, 76, 98-100, 154-158
Connecticut Advanced Nuclear Engineering
Laboratory, 80
Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation
(Convair), 67, 68, 103, 104
contracting, 174-183
cooperative work-study program, 54, 69
Cornell University, 7, 64, 127
cryogenics, 69, 70
culture, institutional, 164-168
Cummings, Milton, 77
d'Annunzio, Gabriele, 93
Daimler, Gottlieb, 13
Davidson, Jim, 157, 159, 165, 166
Defense Reorganization Act, 163
Delta, 115, 116
Department of Transportation, 178
Depression, 2, 5, 6, 12, 25, 36, 102, 117
Destination Moon, 48
Diesel, Rudolf, 13
Doc Savage, 3
Dominic, Hans, 14
Donaldson, Pamela, 77, 107-109, 131,146
Douglas Aircraft, 77
Downey, Calif., 17
draftsman, 16
drag, 63, 68
Duke Power, 178
Duke University, 20, 25
Dussault, Paul, 29-33
East St. Louis, Ill., 35
Eastman Kodak, 21, 92, 187
Eddington, Sir Arthur S., 3
Edmondson, Woody, 36
Electronic Research Center, 32, 33, 111
Ellis Island, 8
Emory University, 97
erector set, 6, 14, 22
F-102, 67, 68
facilities engineers, 135
Ferri, Antonio, 64
Finch, Eleanor, 149, 180
Finn Engineering, 52
Florida Power, 23
fluid dynamics, 7, 50
Ford Aerospace, 115
Fort Belvoir, Va., 10
Fort Monmouth, N.J., 91
FORTRAN, 73, 75, 76
fracture mechanics, 70
gas dynamics, 95
Gemini project, 78, 108
General Dynamics, 68, 83
General Electric, 71
general schedule system, 137, 138, 139, 140
General Services Administration, 163
Georgia Institute of Technology, 67
GI bill, 7, 17, 23, 27, 54, 55, 129
Glenn, John H., 67, 75
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Goldbloom, Michael, 17, 25, 154, 156, 157, 160,
170, 188, 189,
Goddard, Robert H., 15, 78
Goddard Space Flight Center, 8, 21,33, 49, 91,92,
95, 96, 97, 101,117, 130,139, 147, 157, 168,172,
177, 181,182, 187
Goode, Marilyn, 39, 42-44, 135, 167, 187
Great Society, 154
Grumman Corporation, 114
Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, 78
Guggenheim Foundation, 25
Guided Missile Development Division, 80
Guidonia, Italy, 93
H-I engine, 104
Haise, Fred, 114
Hampton Institute, 43
Hampton, Va., 2, 19
Harvard University, 50
Hauser, Fred, 50-52, 127, 142, 170, 180, 188
heat sink, 66
heat transfer, 71
Heinlein, Robert A., 48
Herbert C. Hoover, 8
Hollywood, Calif., 11
Hoist, Gustav, 1
Houston, Tex., 17
Hubble, Edwin P., 100
Hubble Space Telescope, 100, 101
Hughes, 115
Hunsaker, Jerome, 2
Huntsville, Ala., 4, 15
Huntsville Industrial Center, 77
hydrogen bomb, 61
hypersonic flight, 62, 63, 66
hypervelocity flight, 65
IBM, 75, 76, 98
icing, 69
Illinois Institute of Technology, 6
instruments, aircraft, 7
International Council of Scientific Unions, 91
International Geophysical Year, 91
International Polar Year, 91
J-2 engine, 81
}-57 engine, 67
Jackson, Mich., 12
Jacksonville University, 29
Jansen, Sandra, 73-76, 156
jet aircraft design, 77
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 92, 159, 163
Johnson, Lyndon B., 153
Johnson Space Center, 17, 34, 52, 53, 82, 104, 105,
106, 107, 109, 113, 114, 131,138, 140, 141,144,
145, 148, 154, 171,172, 173, 178, 179, 188
Joliet Junior College, 76
Jones, Bob, 21-25, 144, 146, 160, 175
Juno, 78
Jupiter C, 91
Jupiter engine, 104
Jupiter missile, 4, 23, 78
Kennedy, John F., 153, 189
Kennedy, Robert F., 153
Kennedy Space Center, 11, 27, 29, 112, 113, 115,
128, 135, 140, 141,144, 148, 149, 160, 171,177,
178, 179, 180, 182, 188
Korean War, 30, 54, 103
Kubrik, Stanley, 48
Kuritzky, [saac, 25
Landsat, 92, 93
Landsat D, 100
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 165, 166, 167
Langley Research Center, 2, 19, 20, 26, 36, 37, 39,
41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 54, 61, 62, 64, 68, 82, 91,
106, 127, 130, 132, 133, 135, 139, 142, 144, 167,
t69, 170, 171,176, 181,182, 183, 187
Large Space Telescope, 100
Lawrence, E.O., 61,147
Le Bourget Air Field, 2
Leesburg, La., 107
Lewis Institute of Technology, 6
Lewis Research Center, 38, 45, 54, 65, 66, 69, 70,
71,73,134,135,138,140,144,145,149,156,157,
159, 164, 165, 167, 171, 175, 176, 182
Ley, Willy, 34
libration point, 31, 32
life support systems, 110, 111
Lindbergh, Charles, 1, 2, 12, 25
Lipshutz, Joe, 127, 128, 137, 155, 158, 166
Lithuania, 5, 8, 9
Lockheed Missile Systems, 18
Lockheed Missiles and Spacecraft, 32
Lockwood, Richard, 49-50, 187
Los Alamos, NM., 7
Los Angeles, Calif., 5, 18
Louisiana State University, 102, 103
Lovell, James A. Jr., 107
Low, George, 33, 38
Luftwaffe, 14
Lynchburg College, 37
Lynchburg, Va., 36
Manhattan Project, 7, 163
Manned Space Center, 91
213
NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo
manned space flight vs space science, 90, 101
Marcellus, 123, 124
Mariner 4, ]68
Marshall Space Flight Center, 4,15, 31, 32, 51, 77,
78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 101,104, 106, 113, 126, 134,
138, 142, 143,155,158, 170, 171,175, 177, 180,
183, 188
Martin Company, 16, 141,154
Martin, Hank,47-49, 96-97,135, 168, 172,173,182
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2, 13, 25,
111
matrix organization, 172, 173
McConnell, Robert, 138, 145, 165, 175, 182
McDonald, Sarah, 128, 155, 156, 158, 188
McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft, 35, 36
Mciver, William, 37-39, 66-67, 130, 132, 159, 164
medical technology, 107
Mercury project, 36, 68, 78
Mercury Rankine System, 72
Miami Beach, Fla., 10
Michoud Assembly Facility, 104, 105
Middletown, N.Y., 9
Miller, Willie, 188
MITRE Corporation, 150
Monsanto Chemicals, 80
Morton Thiokol, 80
Mueller, Elizabeth, 97-101,147
Multimission Modular Spacecraft, 100
NASA Headquarters, 39, 42, 83, 137, 145, 170,
178, 181,183
NASA Office of Space Science and Applications,
101,130
NASA Office of Space Sciences, 170
National Academy of Sciences, 91
National Bureau of Standards, 70, 175
National Defense Act, 55
National Die Casting, 7
National Endowment for the Humanities, 169
National Science Foundation, 126, 129, 169
National Youth Administration, 55
Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 21, 91, 92
Naval Research Laboratory, 21, 91, 92
Naval Reserve, 21
NAZI party, 2
NERVA, 94
New York City, 8
New York Stock Exchange, 112
New York University, 10, 25
Nimbus, 92, 93
Nixon, Richard M., 116
Norfolk State College, 41,42
North Andover, Mass., 1
North American Aviation, 159
North Carolina State University, 46, 47
Northeastern State College, 107
Northrop Corporation, 18
Notre Dame University, 34, 51
nuclear propulsion, 134
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 178
nuclear warhead testing, 80
nuclear-powered bomber project, 103, 104
O'Day, Matthew, 44-46, 69-70, 176
O'Neill, Dan, 2-4, 25, 158, 180
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 60, 161
Oberth, Hermann, 13
occupational classifications, 126
Office of Naval Research, 129, 169
Officer Candidate School, 4, 10
Ohio State University, 73
Oil City, Pa., 52
Olsson, Jack, 130, 137, 143, 157, 159
Oneonta, N.Y., 28
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 61
orbital mechanics, 69
Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, 99, 100,157
Orbiting Solar Observatory, 99
Orbiting Test Satellite, 115
ordnance Guided Missile Development Group,
15
Ostrach, Simon, 38
Ostrand, Robert, 140, 143, 144, 149, 157, 164, 171
Owen, Wilfred, 1
Parks College, 35
Peace Corps, 45
Peter Principle, 144
Petrovsky, Isaac, 8-12, 25
Pittsburgh, Pa., 21
Plutarch, 123, 124, 125, 136
Posen, Werner, 13-15, 25, 143, 149, 158, 170, 183
Pratt and Whitney, 80, 81,113
Project Mercury, 64, 91, 98
Project Vanguard, 92
projects v s progra ms,168-174
propulsion, 69
propulsion systems, 160
radiation heat transfer, 96
ramjets, 64
Rand Corporation, 31, 90, 150, 163
RCA, 50, 115
Reagan, Ronald W., 105, 111,178
Redstone Arsenal, 4, 15, 49, 162
Redstone engine, 104
Redstone missile, 23
reentry, 64, 65, 66
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relativity, theory of, 3
Remington Rand, 75
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 29
Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 4,10, 20, 25, 34,
80, 103, 129
Rice University, 53, 110
Robertson, John, 102-106, 117, 144, 148
Rochester, N.Y., 21
rocket propulsion, 81
rockets, 14, 15, 24, 34, 71,90
Rockwell Corporation, 17
Roebling, Derek, 128, 129, 140, 182, 183, 188
Ross, Stanley, 32
Sabado, Herman, 146
Salyut, 189
Sanders, Bettylou, 145, 172
Saturn I, 24
Saturn IB, 24, 79, 104
Saturn IC, 104
Saturn rocket, 81,107
Saturn V, 78
science fiction, 14
Scout, 116
Second Punic War, 123
semi-conductors, 47
Senior Executive Service, 137
sensitivity training, 145
Service Procurement Regulations, 163
Shepard, Alan B., 75
shock tube, 19, 62, 64, 65
Shuttle, 82, 105, 107, 109, 110, 111,116, 180
Siebold, Philip, 15-17, 25, 141,154, 179, 188
Sieger, George, 33-36, 54, 138, 140, 142, 143, 146,
173, 178, 179
Siemans, Ronald, 52-53, 109-111,171,179
simulator, orbital, 113, 114
SIRIO, 115
Skylab, 79, 107, 108, 111
Skyray, 77
Smith, Hank, 27-29, 128, 148, 179, 180, 188
Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 8
Solar Maximum Mission, 100
solar power system, 72
Songyin, John, 70-73, 134, 138, 167, 175
Space Age, 159
space medicine, 107, 108
space station, 53, 106, 111,161,171,172, 173, 177,
179
Space Task Group, 36, 91, 98
Space Telescope, 172
Space Transportation System, 81, 99, 105, 109,
173, 179
space vehicles, 16, 17, 53, 64
spacecraft coordinator, 115
specific impulse, 68, 69
Sperry Gyroscope Compa ny, 18, 160
Sputnik I, 31,159
St. Louis, Mo., 7
St. Petersburg, Fla., 21
St. Petersburg Junior College, 23
Stack, John, 167
Standard Spacecraft Computer, 99, 100
Stanford University, 32, 50
Stern, Charles, 18-20, 25, 64-66, 132,133, 145, 166
strain gauge, 70, 71
Strassen, Henry, 12-13, 25
stress analysis, 70, 71, 79
Strickland, David, 67-68, 132, 138, 173
Strong, Robert, 1-2, 12, 25, 130, 133, 141,142, 166,
183
structural analysis, 79, 83
Student Army Training Corps, 55
Super-Jupiter, 78
Supersonic Free Flying Wind Tunnel, 62
Sverdrup and Parcel, 7, 8
Swain, Thomas, 161,165, 169, 174, 188
Symphonie, 115
Syracuse University, 21
Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power, 71
Technische Hochschule, 14
tektites, 66
Tennessee Valley Authority, 60, 161
The Johns Hopkins University, 16
thermal analysis, 96
thermal design, 49
thermodynamics, 7
Thompson, Floyd, 167
Thompson, J.R., 81
Thor, 78
Thor-Delta, 99
Three Mile Island, 178
throttle settings, 103
Titan, 116
Titan III, 17
Titan missile, 65, 78
Toledo, Ohio, 33, 44
Toscelli, Frank, 93-96, 117, 124-125, 157, 168, 177
Torten, Joseph, 76-79, 82, 126-127, 143, 146, 148,
155, 156, 180, 181,183
Toussault, Paul, 130, 168, 172, 173, 177
trajectory analysis, 128
Treaty of Versailles, 78
Tsiolkovski, Konstantin, 78
Tufts University, 18
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U.S. Air Force, 34, 35, 67, 79, 80,102, ] 03, 116,163,
166
U.S. Air Force Reserve, 4
U.S. Army, 23, 30, 91,163, 174
U.S. Army Air Corps, 18, 19, 76
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 7, 29, 79
IJ.S. Department of Defense, 91
U.S. Naval Academy, 34
U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 31
U.S. Navy, 13, 17, 23, 29, 47, 67, 91,166
U.S. Office of Strategic Services, 93
UNIVAC, 74, 75, 76
University of Alabama, 3, 4, 128
University of California at Los Angeles, 31
University of Detroit, 44
University of Florida, 23, 27, 29
University of Houston, 107, 131
University of Illinois, 6, 31, 76
University of London, 32
University of Maryland, 95
University of Michigan, 12, 25, 67, 68, 164
University of Missouri, 60
University of Naples, 94
University of Pittsburgh, 94
University of Rochester, 21, 92
University of Tennessee, 61
University of Virginia, 19, 42, 49
University of Wichita, 7
Vanguard program, 21, 91
Veterans' Continuation School, 4
Vietnam War, 51, 54, 153
Viking, 78, 91
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 37, 49
Virginia State College, 43
yon Braun, Wernher, 4, 13, 14, 15, 34, 78, 80, 82,
162, 183
yon Hoffman, A.W., 13
yon Siemans, Werner, 13
Washington, D.C., 20
weapons analysis, 92
Webb, James E., 146
Westinghouse Airbrake, 94
Whitcomb, Richard T., 67, 68
White Oak, Md., 21
Whitebread, Dennis, 158
William and Mary College, 37
Williams, Richard, 112-117, 140, 141,148, 177
Willimantic, Conn., 18
wind tunnel, 8, 37, 62, 67, 73, 76
Woodbury, N.J., 48
World War 1, 55
World War II, 10, 14, 18, 19, 25, 26, 29, 33, 36, 37,
52, 53, 89, 90, 93, 117, 129, 174, 189
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, 176
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